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This thesis is a defense of the Content View on perceptual experience, of the idea that our 
perceptual experiences represent the world as being a certain way and so have 
representational content. Three main issues are addressed in this work. 
Firstly, I try to show that the Content View fits very well both with the logical behaviour of 
ordinary ascriptions of seeing-episodes and related experiential episodes, and with our pre-
theoretical intuitions about what perceiving and experiencing ultimately are: that preliminary 
analysis speaks for the prima facie plausibility of such a view. 
Secondly, I put forward a detailed account of perceptual episodes in semantic terms, by 
articulating and arguing for a specific version of the Content View. I provide arguments for 
the following theses: Perceptual content is two-layered so it involves an iconic level and a 
discrete or proto-propositional level (which roughly maps the seeing-as ascriptions in 
ordinary practices). Perceptual content is singular and object-dependent or de re, so it 
includes environmental objects as its semantic constituents. The phenomenal character of 
perceptual experience is co-determined by the represented properties together with the Mode 
(ex. Visual Mode), but not by the perceived objects: that is what I call an impure 
representationalism. Perceptual content is 'Russellian': it consists of worldly objects, 
properties and relations. Both perceptual content and phenomenal character are 'wide' or 
determined by environmental factors, thus there is no Fregean, narrow perceptual content. 
Thirdly, I show that such a version of the Content View can cope with the objections which 
are typically moved against the Content View as such by the advocates of (anti-intentionalist 
versions of) disjunctivism. I myself put forward a moderately disjunctivist version of the 
Content View, according to which perceptual relations (illusory or veridical) must be told 
apart from hallucinations as mental states of a different kind. Such a disjunctivism is 
'moderate' insofar as it allows genuinely relational perceptual experiences and hallucinations 
to share a positive phenomenal character, contrary to what Radical Disjunctivism cum Naïve 
Realism holds. 
Showing that the Content View vindicates our pre-theoretical intuitions and does justice of 
our ordinary ascriptive practices, articulating a detailed and argued version of the Content 
View, and showing that such a version is not vulnerable to the standard objections recently 
moved to the Content View by the disjunctive part, all that can be considered as a big, 
multifaceted Argument for the Content View. 
DEENDING THE CONTENT VIEW OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE  
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This is a dissertation about the Content View on perceptual experience – in 
particular, on visual experience – about the idea that perceptual experiences have 
representational content. Its global aim is that of arguing for a certain version of the 
Content View which can meet the desiderata of a satisfactory theory of perceptual 
experience, on the one hand, and which can be defended from the main criticisms 
that have been moved against it, specially from the disjunctivist part, on the other. 
This global aim is articulated in many different arguments, discussions and specific 
proposals, which develop into three big lines of inquiry. 
 
Firstly, I will show that the Content View fits well with ordinary ascriptions of visual 
episodes and visual experiences. Ordinary ways of talking about seeing and 
experiencing embed deep and pre-theoretical intuitions about what the ascribed 
episodes and states are, or at least seem to be. Capturing the commonsensical 
intuitions about the matter and making sense of the ordinary ways of talking about 
the matter, is a relevant virtue for a philosophical theory, even if it may well be that 
our pre-theoretical intuitions are wrong and our ordinary ways of talking are 
confused. From a methodological point of view, showing that the Content View 
respects and vindicates such pre-theoretical intuitions and ways of talking, is not an 
arbitrary celebration of vulgarity. Having such virtues does not amount to being true, 
of course, but still, a theory which has such virtues is, ceteris paribus, to be preferred 
to a theory which lacks them. So, showing that the Content View has these virtues 
counts as an argument to its plausibility, at least prima facie. 
 
Secondly, I will argue for a certain detailed version of the Content View, by 
discussing the main issues raised within the debate on the Content View, and I will 
take a stand toward each of these issues so to produce a systematic picture involving 
arguments and commitments concerning: the many types and layers of perceptual 
content, the semantic structure of perceptual content, the way objects and properties 
feature in perceptual content, the relation between phenomenal character and 
representational content, the externalism/internalism debate on perceptual content 
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and character, the issue about whether perceptual content is Fregean or Russellian. 
 
Thirdly, I will try to defend the Content View – after having spelled out a specific 
and detailed version of it – from the principal criticisms moved to it by the advocates 
of the recently revived Naïve Realism, based on a new form of radical disjunctivism 
about the relation between successful perceptions and deceptive perceptions. I will 
show that some of these criticism can be, so to speak, embedded into the Content 
View, far from defeating it. Indeed the version of the Content View I articulate is a 
form of moderate disjunctivism. But I will argue that some other criticisms, 
according to which the Content View should just be abandoned, can be addressed 
and coped with by the Content View. As a result, my specific version of the Content 
View is vindicated and is shown to be the most promising view in avoiding the 
problems that are pointed to by their opponents and wrongly considered by them as if 
they were problems weighing on the Content View as such. 
 
To organically develop these three lines of inquiry I will proceed as follows. 
The Chapter I is introductory. I systematically analyze the logically and semantically 
relevant features of ordinary ascriptions and self-ascriptions of visual episodes and 
experiences. Firstly, I propose a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
subject to be said to be seeing something, then I argue that such conditions are highly 
plausible. The logical behavior of seeing-ascriptions is analyzed, like 'S sees O', 'S 
sees an F'. Secondly, I move on to consider how seeing-that ascriptions behave and 
what seeing-that involve, in cases like 'S sees that P', 'S sees that a is F'. I individuate 
certain features of that ascriptive contexts (opacity, concept-involvement, 
propositionality, factivity) and argue that seeing-that is a fully fledged propositional 
attitude which amounts to coming to know by visual means. Then I consider seeing-
as ascriptions and their behaviour, expressed by a three-places relation as 'S sees a as 
an F'. Seeing-as is intermediate between object seeing and seeing-that, it presupposes 
the first and is presupposed by the second. I show that ascribing a seeing-as episode 
amount to ascribing a positive, recursive, vision-based recognitional disposition, and 
I discuss the relation between such ascriptions and the evaluability of such episodes 
as mistaken or accurate. 
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After having treated object-seeing (seeing X), propositional seeing (seeing that P) 
and recognitional seeing (seeing a as an F), I move on to consider the ascription of 
experiential predicates like 'looking', 'seeming' and 'appearing' in their different uses, 
roles, applications in ordinary sentences. In discussing specially look-ascriptions – 
helped by the relative literature – I make explicit the relations between the different 
senses in which a 'looking' may be ascribed, an epistemic sense (it looks to S as if a 
is F), a comparative sense (A looks like B), a phenomenological sense (“the penny 
looks elliptical to me from here”). I question the independence of a 
phenomenological use of 'looks'. Then I argue, by re-articulating a point already hold 
by Sellars, that 'looks F' conceptually and logically depends on 'is F'. 
Such a taxonomical survey is a way of getting into the matter of perception with a 
clearer grip on certain fundamental distinctions, both conceptual and terminological. 
As Austin opportunely suggested, for sure ordinary language is not the last word; yet, 
it is the first. 
 
In Chapter II I introduce the Belief-Theory of perception, and point out to some of its 
basic virtues. I start with introducing the Belief-Theory itself and locating it in the 
classical debate on perception between Sense-Data theorists, Direct Realists, and 
Adverbialists. By showing its advantages in treating perception in representational 
terms – beliefs are representations – I consider its difficulties, the philosophical ones, 
on the one hand, and the problems it encounters before some experimental evidences, 
on the other. The philosophical problems are related to its phenomenological 
inaptness, and to the different behaviour of perceiving something to be F from 
believing that something is F (the second being concepts-involving, entailing 
inferential sensitivity and demanding constraints on rationality). The experimental 
evidences I have focused on (Inattentional- and Change Blindness, Sperling 
Experiment, Visual Associative Agnosia, Optic Ataxia, Blindsight) variously suggest 
that there is seeing without noticing, seeing without believing and also belief-
acquiring through perception without perceptual experience, so perceptual 
experience cannot be reduced to belief-acquiring. 
 
In Chapter III, I will go on to introduce the Content View as a view that can embed 
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the virtues of the Belief-Theory – as a semantic, representational account of 
perception – without falling onto the philosophical and experimental weaknesses 
focused on above. The first crucial move is that of introducing the notion of non-
conceptual content and substituting it to the doxastic account involved in the Belief-
Theory. I argue that if perceptions are considered as non-conceptual representations, 
the Content View can avoid all the difficulties encountered by the Belief-Theory. A 
non-conceptual content is phenomenologically apt, does justice of the difference 
from O's visually looking F to S and S's believing that a is F (the last being concept-
involving, entailing inference-sensitivity and rational capacities on the part of S), and 
has no special problems before the experimental data (a nonconceptual 
representation is pre-doxastic, can occur without its content being believed, can 
outstrip conscious attention, and so on). Then, I take into consideration the relation 
between phenomenal character and representational content, to suggest that fineness 
of grain and unstructuredness of non-conceptual content can well do justice of 
perceptual phenomenology, which is profuse and rich of details in a way a doxastic 
state cannot be. I introduce the Peacocke's notion of Scenario Content as a very 
promising way of semantically characterize perceptual contents in a way which does 
justice of the distinctiveness of perceptual phenomenology. 
Afterward, I enucleate and briefly discuss some general reasons for favoring the 
Content View, namely, some of its fundamental explanatory virtues with respect to 
certain apparent features of perceptual experiences: Aspect, Absence, Accuracy, 
Aboutness. Since the Content View is in a position to account for such apparent 
properties – representations typically exhibit such features – it is a highly promising 
view worth taking very seriously. That is not a trivial point because, surprisingly 
enough, the Content View is very seldom argued for as such. Rather, it is 
presupposed and one or the other version of it is defended or attacked. 
Finally, I consider some interesting analogies with the Content View and the 
ordinary ways of ascribing seeing-episodes. The difference between 'seeing 
something' and 'seeing that' maps the difference between perceptually-
nonconceptually representing and coming to believe by visual means that things are a 
certain way. I will also argue that looking-ascriptions are consistent with the 
representational conception of perceptual experience, and that the Content View 
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vindicates our pre-theoretical intuition that our perceptual experiences can be 
veridical, partially illusory or totally illusory. No non-representational account of that 
intuitive matching/mismatching relation is available. 
 
Chapters IV and V are the core of the pars construens of that dissertation, where I 
get into the matter and positively articulate a certain version of the Content View 
(basing myself on the options made available in the current debate, of course). 
 
In Chapter IV, I firstly (Section 1) argue for a two-layered view of visual content. 
Beyond the Scenario Content, which is specified by ways of filling out the space 
around the perceiver and it is made out of spatial-chromatic-morphological 
properties, another semantic layer is to be introduced, the proto-propositional 
content. With Peacocke, I argue that the Scenario Content cannot capture all there is 
in perceptual representation, in particular certain acts of property-recognition which 
can be present or absent without that the Scenario Content changes. I show that the 
necessity of introducing a perceptual proto-propositional content between the 
Scenario Content and the doxastic content of perceptual beliefs maps the pre-
theoretical necessity, testified in ordinary ascriptive practices, to distinguish object-
seeing from seeing-as and both of them from seeing-that. Indeed, seeing-as 
ascriptions basically ascribe visual episodes with proto-propositional content. With 
respect to that, I criticize Dretske's theory of seeing, which distinguishes simple 
seeing and epistemic seeing and does fatally overlook the intermediate level of 
seeing-as, or recognitional seeing. Without the position of that level, the semantic 
and epistemological transition from object-seeing to visually-based propositional 
knowledge remains an unaccountable mystery. 
Secondly (Section 2) I argue for the object-dependency and singularity of visual 
content, so against the Generality Thesis hold by Searle, McGinn and others. On my 
view, a visual experience is individuated by a Subject, a Content (upper case) 
composed by a perceived Object and by a set of represented properties (the content, 
lower case), a perceptual Mode. I show that the Generality Thesis must be false, so 
the Singularity thesis must be true. Visual perception involves particulars into its 
Content, so visual Contents are de re, demonstrative Contents. Then I profile the big 
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puzzle that the Singularity Thesis opens with respect to hallucinatory contents, since 
hallucinations does not have worldly particulars as constituents of their putative 
contents: I have labeled it the Semantic Gap Problem, but I treat it systematically 
only in the last Chapter (Chapter VI, Section 2.5). 
In Chapter V I firstly (Section 1) argue for an impure representationalism about 
phenomenal character. On this view, the phenomenal character of a conscious 
perception is made out of represented properties, but represented under a Mode (ex. 
the Visual Mode). So on my view there is a dependence-without-reduction, rather 
than an identity, between the phenomenal and the intentional, between character and 
content. In particular, the Object does not determine the phenomenal character (that 
is why a hallucination can share its character with a veridical perception), which is 
instead determined by the content (lower case) plus the Mode. 
To argue for such an impure representationalist account of phenomenal character, I 
start by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. That phenomenon 
seem to show that there can be a change in 'look' without a change in represented 
properties, for example if you tilt a coin it will 'look' elliptical but it will keep 
looking to be round. I reply that perceptual constancy does not speak against 
representationalism, because the orientation of the penny is represented in vision, so 
something does change in the represented properties. No phenomenal change without 
representational change. Although, I suggest that the phenomenology involved in 
perceptual constancy does show that perceptual experiences are egocentric, 
perspectival representations of the world. It may be thought that the fact that in 
perception egocentric contents are represented explains the perspectival 
phenomenology of visual experience. But egocentric contents (representations of 
very relations between the world and the perceiver) can only partially account for the 
egocentric character of visual experience. I argue that in order to exhaustively 
account for the egocentric character of visual experience we need to appeal also to 
the Mode, besides the egocentric content. The world is represented under a Mode, 
and it is the Mode, that which makes the experience able to represent egocentric 
contents. Visual representation is perspectival in a way which goes beyond it's 
representing our perspective on the world. Rather, both the world, and our contingent 
perspective on it are perspectivally represented. Thanks to the Mode, perceptions 
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represent the world 'from here'. 
Following on from this, I consider the Inverted Spectrum Hypothesis and the 
Inverted Earth Thought Experiment as potential objections to representationalism. I 
show that the Inverted Spectrum scenario, at a closer inspection on how our color-
experience holistically involves interwoven relations between color-properties 
(brightness, hue, saturation), is less conceivable than it prima facie appears. Since 
each color has a place into a virtual three-dimensional space with brightness, 
saturation and hue as coordinates, inverting two colors would ruin all the other 
representable relations between colors. I also analyze Block's Inverted Earth thought 
experiment and argue that it does not show that representationalism is false, unless 
you already take it that representationalism is false: in other words, it is an interesting 
argument to make our intuitions explicit, but it is circular at the end. I accept that the 
conjunction of representationalism about phenomenal character and externalism 
about perceptual content entails phenomenal externalism. Since I hold both 
representationalism (though impure) and content-externalism, I must accept 
phenomenal externalism, even though it is counter-intuitive (once, also content-
externalism sounded outrageous). So I commit to phenomenal externalism. 
In Section 2 I examine a very important issue for the Content View, so to complete 
my global picture of the semantic characterization of perceptual episodes, the issue 
of whether perceptual content is Fregean or Russellian in nature. I discuss Chalmer's 
Double Content View, the proposal that perceptual experience has two kinds of 
content, one Russellian and the other Fregean. Chalmers aims at saving phenomenal 
internalism and content-externalism by distinguishing a Fregean narrow content, on 
which phenomenal character supervenes, and a Russellian, wide content. The 
Fregean content would be specified, for example, as [the property which normally 
causes the phenomenal property F], the Russellian content would be what normally 
causes that phenomenal property in the subject's environment. I provide many 
arguments against that proposal. Firstly, that 'normal causation' enters into the 
perceptual content is implausible. Perceptual contents are not so sophisticated; 
moreover, it does not seem at all that visual phenomenology includes the 
representation of properties like 'being normally caused by' something. Perceptual 
content should be ascribed in a way that respects perceptual phenomenology. 
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Secondly, Chalmers assumes that a phenomenal property can be picked out 
independently on any worldly represented property, but that possibility is far from 
pacific. In addition, I show that such a possibility would entail a separation (a totally 
contingent relation) between phenomenal character and representational content, so 
that view inherits the same problems typical of the qualia-realism. Such a separation 
does not do justice of the transparency of visual phenomenology either, which 
attributes to things the properties we are aware of, not their normal causes. 
In addition, reference to 'normality' and/or appropriateness of causation is highly 
problematic. Any normality-clause on causation implicitly refers to an environment, 
but then the Fregean content is not narrow anymore. I show that there is no normality 
which is not environment-indexed, so that there is no narrow normality. If there was 
a Fregean content of perception, it would be wide, so we better get rid of it and hold 
on a wide, external, Russellian content. Chalmer's third way is flawed. 
I conclude that perceptual content is Russellian and Wide, (impure) 
representationalism about phenomenal character is true, so phenomenal character is 
wide and phenomenal externalism is true. 
 
In Chapter VI I will take at face value the objections to the Content View typically 
made by those disjunctivists who advocate Naïve Realism. 
Firstly (Section 1) I take into consideration the core-idea of Disjunctivism, and the 
principles it  rejects. Then I present the reasons disjunctivists provide against the 
Content View: I hold that these reasons (phenomenological, epistemological, 
semantical, metaphysical) are all amenable to what I call the Detachment Problem. It 
seems that, on the Content View, a veridical perceptual experience must be 
conceived of as separated from the world, characterizable and type-individuated 
independently on its being a genuine relation to the world. Indeed if perceptual 
experiences are individuated by their semantic properties or contents, and the content 
they possess is possessed independently on being exemplified or not, then veridical 
experiences and hallucinations should be states of the same kind, and not even the 
first can be thought of as an essentially world-involving state. Here are the basic 
facets of the Detachment Problem. Perceptual phenomenology is presentational 
(phenomenological facet), perceptual knowledge entails that veridical experiences 
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make available to us not just that which also hallucinations make available to us, on 
pain of skeptic consequences (epistemological facet), perceptual beliefs and 
judgments can be de re and anchored to the world only if perceptual experience is a 
direct presentation of worldly particulars (semantic facet), if veridical experiences 
are genuine manifestations of the world they cannot be mental states of the same 
fundamental kind as hallucinations (metaphysical facet). 
Secondly (Section 2), I argue for a moderately disjunctive version of the Content 
View, a version which should embed the demand of Cognitive Contact raised by the 
disjunctivists and so avoid the Detachment Problem is all its facets. I argue that there 
is a conceptual, explanatory and metaphysical asymmetrical dependence between the 
Bad case and the Good case: disjunctivists are right in taking the Good case as basic 
and in characterizing the Bad case in terms of the Good case. 
I argue that, from a naturalistic point of view, mental states are to be type-
individuated according to their natural functions. I suppose that a teleo-semantic 
version of the Content View is true. Rather than arguing for its truth (I would have 
needed another dissertation), I show that such a view could meet the demands and 
the worries raised by disjunctivists, especially with respect to the Good/Bad 
asymmetrical dependence. Moreover, such a view would provide a naturalistic 
explanation of that asymmetry. A wired-in teleo-function is acquired through 
evolutionary selection thanks to its success, and is thus defined by reference to its 
successful exercises, so that its failed exercises are essentially a failure of the 
function they are exercises of. Although, if perceptual states are teleo-functional 
states, a veridical experience and a deceptive experience will share their function of  
representing the environment a certain way, even if one is a successful exercise and 
the other is not. So, a teleo-functional type-individuation of mental states rules out 
radical disjunctivism, insofar as it predicts that veridical and non-veridical 
perceptions have relevant properties in common.  
Nonetheless, I argue that we should buy a disjunctive treatment having hallucinations 
and perceptual experiences (veridical or illusory) as disjuncts, rather than contrasting 
veridical and deceptive experiences. Veridical perceptions and illusions are genuine 
relations to the world, they are world-involving states with de re, object-dependent 
Contents, whilst hallucinations are not relational states but states which 
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introspectively seem to be what they are not, namely, relational states. Disjunctivists 
are right in thinking that subjective indiscriminability is not sufficient for sameness 
in kind – it is not sufficient for sameness in Content either – they are right in thinking 
that for two mental states to have the same proximate causes is not sufficient for 
these states to be of the same mental kind. Indeed hallucinations are objectless states 
even if they could have the same proximate causes as perceptions (veridical or 
illusory), whereas perceptual experiences (accurate or not) are essentially relational 
states involving a worldly object as a target. 
Successively (Section 3) I treat two related apparent problems for the Content View, 
which I call Item Awareness Problem and Semantic Gap problem. The first addresses 
the question of what we are aware of when hallucinating, the second addresses the 
question of how hallucinations can be inaccurate states as they intuitively seem to be, 
if they lack an object the represented propreties could match or mismatch. About the 
first problem, I rule out the Meinongian proposal according to which hallucinations 
have non-existent particulars as genuine objects. I argue that, besides the ontological 
extravagance of the idea of objects having the bizarre property of not existing, if it 
was so, then hallucinations were be a priori true. Indeed, the hallucinated pink rat is 
pink, although it does lack existence, but in this way not only is the inaccuracy of 
hallucination not vindicated, it even becomes impossible. Then I consider a more 
promising option, on which in hallucination we are aware of structured complexes of 
uninstantiated properties (Property-View), even if we wrongly seem to be confronted 
with particulars. After raising some perplexities about that proposal, I consider a 
more radical alternative to it, namely, the idea that in hallucinating we are not aware 
of anything, neither of particular nor of properties (No Item View). For that view, the 
conscious character of our state depends on the Mode and on represented properties, 
but a conscious state's representing certain properties does not entail that state's 
involving the awareness of these properties. I do not adjudicate between the 
Property-View and the No Item View, rather I points to virtues and weaknesses of 
both but I conclude that one of them must be true. I also point that the Item 
Awareness problem is not a special problem of the Content View but it is shared by 
any other views on perception, so it cannot be adduced against the Content View. 
Anyway, the second issue of the Semantic Gap of hallucinatory contents is 
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independent on the option we prefer between the Property-View and the No Item 
View. In both cases we would not be aware of particulars, so no worldly object can 
work as a truth-maker or as an accuracy-maker for hallucinatory states. My treatment 
of the problem consists of dropping the intuition of inaccuracy of hallucinations and 
at the same time trying to explain its origin and its apparent force on us. 
Hallucinations are not inaccurate states, rather they are only states which seem to be 
about worldly particular and seem to have accuracy-conditions, but they are neither 
accurate not inaccurate. The intuition to the contrary depends on hallucinations' 
having immediate cognitive effects which are inaccurate, so that we tend to project 
their inaccuracy (of beliefs or belief-like states) onto the hallucinations which 
normally produce them. 
After this, I go back to the original Detachment Problem and show that the Content 
View can avoid it. The presentational phenomenology, the justificatory power of the 
veridical perceptions, the possibility of having demonstrative thoughts about the 
surrounding world, and the relational metaphysics of veridical perceptions, all that 
can be vindicated by my version of the Content View. 
 
Let us begin our adventure into the Content View then! 
 
 1 




This chapter is divided into five sections.  
Section 1 is introductory and presents the general aim of the chapter, which is that of 
producing a taxonomical survey of the ordinary ascriptions of episodes of “seeing” 
as well as of episodes of seeing-experiences like “seeming”, “appearing”, “looking”. 
In Section 1 the methodological sense of such a survey on ordinary language is also 
made clear. Although my central concern is the perceptual phenomenon as such 
rather than the typical ways it is ordinarily characterized in everyday language, 
nevertheless an analysis of the logical behaviour of ordinary ascriptions of perceptual 
experiences seems to be a privileged starting-point to make explicit at least our basic 
intuitions concerning the phenomenon itself. Maybe a substantial theory of seeing 
and perceptual experiencing will correct or even eliminate the intuitions underlying 
those ascriptive uses, but there is no other way to start shaping a positive theory than 
previously articulating its putative objects as they are prima facie manifest. To recall 
an Austinian saying, although ordinary language is not the last word, still it has to be 
the first
1
. Addressing the preliminary question: “What do we ascribe, when we 
ascribe an episode of seeing (or !-ing)?” at least can shed light on the much more 
relevant question: “What does seeing (or !-ing) consist of?”. 
In Section 2 a list is drawn up of necessary and sufficient conditions for an ordinary 
seeing-ascription to be true in non-abnormal contexts. Secondly, the logical behavior 
of basic seeing-X-ascriptions is analyzed, when the verb is used as an objectual 
attitude without clauses, according to the simple two-places scheme “S sees (an) O” 
like “Fido sees a tree”, “Diego sees a table”, and the like. 
Section 3 concerns the ascriptions of seeing-that cases, which behave like 
propositional attitudes, according to the scheme “S sees that P”, “Diego sees that the 
table is brown” and the like. I argue that such ascriptions are factive and logically 
opaque just like propositional attitudes are, but they are not just ascriptions of 
perceptual episodes. Rather they are ascriptions of a certain empirical  propositional 
                                                
1 See Austin 1961. 
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knowledge acquired as a consequence of a perceptual episode. 
Section 4 takes into account seeing-as ascriptions, i.e. ascriptions of a sui generis 
three-places relation – S sees O as (an) F – whose logical behaviour is irreducible to 
either the objectual seeing-O or the propositional seeing-that-P. Such ascriptions are 
neither factive nor logically transparent, and presuppose the ascription of a certain 
“cognitive stand” by the perceiver, like a recognition or a categorization of some 
sort. I will argue that that is the only ascriptive context where the perceptual mistake 
can come into play. Neither seeing-O episodes as such – unless it is a constituent of a 
seeing-as episode – nor seeing-that episodes can be uncorrect, false, mistaken and 
the like. Either you see an O or you don't, you just cannot falsely see an O (given ex 
hypothesi that we are not talking about seeing the O as something). Likewise, you 
cannot falsely see that P, because that is a factive ascription just like “knowing”. The 
reciprocal relations between such three distinctive ascriptions (seeing O, seeing O as 
an F, seeing that O is F) will be carefully articulated. 
Section 5 will change the focus from the seeing-predicate to some basic experiential 
predicates such as “seeming”, “appearing”, “looking”. They will be considered as 
they behave in paradigmatic ascriptive constructions like “seeming-that”, “looking-
like”, “looking-as-if”, “looking-as-though”, “appearing-that”, and the like. Such 
verbs do not just ascribe perceptions (as “sees”, “hears”, “smells” do), they ascribe 
conscious perceptual experiences. As in the previous cases, I will critically discuss 
the relative literature on the matter.  
At the end of the chapter, I will provide a summary of the results of each section and 
I will state such results into concise points. 
 
Section 1 – A Methodological Remark 
What do we ordinarily ascribe when we ascribe or self-ascribe an episode of seeing 
something, a case of seeing that something is such-and-such, an episode of seeing 
something as something? What do we ascribe to S or to us when we say that it seems 
to S (or to us) that such-and-such is the case, when we say that an O looks F to me, 
that this O appears F to her, or when we say that this looks like that, and so on? 
Some could find it plausible to think that visual perceptions and visual experiences 
are to be typed under natural kinds. Aren't those phenomena distinctive byproducts 
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of the biological evolution of certain animal species? So that it may well be that the 
rough and intuitive individuation-criteria applied by those ascribing them, actually 
pick out a cluster of different phenomena whose ordinary grouping do not genuinely 
“track” the objective division into natural kinds. Maybe the superficial properties 
exhibited by the ordinary referents of “seeing”-episodes' ascriptions are not shared 
by other genuine cases of seeing. Maybe very different natural kinds occasionally 
happen to be the referent of people's ascription of seeing. If that was the case, only 
scientists of vision (for example) would know the real reference and the genuine 
extension of the term “seeing”, whilst ordinary people would just be able to vaguely 
fix the reference through attaching the meaning of the term to a cluster of manifest, 
superficial and non-essential properties
2
. Just as a speaker can successfully refer to 
water without knowing at all the nature of water (be it H2O), so a speaker can 
successfully master and apply terms like “seeing”, “visually experiencing” and the 
like, without having to know the nature of the phenomena she ascribes. Be it the case 
or not, even that view would not per se entail the uselessness of a systematic 
consideration of the ordinary uses as well as of the related shared intuitions 
underlying these uses. Generally speaking, any explanation must have the 
individuation of an explanandum as its inevitable starting-point. In order to 
meaningfully ask, for example, “what is seeing?”, the very question must make sense 
before the answer (the explanans) has been obtained, before coming to know what 
seeing is. What are we asking “what is it” about, if not about the manifest 
phenomenon we can intuitively pick out as folk speakers in the first place? Even if 
discovery of the nature of X can feedback on the starting characterization and reveal 
it as flawed (confusing, naïve, illegitimate, to be abandoned), nonetheless its status as 
a starting-point of the inquiry was still a precondition of the final cognitive success. 
So a reconstructive taxonomy of the basic ways of ascribing visual perceptions and 
experiences, a survey on the related vocabulary, are methodologically useful at least 
in order to make explicit our unreflected intuitions on the matter. Although the ways 
certain paradigmatic expressions behave in ordinary language should not be 
considered as normative to establish the way things are
3
, still a reflective analysis of 
                                                
2 That is, at least, the Kripke-Putnam theory about the reference of natural kind terms. See Putnam 
1975. 
3 That was the “quietist” way the some Oxford linguistic philosophers seemed to consider their 
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those ways could successfully orient and prepare the substantial inquiry as its 
preliminary rough material. 
 
Section 2 – Seeing something 
2.1 – Basic Conditions 
We consider cases of seeing as perceptual episodes occurring to a subject in an 
environment. “Seeing” is a determinate of the determinable “perceiving” (as 
“hearing”, “tasting” and so on). Are there necessary and sufficient conditions for 
truly ascribing to S an episode of seeing something? Which contexts and 
circumstances are ordinarily, implicitly taken to entitle a speaker to say her or 
someone else is seeing something? First of all, seeing-something is a certain sort of 
real dyadic relation involving a perceiver and an environment as relata. Here is a list 
of trivial conditions for seeing-X: 
S sees X iff a) S is a perceiver with a visual apparatus b) X is there in the S's 
surrounding environment c) Through the very episode S discriminates X in some 
way from the environment d) X causes the very episode of S's seeing X e) Such a 
discrimination must involve a presentation with a phenomenological salience, it must 
give rise to a “looking” or a “seeming”. 
You cannot see X if you are blind or do not possess a perceptual visual apparatus. 
You cannot see X unless X is not there. You cannot see X if you do not discriminate 
it in any way from its surrounding environment. You cannot see X if X does not 
provide any causal contribution to your seeing it, and you cannot see X unless X 
looks some way to you. On the other hand, if you have a working visual apparatus, 
and X's impact on it causes your discrimination of X in such a way that X looks 
some way to you, all this is intuitively sufficient for you to be seeing X. In short: 
Seeing (X) is a certain episode consisting of a discrimination-relation between a 
perceiver and an environmental object, where the object is causally responsible of its 
being discriminated through appropriately impacting on the subject's visual 
apparatus, in such a way that the object looks to S a certain way. a) captures the 
trivial reference to eyes implicitly involved in the very mastery of the folk seeing-
concept. b) captures the so-called implicativity of seeing: “S sees O” presupposes that 
                                                                                                                                     
language-analyses. For example, see Malcolm 1942, Moore 1962. 
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O is there to be seen (differently from “S wants O”, for example) c) depends on that 
seeing is a success verb
4
, as other perceptual verbs are. Perceiving something is 
certainly a kind of cognitive achievement, the occurrent exercise of a dispositional 
capacity to achieve a certain positive state. d) is meant to capture what has been 
notoriously emphasized by the causal theories of perception
5
: Perceptions are 
episodes appropriately caused by the perceived environment itself. Perception can 
provide a form of contact with the world insofar as it consists of a certain sort of 
world-to-subject causal impact. e) involves that object-seeing has some minimal 
phenomenological constraints, to the effect that in understanding “S is seeing X” 
uttered in non-abnormal contexts, a speaker is entitled to take it that there is a way X 
looks to S. 
 
2.2 Some Objections 
Now I will consider some possible objections to those proposed conditions for S to 
be seeing something, and I will briefly reply to them. 
A way of raising doubts on the a-condition could be to appeal to the well-known 
experiments of prosthetic vision which realizes cases of “vision-through-touch” 
(Bach-y-Rita 1972), reported and discussed by Dennett
6
 among others. A device 
involving a small low-resolution video-camera is mounted on eye-glass frames, so 
that the signal from the camera – an array of black-and white pixels – is spread over 
the back or the belly of the subject in a grid of vibrating tinglers. Surprisingly, the 
subject becomes able to interpret the patterns of these tingles on her skin after a few 
hours of training, for example she recognizes a face, identifies objects, and so on. Is 
she seeing those objects despite no eye is involved? Let us assume that it is a case of 
vision. First of all, we should consider that a part of the prosthetic device – the 
camera – may be taken as an artificial visual apparatus. After all, it is causally 
sensitive to light-waves and carries a signal consisting of a certain distribution of 
gradients of light-energy, just like biological retinas and animal eyes. Therefore, the 
“no eyes-no vision” principle embodied in condition a is respected. Secondly, the 
                                                
4 Ryle 1949, Austin 1962, Armstrong 1968. 
5 See Grice 1961, Strawson 1974, Lewis 1980. 
6 See Dennett 1991, 337-344. On tactile-vision substitution systems (TVSS) see also Back-y-
Rita/Kercel 2003. 
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capacity of seeing-with-touch comes with a training that necessarily involves the 
exercise of canonical vision in order to match a certain tactile information with a 
certain visible scene. So, such a capacity is parasitic on proper vision and can be 
ascribed only to subjects endowed with a working visual apparatus. Thirdly, it is no 
surprise that such an artificial integration of our natural, biological capacities could 
constitute a borderline case (both of vision and of touch), but the existence of 
borderline cases does not undermine canonical demarcations. Finally and most 
importantly, at this stage of our inquiry we are talking about the ordinary concept of 
seeing and its folk-application in normal contexts. We do not learn to master the 
concept seeing and to ascribe cases of seeing-something by being shown such 
abnormal contexts like prosthetic tactuo-vision. If a speaker would not know that 
seeing something presupposes using one's eyes, we just would not ascribe to that 
speaker the mastery of the concept seeing as well as of the respective word “seeing”
7
. 
Maybe there can be dark samples of H2O, maybe that unusual circumstance should 
be known by a scientist who claims to know the nature of water – the real reference 
of “water” – nonetheless the ordinary concept of water involves transparency as a 
superficial, reference-fixing property.  
Condition b could raise perplexities insofar as some ascriptions of seeing-X cases. 
For instance, where X is known to be not there, like “Mary sees phantoms”, “Even if 
he's in front of his wife, Mister P. keeps seeing a hat”. To address this objection, we 
should consider that apparently simple seeing-X ascriptions can be elliptic 
ascriptions of more complex cases, like cases of seeing-as or seeing-that, which we 
will carefully treat below. Mister P does not just sees a hat, rather he does not see a 
hat at all. He sees his wife as a hat, he mistakes his wife for a hat actually. So, the 
above case is a case of seeing-as, not a basic case of seeing something simpliciter. 
Likewise, Mary cannot see any phantom unless there is a phantom there to be seen. 
Rather, Mary sees something that look to her as if it was a phantom, or she 
hallucinates a phantom and falsely takes her subjectively seeing-like experience as an 
episode of seeing. In both cases, Mary just believes she sees phantoms but she 
                                                
7 I am making the plausible assumption that ascribing the mastery of a certain word in ordinary-
language contexts is sufficient for the mastery of the relative concept. A subject's using, 
understanding and correctly applying the word “water”, is a sufficient evidence for crediting the 
subject with the concept of water. 
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doesn't. Harman distinguishes “seeing” (implicative) and “seeing*” (intentional)
8
: 
Whilst seeing is implicative and presupposes the existence of the seen object, seeing* 
can have non-existents as complements, like “Jack sees a unicorn”. As we have 
noticed, though, what Harman stipulates to call seeing* is a use of “seeing” which is 
not the simple one we are talking about here. The very fact that he needs to introduce 
a special stipulation (*) entails that he is not talking about the ordinary application of 
seeing-something ascriptions. Furthermore, the fact that sentences like the above one 
can sound fine and in order, should not mislead us. The superficial grammatical form 
of “seeing-X” can hide the contraction of more complex ascriptions. By 
nominalizing the complement I can treat any form of seeing as a case of object-
seeing: “S sees the train's stopping at the station at 8 o' clock”, “S sees the difference 
between a phantom on his right and a unicorn on her left”, and so on. But now we are 
treating object-seeing in a more specific sense, where “object” is not meant either in 
such an abstract way or in a superficially grammatical sense
9
. As Heil remarks
10
, 
when an episode of seeing-X is ascribed, the X-complement can be meant to express 
either the object or the content of the ascribed perceptual episode. Up to now we are 
considering the object rather than the content, so we are interested in the direct 
complement of seeing on the objectual interpretation. For example, one can ask: 
“Can you see the boat there in the distance?” meaning by that: “Can you recognize a 
boat in that, which you are seeing?” That would be a case of seeing-as, not just a 
case of seeing-X. Likewise, we are not concerned with cases where “X” is a 
propositional clause, be it nominalized or not: “I saw the cat running away from a 
dog” is not just an example of object-seeing, at least under the most natural 
interpretation of it, because it is a case of seeing a fact having one or more objects as 
its constituents (see below). Some think that perceptions have certain objects in 
virtue of having certain contents. Be it the case or not, perceptual object and 
perceptual content should not be confused
11
, not even in analyzing ordinary 
                                                
8 Harman 1990, 36ff. On the intentionality of seeing, see Anscombe 1965, Travis 2011. 
9 Dretske 2000a, 117, refers to that as to the difference between “concrete” and “abstract” objects of 
seeing abstract objects of seeing are grammatical objects as abstract noun phrases (seeing the bus 
arriving, seeing the difference, the number, the answer), interrogative nominal clauses, and so 
forth. 
10 See Heil 1991, p. 9. 
11 As we will see, even though all take it that perceptions have objects, many philosophers think that 
perceptions do not have content at all, namely, that the very notion of content is misleading as 
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ascriptions. As we will see, the typical basic scheme for perceptual content 
ascriptions is: S perceives: [O's being F], namely, an object' having a property
12
. But 
now it is object-seeing, that is our focus, not the content of seeing. So far so good. 
Condition c – call it discrimination-condition – could sound very ambiguous at the 
first sight. What does (visually) discriminating consist of? An objection to c, for 
example, could be that one can well see X without noticing it, so without consciously 
discriminating it from the environment. That could happen because of tiredness, lack 
of attention, rapid disappearance of the stimulus
13
, bad conditions of visibility and so 
on. “He saw it, but he did not discriminate it” is a quite common and intelligible 
sentence. As a first reply to that, we should point out that seeing an F does not 
involve discriminating it as an F, recognizing it, noticing it, taking it that there is an 
F there, and the like. Nonetheless, seeing X is meaningfully ascribed if the subject is 
taken to discriminate X from the environment in some way. For example, in order to 
be seeing a boat in the distance, it is not necessary to see it as a boat, or as anything 
else, but the object must be for the subject a potential object of individuation and 
characterization (even if extremely vague). It must be possible for the subject, if she 
focus her thematic attention on such a seen object, to ask: “What is that”?
14
 Such a 
condition – discriminating in some way O from the surrounding environment – does 
not even require any belief or explicit “taking it” that there is something there. What 
is required, it that the allegedly seen object must make a potential difference for the 
subject, be that difference doxastic or just behavioral. If the presence of O does not 
make any difference – not even a potential one
15




                                                                                                                                     
applied to perceptual phenomena. See Chapter VI. 
12 Fish 2009, p. 52. 
13 That is the case raised by the Sperling experiments (Sperling 1960). I will discuss such 
experiments later on (Chapter II, Section 1.2.2). In such experiments, a subject is exposed for a 
short lapse of time to a visual stimulus she cannot notice and report. Nonetheless, thanks to an 
acustic marker, she can access to such visual information after the very stimulus has disappeared, 
so that she must have seen that stimulus. 
14 See Dretske 2006, Siegel 2006b. 
15 I can be seeing something that is completely uninteresting for my behavior and my belief-
updating, so that there is nothing actually changing in my behavior and in my system of beliefs. 
Although, if I see O, then it must be true at least that if O was behaviorally, pragmatically or 
doxastically relevant for me, it would make a difference for me now. 
16 If seeing an object is to make a difference, even a slight one, for the subject, then such an episode 
must enable certain discriminations, which are potentially manifest in behavior or in reasoning as 
difference-makers in the subject's treating the surrounding environment. Otherwise, the subject has 
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Condition e could be resisted by pointing out that X's causing X's vision by S is an 
empirical rather than a conceptual condition of S's seeing X. In other words, the 
ordinary concept of seeing an O does not involve O's causation of O's vision, even 
though it is true that S sees O iff O causes the very episode. A straightforward test to 
make explicit the cluster of intuitions underlying the ordinary mastery of a concept, 
is that of constructing a counterfactual situation in which one of those allegedly 
primitive intuitions are not satisfied. Imagine someone who understands the 
expression “S sees an O” and can successfully apply it to normal contexts. Could she 
really ignore that the episode involves a causal impact between the object and the 
perceiver? Of course she does not have to know which kind of causal interaction is 
going on – we do not need to be scientists of vision to master the ordinary concept of 
seeing and to successfully ascribe episodes of object-seeing – but at least she needs 
to intuitively type the episode as an interaction between the subject and its 
environment. No interaction without causation, so no vision without causation
17
.  
Condition e can be seen as a way to specify the nature of discrimination introduced 
in condition c. 
As poor as that discrimination can be, it must be conscious and involve a 
phenomenological difference. No matter how S sees O, how S looks to S, it matters 
that O must look some way to S, be that way as vague and indeterminate as: A dark 
point in the distance, a rough shape, something having a certain color, something 
moving, and so on. Seeing an object involves having phenomenological 
consciousness of at least of one of its properties, that can also be a perspectival, 
relational property like its distant location from me. The way O looks to S in S's 
seeing O can well be wrong. O can look F to S even though O is not F. Still, S would 
be seeing O insofar as, among other conditions, S looks some way to O (though it 
looks wrongly so). What matters, is that the phenomenology associated to O's 
looking F to S is sufficient for S to consciously discriminate O from the surrounding 
                                                                                                                                     
not seen the object. 
17 According to some ancient theory of vision – for example, the Democritus' view – the eyes are the 
active causal part of the visual phenomenon, they “launch” a certain quantity of rapid atoms 
toward the object, acting as a sort of  “illuminating factor” of it, namely, making it visible. That 
empirically false and rudimentary theory, though, does not undermine the causal factor as 
embedded into the concept of seeing. On the contrary, the theory presupposes a the idea of a causal 
interaction between the perceiver and the perceived environment, even though it is wrong in 
specifying the type, mode and direction of this causal interaction.  
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environment. Suppose you see a green landscape where an unmoving chameleon is 
perfectly disguised through a perfect mimicry. Suppose you even focus your 
attention on that point of the objective scene, which globally looks to you just as a 
uniform greenish vegetable tract. Do you see the chameleon? Intuitively not, because 
your visual phenomenology does not differentiate it from the immediate 
surroundings. There is no phenomenologically salient discrimination from the scene, 
even if the object is there. You are in visual contact with the surface of the 
chameleon, you focus on the portion of the scene corresponding to its skin, you 
receive information about its color, your well-working visual apparatus is in 
appropriate causal contact with it, and so on
18
. Such a thought-experiment shows by 
substraction, so to speak, the necessity of the phenomenal discrimination-condition 
(e) for object-seeing. If visual discrimination of O from its immediate surroundings is 
missing, then S is not seeing O, according to the ordinary concept and ascription-
conditions of seeing something. Object-seeing has phenomenological constraints, 
although minimal. 
A natural objection to condition e could appeal to counterexamples, namely, to cases 
of object-seeing which lack phenomenology and a fortiori lack differentiation-
phenomenology. For example, the so-called Blindsight is a case of vision lacking 
visual phenomenology. The subjects having blindsight report a lack of any visual 
experience, despite showing a certain ability at guessing what is there and at 
detecting visually perceivable properties. So, blind-sighters form conscious empirical 
(true) beliefs grounded on unconscious episodes of vision
19
. Well, if such patients do 
see objects, then seeing cannot have phenomenological constraints. Another case 
against e could be Inattentional Blindness
20
. According to an interpretation of that 
phenomenon, you do see objects falling under a scene within your visual field, but 
                                                
18 Siegel 2006b constructs a thought-experiment on the same lines: Franco loves doing stunts in the 
sky, dresses red and uses invisible fibers to keep suspended in the air. But today Franco has 
dressed a blue uniform which perfectly matches the actual color of the sky, so that you cannot 
individuate him, you just see a homogeneous blue scene (which includes Franco's surface despite 
you do not know that). Siegel argues that you do not see Franco, because you are not in a position 
to form any de re mental state about Franco. Seeing O should put you in a position to have de re 
mental states about O, given other conditions that we do not need to specify. See also Dretske 
1969, 18-33. 
19 See Weiskranz 1997, Clark 2001, Hilbert 1994. 
20 See Chapter II, Section 1.2.1. 
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you fail to notice them
21
. So, there are also non-pathological cases of object-seeing 
which do not involve conscious and phenomenologically salient discrimination of O 
from its immediate surroundings. Another counterexample alleged by Siegel
22
, is that 
of zombies. A zombie-twin of mine is a cognitive system functionally and physically 
identical to mine but lacking any conscious phenomenology at all.
23
 Such zombies 
would behave like me, form my empirical beliefs, perform the same actions, make 
the same verbal reports, and so on. So, one could plausibly think that it would be 
arbitrary to deny to zombies any object-seeing, and she could consistently refuse a 
notion of object-seeing involving that . That would therefore count as an objection 
for phenomenological constraints on object-seeing. We could address the three 
objections together by reminding ourselves what we are doing up to now in the first 
place: We are making explicit the intuitive conditions for ordinary object-seeing' 
ascriptions. Again, appealing to borderline cases of object-seeing in such 
methodological context does not do, it is just premature and misleading. Making 
explicit the intuitions underlying the ordinary concept of seeing is not absolutely 
normative for what we should take object-seeing to be. On the contrary, experimental 
evidence can well be incompatible with ordinary intuitions and lead us to amend, 
change or even abandon the ordinary concept. About blindsight, it is a pathology, so 
it is an abnormal behavior which even puzzled the scientists who discovered it in the 
first place. In addiction, one could legitimately doubt that it is opportune to describe 
blindsight an an example of genuine cases of vision. About inattentional blindness, 
the very fact that there is a vivid debate on its interpretation – Is it not seeing but 
only potentially seeing? Is it unconscious seeing? Is it conscious seeing without 
noticing?
24
 – shows that it is a non-ordinary case of object-seeing, so it is a 
borderline case. Spelling out the conditions for ordinary ascription of X well tolerates 
borderline cases not perfectly meeting those conditions, or even lacking one of them. 
About zombies, it is ex hypothesi a (doubtful) thought experiment which depicts a 
possible world quite different from the one in which our ordinary concepts are 
                                                
21 See Mack and Rock 1998, Dretske 2000a, Block 2007. 
22 Siegel 2006b. 
23 See Chalmers 1996. 
24 As Siegel 2006b points out, the question whether there can be phenomenology outside attention 
does not undermine per se the differentiation-phenomenology constraint. If there can be 
phenomenology outside attention, then cases of inattentional blindness would count as cases of 
object-seeing. 
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socially established, individually formed, acquired and applied in everyday contexts. 
Probably, in a world inhabited by zombies the ordinary perceptual concepts would be 
different and presuppose a different cluster of basic intuitions for their application. 
Another objection can accept the discrimination-condition c but deny that it must 
involve phenomenological constraints, along the following lines: The discrimination 
of O from its surroundings could be behavioral, consisting of sensory-motor 
dispositions, of potential influence on belief-formation and intention-formation, or 
otherwise, without necessarily involving a phenomenological difference. Again, 
apart from pathological and other borderline cases, such an objection would entail 
that S can see O. Remember: According to the intuitive meaning of object-seeing – 
without O's visually looking to S in a way sufficient for S's discriminating O from its 
immediate surroundings. But if you see O, O must look some way to you. So, a 
certain visual phenomenology is constitutive of intuitive object-seeing, such that a 
certain causal contact of S's visual apparatuses with an object O counts as an episode 
of S's seeing O insofar as O looks some way to S, where such a “looking” relation 
consists of a certain distinctive visual phenomenology. To sum up again our list of 
object-seeing conditions:  
 S sees O iff 
a) S is endowed with a working visual apparatus  
b) O is there in S's surrounding environment 
c) S discriminates O in some way from the immediate surroundings 
d) O causes the very episode of S's seeing X 
e) O's being discriminated by S is enabled by S's visual phenomenology to the effect 
that O looks some way to S 
 
2.3 Transparency 





(S sees X) and (X=Y) " S sees Y 
 
                                                
25 Transparency of object-seeing is rightly emphasized by Dretske 1969, 1990. 
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Object-seeing is extensional, its truth-conditions are indifferent to the descriptions 
through which the seen object is referred to. The seen object is a particular which the 
subject is causally related to. That particular, no matter how you describe or 
characterize it in the ascription, is the seen object when a-e conditions are satisfied. 
Transparency and extensionality of object-seeing depend on that the truth-conditions 
of “S sees O” do not depend on the way O is cognitively appreciated or categorized 
by S, nor does it depend on the way O looks to S. The description used by the 
ascriber does not matter for the truth-conditions of the ascription, just because the 
way O is cognized by S does not matter for it to be the case or not that S sees that 




It is worth noticing that conditions d and e – discrimination and phenomenological 
constraints – are not incompatible with the transparency and extensionality of object-
seeing ascriptions. If an object can be seen by S only if it visually looks some way to 
S and is discriminated from the surroundings in virtue of that way it looks, 
nonetheless such a condition does not turn object-seeing ascriptions into intensional 
contexts. It is irrelevant for the truth-conditions of the ascription which way the 
object looks to S, what matters is that the way it looks determines the subject's visual 
phenomenology in such a way to put her in a position to individuate O and 
differentiate it from its immediate surroundings. So, seeing O is compatible with 
mistaken acts of categorization – mistaking one's wife for a hat is still seeing one's 
wife – and more generally with false and illusory perceptions. Actually, as we will 
see later, illusions and other deceptive perceptions are possible only insofar as they 
are successful acts of object-seeing. What I believe I am seeing, what I take it to be, 
does not have any relevance for what I am actually seeing. Seeing-O as such is 
neither correct nor incorrect, neither true not false, neither right nor wrong. Either it 
is the case, or it is not. 
What determines what S is seeing, is the causal context connecting S and its 
surroundings: The particular object which is causing the very visual episode, is the 
object S is seeing, even thought only the phenomenological conditions – among the 
other conditions spelled out above – makes that causal contact into a proper case of 
                                                
26 See Dretske 1969, 1981, 1990, 1995. 
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seeing. To sum up, in order for S to see O, O must look some way to S, where that 
“way” is salient in visual phenomenology, but it is not the way O looks that 
determines what S is seeing, rather, it is the fact that S's visual apparatus is in a 
certain appropriate causal contact with O, even though such a causal contact counts 
as a seeing-episode only if it gives rise to a phenomenological difference involving at 
least a way O looks to S. 
In this section, I have spelled out the conditions for object-seeing' ascriptions in 
ordinary contexts, I have then addressed some possible objections to them' being 
necessary conditions. I have argued that object-seeing is non-cognitive and causally-
contextually determined, but has some minimal phenomenological constraints 
basically consisting of putting S in a position to visually discriminate O from its 
immediate surroundings. I have also noticed that the logical behavior of seeing-X 
ascriptions is characterized by transparency: Substitution of O's description with co-
referential expressions does not affect the truth-conditions of “S sees O”. Seeing-O is 
an extensional context. 
 
Section 3 – Seeing that P, seeing that a is F 
3.1 - Propositionality 
We ordinarily claim to see objects like tables, chairs, people, trees, and so on. But 
object-seeing in that sense (for O = a physical particular) is not the only kind of 
“seeing-X” ascriptions in ordinary discourse. We see events, like the sunrise or the 
fall of a glass on the ground. We see properties, like the yellow of the car and the 
rectangular shape of the sofa. We see relations, like the difference between the 
scarlet of your bicycle and the scarlet of my pullover. We also take ourselves and 
others to see facts or states of affairs, like the fact that just now in my garden a cat is 
running after a mouse. So, the grammatical object of “seeing-X” ascriptions does not 
always consist of a “mundane” object like an apple, a chair, a table and the like. That 
last kind of object-seeing is the one we have analyzed at length until now. Now we 
will turn to seeing-that ascriptions. Later on, we will consider the relations between 
object-seeing in the basic sense and other less basic “object”-ascriptions (like 
property-seeing, relations-seeing, events-seeing) on the one side, as well as the 
relations between basic object-seeing ascriptions and seeing-that ascriptions. Let us 
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consider the ascriptive scheme: 
 
S sees that: [a is F] 
 
Such ascriptions are ascriptions of a propositional attitude. Indeed the that-clause is 
filled by a proposition, just as it happens for thinking-that, hoping-that, knowing-that 
and the like
27
. Without entering into the logical debate about the nature of 
propositions, let us assume that a proposition is an abstract entity consisting of a 
certain structured semantic content, in such a way that an entity – a thought, a 
sentence, an utterance – expressing a certain proposition is semantically evaluable as 
true or false in virtue of expressing that proposition, where expressing a certain 
proposition amounts to possessing a certain (propositional) content. Whilst 
propositions are either truth-conditions or bearers of truth-conditions for the entities 
expressing them, propositional contents are truth-conditions. The sentence “the vase 
of flowers in front of me is red” expresses a proposition that makes the sentence true 
if the vase of flowers in front of me is red, and false if that is not the case. Therefore, 
a proposition is or bears
28
 a content consisting of a possible fact or state of affairs. 
Thoughts or sentences (or other content-bearing entities) possessing a certain 
propositional content, are true or false according to whether such a content is 
satisfied by a corresponding state of affairs or not.  
 
3.2 - Factivity 
What does it take to be true that S is seeing that P, for example, for P = (a is F)? 
What logical behaviour characterizes ordinary seeing-that ascriptions? 
The first relevant property of seeing-that ascriptions is their factivity: 
 
Factivity - S sees that P " P 
  
It is a very strong intuition that if S sees that P, P is the case. If P was not the case, no 
one could ever see that P. So, seeing-that ascriptions behave like knowing-that 
                                                
27 See Searle 1983. 
28 For example, Stalnaker 1984 takes it that propositions are contents, rather than being content-
bearers. Although, such an abstract difference is not relevant at all for our actual concerns. 
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ascriptions, at least from the point of view of their factivity
29
. Just as you cannot 
know that P unless P is the case, you cannot see that P unless P is the case. Just as 
you cannot know something false
30
, you cannot see something false either. This is 
why ascribing a seeing-that-P episode to S involves endorsing the truth of P
31
 
besides making a statement about S or S's occurrent mental episode
32
.  
Let us note for the sake of clarity that ascribing to S an episode of seeing that P, 
obviously is not to say that S sees a proposition. Rather, it is to claim that S sees that 
actual fact or occurring state of affairs which makes true the proposition P. We will 
soon explain what “seeing a fact” can mean. 
 
3.3 Opacity 
The second interesting property of seeing-that, shared by propositional attitudes in 
general, is referential opacity: 
 
Referential opacity – From (S sees that [a is F]) and (a=b), you cannot infer (S sees 
that [b is F]) 
 
Referential opacity characterizes intensional contexts, where you cannot substitute 
salva veritate co-referential expressions within the proposition towards which the S' 
attitude is ascribed to be. Opacity is the contrary of transparency, so this is a first 
important difference between seeing and seeing-that. Just as you cannot infer that S 
believes that the morning star is such-and-such from the circumstance that S believes 
that evening star is such-and-such even if the morning star = the evening star, 
                                                
29 Some philosophers coin “seeing”-like expressions as non-factive corresponding counterparts for 
seeing-that. Millikan 2000 introduces the technical notion “to visage”, which is meant to stand to 
“to see” as believing stands to knowing, such that S can falsely visage that P. Likewise, Johnston 
2004 proposes to accept a non-factive reading of seeing-that and defines it as “visually 
entertaining a content”. Byrne 2011 also characterizes visual perception as a sui generis attitude he 
calls “exing” (non-factively experiencing that P). As interesting as those proposals could appear 
from a theoretical point of view, they just confirm what we are arguing for here: The ordinary 
logical behavior of seeing-that ascriptions does  involve factivity. 
30 Of course, you can know that a certain proposition is false. But the proposition that a certain 
proposition is false, can be known by you just insofar as it is a true proposition. Although some 
deny it – for example, Hazlett 2010 – factivity of knowledge is mainly accepted by 
epistemologists.  
31 See Sellars 1953, 223: “To characterize S's experience as a seeing is, in a suitably broad sense, to 
apply the semantical concept of truth to that experience”. 
32 That is what Armstrong calls “success-grammar” of the determinable perceive-that and its 
determinates. See Armstrong 1968, 212. 
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likewise you cannot infer that S sees that b is F from the fact that S sees that a is F 
even if a = b. On the contrary, if you sees a, and a = b, you see b. So the conditions 
for ascriptions of seeing-that to be true are not the same as the conditions for 
ascriptions of seeing-O to be true. As we will see, the a-e conditions spelled out 
above are not enough for seeing-that. 
Provided that it is factive and opaque, what does seeing-that P amount to? According 
to Dretske
33
, seeing-that does not consists of a purely visual episode, rather it 
consists of an episode of coming to know by visual means. If S sees that P, S comes 
to know that P is the case through the contribution of one or more visual episodes. 
The epistemic result of S's seeing-that P is S's knowing that P. In order for such 
coming-to-know that P to be a case of seeing-that-P, some perceptual-visual episode 
must be at least among the ways in which S has gained that knowledge. Given that 
Dretske's proposal seems very plausible – it seems to be intuitive and it well explains 
both opacity and factivity – we can ask what the strictly visual conditions are for an 
episode of coming-to-know that P (where P is piece of empirical knowledge) to 
count as an episode of seeing-that-P. 
 
 
3.4 - Literal/Metaphorical 
To address that question, it is opportune to preliminarily make clear that we are 
exclusively talking about literal cases of seeing-that. Even though the 
literal/metaphorical distinction may be blurry and involve borderline cases, we 
should leave aside the seeing-that ascriptions that have nothing to do with the visual 
way of gaining the respective knowledge, cases where “seeing” just generically 
means “becoming aware”, “coming-to-know (through whatever means)”, “realizing” 
and the like. For example, cases like “S sees that the government is in trouble” do not 
concern us, provided that S could see that even if she was completely blind
34
. So, 
                                                
33 Cfr. Dretske 1969, 1990, 2000. Also Williamson 2000 and Crane (talk in Manchester, 2008) agree 
on that. 
34 Of course, it can be the case that S sees that the government is in trouble by visual means. For 
example, S can read that on a newspaper. Cases like that will be analyzed below: They consist of 
coming-to-know a certain fact through directly coming-to-know other facts by visual means, for 
example facts about what is written on the newspaper. Suppose the news you read are false: you 
acquire a false belief, but you do not visually misperceive: the mistake does not rest on the seen 
facts, but on other matters (like trusting the journalist). Knowing that P by visual means is forming 
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even though seeing-that not always means “coming-to-know by visual means” in 
ordinary discourse, we are exclusively interested in a sub-set of those ascriptions for 
which the visual involvement is taken by the ascriber to be essential 
35
. Just in those 
cases, “seeing” is not ascribed metaphorically but literally, namely it entails the 




With that in mind, we can distinguish at least three kinds of seeing-that episodes, 
according to the nature of visual involvement, into the process of knowledge-
acquisition the seeing-that is a result of: 
 
1) Literally and directly seen facts: S sees that P when P is made true by a fact whose 
constituents are seen by S. I see that the cat is on the sofa. I see the cat, I see the sofa, 
I visually appreciate the on-ness spatial relation. 
2) Facts I come to know as holding on the basis of literally seeing other facts. As 
soon as I see that the mailbox is empty – through seeing the constituents of that fact: 
The mailbox, its being empty – I come to know that the postman hasn't arrived yet. I 
do not see that last fact, rather I come to know it as holding by actually seeing 
another fact (where seeing that last fact does involve seeing their constituents)
37
. So, 
                                                                                                                                     
a perceptual belief that P that is justified on the basis of how things look to one. A belief is 
perceptual when it is the output of one of one's perceptual system, without being the result of 
inferential combination of that output with other collateral information. On the difference between 
perceptual and non-perceptual beliefs, see Lyons 2005. 
35 In order to realize that seeing-that is not just a perceptual episode but an epistemic result of it, 
consider ascriptions of other non-visual perceptual episodes: We do not ordinarily say that S 
touches that P, S smells that P, S tastes that P, just because we cannot perceive facts, even though 
we can well come to know facts in virtue of perceiving those objects, properties and relations 
which are their constituents. Instead, hearing-that ascriptions are also quite in order, because they 
ascribe episodes of coming-to-know by auditory means. Indeed, a paradigmatic case of hearing-
that is testimonial knowledge, namely, understanding a spoken sentence and become aware of its 
content as true. You hear sounds, maybe words, you do not literally hear the propositional content, 
rather you understand it virtue of hearing sounds and words. 
36 Also for object-seeing holds the same literal/metaphorical distinction. Our analysis of ordinary 
object-seeing ascriptions in section 2 does not concern ascriptions like “S sees the Nothingness”, 
“S sees the Uselessness of Existence” and the like. Those cases do not concern philosophy of 
perception because do not have to do with perception. Any episode of seeing which could be truly 
ascribed to a blind subject, does not concern our inquiry. 
37 It is in this second sense that sometimes we claim to see past facts, facts whose holding in the 
environment is not current anymore: I see that someone came in with muddy boots last night. As 
Armstrong  remarks (see Armstrong 1968, 211) in such cases we can only speak of seeing-that P, 
never of seeing the objects and properties which constitute the fact which makes P true. We 
wouldn't appropriately claim that we saw the muddy boots or the person, for example. Rather, 
what we see is the bookmarks on the ground, so the only literally and directly seen fact is that 
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case 2) involves case 1). I cannot indirectly see that Q unless I literally see that P. 
3) Facts I “see” only metaphorically. I come to know that Q, but neither do I literally 
see constituents of Q, nor do I literally see constituents of the facts which are the 
proximate sources, or epistemic basis, for coming-to-know that Q. 
 
In both cases 1) and 2), my seeing-that P rests on being in a certain visual contact 
with the constituents of a fact (objects, properties, relations). Only 1) counts as 
literally and properly seeing-that, whilst 2) is a derivative ascription, where the visual 
means are only indirect. They concern knowledge of another fact Q, on which 
knowledge of the P involved in seeing-that-P is epistemically based. 2) involves an 
inference or another kind of cognitive transition from a proposition to another. While 
cases of type 3) do not concern us at all, cases of type 2) concern us, although they 
do only insofar as they involve instantiations of cases of type 1). So, our focus now is 
on type 1). 
What does it take then to see that P – or: that a is F – in the sense 1)? 
Dretske calls seeing-that “epistemic seeing”
38
, to differentiate it from “simple 
seeing” or object-seeing. Not only is epistemic seeing a propositional state – an 
attitude toward a proposition – but being in such a state involves conceptualizing the 
constituents of such a proposition. So, seeing-that the vase is on the table amounts to 
coming-to-know that [the vase is on the table] and that entails that S possesses and 
exercises the concepts [vase] and [table]. No cognitive system not possessing the 
concepts a and F could ever see-that [a is F]. So, seeing-that is propositional, 
cognitive, conceptual, and its ascription generates intensional and opaque contexts, 
whilst seeing-X ascriptions are neither necessarily cognitive, nor conceptual. Instead 
they generate extensional and transparent contexts.  
Now, under that interpretation of the ordinary ascription of seeing-that P, such an 
ascribed episode is not just a perceptual episode, although it involves at least a 
perceptual episode as (one of) the means to obtain the perceptual knowledge that 
                                                                                                                                     
there are boot-marks on the ground. A negative test for a case being of the kind 1 or 2, is that of 
asking: Do I also see the constituents of the fact I claim to see? If it is not the case, then I am self-
ascribing a case of kind 2, namely, coming to know a fact in virtue of seeing another fact (= in 
virtue of coming to directly know that fact just by visual means). Kind 2 can even concern the 
past, as in the case above. 
38 Dretske 1969, 1990, 2000. 
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seeing-that P entails. At that point of the inquiry, we can ask: Which relation does 
hold between such a visual episode and the propositional-conceptual state of 
perceptual knowledge resulting from it? 
 
3.5 – Object-seeing and Fact-seeing 
To begin with, we could notice that, even though seeing something it is not a 
sufficient condition  to see that something is something, nonetheless seeing 
something seems to be a necessary condition for an episode of seeing-that to occur. 
So: 
 
S sees that [a is F] " S sees a 
 
Let us consider what I will call the object-property scheme [a is F] for P. Of course, a 
proposition can also have relations as its constituents. In addition, it is quite normal 
to come-to-know by visual means that something has a certain relation with 
something else, for example, that the table is bigger than the chair. I can gain that 
elemental piece of perceptual knowledge just by looking at the table and at the chair 
at once. Nonetheless, the object-property scheme is a more primitive way to start 
with. Actually, coming to know that a and b entertain a certain relation, entails 
coming-to-know that a has a certain property and b has a certain property in the first 
place. So it seems legitimate to begin with the more simple cases. Two objects can 
entertain a relation only in virtue of having certain properties, so that perceiving a 
relation entails perceiving properties of the relata. 
As Jackson points out
39
, seeing-objects is even conceptually more primitive than 
seeing-facts. An argument for that is that seeing an object a can be immediate, 
namely, not mediated by seeing some other object b in virtue of whose vision S can 
be taken to see a. On the contrary, Jackson successfully argues, S's seeing a fact (i.e. 
seeing that [a is F]) must be mediated by S's seeing objects and properties, the 
constituents of the allegedly seen fact. However, I prefer to leave aside the 
“mediated/immediate” distinction, because it can capture different notions so its 
                                                
39 See Jackson 1977, Chapter I. 
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meaning is potentially ambiguous (just like the direct/indirect couple)
40
. In any case, 
if seeing that [a is F] entails seeing a, therefore the a-e conditions spelled out in 
Section 2 for seeing-X, are necessary though not sufficient conditions for seeing-that 
[a is F]. For any seeing-that ascription, there is an entitlement to ascribe a respective 
episode of seeing-O, but such an entitlement does not hold the other way round. We 
can see an object a in virtue of it looking F to us, without seeing that a is F. 
Until now, we have not directly considered the role of seeing properties besides the 
cases of seeing objects and seeing facts. But we have pointed out that when S sees an 
O, there must be a way O looks to S. Actually that “way” is a property, the one 
through which the seen object is given to S in her visual perception. So, we basically 
see particular objects, but we can see objects just insofar as they are given in 
perception in some way. They look some way to us, where that “way” is a property.  
As we have already said, no matter which way the particular object is given in 
perception, in order for the particular to be seen, some property of it must be given to 
S and determine the way O looks to S. Be it the color, a contour, the shape, the 
property of being moving in a certain way or direction, the size, or anything else. So, 
object-seeing requires a perceptual relation to a property which enables the subject to 
discriminate the object and to be visually-phenomenologically conscious of it 
(“under” that property, so to say). In other terms, we see objects (also) in virtue of 
becoming visually conscious of some of their properties.  
 
3.6 - Conceptuality 
But if S' seeing an object entails this object's visually looking some way to S, that 
condition is far from being sufficient for seeing that the object is that way (the way it 
looks). To repeat the point, in order for S to see that a is F, a looking F to S is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition. What else is needed?  
Firstly, S must possess and exercise the concepts involved in the proposition which 
expresses the seen fact. If S is to see that a is F, S must conceptualize a and F. 
Without possessing the concepts of [dog], [tree], [running-toward], S just cannot see 
that the dog is running toward the tree, even if S could well see the dog, the tree, as 
                                                
40 For a criticism of the direct/indirect distinction, see Austin 1962, Martin 2008, cap. 4; Also Travis 
2004, 66, argues that such a distinction is occasion-sensitive. 
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well as the movement of the running dog
41
. Seeing-that amounts to coming-to-know. 
Knowledge is true belief, beliefs involve concepts, so seeing-that involves concepts. 
Secondly, S must cognitively grasp the structure of the fact. Seeing-that is a 
propositional attitude, propositions are structured entities, such that attitudes toward 
those structured contents are structured states in the same way. Suppose I am seeing 
a red cube under a blue triangle, such that I am visually conscious not only of the 
[red] and [blue] properties, but also of the [being-under]  spatial relation. Moreover, 
suppose I also possess the respective concepts and also deploy them when perceiving 
the scene. If seeing the cube and the triangle and being visually conscious both of the 
[red]]-[blue] properties as well as of the [being-under] relation was a sufficient 
condition for seeing that the red cube is under the blue triangle – given also the 
subject's relevant concept-possession – then such a condition would always entail 
such a seeing-that. But that is patently false: Such a condition holds also when I see a 
blue triangle under a red cube, when I see a red triangle under a blue cube, when I 
see a blue cube under a red triangle, and so on. Given the same visual awareness of 
the same objects, properties and relations, what makes the difference is exactly the 
(grasp of the) structure of the seen fact. Given a certain scene including a certain 
structured fact – certain objects having certain properties and standing in certain 
relations – the visual awareness of its constituents is necessary but not sufficient for 
seeing that fact, for example for seeing that aRb (bRa is another fact despite being 
made out of the same constituents indeed).  
If S possesses the relevant concepts and a looks F to her, then S is in a position to see 
that [a is F]. It usually happens, but it is not necessary. Indeed, usually possessing the 
relevant concepts and seeing an O which visually looks F to one, causes her to come 
to believe that a is F, which is her coming to know that a is F if a is F and the 
perceptual relation to that circumstance is appropriate
42
. As we will see in the second 
                                                
41 Of course there can well be de re attitudes, like demonstrative thoughts and beliefs. I can see that 
dog, and of/about that particular I see, I can see that it is running toward a tree. In any case, even if 
I can see-that a is F where a is to be interpreted extensionally and demonstratively – I see that that 
is F, no matter how you ascriber fix the reference of that particular  – still I must at least possess 
the concept of F in order to see that that is F.  
42 There can well be “veridical illusions”. For example, suppose S's perceptual system is not working 
properly, O looks F to S and it happens that O is actually F. If S comes to believe that O is F on the 
basis of a wrongly-caused perception, she would not come to know that O is F thereby, because 
the visual means grounding her perceptual belief would be not appropriate for justify her belief 
and would not be able to turn it into knowledge. Such cases are a sub-class of Gettier-cases 
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part of this work, perception is not to be identified either to belief or to belief-
acquiring, even if perceptions usually lead to doxastic states. Provided that seeing-
that is acquiring a certain knowledge and knowledge involves belief, it is clear that 
neither seeing O nor O's looking F to S entail as such S's seeing-that O is F.  
Let us sum up the points we have established so far: 
Seeing-that is the ascription of a propositional attitude. It is the ascription of a factive 
state, so that seeing that P entails P. Such ascriptions generate referentially opaque or 
intensional contexts. Both factivity and opacity are well explained by interpreting the 
ordinary meaning of seeing that as amounting to coming-to-know by visual means. 
So seeing-that ascriptions not only ascribe a perceptual episode, rather they ascribe – 
when used not metaphorically – the acquiring of a piece of empirical knowledge on 
the basis of a perceptual episode. When that acquiring is not inferential, seeing-that 
(coming to know facts by visual means) not only entails seeing the objects, 
properties and relations which are the constituent of those known facts, but also 
involves possession of the relevant concepts on the one side, as well as a cognitive 
grasp of the structure of the perceptually known fact, on the other side. If having 
propositional attitudes is a privilege of rational and conceptual beings
43
, then only 
rational and conceptual beings can see that something is the case. 
 
3.7 - Definition 
We could embody all those relevant acquisitions into a working definition: 
S sees that P iff 
Thanks to becoming visually aware of those objects, properties and relations which 
are the constituent of the environmental fact which makes P true, by conceptualizing 
those constituents and by grasping the structure of that very fact, S comes to know 
that P is the case. 
 
Section 4 – Seeing-as, seeing something as something 
4.1 – Implicativity and Normative Evaluability 
Besides objectual seeing (seeing O) and propositional seeing (seeing-that P), there is 
another important kind of seeing-ascriptions to be carefully considered, namely, the 
                                                                                                                                     
concerning perceptual knowledge. On veridical illusions, see Chapter III, Section 2.4. 




. The basic scheme for that kind of ascriptions is: 
 
S sees a as (an) F 
 
Differently from seeing-that, seeing-as is not factive. The implication: [S sees a as 
(an) F] " [a is F] is false indeed. S can see a particular as F even if that particular is 
not F. I can see a dark moving object on the street as a mouse, even if it is actually a 
piece of paper moved by the wind in the dark.  
Like seeing-O, seeing-as is implicative. In order to see a particular as a mouse or as a 
piece of paper, I must see it in the first place
45
. Implicativity of seeing-as depends on 
that for each seeing-as episode a respective object-seeing episode is involved as its 
constituent: 
 
 [S sees a as (an) F] " [S sees a] 
 
Maybe what I see as an F is not an F, still I must be successful in seeing it, to 
wrongly see it as an F. That entails that the a-e conditions spelled out in Section 2 for 
seeing-O are at least necessary conditions for seeing-as as well. In order to see my 
wife as a hat
46
 I must see my wife in the first place, so the conditions for seeing my 
wife as a hat include those for seeing my wife simpliciter. 
So, in order to see a as F, I must see a on the one hand, but I do not need to see that a 
is F, on the other. Indeed seeing-that a is F is incompatible with a not being F 
(factivity), whilst seeing a as F is well compatible with a not being F insofar as it is 
not factive.  
Therefore, a very important property of that kind of ascription is that they can be 
correct or incorrect, in other words there are correctness-conditions associated with 
                                                
44 Surprisingly enough, Dretske does not consider at all that kind of seeing. As we will see later, that 
omission has fatal consequences not only for his semantics of “see”, but also for his substantive, 
philosophical theory of perception. As far as I know, all he has to say about is in a small note (see 
Dretske 1990, 133, footnote 1), where he recognizes seeing-as as a hybrid way of seeing between 
object-seeing and fact-seeing. 
45 Again, we should keep in mind that we are considering only literal ascriptions of seeing-as, those 
essentially involving an ascription of a visual perception. Just as S can see the taxation as a state-
robbery, S can even see unicorns as nice animals. We are not interested on such non perceptual 
uses of seeing-as, so we will not talk about them. When literally ascribed, seeing-as is implicative, 
so that S cannot see a as an F unless she sees a. 
46 See Sacks 1985. 
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them. Seeing-O as such cannot be correct or incorrect. Rather, either you see O or 
you don't. Likewise, seeing-that P cannot be correct or incorrect either. Rather, either 
you see that P, or you don't. You cannot incorrectly see that P, nor can you correctly 
see that P for the same reason. Seeing-that is an epistemic achievement, it is factive 
indeed, seeing-O is also an achievement insofar as it is implicative and therefore 
presupposes a real seen object. Seeing-O and seeing-that-P are essentially success-
expressions, as we have already noticed. 
Only seeing-as, then, exhibits the peculiar capacity of being normatively evaluable, it 
can be right or wrong. With seeing-as ascriptions, the possibility of error concerning 
seeing-episodes definitely comes into play. Indeed, until now seeing-as episodes are 
the only seeing-episodes that can be mistaken. Let us go on by steps, let us analyze 
the ordinary contexts in which seeing-as is truly ascribed to a perceiving subject. 
What do we ascribe when we claim that S sees a as (an) F? Is it a cognitive and 
epistemic achievement based on a perceptual episode (like seeing-that), or is it rather 
a thoroughly perceptual episode (like seeing-O)? To address these questions, let us 
start from the paradigmatic case of seeing-as made famous be Wittgenstein
47
, that of 
the duck-rabbit ambiguous figure. Ambiguous figures are a very specific subset of 
seeing-as episodes, so, that is just a way to start our analysis. Now we are interested 
in ambiguous figures only insofar as they are a well-known case of seeing-as. In the 
case mentioned, a figure is presented – a group of sign and lines – which can be 
“interpreted” as depicting a rabbit (be it F) or as depicting a duck (be it G). So, the 
same seen O can alternatively be seen as an F or as a G. As it is well known, the 
Gestalt-shift from a visual interpretation to another is discrete and can be prompted 
by a voluntary act. Whenever I want to, provided that I am able to visually “see” 
both the figures in the same drawings, I can suddenly “shift” from a figure to the 
other. So, seeing-as ascriptions seem to be ascriptions of acts of recognition. If S 
sees a as an F, S recognizes an (example of) F in the seen object a. Seeing-as is 
recognizing-as. 
 
4.2 – Recognition  
But here is a caveat to be done. Although useful, the example of ambiguous figures 
                                                
47 See Wittgenstein 1953, Part II, Section xi; Wittgenstein 1991, §§ 1-29. On that, see Bozzi 1998. 
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can also be misleading for our concerns, for the following reasons: Firstly, it is a case 
of a cognitively sophisticated visual interpretation of stylized and two-dimensional 
drawings, which presupposes a fine-grained competence. The idea of abstract 
figurative representations, the capacity of suspending the judgment about what the 
seen object really is. Perceivers sensitive to that visual flip-flopping obviously know 
that what they actually see is neither a rabbit nor a duck – and possess many other 
high-level cognitive skills. Seeing-as can be far more primitive than that. For 
example, it can be meaningfully ascribed to an animal. Secondly and most 
importantly, considering what you “can see” in a stylized drawing could fatally 
conceal the fundamental property of seeing-as, namely, the circumstance that it can 
be mistaken. Whatever you see in a drawing, instead, is something you recognize 
insofar as you are playing a sort of game in which you tell “what you see”. It is not 
the ordinary situation where someone would tell you: 'You are wrong, there isn't 
anything like what you claim to see!' Recognition is factive. If you recognize an F, 
what you have so recognized is an F. For example, you cannot visually recognize a 
real rabbit unless what you are seeing is a rabbit. If that is not the case, at least you 
can believe, think, take it that you have recognized a as a rabbit (or: a rabbit in a), 
but you are wrong in so taking. You have not recognized anything. So, seeing-as can 
consist of an episode of recognition when it is correct and successful, but it does not 
have to consist of that. It can happen to be a failure as well.  
Therefore, in successful cases seeing-as is perceptual recognition, the exercise of a 
positive recognitional disposition or capacity. But on closer inspection, also in 
unsuccessful cases, seeing-as is still the (failed) exercise of a positive recognitional 
capacity. That means that by ascribing to S an episode of seeing a as an F, you credit 
S with the general, positive capacity of recognizing examples of F even in case you 
are consciously ascribing a mistaken occurrent exercise of that general recognitional 
capacity. I can wrongly see a bat as a bird only if I have a general capacity to see a 
bird as a bird, even though my actual exercise of such a recognitional capacity is a 
failed occurrence of my positive cognitive disposition.  
So, ascribing to a subject an episode of seeing-as, be it ascribed as being a right or 
wrong token, entails ascribing a positive recognitional capacity which can be 
recursively exercised, whose actual occurrence is the essentially repeatable token of 
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that type. If S sees a as an F, then F is something S has cognitive familiarity with, 
something S can generally recognize. Seeing-as entails general sensitivity to a type. 
What kind of recognitional capacity is involved in seeing-as? Seeing-as can be taken 
as a three-place relation whose constituents are a subject, an object, and a property 
satisfying the as-complement. So we can put the question as follows: Which type of 
properties can stand in the F-place within such a three-place relation [S sees a as (an) 
F?], in literal cases of seeing-as? 
To begin with, seeing-as involves a cognitive stand toward the perceived object. 
“Seeing a as an F”  means taking something as an (example) of F. If I see a as an F, I 
see an a, and I take what I see as an F. I can be wrong in seeing-as just because 
seeing-as is a cognitive 'taking', an exposure to error. 
Secondly, according to the kind of property which stands in the F-place, seeing-as 
can consist of different kinds of cognitive acts. Let us carefully make that point more 
explicit. 
We have already ruled out all ordinary uses of the scheme [S sees a as an F] where a 
is not the kind of thing which can be literally seen. Seeing an apple as an F, seeing a 
table, seeing a rabbit as an F, can be cases that concern us, whilst seeing the 
government, seeing the life, seeing the justice as F are cases we are not interested in, 
insofar as “seeing” has just a metaphorical, non-perceptual meaning. What about F 
instead? Provided that seeing-as involves a taking-as directed at the (literally) seen 
object, which kind of properties can be the right complement of such a taking-as for 
a given seeing-as episode to be of interest for a theory of perception? In other words, 
which arguments for F are such that seeing-as is a perceptual episode, though with 
cognitive significance? For sure, seeing a rabbit as the meaning of my life, seeing a 
tree as a God's gift and the like, are not perceptual episodes of seeing-as, even if they 
remotely do involve respective cases of object-seeing because the argument for a in 
the ascriptive scheme is filled by typically perceivable particulars. 
 
4.3 – 'Thick' categories and sensible profiles 
Often the place of F is filled by sortal terms, as “rabbit” and “duck” in the example 
above. Let us take the example of seeing an object as a real rabbit. Now, is [being a 
rabbit] a property that can be perceptually detected? [Rabbit] is a natural kind. What 
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determines whether an animal belongs to a given natural kind, are certain genetic-
evolutionary features whose discovery can be the object of a long-lasting scientific 
inquiry. So, such a natural kind-property does not seem to be the property a subject 
can perceptually see-as. Seeing-as amounts to taking a certain cognitive stand toward 
the seen object, and that stand is specified just by the F-property the object is taken to 
be. But when we ordinarily ascribe to a subject her seeing something as a rabbit, we 
ascribe her the exercise of the ordinary [rabbit] concept or category, namely, 
sensitivity to a stereotypical intuitive class of particulars, whose exercise is activated 
by the recognition of a certain sensible profile in the seen object. When seeing-as 
episodes are perceptual, the 'as-an-F taking' act must depend on certain visible traits 
that are typically and evidently associated with examples of F's. To be a perceptual 
episode seeing-as must be a recognition of something as an F “just by sight”, without 
inferences grounded in collateral knowledge or other cognitive transitions involving 
guessing, reasoning, hypothesizing and the like. For example, I see something as a 
rabbit only if: 1) I possess the concept [rabbit] or at least the category {rabbit}, on 
which a positive recognitional capacity of examples of rabbits is grounded 2) I am 
able to exercise that recognitional capacity of a as an F just by looking and visually 
appreciating a certain sensible profile which immediately prompts in my previously 
established perceptual scheme the activation of a category or a concept [F]. I say “a 
concept or a category” because seeing-as needs not to be conceptual, even if it is 
essentially cognitive and involves the subsumption of a particular seen object under a 
general type. It is true that when an adult human being is ascribed an episode of 
seeing something as a rabbit, she is ascribed the possession and exercise of the 
(ordinary and stereotypical) [rabbit]-concept thereby. Nonetheless, seeing-as-F 
ascriptions as such not only do not necessarily entail S' possession of the [F]-concept, 
they do not even entail any concept-possession either. We can legitimately ascribe to 
a dog an episode of seeing his master as his leader of the pack, without ascribing it 
either the possession of the [leader of the pack]-concept, or any concept-possession 
at all. We can claim that a lion sees a running gazelle as a prey without committing 
ourselves to ascribe the lion concept-possession (possession of the [prey]-concept or 
of any other concept). Although, we could not ascribe to the dog an episode of seeing 
his master as the leader of the pack, nor could we ascribe to the lion an episode of 
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seeing a gazelle as a prey, unless the dog and the lion possess the respective 
recognitional categories in their “cognitive spaces”, so to say. For sure the general 
and recursive recognitional disposition concerning Fs is a more rough and 
inarticulate dispositional state than the possession of concept F. Possessing the 
concept of [leader of the pack] involves being able to do a lot of inferences, being 
able to understand propositions containing the concept, and so on
48
. Instead, in order 
for a dog to have the “category” of {leader of the pack}, it needs to manifest a 
recursive recognitional capacity on the basis of which its behavior is generally 
interpretable. The dog's {leader of the pack} category has a vaguely similar content 
to our [leader of the pack] concept, and such a similarity is sufficient to ascribe to a 
cognitive system a certain seeing-as-F state using a concept in the ascription without 
committing oneself to attribute possession of that concept to the subject. To sum up 
that last fundamental point: Seeing-as is cognitive but it is not necessarily conceptual 
nor is it epistemic, but it presupposes a general recognitional capacity we have 
provisionally called “category”. Category-possession is much less demanding than 
concept-possession and can be ascribed just on a behavioral basis. It does not entail 
inferential and rational capacities, for example
49
. 
Let us now consider an example of seeing-as made by Crane
50
. An infant and a 
scientist both look at a cathode ray tube. Even though both see it, the difference 
between them is that the scientist see it as a cathode ray tube, because he possesses 
the concept of cathode ray tube and exercises it perceiving it, whilst the infant cannot 
                                                
48 See Chapter II, Section 1.6. Differently from concept-possession, category-possession does not 
require the Generality Constraint to hold: in order S to possess the categories F and G, F does not 
have to grasp what it is to see a as a G and b as an F just because S sees a as an F and b as a G. 
Likewise, seeing-as or recognitional categorization does not require what I have called the 
Rationality Constraint to hold: in order to see a as (an) F you do not need to be able to draw a set 
of relevant inferences, you do not need do have inferential abilities at all, insofar as perceptual 
seeing-as is proto-propositional rather than being a fully-fledged propositional attitude, like 
seeing-that. 
49 So “seeing-as” denotes the occurrent episodic exercise of a recognitional pre-doxastic 
capacity/disposition, pace Tye 2000, 215, who writes: “Object or shape recognition in vision […] 
is a matter of seeing that such and such a type of object is present. Seeing that something is the 
case, in turn, is a matter of forming an appropriate belief or judgment on the basis of visual 
experiences or sensations […] there are two components in visual recognition, a belief component 
and a looking component”. There are indeed a recognitional, cognitive component (thick 
categorization) and a looking-, strictly visual component (sensible profile), but the recognitional 
component is not necessarily a belief nor does it involve a seeing-that episode. If it was the case, it 
would sound inappropriate to ascribe a seeing-as episode to animals we do not normally credit 
with beliefs, concepts and propositional attitudes. Unless we do accept a very little demanding 
notion of belief, then, Tye seems to me plainly wrong in assimilating seeing-as to seeing-that. 
50 Crane 1992, 3ff. 
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see it as a cathode ray tube just because she lack the respective concept. 
Well, it is true that seeing something as a cathode ray tube entails possessing the 
[cathode ray tube] concept, which in turn entails having a certain net of beliefs and a 
certain inferential capacity concerning reasoning and propositional knowledge about 
cathode ray tubes, their functions, and so on. In the same vein, we cannot see an 
object as a toaster without possessing the [toaster]-concept. However, that condition 
does not depend on seeing-as as such, it rather depends on the specific properties 
under which the seeing-as subsumes the seen objects. The properties of [being a 
cathode ray tube] and [being a toaster] are not the kind of properties which can be 
grasped by a non-conceptual being – nor can they be grasped by a conceptual being 
lacking those respective concepts, unless in case grasping them is the very 
acquisition of the respective concepts – but that does not mean that any general 
recognitional capacity or categorical object-typing needs be conceptual thereby. On 
the contrary, there is a non-conceptual seeing-as, even though it cannot concern the 
visual recognition of those properties which only conceptual beings can be 
cognitively sensitive to. By seeing-as, I just recognize something – known or 
familiar to me – in an object in virtue of visually appreciating its sensible profile, and 
not every recognition involves a conceptualization. Some recognitions do (i.e. of a 
cathode ray tube, of a toaster), some don't.  
 
4.4 - Definition 
Let us try to provide a definition of ordinary seeing-as now: 
 
S sees a as an F iff 
S sees an F in a thanks to the exercise of a general recognitional capacity for Fs 
prompted by the visual appreciation of a's objective sensible profile. 
 
For all we have said, it is clear that an important feature of seeing-as ascriptions is 
their referential opacity. Such an opacity depends on the fact that they are ascriptions 
of a certain cognitive stand of the subject  toward an object, of a certain taking-as. 
Even if such a taking-as may be non-conceptual but “categorical” or recognitional, 
nonetheless in “S sees a as (an) F” you cannot salva veritate substitute the “F” with 
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co-referential expressions. Of course, you can substitute a with a co-referential 
expression b, because seeing-a is transparent and extensional. What is not transparent 
and extensional, is not the specification of what you see (a), rather it is the 
specification of the way you cognize or categorize what you see (of the “F” you take 
a as being). So seeing-as ascriptions are referentially opaque, even if they entail 
transparent seeing-O ascriptions as their constituents (as it was the case of seeing-
that ascriptions as well). 
 
4.5 – What is a Sensible Profile? The SCM-properties 
A last remark is worth examining. Even if the arguments for F in [S sees a as (an) F] 
are usually sortal terms – a prey, a rabbit, a cathode ray tube, a duck, an apple, a 
table, and so on – actually that is not necessarily the case. The argument for F can 
well be the property of [being a red thing], [being of a certain shape] and so on. 
Despite the fact that an expression like “seeing something as red” sounds less natural 
than “seeing something as an apple”, the logic of ascription is the same. S sees an 
object as having a certain color that S can recursively recognize, a color to which S is 
perceptually and cognitively sensitive
51
. In cases of seeing something as red, as 
square, as having a certain size, and so on, there is not just a categorization prompted 
by the appreciation of a sensible profile, there is also a recognition of properties 
directly belonging to the strictly, visually appreciated sensible profile. So, there are 
seeing-as episodes that concern purely perceptual properties, even if they are 
cognized or recognized within the episode. Accordingly, there are two possible kinds 
of mistake involved in seeing-as: A mistake consisting of prompting the wrong 
category in front of a particular exhibiting a sensible profile which is correctly 
appreciated by the subject, and a mistake consisting of failing to appreciate 
properties the very sensible profile is made of, so to speak. An example of the first 
mistake could be a case in which S correctly sees a shape with a color, a size (a case 
of seeing the sensible profile as it is) but she takes the particular exhibiting that 
                                                
51 The very same happens with the locution “O looks F” or “O looks as an F”: the argument for F can 
be an adjective, like “red”, or a sortal term, like “a tomato”, but both refers to properties, the 
property of being red and the property of being a tomato. See Price 2011, 141. In the same vein, 
we can say that S sees O as F or S sees O as an F, according to whether F denotes a property to be 
expressed with an adjective, like [red], or a sortal property to be expressed by a name, like [a 
tomato]. Anyway, both “seeing something as a red thing” and “seeing something as a tomato”, are 
ascriptions having the same structure, although the properties referred to are quite different. 
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profile to be an F when it is not an F. An example of the second mistake could be the 
case in which you see a particular as having a shape, and/or a color, and/or a size, 
that the particular does not objectively exhibit. The latter is a purely visual mistake, 
so to speak. The first is a cognitively thicker mistake. 
What do we mean by the recognized properties directly belonging to the sensible 
profile? It is that set of properties the visual system is sensitive to in the first place. In 
what follows, I will call them spatial-chromatic-morphological properties (SCM), 
namely, those properties the subject must be visually aware of in the first place, in 
order to be able to take that visually appreciated sensible profile as being something 
known, as being an (example of) F
52
. Without seeing an object as having certain 
colors, certain shapes and sizes, certain locations and spatial relations with the 
surroundings, a subject could not take any seen object to be anything else. I call an 
instantiated cluster of those basic SCM properties an objective “sensible profile”
53
. A 
particular is seen by S in virtue of S being aware of some properties of its sensible 
profile, in virtue of S looking some way so S, as we had put the same point above.  
 
4.6 – The features of seeing-as 
Let us finally sum up that long but necessary digression about seeing-as' ascriptions: 
1) [Seeing a as (an) F] is implicative (a must be there to be seen) but it is not factive 
(a may not be an F), it has correctness-conditions insofar as it may be 
wrong/uncorrect/mistaken. 
2) It does not entail seeing-that a is (an) F even though it puts the subject in a 
position to see-that a is an F, provided that the subject possesses the concept of F and 
the relevant propositional capacities. Though, seeing a as an F does not necessarily 
involve either the [F]-concept possession or conceptual abilities at all.  
3) Nonetheless, seeing-as is cognitive and involves a taking-as stand toward the seen 
object, consisting of the exercise of a positive recognitional, 'categorical' capacity. 
Such ascriptions are referentially opaque just insofar as they ascribe a way an object 
is cognized by the subject and from the point of view of the subject. 
4) Finally, when it is used non-metaphorically but literally, as referring to episodes of 
                                                
52 In the same vein, McGinn 1982, 42, calls those properties the “manifest properties” of an object. 
53 I take the expression from Johnston 2004, but I do not mean to commit myself to his way of 
characterizing it. 
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recognition-by-vision, seeing-as presupposes the visual awareness of a sensible 
profile – made out of spatial-chromatic-morphological properties – as a strictly 
perceptual basis for the thicker categorization (in case F is not itself a SCM property 
like being of a certain color, shape, size, location and the like). So far so good for 
seeing-as ordinary ascriptions. 
 
Section 5 - Looking, seeming, appearing 
5.1 – Looks/Seems/Appears: Analogies and differences 
Ascriptions of visual perceptions often involve predicates – like “seeming”, 
“looking”, “appearing”– belonging to the “experiential” vocabulary, that characterize 
the ascribed visual episode from the point of view of the subject, so to speak
54
. Let us 
straightforwardly start our analysis by using everyday examples. Consider some 
common ordinary uses of “looks” to begin with: 
 
1) a looks F (to S) 
2) a looks like (an) F 
3) a looks (to S) as if it is F 
4) It looks (to S) that [a is F], It looks as though [a is F], It looks as if [a is F] 
5) There looks to be an a which is F 
 
The looking-ascriptions are but only one relevant type among the ascriptions 
involving what Chisholm calls the “language of appearing”
55
. Indeed analog 
statements to “looks ----” could be constructed with “appears” and “seems” – when 
used in visual contexts – in the place of “looks”
56
. Although, as Austin suggests
57
, 
there are relevant and philosophically interesting differences between appears-, 
seems-, and looks- ascriptions in ordinary discourse. Firstly, suitable contexts of 
ascriptions for “looks” do normally involve vision. At least, they involve episodes of 
                                                
54 As we will see, “looks F” often characterizes something as having an objective look. When I say 
that expressions as “looks” have to do with the point of view of the experiencing subject, I mean 
that even objective looks are potential ways of being experienced by one (by everyone, by a 
“normal” perceiver) as looking in such-and-such way. Without any subject of experience at all, 
even objective looks would just be purely potential looks. 
55 Chisholm 1957, Chapter 4. 
56 Austin 1962, 33-43. 
57 Ibidem. 
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seeing, so that when they are used with reference to non-visual episodes they are 
metaphorical applications stretching the proper sense of “looking” in the same way 
as “seeing” itself can be stretched as to cover non-visual cases (see above). On the 
contrary, “appears” and “seems” may or may not carry an implicit reference to vision 
or to literal seeing. An a may well non-metaphorically appear or seem F without a 
being seen or a being a typically visible entity, without its appearing F being the 
consequence of a visual episode (for example, of the appreciation of a visually given 
sensible profile). According to Austin, while “looks” involves a visual appearance, 
“appears” tendentially involves a reference to special circumstances and “seems” 
tendentially involves a reference to  evidence. Let us consider that taxonomy by 
considering an example: a) “He looks guilty” b) “He appears guilty” c) “He seems 
guilty”. Approximately, they respectively mean: a) His visual appearance is typical 
of guilty men (be he guilty or not) b) Given such unusual circumstances, one may 
take him as being guilty (even if he is not) c) There is a prima facie evidence that he 
is guilty. 
So, a man can seem guilty without looking guilty. Independently of his visual 
appearance, there may be evidence that he is guilty. Vice versa, a man can look 
guilty without seeming guilty. Despite exhibiting a visual appearance which is 
typically associated with guilt, there is non-visual evidence that he is not guilty. So, a 
man can appear guilty without either looking or seeming such. For example, he can 
appear to be guilty given such and such extraordinary coincidences, but fortunately 
for him there is independent evidence that these are just coincidences, and so on. Of 
course, these three uses are not unrelated: The a's distinctive visual appearance 
(look) may well be used as an evidence (seem) supporting the proposition that a is F. 
Likewise, a distinctive look exhibited by a may be what you appeal to when you 
state that a appears F in special circumstances. But there is no immediate implication 
from looking to seeming, or from looking to appearing, or the other way round. One 
could understandably say that the Moon looks no bigger than a sixpence, even if she 
would never say that the Moon seems no bigger than a sixpence
58
. “Seeming” has to 
                                                
58 “Seems”-, “looks-” and “appears”- ascription are occasion-sensitive, so to say. Depending on the 
context even their relation changes. For example, as Austin suggests, football players seen from 
the highest seats of the stadium can be said to “look like ants” without that implying at all that they 
“seem ants” thereby. So, that an animal looks like a pig in the distance, could eventually used as a 
prima facie evidence that it is a pig, so that one could say that it also seems a pig. But if a cloud is 
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do with a non-conclusive evidence, and is therefore appropriate for cases when it 
may or it may not be the case. If you know that a is not F, you do not generally say 
that a seems F, neither do you say that if you know that a is F. A particular feature of 
“seems”, having to do with its reference to evidence, makes its logical behavior quite 
different from both “appears” and “looks”. You can say that judging from its 
appearance, something is such-and-such, you can say that judging from its look, 
something is such-and-such, but you cannot say that judging from its seeming, 
something is such and such. That depends on “lookings” and appearances being facts 
on which a judgment can be based, whilst “seeming” is already a prima facie 
judgment or an inclination to judge. In other words, “seems” refers to a certain body 
of evidence, “looks” and “appears” refer to facts that may eventually count as a 
non-conclusive evidence for a proposition, that a seeming consists of. Given all that, 
given also that “appears” when used as involving vision can be substituted by 
“looks” plus a reference to some special circumstances
59
 – it is clear that the 
constructions involving “look” are of the greatest interest for our concerns. Indeed in 
their most natural use they seem essentially to have do to with visual perception, 
differently from “appears” and “seems”. Consequently, let us focus on them. 
 
5.2 – A principle governing 'looks'-ascriptions 
In the Austinian example provided above, the predicate standing as a complement of 
“look” does not actually denote a typically visible property: [guiltiness], whatever it 
is, is not the kind of property we would take as observational, as something the eyes 
could be directly sensitive to in the first place
60
. Nonetheless, seeing someone and 
appreciating a certain cluster of visual SCM-properties typically associated with that 
'thick' property ([being guilty]), can make it possible that one looks guilty, appears 
                                                                                                                                     
said to look like a pig instead, there would not be any temptation whatsoever to say that the cloud 
seems a pig thereby. 
59 Of course not every occurrence of “appears” implicitly or explicitly entails the presence of special 
circumstances. Ordinary discourse is occasion-sensitive, context-dependent, variable, 
heterogeneous. Austin himself does not mean to argue that a reference to special circumstances is 
necessary for “appears” to be appropriate. Rather, he tries to reconstruct the use of such an 
expression according to what a normal speaker usually and generally does with that expression. 
60 I argued above (see Section 2) that we can see an object only in virtue of being visually aware of 
some of its properties. In that sense, if S sees O, O must look somehow to S. Now, nothing can be 
literally seen by one only in virtue of looking guilty to one. Rather, it can be seen in virtue of 
looking blue, so-and-so shaped, moving, and the like. For the time being, that intuitive test should 
be enough to demarcate observational properties from non-observational ones. 
 36 
guilty according to its look, seems guilty to one if one is to judge him just on the 
basis of his actual look. So, we can express that as a general principle: 
 
In order for something a to look F, when F is not an SCM-property, a must look G in 
the first place, where G is a complex of SCM-properties which individuates a certain 
visual profile. 
 
Let us forget guiltiness then, whose recognition just-by-looking, by the way, 
presupposes high-level skills at recognizing facial patterns, at fine-grained 
psychological interpretations of expressions matched with verbal and non-verbal 
behavior, and so on. But even if we take another non-SCM complement of “looks” 
involved in the ascriptive scheme “a looks F” – like “a pig”, “a table”, “a tree” – still 
the principle just mentioned holds. Something can look F (say a pig) only if it 
exhibits a sensible profile made of a certain cluster of SCM-visual properties
61
. For 
example, those distinctive features typically characterizing pigs, like a pinkish color, 
a certain shape and size, certain movements, and the like. So, what I have just noted 
also entails that for an a to look F to S, S must possess the recognitional capacity for 
Fs, namely, S must be able to be prompted to a certain recognition by being able to 
associate that known/familiar type of things with the as much familiar typical, 
distinctive sensible profile exhibited by things of that type. So, we should distinguish 
expressions like “looks angry, looks (like) a pig, looks European” and the like, from 
expressions like “looks blue, looks round, looks to be moving toward me, looks big” 
and the like. When “looks” is used literally, the first type of ascription to one's 
experience always and necessarily entails the second type. Roughly put, there is a 
purely visual-perceptual “look” on the one hand, and a cognitively loaded 
recognition based on the appreciation of a purely visual-perceptual look, on the 
                                                
61 For now I keep totally neutral about whether properties like [table] or [pig] can be represented in 
perception. According to the Content View on perception, O's looking F to S can, for some cases 
at least, consist on S's visual experience's representing the property F as instantiated by O. 
According to our principle above, if the Content View is true and if properties like [table] and [pig] 
could be contents of perceptual experiences, then it would be true that: In order an experience to 
represent something as a pig or as a table, the very same experience must represent the object as 





. No thick recognition just by looking, without sensitivity to strictly visual 
properties. 
 
5.3 – Three uses of 'looks' 
Not only are there many possible constructions involving “looks”, there also seem to 
be different and irreducible uses of that expression. A classical taxonomy of these 
uses has been notoriously provided by Chisholm
63
. Chisholm distinguishes three uses 
which he respectively calls epistemic, comparative, and non-comparative. Such a 
threefold taxonomy has been successively articulated by Jackson as well
64
, though 
Jackson's version is slightly different as we will see soon. 
Let us introduce and consider such a proposal for a critical assessment in the first 
place.  
The epistemic use is paradigmatically (but not only) given in the propositional 
construction like “It looks as if P”, for example, “It looks as if the dog is running 
after a cat”, or “it looks as if it will rain soon”. Such sentences can be indexed to a 
subject (“It looks to me/to S that P). Their use is called epistemic insofar as they 
allegedly mean: There is a body of visually acquired evidence that supports the 
proposition P
65
. So, “It looks (to me) as if P” roughly captures the situation referred 
to by Austin when a certain visual look is considered as a potential evidence for a 
proposition, resulting in a “seeming”. But while “seeming” is already committal, it is 
a guarded assent, the epistemic use of “looking” is not necessarily committal. That 
there is a body of visually acquired evidence that supports the proposition P, can well 
be compatible with the knowledge that non-P, while such a circumstance is ruled out 
for “seeming”-claims. If I know or believe that it is not going to rain, I can say that it 
                                                
62 Here “based” does not entail inferential processes from premises to conclusions of course, but it 
only entails that given a capacity of a certain kind, a more basic capacity of another type must be 
already in play. 
63 See Chisholm 1957, ch. 4. 
64 See Jackson 1977. 
65 Such epistemic use of “looks”, individuated by Chisholm and Jackson, corresponds to the 
Austinian analysis of “seems” where the evidence supporting the proposition must be of a visual 
nature. On the epistemic sense of 'looks', see also Alston 1999 and Lyons 2005. Lyons 
distinguishes a 'pure' and an 'experiential' sense of what he calls epistemic-doxastic 'looks'. 
According to the pure use, X looks F to S iff S is disposed to believe that X is F, according to the 
experiential use, X looks F to S iff the way X looks to S disposes S to believe that X is F. We are 
interested in the experiential use here. I have called the pure use, at least when not essentially 
connected with perceptual means, 'metaphorical' (just as seeing when not involving the visual 
apparatus), and I leave it to one side. 
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looks as if it is going to rain
66
, but I would not say that it seems that it is going to 
rain. Maybe I have heard the official forecast, so that I know it will be sunny, but at 
the same time it looks as if it is going to rain soon because the sky is darkish and the 
air is wet. So, “it looks as if” is a non committal claim that there is visually acquired 
prima facie evidence supporting a proposition, independently of whether P is known 
to be true or false for other reasons (non-visual collateral knowledge and the like).  
However, there is a non-propositional construction not considered by Jackson, 
consisting of the scheme “a looks (to me) as if it is F” (let's say: F = triangular). As 
Maund points out
67
, in such ascriptions (or self-ascriptions) the object a must be a 
seen object which plays a causal role in the ascribed experience of a's looking F to 
one. Differently from “It looks as if [a is F]”, “a looks as if it is F”, for example, is 
not compatible with S not seeing a at all, while on the contrary it may (even visually) 
look to me as if a is F because I see that b is G and b's being G supports the 
proposition that a is F
68
. So, in sentences like the latter, two distinct elements are 
involved, a seen object a, and a distinctive way it looks which can eventually provide 
a reason for a certain belief about a (so to ground a “seeming” concerning a). The 
non-propositional construction – let us call it de re-looking construction – therefore 
involves reference to a distinctive visual appearance of the seen object,
69
 while the 
propositional construction does not
70
.  
                                                
66 Although, it would not be a very natural thing to say. That may be why Travis 2004, 76, does not 
agree: “It cannot look as if X on this notion where it is perfectly plain that X is not so”. I find that 
if you say “It looks as if P even if not-P”, you are saying that all the evidence immediately 
available supports P, but you have other sources of knowledge which defeat such evidence. Maybe 
it sounds a bit unnatural, but it seems to be perfectly understandable. 
67 I take that remark by Maund 2003, 137ff. 
68 For example, it seems to me to recognize the postman coming toward my house, so I say: “It looks 
as if the mailbox is still empty”. I see the postman and his coming toward my house, so that seen 
fact supports the proposition that the mailbox is still empty (given that I have already taken home 
the post yesterday). Seeing b (postman) and seeing that b is G (him coming to my house) supports 
the proposition that a is F (the mailbox is empty). No causal role is directly played by the mailbox 
in that “looking”, I don't even need to be seeing it. Differently, if I say that “the mailbox looks as if 
it was empty”, presumably I am seeing it, maybe without opening it so that there can be room for 
doubt (otherwise I would just say that the mailbox is empty). 
69 As Sellars points out, in ascribing  “X looks red to S”, I am endorsing the existence of X , while in 
ascribing “It looks to S as if there is a red object over there”, I am not even endorsing the existence 
of an object seen by S and looking to her a certain way. See Sellars 1953, § 21. For example, the 
first can be a successful perception or an illusion, but not a hallucination, the second could be also 
a hallucination without any object being there to be seen. On these lines goes also Snowdon's 
disjunctivist treatment of 'looking'-ascriptions: if (it looks as if there is an F), either (there is 
something which looks to S to be F) or (it is to S as if there is something which looks to S to be F). 
See Snowdon 1981, 185. 
70 So, if it is true that “If I see something it looks somehow to me” (Shoemaker 1975, 299), as we 
 39 
The second use of “looks” is called comparative by both Chisholm and Jackson. It 
typically (but not exclusively) comes in look-like constructions, like “X looks like 
(an) F”, “X looks like Y” and so on. For example, “Jack looks like his brother”, “that 
zebra from here looks like a horse”, “Tom looks like a poodle”, “the football players, 
seen from the high terraces of the stadium, look like ants, or like black spots”, and 
the like. That use explicitly establishes a comparison between two things with respect 
to the way each of them respectively looks (where only one thing needs to be 
actually seen). They look the same way, namely, they exhibit a similar visual 
appearance. That comparison may be indexed to a subject, to more or less special 
circumstances, to a time, to a point of view, and so on. For example, to me, now, 
with that light and from my actual point of view, that zebra over there looks like a 
horse. That indexing does not mean that comparative looking-claims are intrinsically 
subjective. On the contrary, A can look like B, or like an F, without further 
qualifications. Two things can share a shape, a color, a whole sensible appearance 
just because that is the way they are, they look similar when both appearing as they 
are, seen in standard circumstances by anybody. Moreover, when a looking-claim is 
made which is indexed to a subject and to her actual point of view, there is not 
necessarily a reference to the individual subjectivity involved in the particular 
episode. I can well say that X looks like Y to me, from here, in these circumstances, 
meaning that such-and-such conditions makes X and Y look the same (or similar), 
whoever is looking at them in these conditions I now find myself in
71
. A football 
player seen from the highest seats of the stadium, objectively – at least 
intersubjectively – looks like an ant, like a black small rolling ball, and so on. Ways 
of looking, and the relational property of something's looking like something else, 
are publicly assessable features of objects
72
. The comparative use, though, must be 
                                                                                                                                     
have argued for above, on the other side it is true the other way round, namely, that if something 
looks somehow to me, I must be seeing it.  
71 Here by  “these conditions”  I mean: The type of conditions of which my actual conditions are a 
token. 
72 As Austin brilliantly points out “[...] the way things look is, in general, just as much a fact about 
the world, just as open to public confirmation or challenge, as the way things are. I am not 
disclosing a fact about myself but about petrol, when I say that petrol looks like water” (Austin 
1962, 64). To use Searle's expression, the reciprocal property of looking the same (characterizing 
two things) is not “ontologically subjective” (Searle 1992). If it presupposes ontologically 
subjective properties characterizing the experience of a subject who appreciates such a looking-like 
relation, that has to be argued on independent bases. Looking-like relations are objective relations 
appreciated by subjects through their experiences. 
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distinguished from the epistemic use because it does not entail any evidence 
supporting a proposition, any “seeming” to S as if things are in a certain way. X's 
looking like Y or like an F to S, does not entail at all that it looks to S as if X is Y or 
an F. That drawn shape looks like a horse to S, but it in no way looks as if it is a 
horse. Appreciating the similarity of the way X looks to the way F looks is by no 
means the same as being inclined to believe that X is an F, nor is it the same as 
taking X's look as eventually supporting the proposition that X is F. So, comparative 
looking has nothing essential to do with evidence (even though, obviously, a 
similarity between the looks exhibited by two objects may be used as evidence for 
propositions concerning the respective things). A relevant feature of the comparative 
use is that, when the ascriptive scheme involves an object and a sortal term as in “a 
looks like an F to S”, ascribing a comparative looking-like experience to a subject 
entails ascribing her the general capacity to recognize Fs just by looking, to have 
both familiarity with F's sensible profile and the recognitional capacity concerning 
examples of F as such. If a can look like a table to me, then generally I must be able 
to recognize tables just by looking, I must be familiar with tables, if I must know 
what they are (where “knowing” is to be meant loosely, as not necessarily involving 
the possession of the respective concept but only the recognitional category, see 
above the seeing-as Section).  
Both the epistemic and the comparative use of “look” have to do with visual 
appearances as experienced by a subject. The epistemic use involves a certain body 
of evidence being visually acquired, so it implicitly ascribes a visual experience to a 
subject. The comparative use, by comparing ways of looking, presupposes the 
subject's visual sensitivity to each of both ways of looking which are compared. For 
example with the way a looks as grasped as being the same as the way Fs look)
73
. In 
order to visually appreciate a looking-like relation, I must be able to visually 
appreciate the involved relata in the first place
74
. Indeed looking like an F is looking 
                                                
73 On pain of infinite regress, “X looks like (an) F” must presuppose a non-comparative grasp of the 
general way Fs look. If that way was specified by F's looking like Gs, an implicit reference to the 
way Gs look would be made thereby. Now, if G's looking such-and-such was also comparatively 
specified, then a foothold for that last comparison should be pointed, and so on. We need to stop at 
some point and refer to the way things of a certain kind generally look, independently on them 
looking like something else.  
74 By pointing a looking-like relation, either we can compare the typical way Fs look with the typical 
way Gs look, or we can compare the particular way that F looks now in that actual circumstance 
 41 
the way an F looks, so the comparative use is explained using “looks F”. If the 
comparative use was not grounded on another non-comparative sense of “looks”, his 




5.4 – Is there a phenomenological 'looks'? 
So, it seems that both those uses presuppose a third, more fundamental use of 
“looks” which is neither the epistemic one nor the comparative one but must be 
implicitly involved in them. Chisholm negatively calls it “non-comparative”, while 
Jackson positively labels it “phenomenal”. Such a use refers to the way or to a way 
something visually looks, which both can ground a looking-like claim – a looks like 
an F because both a and Fs look that way – as well as an epistemic use – a' s looking 
this way may be an evidence that a is this or that way. How are we to specify a way 
something visually looks without appealing either to what it looks like or to what it 
seems prima facie to be? By describing a sensible profile as an arranged and unified 
complex of SCM properties (for SCM=spatial-chomatic-morphological). For 
example, if a looks like a pig, it must look the way pigs typically look. So how do 
pigs typically look? Excluding a circular comparative appeal to some other type of 
things pigs could look like, we are to individuate some typical “piggish” visible 
features, a complex pattern of SCM-properties exhibited by pigs in standard 
conditions: Colors, shape, movements and patterns of movements, size, shape-
details, and so on. Such a complex visual appearance would constitute a complex 
look decomposable in elements like: It looks [pink], It looks [round (in a certain 
manner)], it looks [with that and that shape] and so on
76
. Recognizing a pig just by 
                                                                                                                                     
with the typical way Gs look, or we can compare the typical way Fs look in certain circumstances 
with the typical way Gs look in other circumstances. 
75 That remark is made by Byrne 2011, 72. Travis 2004 complains that looking-like' claims are 
normally silent on what way is both the relata just look. “Pia looks like her sister”: Well, what 
way, how, do Pia and her sister look? He takes that as an argument against that lookings cannot 
determine the content, but that is not our concern here. To take in Travis' suggestion about 
looking-like, we need to individuate another non comparative use and sense of “look” to make 
sense of the comparative use. Travis does not recognize any other non-comparative use apart from 
the one Chisholm and Jackson call the epistemic use. 
76 The verbal description of a F's general sensible profile could not be as fine-grained as needed for 
individuation of that sensible profile. That is not the issue at stake here though. I am talking about 
distinctive visual profiles, whose indication could eventually need to be partially demonstrative. 
For example, “that round shape typical of pigs” would be circular as a part of the description of a 
general way pigs look, but it could make sense as a demonstrative way to pick out a certain 
peculiar round shape in order to be understood by one who is familiar with pigs and their visual 
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sight presupposes being able to be visually aware of these look-properties as well as 
of their unified complex as a global sensible profile, and appreciate them as potential 
presentations of pigs. 
Such a “phenomenological” use of looks
77
 therefore would concern strictly visual 
properties and sensible profiles. According to Jackson
78
, the phenomenal use – that is 
how he calls it – is limited to properties like “red”, “triangular”, “moving”, and the 
like, so that “it looks blue” can be phenomenal but “it looks old” cannot
79
. Moreover, 
he argues that “looks” has such a special meaning when (and only when) it is 
followed by what I have been calling SMC-predicates, namely, terms for colors, 
shapes, sizes, distances and the like. Why is there a need for introducing that third 
use? Is its application really limited to SCM-properties? What Jackson calls 
“phenomenal use” is the one involved in cases like the following ones: 
 
1) There is a sense in which a tilted coin looks elliptical to S, even if it seems round 
to S. 
2) There is a sense in which a red surface at night looks brown, even if it seems red 
to S. 
3) There is a sense in which a blade of grass before S's eyes looks bigger to S than a 
huge tree in the distance (which is the same sense in which the Moon looks no bigger 
than a sixpence). 
4) There is a sense in which a straight stick into water looks bent, even if it seems 
straight and not bent. 
 
Now, these cases do not hint at all at a body of visually acquired evidence for a 
                                                                                                                                     
recognition. What matters here are visual properties we are sensitive to, not our verbal description 
of them. 
77 While Jackson calls it “phenomenal”, I prefer the looser characterization of it as 
“phenomenological” because Jackson's positive account of that use takes it as involving mental 
objects which strongly resemble the more classical and notorious sense-data. But just recognizing 
the existence of a phenomenological use in the ordinary discourse is still neutral on the existence 
of intrinsically subjective phenomenal properties having a suspicious ontology like sense-data. See 
below. 
78 See Jackson 1977, 77ff. 
79 Also Tye 2000, 54, agrees with Jackson on that phenomenal looks talk involves locutions of the 
form “X looks F to S” where 'F' must express a sensory property. Other philosophers, who hold a) 
that high-level properties like [dog] or [lemon] can be represented in visual perception b) that the 
phenomenology of experience supervenes on represented properties, do not limit the phenomenal 
look-ascriptions to strictly visual properties.  
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proposition, so the epistemic use is ruled out as a candidate for interpreting the 
sentences above. The coin's looking elliptical in that context is by no means even 
prima facie evidence that it is elliptical (at least it may be evidence that it is round). 
The surface's looking brown in that case is not evidence for it being brown (at least it 
is evidence for it being red). The blade of grass's looking bigger than the tree in that 
circumstance is not evidence for the proposition [the blade is bigger than the tree], 
the bent appearance of the stick partially immersed into water is not evidence for its 
being bent
80
. Nor are these essentially comparative cases. If they were, in any case 
they would presuppose implicit reference to a look to be picked out non-
comparatively (may be demonstratively, or otherwise), on pain of circularity. So they 
need to belong to a third, irreducible use or sense of “looking”
81
. 
Perhaps some would not agree that that is a legitimate ordinary use of “looks”, 
indeed some hold that it is actually just a piece of philosophical jargon. But do we 
really need any philosophical background at all to immediately understand 1-4, to 
understand for example that the Moon looks no bigger than a sixpence in a certain 
sense? I do not think we do. On the contrary, we do talk that way quite naturally. 
Provided that we do, it has to be made explicit what we do when we do so. 
According to Jackson, in doing so we implicitly quantify over mental objects having 
intrinsically subjective phenomenal properties, namely mental items which are 
analogous to the classical sense-data
82
. But I think it is quite possible to hold that 
there is a “phenomenological” use of “looks” in ordinary discourse about experiences 
and experienced things, without accepting that there is an even implicit commitment 
to sense-data-like entities as a result. For that I call that third use phenomenological 
because it sounds more neutral than “phenomenal”. Indeed, that use has to do with 
the ways a thing can appear to a perceiver, but that in no way entails that such ways 
of appearing are necessarily 'mental' or intrinsically subjective. 
                                                
80 The Jackson's proposal on which the 'phenomenal use' is limited to SCM-properties, does not 
mean that any look-ascription followed by SCM-properties must be phenomenal. An SCM-look 
ascription may well be epistemic. An object may be said to look red because there is prima facie 
evidence, in certain circumstances of (non-optimal) observation, that it is red, so it looks to be red. 
It is important to remark that an object can keep its 'purely visual' epistemic look (that size, that 
shape, that color) and change its 'non purely visual' epistemic look: a DVD can look intriguing and 
then unappealing, because of a change of interest in the subject, without changing its visual looks. 
The example is by Price 2011. 
81 A similar distinction, between “intentional look”, public and referential, and “qualitative look”, 
private and subjective, is to be found in Block 1990.  
82 See Broad 1925, Price 1932, Ayer 1940.  
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5.5 – Phenomenological 'looks' is not independent  
I will argue that when we say that a tilted coin looks elliptical or that the moon looks 
no bigger than a sixpence, we are implicitly making the very sophisticated 
counterfactual operation of comparing the actual experienced situation with another 
possible perceptual situation in which we would be looking at an elliptical object (or 
at a sixpence-big object). Namely, we do compare two objective ways of appearing, 
one of which is actual, the other of which is only possible. So, comparing two ways 
of appearing does entail the capacity of non-comparatively appreciating the way each 
relatum looks, but that does not entail at all that the “appearance-property” standing 
as a complement of “looks” is intrinsically mental or subjective. So, such uses are 
sorts of complicated comparative uses which do presuppose a non-comparative, 
“phenomenological” but not a phenomenal use of “looks” in the sense meant by 
Jackson. Now I try to make my point explicit. 
Take the sentence: “The penny looks elliptical”, said in front of a tilted coin which 
my experience does not present as being elliptical at all but rather as being a round 
object seen from a certain perspective. Now, in saying that it looks elliptical, I 
indirectly refer to the way elliptical things look. So, I refer to the distinctive 
appearance exhibited by things that are elliptical, seen in a given circumstance which 
I take as paradigmatic for fixing a typical way of looking, as a mark constituting the 
visual memory of that property, so to say (in a similar way, if I am to suddenly 
visualize my brother, I “put before my mind” his face seen from before, even if I 
would suddenly recognize him in many other perceptual circumstances). So, what I 
am saying is: Even if the penny looks the way round things look to one when tilted, it 
also looks in a similar way to the way elliptical things look to one when not tilted. 
Likewise, the Moon looks no bigger than a sixpence, because it looks – in a certain, 
quite abstract respect – the way a sixpence looks up close. So, a red thing looks 
brown insofar as it looks the way a brown thing looks in daylight, which is the 
paradigmatic circumstance that fixes the visual memory of “the” way a red thing 
looks when it looks as it is. Being able to abstract away those phenomenological 
similarities between objective looks from the respective perceptual circumstances, is 
a very sophisticated skill. Indeed the tilted coin looks to be round because of our 
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visual appreciation of perspectival properties, the tree looks to be bigger than the 
blade because binocularity and focus make us able to appreciate the distance, the 
object looks to be red because our visual system is able to keep the color looking (to 
be) constant despite illumination-changes. But in a really sophisticated sense 
(although an ordinary and not just an exclusively philosophical sense) the tree may 
be said to look smaller than the blade of grass, the red object may be said to look 
brown, and so on. When an object moves away from us, despite the size-constancy 
(it looks to be a constant size), still something changes in our visual experience, 
indeed it is thanks to that change that we can perceive that it is moving away from 
us
83
. In order to express that change, we can lean on a counterfactual situation which 
would be in some way similar to our actual one: We can imagine the way a stationary 
object would appear, when becoming smaller and smaller before our eyes. That is 
what “looks” in such a special “phenomenological” sense mean. If we call looking
1
 
the “looking” involved in the epistemic constructions (= looking to be = visually 
seeming) and looking
2




  F iff it exhibits the same visual appearance an F would exhibit in a possible 
experience of an F seen in paradigmatic circumstances, in which it would look to be 
an F, i.e. look
1
 (an) F. 
 
As clumsy as that characterization could sound, I think that it captures what matters. 
Such phenomenological use of “looks” is distinct but nonetheless parasitic on the use 
of “looks” involved in epistemic constructions where looking F means looking to be 
F. The tilted coin does look
2
 elliptical without looking to be elliptical, because it 
looks as an elliptical coin would look to be in certain paradigmatic circumstances 
other than the actual ones. What I am denying, then, is not the existence of a 
phenomenological use of “look”, but the fact that it must concern ontologically 
subjective properties (Jackson) referred to by a sort of parallel phenomenal language. 
Rather, it concerns publicly assessable properties that characterize worldly objects, 
                                                
83 Peacocke 1983, 12-14, discusses the case of seeing two trees of the same size on the same street. 
The one which is farther away will look smaller in some sense, even though it does not look to be 
smaller. On the contrary, in optimal conditions it look to be the same size as the nearer one. In 
short, there is a phenomenal contrast between the trees, which does not seem to be due to a 
contrast in which properties are experienced as characterizing the trees. 
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though it implicitly refers, for a sophisticated comparison, to a non-actual, 
counterfactual perceptual situation in which other circumstances hold and different 
objects would be seen. 
 
5.6 – 'looks F' depends on 'is F' 
So, according to that interpretation of the  “phenomenological” use of “look”, “looks 
F” (looks
2




Now, I want to argue – on the lines of a famous thesis held by Sellars
84
 – that on its 
own “looking to be F” is logically dependent on “is F”, so that “being F” is prior to 
“looking F” even for F = SCM- properties (like [green], [square], [round] and the 
like). If that is the case, not only looking-F (looks
2
) is parasitic on looking-to-be-F 
(looks
1
), but also looking-to-be-F on its own is parasitic on being-F in a strong sense.  
Given the sentence “a looks F to S” with respect to its superficial grammar, we have 
a triadic relation, that of [looking] involving an object, a subject and a property as its 
arguments. Sense-data theorists analyze such a relation by appealing to sense-data
85
. 
For example, when the (round) penny looks elliptical to John, provided that nothing 
elliptical is out there, the [elliptical]-property  would be instantiated by a mental 
sense-datum, which would be the 'real' argument for F. Others would take the 
[looking]-relation as primitive and therefore not analyzable
86
. Without entering into 
that substantial debate, I will take advantage of some illuminating remarks by Sellars 
in order to show that we do not need to introduce any intrinsically subjective entity to 
either explain or analyze the ordinarily ascribed looking-relation “X looks F to S”
87
. 
The core idea is that of taking reports like “a looks F to me” as saying less than “I 
                                                
84 Cfr. Sellars 1953, §§ 10-23. 
85 Other sense-data theorists, like Broad 1925, introduce sense-data not to analyze the relation above 
but to explain it in cases when, as in the example above, nothing elliptical is there. Also Jackson 
1977 and Robinson 1994 accept sense-data-like mental objects as the only possible explanation of 
perceptual illusions. But for the time being we do not need to enter into that substantial debate 
here, because now we are concerned with the ordinary discourse. 
86  That is the so-called theory of appearing, originally proposed by Chisholm 1950 and then 
developed by Alston. See Alston 1988, 1999, 2005. 
87  Of course, there may be many other substantive reasons for introducing sense-data which are 
independent from  trying to make sense of the ordinary discourse insofar as it involves looking-
expressions and the like. I am not interested in arguing again sense-data theories as such, rather I 
am pointing out that we can make perfectly sense of ordinary looking-sentences without taking 
that such sentences (rightly or wrongly) implicitly quantify over sense-data or analog mental 
entities. 
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see that a is F” but as implicitly referring to that positive case, namely, as 
characterizing one's visual experience as being just like one in which one sees that a 
is F – or a as being F just as it is – but at the same time without endorsing that 
content [a is F]. If “a looks F” would mean “a is F according to my visual 
experience”, the ascription of something looking red to one is the ascription of an 
experience individuated by its being just as though one was seeing that something is 
red, just as if one is seeing something as it is
88
. So, all that looking-red involves is the 
ability to recognize red things just by looking, plus the possibility of talking of one's 
experience as withholding its authority about how things are according to it. As 
Sellars says: 
 
“'x looks red to S' has the sense of 'S has an experience which involves in a unique 
way the idea that that x is red and involves it in such a way that if this idea were true 
– and if S knew that the circumstances were normal – the experience would be 




The priority of “is red” over “looks red” entails that the perceptual standard 
conditions for recognizing something as red – which must be known by one 
mastering the [red] concept – are conditions in which things look as they are (= red), 
conditions that give content to the very concept of being red. So, instead of analyzing 
[red] as “what looks red in standard conditions”, the very standard conditions for 
something being recognized by one as being red also fix what it means to just look 
red to one without being such. If a just looks red to one, one's experience is as if one 
was experiencing a red thing, without being such an experience (no red thing is 
experienced indeed). 
Sellars illustrates that priority of “is F” over “looks F” through a fictional story
90
, 
which I will now re-tell and sum up a bit freely. Suppose John, the owner of a 
necktie shop, has only experienced colors in standard conditions in daylight and has 
learned the respective concepts that way, so that when he says “This is green”, “that 
                                                
88 Sellars's account of “looking” is actually the first appearance of a disjunctive theory of experience, 
whose paternity is generally ascribed to Hinton 1967. 
89  Sellars 1953, § 22. 
90  See Sellars 1953, § 14-17. 
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is red”, people nod and approve. Electric light is invented, but John resists for a 
while without it. As soon as he installs a light bulb in his shop, some troubles come 
about. As he says “that necktie is green”, a customer disapproves by saying “no, it is 
blue, come out here and see”, but John replies “now it is blue, inside it was green 
though”, and so on. Firstly, he would realize something like this: “Well, it is blue in 
fact – I rule out that electric light suddenly changes the color of my neckties – but 
still it is as though I was seeing a green necktie when I looked at it here in my shop”. 
After some time he would learn to make another kind of report, like “it looks green 
in here, but it is blue”. So, firstly he has learned that things can look different from 
the way they are, because of variations in perceptual conditions, so that the 
experience of an F in special conditions can be just as the experience of a G in 
normal conditions. He also learns to characterize the visual experience as of seeing 
that a is G – when knowing that a is F – as “looking-G”. In Sellars' terms, he now 
can ascribe to his experience a certain propositional claim (es. that is G) without 
endorsing it. Of course, by learning that a green thing can change its look according 
to the circumstances, he is still learning the concept of [being green], because before 
that awareness his very concept [of green] was quite rudimentary. At some point the 
fact that looking at the blue necktie in the shop is similar to seeing a green necktie 
will become so obvious, that John would say that it “looks green” only in a very 
sophisticated sense, while he could more plausibly say that it looks blue in the first 
place. It actually looks the way blue things look in here, it begins to look as it is as 
soon as its variations are taken as the normal behaviour of blue things when 
displaced. 
In any case, “something merely looking green to S” is defined, as an experience, by 
reference of “S' seeing that something is green”, through the subtraction of the 
endorsement conveyed by the latter. Now, John can become familiar with the general 
fact that blue things look this or that way in this or that circumstance, where those 
“ways” are fixed by paradigmatic experiences of other properties in normal 
conditions. For example, a yellow thing seen in the dark looks a bit like a green thing 
seen in perfect illumination under the sun. Learning that that way is the way yellow 
things look in the dark, is learning both the [yellow]-concept and a use of “looks” 
which is not bound anymore to certain specific circumstances. So, even though 
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something can look a way (F) while it does not look to be that way, it can look F 
(green, elliptical) because it looks the way F-things look to be in paradigmatic 
circumstances. On the one hand, it can look-to-be a way (yellow, round) because the 
experience of it is an experience as of seeing that it is that way (where “as of” is 
neutral about whether it is such an experience or not). 
To sum up that last point, the concept and the understanding of “looking F” depend 
on the concept and the understanding of “being F” even for F = SCM-properties, not 
the other way round. When “looks F” is used in a phenomenological sense (as not 
entailing that something is F at least according to one's visual experience), it means 
that something's visual appearance in one respect is just like the one F-things have 
when seen in some paradigmatic conditions. In turn, the way F-things look in normal 
conditions is the way they are, so that either “looking F” means “looking for one 
respect as F-things look when they look as they are” (phenomenological sense) or it 
means “looking to be F (epistemic sense)”, or it means “looking the way F-things 
look” (comparative sense). The phenomenological sense is also interpretable as a sort 
of sophisticated species of the comparative use, and both the comparative and the 
phenomenological uses presuppose the epistemic one. I can grasp what it is for 
something to look like an F or to look
2
-F (like “looks elliptical” said of something 
that looks to be round) only if I can grasp what it is for something to be F and at the 
same time I am able to visually recognize something as being F. On the other hand, 
the epistemic use presupposes the ability to recognize Fs (say, elliptical things or red 
things) just by looking, an ability involving a certain visual phenomenology. That 
visual phenomenology is actually what is involved in looking-talk as such, provided 
that “It looks F to me” in its more fundamental sense means “my visual experience in 
some relevant respects is (phenomenologically) as if I was experiencing an F”. So, 
the three uses are deeply and reciprocally interwoven but they are not to be confused 
with each other either. The phenomenological sense of “look”, importantly, does not 
entail at all a commitment to intrinsically subjective properties (like sense-data, or 
“phenomenal colors” or the like), it only entails the ability to recognize certain 
properties just by looking at the objects having them, which in turn entails that 
experiences do have a visual phenomenology making it possible that things look 
some way to the perceiver.  
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5.7 - Conclusions  
Now I will briefly sum up what I have acquired in that last Section.  
“Looking”-, “appearing”- and “seeming”- constructions have been analyzed with 
respect to their similarities and differences. If “appearing” ascriptions usually hint at 
special circumstances and “seeming” ascriptions have mostly to do with a non-
conclusive evidence, both of them do not necessarily have to do with visual episodes, 
as is the case of “looking”-ascriptions instead. For that reason, “looking”-
constructions have been what we have specially focused on. At least three 
distinctive, irreducible uses of “looks” can be individuated: An epistemic use having 
do to with visual acquired evidence supporting a proposition (like “seeming”), a 
comparative use having to do with similarities in ways different (kinds of) things 
distinctively appear in their sensible profiles, and a more controversial 
phenomenological use which is involved in the other two and is interwoven with 
them. That last use appears to be irreducible especially when applied to properties 
[F] or [G] things are not taken to possess even though those things may be said to 
look F or G (that round coin looks elliptical, that yellow shirt looks green now). 
Nevertheless, that use does not involve anything more than publicly assessable 
properties that may objectively characterize seen things. Indeed, looking-F in such a 
peculiar sense means looking with a certain respect the way F-things look to be in 
other paradigmatic circumstances. In addition, I have argued that “looks F” in that 
last more natural sense (a looks to be F) is on its own conceptually dependent on “is 
F”. 
Another very important feature of “looks F” is that when F is not a spatial-chromatic-
morphological property (as [square], [bigger-than], [red], [round], and the like), in 
order for a to visually look F a must exhibit a certain distinctive sensible profile 




In that first chapter, I have taken into consideration the ordinary basic vocabulary for 
perceptual ascriptions concerning vision. Namely, I have analyzed the most relevant 
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terms and constructions involved in ascriptions and self-ascriptions of episodes of 
visual perception. Seeing-ascriptions, in their different constructions, on the one 
hand, and the related experiential terms like “looking”, “seeming”, “appearing”, on 
the other, have been analyzed with respect to their logical behavior at a certain 
length, with particular attention to their reciprocal relations. 
In Section 1 I have briefly argued for the methodological necessity and legitimacy of 
starting a substantive philosophical inquiry on perception from the analysis of 
ordinary language and pre-theoretical discourse. Making our intuitions explicit about 
what seeing, for example, is implicitly taken to be according to the way it is ascribed 
in everyday discourse, is a way of individuating the explanandum in the first place - 
what we are interested in when we ask, for example, “what is seeing”? If the very 
question is to make any sense to us before we come to know the answer, then we 
must have a partial, rough and general access to the inquired object. Even though 
making such a pre-theoretical access explicit is not answering any substantive 
question (like the one above), still it is a way to start the inquiry by bringing to 
awareness what we already take the inquired object to be insofar as we show that in 
talking to and understanding each other. In talking about someone seeing something, 
we show what we take seeing to be, maybe mostly in a non-thematic form. We could 
even be systematically wrong, but only a positive theory could establish it with 
substantive arguments. Nonetheless, waiting for a theory to stand such a “manifest 
image” on its head, it seems philosophically wise to carefully consider that manifest 
image in the first place. Even if that manifest image is not normative in a strong 
sense, nevertheless the capacity of saving and explaining our basic intuitions on the 
matter, would be at least an advantage for a philosophical theory of visual 
perception. 
In Section 2 I have taken into consideration ordinary contexts of object-seeing 
ascriptions. Firstly, I have spelled out a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
seeing-something to be truly ascribed, such that seeing-X has been defined as: A 
certain episode consisting of a discrimination-relation between a perceiver and an 
environmental object, where the object is causally responsible of its being 
discriminated through appropriately impacting on the subject's visual apparatus, in 
such a way that the object looks to S a certain way. Secondly, I have argued that 
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seeing-X is implicative, that it is a success-verb, that seeing-X ascriptions generate 
transparent and extensional contexts. I have also argued that, even if what you see is 
a matter of what you are causally connected to in your surroundings, object-seeing 
has some minimal phenomenological constraints, to the effect that there must be a 
way O visually looks to you, if you are to see O.  
In Section 3 I have treated seeing-that ascriptions and their logical behavior. As a 
result, I have concluded that seeing-that is a fully-fledged propositional attitude 
which gives rise to opaque contexts (where substitution fails). I have also argued that 
seeing-that is conceptual (i.e. you need to possess the concepts of F if you are to see 
that something is F), and factive (if you see that P, then P). All these features of 
seeing-that are best explained by taking the meaning of ordinary instances of seeing-
that as equivalent to “coming to know by visual means”. As a consequence, I have 
provided a definition, according to which S sees that P iff: “Thanks to becoming 
visually aware of those objects, properties and relations which are the constituent of 
the environmental fact which makes P true, by conceptualizing those constituents 
and by grasping the structure of that very fact, S comes to know that P is the case”. 
That definition is meant to capture only those cases of true ascription where “seeing-
that” is neither metaphorical # knowing or coming to know that P by whatever 
means # nor referred to an inferential knowledge only remotely dependent on a 
visual episode. 
In Section 4 I moved on to a treatment of seeing-as ascriptions. I have shown that 
seeing-as is peculiar and irreducible either to seeing-O or to seeing-that, even if it 
entails the first and is entailed by the second. I have also argued that seeing-as-
ascriptions give rise to non-transparent contexts, and that this logical feature is best 
explained by seeing-as being cognitive, categorical, and recognitional. It entails a 
cognitive stand the perceiver takes toward a seen object, although such a stand or 
“taking” need not be either conceptual or epistemic-propositional. Seeing-as is 
implicative like object-seeing, and it is not factive, differently from seeing-that. 
Being both cognitive and non-factive, seeing-as can be right or wrong, namely, its 
ascription makes room for a normative evaluation involving the possibility of 
mistake: Seeing-as can be mistaken. When “seeing an a as F” is not metaphorically 
ascribed (as equivalent to considering-as), it necessarily involves the visual 
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appreciation of a sensible profile, namely, of a unified complex of spatial-chromatic-
morphological properties (I called them SCM-properties) as typically exhibited by 
Fs, where S possesses the general capacity of recognizing Fs just by looking. To 
concentrate all these acquisitions I have defined seeing-as as follows: “Seeing a as an 
F is seeing an F in a thanks to the exercise of a general recognitional capacity 
prompted by the visual appreciation of a's objective sensible profile”. 
In Section 5 I have left seeing-ascriptions behind to focus on experiential predicates 
like “seeming”, “appearing”, “looking”, insofar as they are ordinarily used to ascribe 
or self-ascribe visual experiences. If seeming normally hints at non-conclusive 
evidence (“It seems that P”, “X seems F”, “It seems to S as if P”, and the like) and 
appearing normally involves an implicit reference to special circumstances, both of 
them do not necessarily entail a reference to seeing or vision. On the contrary, 
looking when non-metaphorically used does involve reference to the visual 
presentation of a seen object. For that reason I have specially focused my analysis on 
looking. Firstly, I have distinguished propositional constructions (It looks as if P, It 
look as though P) from a de re construction (a looks F, a looks as if it is F) which 
involves reference to a seen object looking some way, so I focused on the latter. 
An important distinction I have made, is that between SCM-properties, like [square], 
[yellow], [big], and non-SCM-properties, like [old], [European], [pig] and other 
'thick' properties. To this end I have established the following principle: When F is 
not an SCM-property, a must look G in the first place, where G is a complex of SCM-
properties which individuates a certain visual profile. 
Subsequently, by critically relying on the relevant literature I have distinguished an 
epistemic, a comparative and a phenomenological use of looks. When used 
epistemically, as in “It looks as if a is F”, “a looks as if it is F”, it means: There is a 
body of visually acquired knowledge that non-conclusively supports the proposition 
[a is F]. So, the epistemic use is an analog to “seems” when used with reference to 
vision, but nonetheless it is not as committal as “seems” is. Something can look F to 
me even if I know it is not F, but something cannot seem F to me if I know it is not 
F. The comparative use covers cases like “a looks like b”, “a looks like an F” and the 
like. It roughly means that a's sensible profile is similar to b's (or to Fs') sensible 
profile. If that cow looks like an horse, its visual profile is such that it is similar to 
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the typical visual profile horses exhibit. On pain on an infinite regress, the 
comparative use presuppose a non-comparative one (How do horses look? If they 
just look like G's, then how do G's look? And so on). That third use, also 
presupposed by the epistemic use (how to analyze a “visually acquired body of 
knowledge”?), is what I have called the phenomenological use. When a looks F to S 
a exhibits a certain visual profile, whose appreciation by S is a condition both for a 
visual episode counting as an evidence (epistemic) to S and for S to appreciate the 
similarity between two visual profiles (comparative). In particular the 
phenomenological use explains how it is possible that, even when F is an SCM-
property, a looks F without looking like an F or without that look being an evidence 
for claiming a is F. The phenomenological use is in play, for example, when we say 
that a tilted coin looks elliptical, even if we know just from that very visual episode 
that it is round and looks to be round (epistemic), even if it does not even look like 
elliptical things (comparative). However, I have argued that that use does not entail 
at all a commitment to the existence of intrinsically subjective properties, least of all 
to the existence of mental objects having them. On the contrary, following Sellars 
among others, I have argued that “looks F” logically and conceptually depends on “is 
F”, in such a way that, when we claim that something looks F without looking to be 
F # according to the phenomenological use # we are implicitly positing a 
counterfactual perceptual situation, different from the actually experienced one, in 
which things would look to be F. Calling the phenomenological look “look
2
”, I have 
stated that view in the following principle: X looks
2
 F iff it exhibits the same visual 
appearance an F would exhibit in a possible experience of an F seen in paradigmatic 
circumstances, in which it would look to be an F. Something can look F without 
being known to be F thereby, because it can look, in a certain respect, the same way 
something else would look in looking as it is in a paradigmatic presentation. 
So far so good for the preliminary analysis of the basic visual and experiential terms. 
Before using these acquisitions to enter into the matter of perception theory and 
articulate a positive view (Chapters III-VI), in the next chapter I will present and 
critically discuss the most classical version of the Belief Theory.  
 55 
CHAPTER II – Some Basic Features of Perceptual Experience  
 
Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two sections. 
Section 1 critically presents the classical Belief Theory of perception and discusses at 
a certain length some of its virtues and the many problems it faces. Section 2 rises 
some problems of the Belief Theory: I show that such a view is incompatible with 
experimental data about vision and visual experience, so that it must be either deeply 
revised or abandoned. 
  
Section 1: The Belief Theory: Arguments For and Against 
1.1. – The Belief Theory (BT) 
Through our perceptual experiences, we cognitively relate to our surrounding 
environment in such a way that those experiences put us in a position to come to 
know how our environment is arranged, which properties are exemplified in it, which 
objects are present, what relations such objects and properties entertain with each 
other, and which events occur that involve those objects, properties and relations. It 
is by means of our perceptual experiences in the first instance, that we as subjects 
keep in constant touch with that part of the physical world surrounding us we act 
upon and judge about. Indeed, very often the exercise of our perceptual capacities 
immediately gives rise to true beliefs about the world. For that reason, a well-known 
classical view on perception straightforwardly identifies perception with belief or, 
more precisely, with episodes of belief-acquiring. Even though nowadays the so-
called Belief Theory
1
 is not a mainstream view anymore, critically presenting it 
seems to me a good way to enter into the matter by both contrasting and demarcating 
perception from belief, and evaluating the nature of their intimate connection. The 
core of the Belief -Theory of perception, in Armstrong's word is that: 
 





                                                
1 See Armstrong 1968, Pitcher 1970, Heil 1983. 
2 Armstrong 1968, 208. 
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The reason why Armstrong talks about belief-acquiring instead of belief simpliciter, 
is the following one: A belief is a dispositional state, that can produce occurrent 
events as judgments. Whilst judging that P is a mental event, believing that P is not 
an event, even though on the one hand its acquiring may be an event, on the other, it 
typically produces mental events with the same content P, namely, correspondent 
judgments that P. Once I have acquired a belief and until I do not envisage good 
reasons to revise or reject it, I can be ascribed that belief as a permanent disposition 
to make judgments, inferences grounded in that belief, as well as actions consistent 
with that belief. Judgments, actions, and inferential reasoning can be occurrent 
manifestations, or expressions, of related doxastic dispositions. Such states not only 
produce events, but may well be produced by events. Indeed certain empirical beliefs 
are produced by the occurrence of perceptions. 
So if perceptual experiences are by their very nature events or episodes
3
, they cannot 
be identical to states or dispositions as beliefs are, rather they are to be identified 
with the episodes of acquiring of certain empirical beliefs. Of course, they are 
acquisitions of empirical beliefs by means of senses, not by whatever means. A visual 
experience will be an eyes-dependent belief-acquiring, for example. 
 
1.2 – Virtues of BT 
Prima facie that view has some important advantages. Firstly, it straightforwardly 
explains the intentionality of perception by appealing to the intentionality of beliefs. 
As Armstrong points out: 
 
“The intentionality of perception reduces to the intentionality of the belief acquired” 
(Armstrong 1968, 210). 
 
A belief that P has the propositional content P. A belief-state is a state with content, 
so the acquiring of such a state with content P can be taken as an episode having the 
                                                
3 The first who has stressed that perceptual experiences are events rather than states, was Ryle 1949. 
Indeed on his view perceptual verbs are achievement-verbs, namely success-verbs denoting the 
occurrence of a cognitive accomplishment. Even better would be to take perceptions as episodes, 
because an episode can last a bit through time, as a perception like staring at a relatively stable 
scene for a while could, even though the event/episode distinction is blurred and vague, differently 
from the state/event-or-episode distinction, which is much more important and clear-cut.  
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same intentional content characterizing the so acquired state. In that view, 
intentionality is grounded in content, provided that a state's representing something 
as being some way is a way for such a state to be to be about something
4
. If beliefs 
are intentional states insofar they are representations, so will be their acquisitions as 
perceptions. 
Secondly, such a view elegantly explains how it is that having a certain perceptual 
experience so naturally involves forming a certain perceptual belief about the world. 
On that view the very experience just consists of the acquiring of the respective 
belief, so no special transition is needed. 
Thirdly, that view explains the intuition that we can be right or wrong in perceiving 
the world, where being wrong amounts to being in a false state, and being right 
amounts to being in a true state. Perceptual experience can be veridical or falsidical 
insofar as it can be respectively the acquiring of a true or of a false belief. Illusory 
and delusive perceptions are sensory acquisitions of false beliefs. Veridical 
perceptions are (appropriate) acquisitions of true beliefs, so episodes of production of 
empirical knowledge about the surroundings. 
 
1.3 The Argument from Illusion: BT, the Sense-Data Theory and the Adverbialist 
View 
From a historical point of view, such a view presented some very important virtues in 
avoiding the embarrassing consequences of the classical Sense Datum Theory which 
used to be the mainstream view of perception during the first half of the past 
century
5
. According to the Sense Datum theory, what we are directly conscious of in 
perception are mental items, intrinsically subjective entities having the properties 
they look to have, or being as they appear so infallibly known by the perceiver 
through the very act of her experiencing them. Instead material objects populating 
                                                
4 The notion of intentionality was firstly introduced by Brentano 1874 as that property, 
characterizing mental states, of being “directed upon” or “about” something: “In presentation, 
something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, 
in desire desired, and so on” (Brentano 1874, 88). Having an object for a mental state is the basic 
way of being an intentional state. Whilst having content entails having intentionality, it is not 
obvious that having intentionality entails having content: Object-intentionality, for example 
desiring that object, may be a property of states which do not exhibit content-intentionality. More 
on that, later. 
5 See Moore 1910, Russell 1912, 1922, Broad 1925, Price 1932, Ayer 1940. More recently, updated 
versions of the sense-data theories have been held by Jackson 1977 and Robinson 1994. 
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the external world would be accessed only indirectly by the perceivers, through them 
experiencing subjective Sense Data which in some way resemble those worldly 
objects they give indirect access to. Leaving aside the details, the most relevant 
among the many problems of such a view is the extravagant ontology to be attributed 
to Sense Data. They are non-physical, subject-dependent entities – so their position is 
a priori incompatible with a physicalist view of Mind and Nature – they can be 
indeterminate insofar as experiences can be such
6
, they can even be contradictory 
insofar as experience can be such
7
. Another quite interesting objection moved by 
Armstrong, is that such mental objects should be so peculiar that for them the 
relation of “being identical in a respect” cannot be transitive, in such a way that A 
can be exactly identical to B in respect to property F, B can be exactly identical to C 
in respect to F, without A being exactly identical to C in respect to F thereby. 
Suppose I cannot distinguish either A's color from B's color or B's color from C's 
color, but I can distinguish A's color from C's color. If Sense Data ex hypothesi are as 
they appear and are incorrigibly known, for them subjective indistinguishability 
entails identity, but for them it can paradoxically happen that A is identical to B in a 
respect (ex. color), B is identical to C with that very respect, but A is different from 
C with that very respect! Something must be wrong in that
8
. 
Within the Belief View of perception such difficulties do not seem to arise. Firstly, 
there is nothing surprising in indeterminacy of belief contents, since I can well 
perceptually acquire the belief that the hen has a large number of speckles without 
having to believe that it has a certain N-number of them. Secondly, If I look at A and 
B and acquire the belief they are the same color, then I look at B and C and acquire 
the belief they are the same color, I acquire two beliefs which turn out to be 
                                                
6 For example, I can visually experience a speckled hen without being visually aware of a 
determinate number of speckles the hen allegedly presents in my perception. If the “mental hen” is 
a Sense Datum which by definition is as it appears, so it must be an indeterminate object, having 
an indeterminate number of speckles. On that see Chisholm 1942. Sanford 1981 argues that sense 
data, if they existed, should have contradictory properties. 
7 For a discussion of such problems, see Armstrong himself, 1968, and Pautz 2007. For example, the 
Waterfall illusion is such that the Waterfall looks to you both moving and not moving at the same 
time. On that case and its relevance for the theory of perception, see Crane 1988. Another example 
of contradictory perceptual contents is given by impossible figure, as Escher's or Reutersvärd's 
drawings, to make a well-known example. On that see Crane 1992. 
8 Russell accepted that consequence and held that “identity in a respect” is not a transitive relation. 
But it is so intuitively obvious that if A and B share the same property and B and C share the very 
same property, that property must be shared also by A and C, that denying that inevitably looks 
and ad hoc and unsatisfactory solution. 
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incompatible or false only once I look at A and C at the same time. That last belief 
about their difference I so acquire makes me revise (at least one of) the two 
previously acquired beliefs. So “identity in a respect” is a transitive relation, but my 
experience can consist in me wrongly acquiring the belief that certain things are 
identical in a respect whilst another perception can correct the previous acquisitions 
just insofar as it is another, more authoritative, act of acquiring. 
In addition, the Belief Theory purports to remove the very ground on which the 
Sense Datum theory has been proposed as the only possible “solution”, namely the 
so-called Argument from Illusion and the analog Argument from Hallucination
9
. 
Both arguments have been often provided as inescapable cases against Direct 
Realism, which is in short the ordinary and intuitive idea that in perception we are 
just directly aware of the perceived world. The first (AI), on a plausible and 
summarized reconstruction, runs as follows: In perceptual illusion, something 
appears F without being F (Intuitive Definition of Illusion); Whenever something 
perceptually appears F to S, given that the property F is somehow presented, S is 
aware of something which has the property F (sometimes called “Phenomenal 
Principle”
10
); But ex hypothesi the perceived object is not F, so S must be aware of 
something else (Leibniz's Law); Therefore we need to posit a mental Sense Datum 
which is F and S is aware of (Inference to the Best Explanation); But if illusions 
involve awareness of Sense Data and are potentially indistinguishable from veridical 
experiences, then we are always aware of Sense Data in experience 
(Generalization)
11
. The second argument (AH) is analog to the first but slightly 
different. For any veridical experience there could be a subjectively indistinguishable 
hallucination
12
 (Intuitive Assumption). In hallucination one is aware of something, 
                                                
9 For a more detailed and critical analysis of those well-known arguments, see Austin 1962, 
Robinson 1994, Dancy 1995, Smith 2002. 
10 Phenomenal Principle has been variously formulated by Sense Data theorists. Robinson 1994, 31, 
renders it as follows: “If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possess a 
particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which possess that 
sensible quality”. 
11 The argument from illusion is presented by Moore 1910, Broad 1925, Price 1932, Ayer 1940. 
12 An illusion is an experience where some object in the world is perceived, but the experience 
presents it as being a way it is not. A hallucination is an experience where something is 'presented' 
which does not exist at all in the world. For example, seeing a green lemon as being yellow is an 
illusion, having an experience as if you were seeing a yellow lemon when there is no seen lemon 
(neither green nor yellow), is a hallucination. That intuitive distinction is more philosophical than 
scientific. For example the “Hermann-Grid” illusion – looking at a grid of white lines on a black 
background you “see” grey spots at each intersection between the lines, but there is no grey spot at 
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for example of an object experienced as being such and such (Phenomenological 
Evidence). The object you are aware of does not exist ex hypothesi, so it must be a 
Sense Datum (Inference to the Best Explanation). But if hallucinations are 
subjectively indistinguishable from veridical experience, then in experience we are 
never aware of worldly objects but we are always aware of Sense Data 
(Generalization). So, given that these arguments seem to make impossible the option 
of Direct Realism – in Illusion and in Hallucination by definition you cannot be 
aware (just) of the external world – Sense Data need to be posited as the only direct 
objects of perceptual awareness. 
Without entering into a detailed analysis of these very controversial arguments, I 
have briefly introduced them only to stress a purported virtue of the Belief Theory, 
without meaning at all either that the Belief Theory is the only alternative in town to 
the Sense Datum Theory as a “solution” of these arguments, or that these arguments 
are as conclusive and knock-down against Direct Realism as they historically 
purported to be. In any case, if perceptual experience is belief-acquiring, what you 
are aware of in illusions and in hallucinations are the contents or your acquired false 
beliefs. For example, you can well be aware of that that you are experiencing is 
something blue, even if you are perceiving something yellow (illusion) or you are not 
perceiving anything (hallucination). The content of your beliefs is nothing non-
physical, it is just the way you come-to-believe the surrounding world is arranged. 
Another traditional attempt to face the Argument from Illusion without accepting the 
dubious ontology of Sense Data, is the Adverbialist View. Adverbialists (Chisholm 
1966, Ducasse 1942)
13
 reject the very Act-Object analysis of perceptual experience, 
so they claim that when you visually hallucinate a red tomato you are not aware of a 
Sense Datum, namely, a non-physical particular having the visible features of a red 
tomato. Instead of you being aware of a red and circular mental item – as it could 
seem at a first sight by trusting the superficial grammar of experience-ascriptions – 
[red] and [circular] are ways of S's experiencing, rather than objects of S's 
experience, so S visually experiences 'circularly' and 'redly' rather than experiencing 
                                                                                                                                     
all – in the standard jargon philosophy of perception would be called a hallucination. 
13 The adverbialist view has been defended by Sellars 1967. For a more recent defense of the 
Adverbialist View see Tye 1984. For persuasive criticisms to the view, see Lycan 1987 and 
Butchvarov 1980. 
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something circular and red, in the same way in which someone can be said to dance a 
merry dance just to mean that she dances merrily. When you experience (as of) a red 
circular object in fact [red] and [circular] are ways of your experience's being 
modified. So there is no need to hypostatize alleged mental objects of awareness to 
justify the possibility of hallucinations and illusions. Without entering into further 
details, here I want to point at two main weaknesses that “solution” has been 
conveniently charged with. First of all, there is a big problem of phenomenological 
adequacy
14
. When we introspect our experiences we seem to be aware of objects and 
properties presented to us, we do not just seem to be aware of ourselves being 
modified, or affected, in certain ways. On the contrary, in that view the ways of S 
being affected in a given experience and the ways in which things appears to be to S 
in virtue of having that experience, are neatly separated even if the second is an 
effect of the first. As Martin 2008 (II), 33, points out “[...] we cannot separate our 
knowledge of what it is like to be in a state from knowledge of the subject matter 
presented to one in being in such a state of mind […] to know what such experience 
is like is in part to know how things are presented to one as being”
15
. Experience 
appears to have a 'subject matter' we can attend to, and the adverbialist view is 
inadequate insofar as it does not do justice to that immediate phenomenology of 
experiencing
16
. An Adverbialist could reply that phenomenology is tricky, and that 
                                                
14 On the phenomenological inadequacy of Adverbialism, see Maund 1994, 200ff., Martin 2008. 
15 That is not the so-called transparency of experience we will deal with later on. Transparency or 
'diaphanousness'  (see Moore 1922, 25ff.) is that property of experience in virtue of which, if we 
try to describe the intrinsic properties of our experience, we end up describing the way the 
experience presents the objective world as being. But whilst transparency is denied by Sense Data 
theories, that less committal phenomenological observation is compatible with the Sense Data 
theory (not with Adverbialism though). Indeed, also Sense Data are 'topics' for the experience, 
presented as being certain ways. Those topics are taken to be mental though, but the Act-Object- 
or 'Topic'-principle which captures our immediate phenomenology is respected both by Sense Data 
theories and the Belief Theory but not by Adverbialism. Differently, transparency, which also 
seem to capture our phenomenology, is not respected either by Sense Data theories or 
Adverbialism, but it is respected by the Belief Theory. For Belief Theory such topics concerned in-
and by experience are contents rather than objects (even if contents can well be object-dependent, 
as we will see later). 
16 Martin 2008 (II), 30ff., also points out that another relevant feature of our perceptual 
phenomenology is incompatible with Adverbialism: In introspecting our experiences we not only 
come to know objects and properties we are purportedly attending to, we may also come to 
discover how we can experience those objects, properties and relation, for example by exploiting 
chromatic contrasts, shadows, illumination condition, differences in focus and the like. 
Experiencing involves a conscious point of view on something, so that introspection makes 
explicit also those very elements of experiencing which makes possible that point of view on the 
surrounding world. For further criticism of the adverbial view, see Butchvarov 1980 and Lycan 
1987. 
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even if the phenomenology of experience turned out to be incompatible with the 
account, so much the worse for the phenomenology. Phenomenology would turn out 
to be systematically misleading. 
But there is another worry, having to do not only with phenomenological constraints. 
Suppose you see a red cube over a green circle. The way things appear to be to you 
by having that experience, exhibits a semantically articulated content. You see a red 
cube over a green circle rather than seeing a red circle over a green cube, or a green 
cube over a red circle, or a red cube under a green circle, and so on. So, you do not 
just see properties and objects and relations, you experience a certain relation 
between certain objects having certain properties – each having their own properties  
– where that relation is not symmetrical: The cube is over the circle and not the other 
way round, the red thing is over the green thing, and not the other way around, for 
example. Now, if the purported properties given in experience E are just ways of E's 
being modified, how is it that experiencing [redly] plus [greenly] plus [cubically] 
plus [circularly] plus [overly] makes me come to be in a cognitive state with such a 
semantically structured content? In short, a juxtaposed sequence of adverbs cannot 
render the articulateness of the information we acquire through experience
17
.  
An Adverbialist could reply that seeing a red cube over a green circle is a certain 
complex way of being modified which typically causes a belief that there is a red 
cube over a green circle, instead of other beliefs even involving the same (concepts 
of) objects, properties and relations. That reply would only shed light on the 
inadequacy of the theory itself. Either the relation between experiences and what 
they make us take to be the case is just inscrutable and mysterious, or the elements 
that at least seem to be given in experience are not reducible to ways of being 
modified, no matter how complex these ways are.  
With respect to that, Belief Theory seems to involve a more promising treatment of 
the Argument from Illusion/Hallucination than the Adverbialist proposal, with the 
advantage of avoiding the commitment to ontologically suspect entities like Sense 
Data. A belief that [there is a red cube over a green circle] can bear a content as 
                                                
17 That articulatedness of perceptual information is not to be conflated with the propositional 
structuredness of perceptual beliefs, as we will see in the next chapter. For the time being, it is 
sufficient to point out that perceptual information has an such an articulation that the Adverbialist 
View cannot capture and explain. 
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structured as a propositional content could be. In addition, the committal nature of 
belief explains how it is that in experiencing (as well as in hallucinating) a red cube 
over a green circle we take things to be a certain way insofar as they appear to be that 
way in the experience, not only 'because of' or 'due' to the experience. To conceive 
that such an experience can be a hallucination/illusion there is no need either to posit 
a mental non-physical red-and-cubic item, or to take the experience as a complex 
cluster of ways of being affected which is never witnessed in phenomenology. Rather 
it is sufficient to take the experience as the acquiring of a belief whose content – that 
there is a red cube over a green circle – can not be exemplified at all (hallucination: 
There is no cube and no circle) or partially exemplified (illusion: ex. there are a cube 
and a triangle but they are not respectively red and green, they are not one over the 
other, etc.). 
To sum up, the Belief Theory seems to explain some fundamental features of 
perceptual experience, on the one hand, and was historically appealing as an 
alternative to the Sense Datum theory which could avoid the main embarrassing 
difficulties of the latter, on the other. 
 
1.4 – The problems of BT. Objections and Possible Replies 
Nonetheless, there are other types of evidence and other arguments that seem to 
jeopardize the identification of perceptual states with states of belief-acquiring. Let 
us consider some of these problems now. 
First of all, beliefs are propositional attitudes towards structured contents, in such a 
way that having a certain belief involves possession and exercise of those concepts 
the belief is, so to say, made out of. I cannot believe that Gs are F without possessing 
the concepts {G} and {F}
18
. So, if perceptions were acquisitions of beliefs and 
beliefs involve concept-possession, then only conceptual beings would have 
perceptual states. That is still not a knockdown objection, because the idea that 
perceptual experiences are conceptual states is an option within the debate, as we 
will see later. But it puts a strong constraint on the acceptability of the view, to the 
effect that the Belief Theory is true only if perceptual conceptualism is true. In 
addition, if the Belief Theory is true, then either non-linguistic animals do not have 
                                                
18 To avoid confusions, I will adopt the following notation in the rest of this work: [F] = the property 
of being F; {F} = the concept F. 
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perceptual states and perceptual experiences properly speaking, or we should ascribe 
to non-linguistic animals beliefs and concept-possession, so we should buy a very 
undemanding idea both of what it takes to possess a concept and of what it takes to 
be a believer
19
. The first option seems unnecessary and arbitrary, the second option 
entails a sort of trivialization of the view, because it identifies perceptual states
20
 
with belief acquisitions only at the cost of adopting a very poor notion of belief 
without explaining what it really is and how it relates to propositional attitudes like 
our fully structured perceptually acquired empirical beliefs.  
Secondly, it seems that providing a case of perception without belief, or even a case 
of perception without any acquiring of belief, would be sufficient to defeat the view: 
If perceptions were episodes of belief-acquiring, neither perceptions without 
respective beliefs nor perceptions without respective acquisitions of belief would be 
possible. Both the first and the second case seem quite common though. To begin 
with the first case, many times we have a perceptual experience as if things were a 
certain way, without believing they are that way. That typically happens with 
perceptual illusions, like the Müller-Lyer illusion or the Ponzo Illusion, where two 
equal lines seem to be different in length
21
. The interesting, well-known phenomenon 
is that even once we are told that the lines are equal, the experience of them 
continues to be as if they were unequal. That feature of perceptual experience, often 
called cognitive impenetrability and allegedly due to the informational encapsulation 
of perceptual modules
22
, makes perceptual experience relevantly insensitive to 
collateral knowledge, for example to the fact that we judge and believe that the lines 
are equals because we are told it. So we have a perception which does not give rise to 
a corresponding belief, instead the persistence of the illusion despite our belief on the 
matter entails that we believe and judge things to be other than the way they are 
experienced in perception. So, perceptual illusions known as such appear to make a 
strong case against the Belief Theory. 
                                                
19 In fact that entailment is accepted by Armstrong himself, who writes: “If perception is the 
acquiring of belief then clearly it must involve the possession of concepts. For to believe that A is 
B entails possessing the concept A and B. But since perception can occur in the total absence of 
the ability to speak, we are committed to the view the there can be concepts that involve no 
linguistic ability” (1968, 210). 
20 To respect the standard way of talking I keep talking of perceptual states, but it is clear from what 
said before that perceptions are to be considered events or episodes rather than states. 
21 See Figure 1 and Figure 2 at the end of this Chapter. 
22 See Fodor 1983, Pylyshyn 2006, Crane 1992, Palmer 1999. 
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The second case is also very common. Suppose you know your desk is black because 
you see it every working day. Now you are visually experiencing it, but there is no 
event of acquiring the belief that the desk is black, just because you cannot acquire 
what you already possess. So, if there can be a perceptual experience without any 
doxastic change or increasing, then perception is not belief acquiring but it must be 
something else. According to the first case, perception cannot either be belief or 
necessarily involve belief. According to the second case, ad abundantiam, even if 
perceptual states could be belief states, anyway they could not be acquisitions of 
belief states. 
Advocates of the Belief Theory have offered some replies to such challenges, but 
they do not seem fully satisfactory. As a first move, the case of Perception-without-
Belief is faced by treating perception as an inclination to believe. For example, if we 
perceive the lines looking unequal but we know on independent grounds they are 
equal, there is an inclination to believe they are unequal, which is successfully 
contrasted by a more authoritative non-perceptual, previous knowledge, so the 
inclination is “held in check by a stronger belief” (Armstrong 1968, 213) or it is a 
“suppressed inclination” (Pitcher 1970, 78)
23
. Although, that reply involves a 
substantive modification of the original view, to the effect that now perception has 
become an inclination to acquire a belief, it is not anymore the acquiring itself. It is 
quite different to say that perceptions are belief-acquiring inclinations from saying 
that perceptions are belief-acquisitions full stop. 
Things get even worse if we consider that sometimes perception does not even 
involve any inclination to acquire a belief. For example, one's own image on a mirror 
looks like the bodily presence of a doppelgänger, but in no way do we find ourselves 
inclined to believe it is the case. So, things can perceptually appear to be a way we 
do not believe they are, things can even perceptually appear a way we are not even 
prima facie inclined to believe they are. Moreover, things (as in the second case 
above) can perceptually appear to be a way we already believe they are, so there is 
neither acquisition nor inclination-to-acquire at all
24
. Armstrong and Pitcher counter-
                                                
23 Pitcher 1970 distinguishes three cases: a) Full belief, when an experience just coincides with 
acquiring a belief b) Half-belief, when we suspend the judgement although we have an inclination 
to believe a certain content c) Anti-belief, when we resist the very inclination in virtue of 
possessing more authoritative collateral knowledge. 
24 Although, once the modification from 'belief-acquiring' to 'inclination to believe' is accepted, that 
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reply by appeal to counterfactual analysis, on the following lines: Granted that I do 
not believe that the lines are unequal, or that there is a doppelgänger behind the glass, 
still we can say that had I not known that I am facing an optical illusion, I would 
have been at least inclined to believe that the lines are unequal, had I not known how 
mirrors work in our world and other facts of that kind, I would have been inclined to 
believe that a doppelgänger is facing me. In the same vein goes the treatment of 
Perceptions-without-Acquisitions. Had I not already believed that my desk is black, 
that experience would have been the (inclination to an) acquiring of the belief that 
my desk is black. Armstrong calls such cases “the acquiring of a potential belief” 
(1968, 215). So the view gets more and more modified as well as less and less clear 
as soon as it embeds the objections in itself, so to speak. Perception is not belief, nor 
is it acquiring of belief, but it is suppressable inclination to acquire a belief, then it is 
characterized as a suppressable inclination to acquire a potential belief
25
. What is  
stated then, if not that perceptual experience is intimately connected with perceptual 
beliefs and in normal conditions it gives rise to beliefs in systems capable of 
believing? In addition, why are such episodes inclinations to believe one or another 
content? What does it make that perceptual experience I am having to (suppressably) 
incline me to acquire the belief that P rather than the belief that Q? There is a 
difference between me being told that my desk is black, and me seeing that my desk 
is black. Now, if a theory of perception is meant to capture what perception 
essentially is, and perceiving my desk is only one of the indefinitely many ways I can 
come to believe that it is black, the peculiarity of that special way of coming-to-
believe that a is F perceptually rather than otherwise, should be embedded in the 
general characterization provided by the theory. In other words, even granted that 
perception is a special way of prima facie coming-to-believe certain empirical 
propositions about our surroundings, what does make that way special, what does 
make such episodes what they are beyond them being just a way of being inclined to 
believe that something is the case? Perceptual means, namely involvement of sense-
                                                                                                                                     
objection could be accommodated: If you already believe that your desk is black, still your actual 
perception contributes to reinforce your belief state as being an inclination to believe what you 
already believe. Even if you cannot acquire a belief you already have, still you can be inclined to 
believe – maybe uselessly – a content you already believe. 
25 As Smith 2001 rightly remarks, a potential belief is not more a belief than a potential chair is a 
chair. 
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organs, is too poor an additional characterization to enucleate the distinctive way in 




1.5 – BT and the Phenomenological Adequacy Constraint  
So, the Belief Theory does not seem to meet what we may call the constraint of 
phenomenological adequacy that a good theory of perception should meet. As we 
will see more in detail, perceptual experience exhibits a conscious phenomenology, 
and that phenomenology is relevant both for individuating the very perceptual 
episode exhibiting it and for explaining how it is that that experience gives rise to 
this or/and that belief rather that to another. In particular, perceptual experience 
exhibits a phenomenology of “bodily presence” of the environment, as Husserl puts 
it
27
, which is neither explained nor captured by the reductive analysis provided by 
belief-theorists
28
. Just taking perceptual experience as an inclination to come-to-
believe certain propositions, and exteriorly adding that that inclination is exerted on 
the subject by perceptual means, leaves unexplained the intimate relation between 
the peculiar phenomenology determined by these “means” and the (potential) beliefs 
that such conscious episodes give rise to. Likewise, even though the phenomenal 
character of experience does not need to be hypostatized into qualia or non-physical 
Sense Data, nonetheless it needs to be accounted for in some way. The apparent 
bodily presence exhibited by the phenomenology of illusions and hallucinations is 
too recalcitrant to be reduced to incoming awareness of belief-contents. Something 
                                                
26 A variant of the Belief Theory is the Judgment Theory articulated by Craig 1976, according to 
which perceptions are to be equated to judgements rather than to beliefs. Since the notion of 
judgment must be defined in terms of belief – can you judge that P without believing or coming-
to-believe that P? – the criticism of the Belief Theory seems to me to be as much challenging for 
that more recent variant of the view. 
27 Cfr. Husserl 1910/2006. On the phenomenology of bodily presence which as calling for 
explanation in perceptual theory, see Smith 2001, 2002. Moved by ontological worries, Armstrong 
unsatisfactorily reduces perceptual phenomenology to a doxastic element: “The content of our 
perceptions, which so many philosophers want to turn into a non-physical object, is simply the 
content of the beliefs involved” (1968, 215). 
28 It is worth to say that by “Belief Theory” here we mean the reductive analysis which just equates 
perceptual experience with belief-acquiring, as it happens in the Armstrong-Pitcher view. A non-
reductive analysis would take belief-induciveness as an essential feature of perceptual experience, 
without denying the irreducible and as much essential presence of a sensory aspect. For example, 
in the classical theory of Reid perception is constituted by “sensation plus conception”, a sensory 
episode and a consequent belief. The main worry of Armstrong is just that of avoiding a two-factor 
view (raw feel + judgement) because he is trying to provide a physicalist alternative to the Sense 
Datum theory, which hypostatized the qualitative element of experience as a domain of non-
physical entities. 
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essential is missing in that picture. 
So, Belief Theory, at least as it has been classically articulated ! to my knowledge ! 
does not seem phenomenologically adequate. Even if it was true it would be deeply 
incomplete, it would fail to capture and explain an essential element of its object. 
Another aspect of that lack of phenomenological adequacy is the reductive way of 
treating perceptual introspective awareness. According to Armstrong, given that 
perceptual experience is inclination to acquire a potential belief ! where that 
potentiality is counterfactually specified ! “introspective awareness of perception 
would be the awareness of the acquiring of such potential beliefs” (1968, 218). But 
perceptual introspection, whatever it is, involves an access to the phenomenology of 
one's own experience, which is irreducible to an awareness of oneself acquiring a set 
of potential beliefs. In particular, that theory entails that perceptual introspection, by 
means of which we have access to the content of our perceptions, would involve the 
grasp of a counterfactual of the kind discussed above, like: “Had I had different 
beliefs and knowledge than I have now, that state I am just having would have 
inclined me to acquire such and such beliefs”: Can it really be what perceptual 
introspection amounts to? Whatever introspection is, it seems strongly counter-
intuitive that it is made out of the grasp of such abstract and logically sophisticated 
counterfactual contents
29
. Furthermore, if introspection is a self-conscious access to 
perceptual phenomenology, and beliefs as such lack phenomenal character
30
, why 
should the mere acquiring of an empirical belief exhibit a distinctive phenomenology 
instead? If there is no distinctive phenomenology in believing that a is F, why should 
there be one in being inclined to acquire the potential belief that a is F? By reducing 
perceptual experiences to belief-acquiring, belief-theorists do not do justice to the 
essential role of phenomenology in both individuating perceptual experiences and 
explaining their cognitive role. Even if an ad hoc theory of introspection could 
maybe fill that gap, the more ad hoc collateral views are added, the more weakened 
and less plausible becomes the global picture.  
                                                
29 On the constraint of phenomenological adequacy, see Smith 2001, Crane 2011. 
30 Although there is an ongoing debate about that – see Horgan and Tienson 2002, Pitt 2004, Kriegel 
2009 – the mainstream view is still that beliefs do not have a proprietary phenomenal character. In any 
case, it is the distinctively perceptual phenomenal character (for example, visual) what must be done 
justice of within a theory of perceptual experience, it is not just a generic phenomenal character of any 
other sort. The sensuous character of perception cannot be disregarded. 
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1.6 – Beliefs, Inferences, Concepts: Rationality Constraint and Generality Constraint  
In any case, even if we accept as a substantive and clear view, the thesis that 
perceptual experience is inclination to believe or suppressable inclination to acquire a 
belief by perceptual means, even if we leave aside the doubts of phenomenological 
inadequacy hinted at above, still there are further problems with that view which 
concern the radically different behavior of perceptual experiences from perceptual 
beliefs in the economy of our cognitive lives. Let us explore these problems more 
closely now. 
Beliefs are mental states involving concept-possession and inferential abilities, their 
ascription is subject to the normative constraint of rationality typical of full-fledged 
propositional attitudes
31
. Beliefs, concept-possession and inferential abilities are 
intimately connected, to the effect that possessing a concept entails the ability to 
compose it with other concepts so to form one or more beliefs. Having a belief on its 
own entails the subject's ability to compose it with other beliefs or judgements so to 
draw inferences and produce rule-governed reasoning. If that is the case, attribution 
of rationality – meant as sensitivity to reasons plus aiming at truth – is a precondition 
for crediting a subject both with belief-states and with concept-possession at all. So, 
insofar as beliefs necessarily involve concepts, any argument against perceptual 
conceptualism turns out to be an argument against the Belief Theory as well. I will 
reconsider conceptualism later, now I only anticipate some main criticism of that 
view. 
According to many philosophers
32
, a relevant condition for concept-possession is 
what Evans 1982
33
 introduced as the Generality Constraint (GC). Roughly speaking, 
according to GC if S possesses the concept {F} and is able to think [a is G], in case 
{F} can be meaningfully applied to a and {G}can meaningfully applied to b, then S 
must be able to think [a is F] as well as [b is F] (provided that she knows b). I cannot 
be credited with possession of the concept {love} unless, if I think that John loves 
Mary, I am also able to think that Mary loves John, or that Diego loves Mary, 
                                                
31 On that, see Davidson 1973, 1982, Evans 1982, Crane 1992. 
32 Cfr. Evans 1982, Peacocke 1992, Brandom 1994, Crane 1992. For a radically different view see 
Fodor 1998. 
33 See Evans 1982, 100ff. 
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provided that I know Diego
34
. Of course, I must be able to entertain these thoughts, 
even if I could believe they are false: “meaningfully applied” does not mean “truly 
applied” indeed. GC entails that a concept is never possessed and exercised in 
isolation but always as a constituent of actual or potential propositional structures as 
thoughts, beliefs or judgments. Likewise, GC entails that in entertaining a single 
thought – or in possessing/acquiring a single belief – we manifest capacities which 
can be recursively exerted in a potentially infinite number of different cases
35
. 
Intentional propositional states “come not as single spies but in whole bataillons”, as 
Crane vividly remarks (Crane 1992, 11), so that if you have a belief you must have 
many other beliefs rationally interacting with each other as well as with other types 
of intentional states (desires, intentions, hopes, fears and the like). In order to have 
the concept of {F} I must have many beliefs in which that concept figures
36
, 
likewise, in order to have a belief I must have many other beliefs interacting under 
constraints of logical and semantic consistency and being revisable in the light of 
other incoming beliefs. Namely, I must have articulated inferential abilities. Vice-
versa, in order to play their logical and semantic role in reasoning, beliefs must be 
internally structured into discrete constituents – the concepts – whose composition 
produces and explains the inferential properties of the beliefs in which such concepts 
occur. As Evans 1981, 132, puts it: “behind the idea of a system of beliefs lies that of 
a system of concepts whose structure determines the inferential properties of the 
beliefs”. 
These features of beliefs and concepts are often characterized as normativity and 
holism of the intentional. If I ascribe to you the belief that the table is red, I must 
ascribe to you the belief that the table is colored, the belief that the table has a 
surface, the belief that the table is not transparent, the belief that if just another thing 
in the room was red, there would be just two red things in the room, and so on. In 
ascribing you a belief that a is F, I need to ascribe you all beliefs sufficient for you to 
                                                
34 {John},{Mary} and {Diego} as constituents of potential thoughts are singular concepts, namely, 
concepts which apply only to an individual. 
35 In fact CG is a way of stating the so-called compositionality of thought as involving both its 
productivity and its systematicity. See Fodor 1975. 
36 Possessing a concept C amounts to knowing the conditions of its satisfactions, and knowing when 
C is satisfied involves knowing that certain beliefs involving C would be true in certain 
circumstances, false in others. 
 71 
possess the concepts contained into the ascribed belief (according to GC)
37
, I also 
need to ascribe you the belief that many propositions immediately incompatible with 
that belief are not true, and so on. By “normativity” it is meant that if you believe P 
you ought to believe other things, are you to be rational, so that in ascribing you a 
belief I am treating you as a rational being having a whole belief-system aiming to 
consistency therefore sensitive to reasons and logical consequences
38
. By “holism” it 
is just meant that intentional contents of your propositional attitudes are reciprocally 
co-determined in such a way that you cannot have a single attitude toward a content 
without having many other attitudes to that content as well as to many other 
propositional contents. 
Now, if having a belief-state involves all that and the Belief Theory of perception is 
true, perceptual states would likewise involve all that and exhibit a similar behaviour 
in our cognitive lives. But that does not seem to be the case. Consider the reasons-
sensitivity of belief-forming, on the basis of which our beliefs are open to constant 
revision through the income of new evidences and the increase of our knowledge. 
Revisability in the light of evidence is an essential feature of belief, but as we have 
seen, persistence of illusions though disbelieved shows that perceptual experience 
does not just behave like belief. A perception can very well make you revise a 
previous belief you had, but it cannot be revised in light of a belief that is 
incompatible with it. If perceptual experience could be reduced to belief-acquiring, it 
would be a state sensitive to reasons and to availability of new evidence so that the 
inclination to believe in the experience would just disappear as soon as we come to 
believe otherwise. But it does not disappear – nor does it lose its 'phenomenology of 
immediacy' – therefore perceptual experience does not meet the essential constraints 
of belief ascription like revisability, sensitivity to reasons and evidence, logical 
constraints of consistency, and so on. 
                                                
37 Which beliefs are sufficient for a subject to be ascribed possession of a certain content, is a big 
substantive problem. 
38 You do not need to consciously think all contents you “must believe” if you are rational and 
believe that P. A belief, as a dispositional state that may or may not produce conscious judgments 
and thoughts, can well be unconscious. For example, I used to believe that the first minister has 
two legs also before making that judgment now. It was true that if one would have asked my about 
that, I would have answered in a certain way, if I had heard that the first minister has lost a leg, I 
would have thought that he has just one leg, and so on. Even if I do not know it explicitly, I 
believe many contents that it is rational for me to believe, given that I believe certain propositions 
and I am in a position to envisage those contents as necessarily entailed by these propositions. 
Beliefs need not be conscious. 
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1.7 – Further Difficulties of BT 
Another case against this identification has been made by Crane 1988. Some 
experiences have contradictory contents at the same time, as in the case of the 
Waterfall Illusion where the waterfall looks to be both moving and not moving. Now, 
contradictory beliefs at the same time do not occur to the same subject, just because 
our doxastic life is constrained by rationality and requirements of consistency in such 
a way that the contradictions nested in our whole system of beliefs will be removed 
as soon as they are made explicit and conscious as such, namely, as logically 
incompatible. A subject can very well doubt and oscillate between P and not-P for a 
while of course, but she cannot explicitly believe P and not-P at the same time. So, if 
experiences with contradictory contents are possible in a way in which contradictory 
beliefs are not possibly held, perceptual experiences are not beliefs. So perceptions 
lack inferential structure and do not entertain logical-deductive relations as beliefs 
do. As such, they do not exhibit the essential features of belief such as normativity 
and holistic dependence. As Crane 1992, 18, remarks, there is nothing else you ought 
to perceive just because you perceive something as being such and such, but there are 
many propositions you ought to believe if you are to believe that something is such 
and such. So perceptual experiences are evidentially relevant inputs of new 
information and contents to our reasoning systems, and can well make you revise 
your beliefs, but not the other way round. That asymmetry, of great importance from 
an epistemological point of view, is incompatible with the Belief Theory and, all the 
more so, cannot be explained within it.  
In addition, there is a relevant difference between the way certain information is 
acquired in perception and the way information is doxastically acquired, which 
remains unexplained within the framework of the Belief-Theory. Consider your 
visual experience of a cup of coffee on your table. In having that experience, I 
acquire the belief that [the cup on the table before me has coffee in it]. Now, I could 
acquire the belief that [the cup on the table before me has coffee in it] – suppose I am 
looking elsewhere and you tell me – without having to acquire beliefs with detailed 
contents concerning the shape, size and color of the coffee, the table and the cup, 
their orientation, their distance from me, and so on. On the contrary, I cannot 
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visually experience the presence of coffee in the cup without experiencing the 
particular shape of the cup, its particular shade of color, its orientation, how much 
coffee is in the cup, how dark it is, and many other details of the seen scene. That 
difference speaks in favor of an asymmetry between the perceptual way and the 
doxastic way we acquire information about the world. A belief contains a discrete 
piece of information the believer commits to without having to commit to more 
specific information thereby. Of course if I come to believe that the cup has coffee in 
it, I need to come to believe (though maybe implicitly) that the coffee must have a 
color, the cup must have a shape, and so on. But firstly that is something I must infer 
from the content of my belief. Secondly these inferences, differently from the visual 
experience, may well leave indeterminate what color the coffee has, which shape the 
cup has, which size the table has, and so on. In Dretske's terms
39
, that is a distinction 
between an analog and a digital coding of information involved respectively by 
belief and perception, so that any belief I can come-to-acquire through having a 
perceptual experience, is a different way of “digitalizing” the rich, profuse and 
detailed content of my visual perception. I will critically focus on that important 
distinction later
40
. Here it is enough to point out that, in the same way a 'picture is 
worth thousand words', we could well say that an experience is worth thousands 
beliefs. In having a visual experience I am in a position to form at once many 
specific beliefs about a certain range of objects, properties and relations, without 
having to infer one from another. For example, seeing an object involves seeing its 
actual shape, color, orientation, illumination, distance, size, spatial relations and so 
on, in a way in which acquiring a belief about that object does not involve acquiring 
other beliefs about its actual properties. A belief theorist could reply as follows: 1) 
Nothing prevents perception from being the simultaneous acquiring of a very high 
number of beliefs
41
. A perception is an episode of belief-acquiring, not the acquiring 
of a single belief 2) That I must acquire certain specific beliefs about actual shapes, 
sizes and colors (SCM-properties) in visually experiencing a scene, does not depend 
                                                
39 See Dretske 1981, 135-153, Dretske 1988, 1990, 1995, 2000. 
40 See this Chapter, Section 2; Chapter III, Section 3. 
41 Still, in order the Belief Theory to be plausible and consistent, that number of acquired beliefs 
must be finite. The information acquired cannot be other than determined and limited with respect 
to the means, the ways of the information being coded, the time of causal exposure to the 
environmental stimuli, and so forth. 
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on that experiencing being not reducible to belief-acquiring, rather it depends on that 
the visual way of acquiring beliefs entailing that certain specific beliefs need to be 
acquired together. In short, perception is a special case of belief-acquiring where the 
subject must acquire many beliefs at once, and these beliefs need to contain certain 
specific information about certain kinds of properties, depending on the perceptual 
means involved. For example, acquiring the belief that something is edged by 
touching it will involve the acquiring of specific beliefs about the particular texture 
of the touched object, whilst seeing the same edged object need not involve belief-
acquisitions about the texture rather it will involve belief-acquisitions about the 
color, hearing something moving on your left (say someone is calling you) will not 
involve belief-acquisitions about the color of the moving object but it will involve 
belief-acquisitions about the pitch and the tone of the sound it is producing, whilst 
seeing the very same moving object will keep 'belief-neutral' about what sound it is 
producing but will need to involve belief-acquisitions concerning which color, size 
and shape it has. 
Nevertheless, that reply leaves unexplained why visually coming-to-believe that X is 
moving should entail visually coming-to-believe that X is so-and-so shaped, so-and-
so colored, at this or that distance and so on. As a matter of fact, the concept {red} 
does not entail a certain way of being shaped, a certain way of being distant, and so 
on. So, the beliefs acquired through a given experience have specific contents which 
do not entertain inferential relations and do not entail each other, still these beliefs 
need be acquired together. So the way contents are perceptually acquired determines 
these contents being in certain relations that are not those inferential relations in 
which belief-contents normally stand to each other. That must have to do with the 
nature of perceptual information itself. Belief contents are insensitive to their 
informational origins in a way perceptual contents are not
42
. In perceptual experience 
what information I come to acquire is inextricably connected with how I come to 
acquire it
43




                                                
42 On that see Jacob 1999, 82-85. 
43 On that, see Evans 1982, specially the Chapters 6-8. 
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Section 2: Against BT: Arguments from Experimental evidence 
2.1 – Inattentional- and Change Blindness: There is seeing without noticing 
Another case against the Belief Theory is constituted by the available experimental 
evidence that visual perception does not always involve perceptual belief. In what 
follows I will discuss a bit of such evidence by dividing the material in two parts. 
Firstly, I will present and consider the well-known phenomenon of seeing-with-
noticing involved in normal vision as well as in experimental cases of Inattentional 
Blindness and Change Blindness. Then I will introduce the Sperling Experiment and 
critically discuss some interpretations of it. Secondly, I will consider some evidence 
coming from the clinical study of pathological cases such as some forms of Visual 
Associative Agnosia, some forms of Optic Ataxia, and some forms of Blindsight. 
Finally I will argue all that evidence taken together constitute another big, 
insurmountable problem for the Belief Theory of perception. 
Inattentional Blindness
44
 is the failure to visually notice a fully-visible but 
unexpected object because attention was engaged in another task, event, object or 
local part of the scene. A quite bizarre example of such a phenomenon is the 
“Invisible Gorilla” experiment (Simon & Chabris 1999)
45
. Subjects facing a video of 
a basket match are asked to keep track of the passages or are given some other 
special task involving attentional focus on details, so at some point a lady with an 
umbrella dressed as a gorilla enters into the playground and comfortably plays with 
the other players. The majority of subjects is unable to notice and recognize the 
gorilla, even though it is so evident to them once they are told about its presence, that 
it becomes even hard to believe they could have failed to notice such a macroscopic 
object perfectly falling into their visual field
46
.  
Another analog, interesting and well-known phenomenon is Change Blindness
47
. In 
the most classical experiments, a photograph is briefly presented to the subject, 
followed by a blank, then followed by an identical photograph but sometimes 
                                                
44 See Mack & Rock 1998, Simon & Chabris 1999. 
45 Here is a link to the video of the experiment: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJG698U2Mvo 
46 According to Pani 2000, in cases of IA “you see the stimulus but you do keep conscious of it in a 
belief-way”.  Therefore, IA would be a case of unconscious seeing. According to another 
interpretation, more liberal on what 'being conscious amounts to', IA could be a case of 
consciously seeing a feature without noticing it.  
47 On Change Blindness see the debate between Dretske 1994, Dennett 1994. See also Simons 2000, 
Rensink 2002. 
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followed by a similar but not identical photograph. The difference can be an object 
that changes color, shape, or disappears. That exposition can go on for fifty times or 
more, still subjects are unable to see the difference between the two pictures, even 
though they had sequentially and carefully “explored” both the pictures
48
. Change 
Blindness (CB) in fact is an analog but different phenomenon from Inattentional 
Blindness (IB), insofar as it involves memory and the comparison of a past percept 
with a present one, whilst IA is a failure to notice a present object or visible feature 
within a single scene we are presently facing. An example considered by Dretske 
1994, 2006, consists of the presentation of two pictures of the same group of people 
in the same positions and circumstances, apart from the fact that in the second picture 
one of the eight people is just missing. Another example provided by Dretske 2000, 
125, asks us to accurately glance at two figures A and B which will look to us 
perfectly identical
49
. Although, the figure B has a well-visible black spot which is 
absent from the figure A. Now, on the one side, we have not noticed that spot, 
otherwise we would have easily been in a position to detect and report how A and B 
differ. On the other hand, we have glanced attentively at all details of both figures, so 
we have a strong intuition that we must have seen that black fully-visible spot in 
figure B as well as the correspondent fully-visible spotless white area in figure A. 
How is it then that we see things we did not even realize we were seeing?  
Both IB and CB seem to show that there are things we see without noticing them, so 
that seeing should not be identified with visually noticing. We see more than we 
notice, in short. Why is that relevant with respect to assessing the plausibility of the 
Belief Theory? It matters a lot because acquiring a belief entails exerting the 
concepts the belief is composed of, committing to its content or endorsing it, and that 
                                                
48 See Block 2007. The cause of Change Blindness is well-known. In experiments things are 
arranged so that changes are introduced into the scene during the subject's saccades. Saccades are 
ballistic eye movements that can happen several times a second. During the saccade, the visual 
system takes in little or no information about the scene. 
49 
                                              
                                                                      Figure 3 
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can only be a conscious event involving noticing what you come to believe and the 
object/objects you come to acquire the belief about. If there are things we see but we 
do not notice, therefore there are things that are contents of our perceptions but fail to 
be contents of any allegedly acquired beliefs, this eventuality constitutes a case 
against the Belief Theory. Without noticing and recognizing the seen objects as some 
kind of thing or as having this or that property, all the more so there can be no 
acquiring of beliefs about the objects seen. So seeing cannot be coming-to-believe
50
. 
Intuitively, we are inclined to say that the subjects do see the invisible gorilla, that 
the subjects do see the eighth person missing in the second photograph, that the 
subjects do see the point making the difference between the figures, although they do 
not notice these objects so that all the more so they do not acquire conscious beliefs 
about those even seen objects. So, if acquiring a belief involves conceptualizing the 
constituents of its content, and conceptualizing presuppose noticing and recognizing 
as its condition, it seems straightforward that if within your perceptual experience 
there are things you see but do not notice, perception cannot be just equated to 
belief-acquiring.  
In Dretske's efficacious terms (Dretske 2000), the cases above show that we can have 
visual object-awareness without having fact-awareness of circumstances involving 
the object we are aware of. For example, we are visually aware of the black point 
making the difference between the two figures but we are not aware that they differ, 
we are visually aware of the gorilla moving around but we are not aware that there is 
a gorilla moving around, we were visually as aware of the eighth person in the first 
picture as we are aware of the correspondent portion of space no longer occupied by 
him in the second picture but we are not aware that a person we had seen in the first 
picture is missing in the second picture
51
. Actually acquiring a belief involves what 
Dretske calls fact-awareness, believing is always believing that something is the 
                                                
50 In fact it is possible to visually notice something without recognizing it as a certain kind of thing. I 
can notice something that suddenly begins to move within my visual field, without being able to 
recognize it. In any case, what matters to us is that recognizing entails noticing, and believing 
entails recognizing. Even if I can notice O without recognizing O and maybe I can recognize O 
without acquiring beliefs about O, anyway acquiring a belief about O entails recognizing O which 
on its own entails noticing O. So seeing without noticing entail seeing without belief-acquiring. 
51 Imagine you see 27 children on the playground, for a brief time. Probably you will see all the 27 
children, so you will become conscious of all those perceptual objects, but you will fail to become 
conscious of the fact they are 27. On the difference between object-awareness and fact-awareness, 
See Dretske 1981, 146ff., Dretske 1993, 1999. 
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case, insofar as believing is a propositional attitude. So object-awareness without 
fact-awareness means perception without belief, it means becoming perceptually 
aware of an object without becoming fact-aware of anything about it, it means 
perceiving something without acquiring any related belief about it. 
Now, a counter-strategy of the belief-theorists would be that of denying that seeing 
without noticing is possible. You wrongly believe you had seen something without 
noticing it, but in fact you do not see anything until you notice it. So, even if you 
think “I must have seen it, it was there before me and it is so big and fully-visible 
after all!” you think wrongly, you just haven't seen the gorilla, or the black spot, or 
the eighth person, and the like
52
.  
Another more subtle reply would restrict the validity of the Belief Theory to 
perceptual experience rather than concern perception as such. Perceptual experience 
is conscious perception. So, maybe you even see the unnoticed objects above, but 
you do not experience them, so it can be maintained that perceptual experiences are 
belief-acquisitions, that therefore they must involve noticing and recognizing the 
seen objects. Seeing is not sufficient for visually experiencing, so it is not a problem 
if seeing is not sufficient for belief-acquiring, because the so modified theory is that 
visually experiencing, not just seeing, is to be equated with belief-acquiring. 
Let us consider one of the examples above and call Mario the eight man missing in 
the second picture, so we can ask: 1) Did S see Mario? 2) Did S visually experience 
Mario? 
If S saw Mario but did not consciously experience him, then perception cannot be 
belief-acquiring but the possibility that perceptual experience is belief-acquiring is 
left open. If S visually experienced Mario, then not even perceptual experience can 
be belief-acquiring
53
. The subject reports that she cannot see the difference between 
picture A and picture B, for sure she cannot have noticed Mario (nor did she notice 
                                                
52 This is the move made by Dennett 1991, 1994, and Nöe 2004. 
53 An advocate of the Belief Theory could reply that even if S did not consciously experienced 
Mario, S could have acquired an unconscious belief concerning the presence of Mario. That looks 
like a desperate move though. Granted that unconscious beliefs are quite possible (see above), it is 
much less obvious that there can be unconscious events of belief-acquirings. In addiction, if a 
belief-acquiring involves a conceptualization, we should be able to think of an exercise of 
conceptualization happening at a certain time as a punctual event but without any consciousness. 
In any case, a belief must be essentially apt to become conscious and interact with other beliefs in 
producing inferences. As we have seen, the doxastic realm is normative, beliefs are states we are 
responsible for. How can a subject be responsible for and rationally responsive to beliefs he does 
not even know to have acquired? 
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his absence of course)
54
 and acquired beliefs about him. 
Now, if S did not see Mario – as one has to hold if she holds the equivalence seeing 
= noticing = believing – as a consequence S did not see any of the people on the 
picture. As a matter of  fact it is counterfactually true that, had S been put before two 
pictures whose difference was another person missing rather than Mario (say Gino), 
S would not have noticed the difference either, so S would not have seen Gino either. 
But the theory's entailing that S did not see any one of the people in the picture, 




Generally speaking, the attentional focus by foveal vision
56
 involves a (blurry) 
difference within the scene falling under our visual field at a given time, between 
what is focused and is a thematic object of visual attention on the one hand, and what 
is “in view” but only as a potential topic of attention, as being “virtually present” 
(Nöe 2004). Now whilst I am looking at my desk, on the periphery of my visual field 
there is the door of my office. Even if I am not visually focusing on the door, still it 
is now counterfactually true that if the door moved I would notice its movement. It is 
quite natural to infer from that fact that I must be seeing the door now, but only 
certain kinds of change in the scene would make me notice it. 
Of course, in normal visual perception we notice and recognize (and believe) a lot of 
things, so it could be maintained that perception, globally considered, essentially 
involves episodes of noticing and taking things as being some or some other way. In 
fact you cannot overlook everything
57
. At a given time, your perceptual experience 
has some 'topics' put under your attention and involving conscious recognition. But 
what is at stake here is whether perception can be identified and reduced to those 
episodes of noticing-recognizing-believing, not just whether perception involves such 
episodes. 
                                                
54 There is still the possibility that she noticed Mario and suddenly forgot it. But we are talking of 
normal subjects not showing special impairment of the memory-skills. In any case, at least in IA 
(Inattentional Blindness) the scene is present so the memory has nothing to do with the 
phenomenon. 
55 Suppose in the second picture Mario is substituted with Franco, who looks completely different. In 
that case both Mario and Franco would be seen, but not their difference. In Dretske's view a 
difference is a fact about two relata, the fact that they differ indeed, such that you cannot see a fact 
without noticing or believing it. See Dretske 1993. 
56 Foveal vision is that involving the fovea. Having the highest concentration of cones, the fovea is 
the part that grant the maximal visual acuity.  
57 On that, see Smith 2001, Husserl, Ideen I, § 84. 
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It is perhaps worth considering that noticing is not identical to believing. Noticing an 
object and some of its property is a condition for putting us in a position to acquire a 
belief about that object, for example the belief that the object has such and such 
properties. So if I acquire a belief through perceptually experiencing a certain 
environmental condition, I must have noticed the object I acquire the belief about, 
but not the other way round. Specially, if believing has a normative, holistic and 
rational dimension as I have argued for above, that is not the same for noticing. 
Noticing a tree and some of its properties (ex. it being distant) does not involve 
acquiring a belief about the tree. Animals not possessing concepts and propositional 
attitudes can well notice certain objects and even overlook certain others objects. As 
I will argue later, there are ways of perceptually noticing and even of recognizing 
kinds of objects which do not involve acquiring a belief. But what matters here for 
challenging the Belief Theory does not concern the identity/difference between 
noticing and believing, for the time being it is enough to accept that in order to 
perceptually come-to-believe that a seen object is a certain way, that object has to be 
noticed in the first place. Believing entails noticing, independently of whether 
noticing entails believing or not. So seeing without noticing entails seeing without 
believing. 
Those who hold that there is no seeing without noticing/believing, like Dennett and 
Nöe
58
, appeal to the so-called “Refrigerator Light Illusion”. As soon as you open the 
fridge, you seem to find the light on, so you could be wrongly led to believe that the 
light is always on. In fact, the light being on depends on you opening the fridge to 
look into it. Likewise, on that vivid analogy, our visual phenomenology presenting us 
with a whole scene continuously in view, where we seem to see more than the details 
and portions we are specially attending to, would be an illusion insofar as what we 
are seeing at a time t depends on our shift of attention on a newly noticed detail. As 
the light is off unless you open the fridge, your seeing a detail or an object is only 
potential unless you focus on it and notice it. In short, the Refrigerator Light Illusion 
involves mistaking a potential event for actual event. You take yourself to see 
something just because you are aware that you could notice it, but in fact you could 
                                                
58 See Dennett 1991, 1994, 2002; Nöe 2004, O' Regan & Nöe 2001. Actually Dennett and Nöe do 
not identify perception with belief-acquiring à la Armstrong, they rather take perceptions to be 
dispositions to believe. 
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see it only as soon as you noticed it
59
. What you take to be seeing without noticing is 
just potentially seeing, which amounts to nothing more than potentially noticing. So 
the seeing = noticing equation is thus vindicated. 
 
2.2 – The Sperling Experiment and what it tells with respect to BT 
Despite that subtle reply above having some force, the so-called Sperling-effect 




 showed subjects arrays of 
alphanumeric characters, for example three rows of four characters each, for 50 
milliseconds, followed by a blank field. Subject reported that they could see almost 
all characters. Although, when asked to say what letters they had seen, they could 
remember approximately only four letters, less than the half of the presented letters. 
Until that point, the situation is analog to the examples above concerning 
Inattentional Blindness and Change Blindness, namely, we are puzzled at deciding 
whether subjects did really see the 'forgotten' letters or instead they properly saw 
only the ones they noticed and are able to truly report. On the one side, S must have 
seen them, they were within her visual field and there was a phenomenal 'feeling' of 
having in view a continuous portion of space populated of many letter-shapes. On the 
other hand though, how is it possible that S saw all the letters if she can identify just 
four letters? Sperling found a genial way to settle the question experimentally. He 
introduced the play of a tone just after the array was replaced by the blank. Subjects 
were asked to report the letters composing the top row when the tone of the sound 
was high, to report the letters in the middle row when the tone was middle, to report 
                                                
59 Dennett 1991, O'Regan and Nöe 2001, Nöe 2001 variously argue for the unreliability of our 
introspective phenomenology, by appealing to phenomena like the Blind Spots in our visual field. 
As it is well-known a relevant portion of surface at the center of our retina is covered by nervous 
fiber such that there are no photo-receptors on it. But our experience does not introspectively 
present itself with black holes in the visual field. In addiction, the visual exploration of the 
environment is not as continuous and uniform as it introspectively seems to us, rather it involves 
jumpy and discontinuous saccadic movements. All that is of the greatest interest but, as Dretske 
rightly remarks (2006, 164), what matters for whether in Change Blindness cases we see more than 
we notice, is not whether we see everything we introspectively seem to see, it is rather whether we 
see more than we notice. In other terms, that we are wrong in claiming to see the whole scenes 
falling under our visual fields in detail does not mean that it is wrong that there is something we 
see despite we do not notice it. See also Nöe 2006. 
60 I have introduced a certain argumentative use of the appeal to the Refrigerator Light Illusion, 
concerning the reducibility of seeing to noticing. Another use concerns phenomenology, so it says 
that a perceptual state has phenomenology only as soon as you attend to it. These use are 
intimately connected but still different. For example, maybe there can be a phenomenology not 
involving any act of noticing or recognizing, much less involving an act of believing. 
61 See Sperling 1960, Baars 1988. 
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the letters in the low row when the tone was low. In these cases, subjects were able to 
report all the letters of the 'auditorily intimated' row (but not those in the other rows, 
of course). Now, in that case saying that you must have seen the letters becomes 
more than an even a strong intuition, rather it is a necessity. Indeed, the acoustically 
induced decision to attend to one or another row is made after the visual stimulus has 
already been removed. So, provided that you cannot see objects that are not there, 
you must have seen them before they disappeared. Sperling-effect entails the 
existence of an “iconic memory” (Neisser 1967), a very short-term store of visual 
information that keeps accessible only when the subject is prompted in certain ways 
to attend to that information. Of course, as soon as the acoustic marker prompts the 
subject to attend to a row, the accessibility to the other rows irremediably vanishes 
forever.   
There is a controversial and fascinating debate I will not enter in now, concerning 
whether the perception of the unattended letters is conscious or not
62
. So, whilst the 
experiment neatly shows that we can see things without noticing them, it is less 
obvious that it also shows we can consciously see or experience something without 
noticing it. In any case, the already seen rows can be accessed, though not all at once, 
after they have disappeared, so there is no room for arguing that you begin to see 
something only as soon as you notice it, as some tried to argue for with respect to 
Change Blindness and Inattentional Blindness. How could I begin to see something 




2.3 – The case of Visual Associative Agnosia and BT 
Some other examples of experimental evidence of the greatest interest for evaluating 
the Belief Theory, are clinical reports about patients with dramatic cognitive and 
perceptual pathologies. In particular, I want to briefly take into consideration the case 
                                                
62 See Block 2007. Block takes the experiment as showing that “phenomenology outstrips cognitive 
accessibility”. But others take it to show that vision outstrips phenomenology. According to them, 
the episode of vision acquires a phenomenology as soon as the subject attends to the objects. See 
also Dretske 2006. 
63 There is an auditory analog of Sperling-effect consisting of an “echoic buffer” (not to be confused 
with short-term memory). Our system “iconically” stores auditory information for a short while, 
which can be accessed after the stimulus has ceased only if we focus our attention on that just 
stored material. To report an example by Fodor 2007, it may happen that I hear the public watch-
bells ringing, say, for four times, when I am not attending that at all. Suddenly, I shift my attention 
to that perceptual intake because I need to know what time it is. There is a short interval within 
which I am still able to “count” the times of ringing.  
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of (a kind of) Visual Associative Agnosia first, then the case of Optic Ataxia, and 
finally the more familiar case of Blindsight. 
Visual Agnosia
64
 involves impairments in perceptual capacities that are not due to 
elementary sensory malfunction. Associative Visual Agnosia is a kind of that 
pathology – typically caused by specific kinds of brain damage – involving an 
inability to recognize familiar objects despite the patients normally being apt to 
perceive and describe forms and other visible features. So object-recognition
65
 is 
impaired despite low-level visual perception working perfectly. The patient is able to 
recognize the objects through other sensory ways (ex. touch). She does not show 
impairments either to the visual system or to intellectual, descriptive or inferential 
skills. She just cannot “extract” from the percept the thick information concerning 
the kind of thing she is perceiving. As it is remarked by a scientist who worked a lot 
on that pathology, in Visual Associative Agnosia “a normal percept is stripped of its 
meaning” (Teuber 1968, 293). Despite the form perception being good
66
 – at least in 
Pure Visual Associative Agnosia – the object-recognition is blocked, so the 
perceptual input is taken in but does not put the subject in a position to categorize the 
object in many relevant ways, therefore, she cannot acquire relevant beliefs about the 
object. As we have already noticed, maybe there can be recognitional acts in 
perception that are more basic than fully-fledged beliefs so that recognizing does not 
entail believing. In other words, maybe there can be something like a nonconceptual 
or 'proto-conceptual' recognition, but vice-versa full-fledged perceptual beliefs do 
involve conceptualization of the percept, so that if perceptual experience is possible 
without object-recognition, a fortiori it is possible without belief. Provided that 
Visual Associative Agnosia shows a dissociation between perception and belief, it 
speaks against their identity as a result.  
A possible reply to the argument based on Visual Associative Agnosia, is that such a 
pathology only shows that there can be perceptual experience without certain kinds 
                                                
64 On Visual Agnosia see Farah 2004, Milner & Goodale 1995, Goodale & Milner 2004. 
65 There are different kinds of Visual Associative Agnosia depending on the kind of objects the 
subject cannot recognize. For example, patients with Prosopagnosia cannot recognize faces, 
patients with Alexia cannot recognize words. 
66 Form perception is impaired in Visual Appercetive Agnosia, which is often but not always 
combined with Visual Associative Agnosia. The most interesting cases with respect to the 
Belief/Perception relation, is the Pure Visual Associative Agnosia, namely, object-recognition 
impairment without form impairment. 
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of belief-acquiring which occur in normal subjects, rather than showing that 
perception is possible without any belief-acquiring. In fact, these subject do report 
that the seen object is red, wide, has such and such shape and color, and so on. For 
example, a subject cannot recognize a comb as a comb (even if she possesses the 
concept of {comb} and can be prompted to exert it perceptually, for example through 
touch), another subject cannot see a bottle opener as a bottle opener and asks whether 
it could be a big key
67
, but they both could wonder whether that was a key or this 
was a pipe insofar as they acquired true beliefs about the seen objects in the first 
place, concerning shape-properties, form-properties, color-properties and the like. So 
what these cases would prove is that certain pathologies can reduce the beliefs 
perceptually acquirable, but would not prove that perception is not belief-acquiring. 
For example, as we will see later, some philosophers take the content of perception 
to be confined to the representation of 'thin' spatial-chromatic-morphological 
properties (SCM)
68
. So if we combine the belief-theory with the view that the only 
properties represented in perception are SCM, 'thick' recognitional properties 
involved in representing a comb as a comb or a key as a key would not be properties 
represented in perception at all, so such cognitive failures at recognizing things 
would not be a strictly perceptual deficit. In that case, visual experiences of such 
patients would be acquisitions of beliefs concerning SCM-properties, as visual 
experiences had by normal subjects. So in perception we conceptualize objects as 
certain kinds of things and therefore acquire beliefs about them, but in cases like 
Visual Associative Agnosia, subjects fail to conceptualize objects as certain kinds of 
things (a comb, a watch, a known person, a word) but they do conceptualize them as 
red, bulgy, thin, distant, and so on, as normal perceivers do. 
That reply is sound, but firstly it weakens the original theory by making it compatible 
only with a particular view on the range of properties representable in perception, 
secondly it still remains to be explained why these impaired subjects are able to 
prompt the exercise of the right thick recognitional concepts just be touching the very 
same objects they so 'poorly' see. If touch is (immediately and non-inferentially) 
                                                
67 Such examples are provided by experiments by Rubens & Benson 1971. 
68 For example, McGinn 1982, Clark 2000, Byrne 2011. Theorists who hold that in perception are 
also represented 'thick' properties (like {comb} or {key}, are Siegel 2006, 2011, Bayne 2011, 
Prinz 2006. 
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'recognitionally rich' whilst vision of the same objects is 'recognitionally poor', there 
must be an impairment in vision, not just in the system of cognitive categorization of 
the percept. Maybe a further reply could be that the impairment is neither in visual 
perception nor in the system of categorization-recognition-conceptualization, rather 
in the mechanism of integration between the information strictly delivered by visual 
experience and certain non-perceptual concepts, whilst the mechanism of integration 
of tactile information with conceptualization is well-working. But the very fact of 
introducing so many positive auxiliary hypotheses seems to me to make this global 
line of defense more and more ad hoc. 
 
2.4 – The Case of Optic Ataxia and BT 
Furthermore, there is other clinical evidence, concerning Optic Ataxia
69
, which is 
clearly immune to these possible replies above. Optic Ataxia is another kind of 
impairment which presents exactly an inverted situation of Visual Appercetive 
Agnosia (which is, differently from Associative Agnosia, an impairment in 
recognizing and reporting information about forms and spatial properties). Patients 
with Visual Appercetive Agnosia are normally good at manipulating, reaching and 
acting upon objects, in short they have a perfect visuo-motor control. On the 
contrary, visually ataxic patients are normally good at recognizing objects and 
verbally reporting what the objects are, where they are and how they are spatially- 
and shape-arranged, but they show dramatic impairments at doing elementary tasks 
like reaching an object with the hand, putting an object into a hole and the like. Both 
the impairments considered together provide evidence for the existence of two 
different relatively independent mechanisms implemented respectively in the so-
called “dorsal stream” and “visual stream”
70
. Indeed Visual Agnosia depends on 
lesions of ventral stream, whilst Optic Ataxia depends on lesions of dorsal steam. 
Optic Ataxics behave as if they could not use the spatial information inherent in any 
visual scene, despite their perfect recognitional and descriptive competence. For 
example, while a subject with Visual Appercetive Agnosia – involving impairment 
                                                
69 On Optic Ataxia see Clark 2001, Milner and Goodale 1995. 
70  The ventral stream leads from primary visual cortex, through V4, to temporal areas, the dorsal 
stream leads from the primary visual cortex, through MT, to parietal cortex. See Milner and 
Goodale 1995, Jennerod and Jacob 2006. 
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of form perception – cannot see the orientation of a displayed slit but can nonetheless 
post a letter through the slit, a subject with Optic Ataxia can recognize and truly 
report the orientation of the slit but is unable to post the letter through the slit, despite 
the fact that he does not have any physical impairment. The first is good at using 
perceptual information for recognition, recall and reasoning but is bad at using that 
information for fine-grained behavior and action upon the perceived scene, the 
second is good at that second task but is bad at the first. 
Both the impairments provide evidence for a double coding of visual information 
that is to be found in unimpaired subjects as well. For example, consider the 
Tichener Circles Illusion
71
: A circle surrounded by an annulus of small circles 
appears bigger than an equally big circle surrounded by an annulus of big circles. 
That is what the experience makes you think or believe (provided that you are not 
told you are victim of an illusion). So, the size of the circle is misrepresented to the 
effect that two equal sizes appears to be different in virtue of surrounding distractors, 
just as it happened with the lines in Müller-Lyer Illusion. Now, you can enlarge the 
central disc of the second figure  to make it as big as to (falsely) appear equal to the 
first central disc. So Algioti did, ingeniously, with his colleagues
72
. They used poker 
chips as the central discs and asked the subjects to immediately pick up the target 
disc on the left if the two disc appeared equal in size, to pick up the one on the right 
if they appeared different in size. Surprisingly enough, despite them' being under 
illusion (both phenomenologically and doxastically) they did the right choice, they 
acted according to the actual sizes of the discs. That experiment shows that, even in 
unimpaired perceivers, an intake of reliable perceptual information can be shown in 
fine-grained behavior without “arriving” to explicit  consciousness to produce 
beliefs. On the contrary, that can happen despite wrong perceptual beliefs being 
acquired about the same scene. 
                                                
71 The Tichener Circles Illusion:   
72 See Algioti et al. 1995. 
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Both Optic Ataxia and the Tichener Circles Illusion show ad abundantiam that 
perception cannot be belief-acquiring insofar as some level of perceptual information 
is used in action-guiding even if it is either absent from any content consciously 
considered and/or believed, or it is even in contradiction with the content consciously 
considered. So, in these cases not even the ad hoc replies above will do anymore. 
Here we have correct and useful visual perceptions of objects as having certain 
SCM-properties without any recognition-conceptualization of them as having these 
properties, not just without recognition-conceptualization of other thicker properties 
belonging to the same objects. Here the only reply perhaps would be that the 
behaviorally displayed information that the discs are unequal is not conscious, indeed 
it can co-exist with other conscious (wrong) information that they are equal. So, 
again it could still be the case that perception is not belief-acquiring but that 
conscious perception, or perceptual experience is such instead. Indeed the content of 
such action-guiding perceptions not only is not the propositional content of empirical 
beliefs, it is not even the content exhibited by our perceptual phenomenology (of 
course those contents for a Belief Theorists are one and the same). So that evidence 
is a good argument against the equation Perception =Belief-Acquiring but it does not 
work against the more restricted equation, Conscious “Experiential” Perception = 
Belief-Acquiring. So far so good. Nonetheless, the evidence that there is perception 
without belief at least should constrain the Belief Theorist to explain why there 
cannot also be perceptual conscious experiences without belief. Moreover, if those 
perceptions are intentional – as a matter of fact, they are about the circles, which are 
perceived, though unconsciously, as unequal in size – the main reason to introduce 
the Belief Theory is flawed. Such a theory purports to explain intentionality of 
perceptual experience by reducing it to intentionality of perceptual beliefs. But if 
there is perceptual intentionality without perceptual beliefs, then the fact of acquiring 
a belief with a certain content cannot be the only way to explain perceptual 
intentionality. In short, an appeal to the intentionality of beliefs as the best 
explanation of intentionality of perception is “screened off” by the existence of 




2.5 – The Case of Blindsight and BT 
On the other hand, the idea that only conscious perception is belief-acquiring meets 
an experimental obstacle in the experimental evidence concerning exactly the 
existence of perceptual belief-acquiring without any related conscious experience. 
The so-called Blindsight is such a phenomenon. In most cases of Blindsight there is a 
damage of the primary visual cortex (V1) which has the absence on any visual 
phenomenology as a tragic consequence, to the effect that the subjects claim to be 
completely blind
73
. Nonetheless, if prompted to a forced response or invited to guess 
about a surrounding scene, they show a surprising ability to answer correctly at 
levels significantly much above chance. Hilbert 1994, 447, reports the case of M.S., 
suffering of cerebral achromatopsia (color blindness due to brain damage)
74
. He 
denies seeing color, cannot sort objects by color, cannot name the colors of objects 
shown to him and mostly behaves as if he was completely color-blind. But in many 
experiments he shows good ability to recognize shapes and figures whose boundaries 
were specified exclusively by color. He acquires true empirical beliefs
75
 by purely 
visual means but  without any related visual experience. Vision directly operates to 
gives him beliefs about what is seen, without any mediation of visual experience
76
.  
Now, putting together these well-known experimental data (Inattentional- and 
Change Blindness, Sperling Effect, Visual Associative and Appercetive Agnosia, 
Optic Ataxia, Blindsight), it seems  we cannot escape the conclusion that visually 
experiencing is neither sufficient nor necessary for coming-to-believe by visual 
means. So not even just conscious experience can be equated with believe-acquiring. 
As a result, both the more ambitious version (seeing is believing) and the more 
                                                
73 On Blindsight, see Cowey 2010. 
74 The source of Hilbert is Mollon et al. 1980. On achromatopsia, see Beauvois & Salliant 1985.  
75 I say that he acquires true beliefs rather than knowledge, because it is far from clear whether such 
beliefs, although they are gained through a relatively reliable process, are or are not justified. In 
any case, even on a reliabilist view of knowledge, treating these true acts of guessing as 
knowledge would entail a very little demanding sort of reliabilism. The subject does not know 
whether she knows, does not even believe she is knowing, does not have any idea of whether and 
why that process of coming-to-believe is reliable and truth-conducive. In any case, that is not our 
concern here. 
76 Another interesting case is the so-called unilateral neglect. Neglect patients often behave as if half 
of their world no longer exists. Due to brain-damage, they are totally oblivious of objects and 
features of the half of the room, they may eat only from a half of the plate, they may shave only a 
side of their faces, and so on. However, they indirectly show sensitivity to objects and features 
falling under the neglected half, when prompted. So, that is another example of perception without 
perceptual awareness, just like Blindsight. On unilateral neglect, see McGlinchey-Berroth 1997, 
Driver and Villeumier 2001, and Dretske 2006 for a more philosophical interpretation of the data. 
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In Section 1 of Chapter II I have presented and critically discussed the Belief Theory 
of perception. Firstly I have pointed at some virtues of that view – i.e. explaining 
intentionality, semantic evaluability, and perceptual belief-forming without apparent 
transitions – which made the view historically attractive in facing the Argument from 
Illusion better than Direct Realism and Adverbialism but without committing to the 
ontological extravagances involved in Sense Data Theory. 
Secondly, I have produced many arguments to show that the Belief Theory is to be 
rejected despite those theoretical advantages over other views. Those arguments have 
been grouped into two kinds, more philosophical arguments, and arguments based on 
experimental evidence (Section 2).  
With respect to the first kind, I have considered the normative, rational, and holistic 
constraints for belief-ascription as well as the Generality Constraint holding for 
concept-possession. Were perception identical to belief, its content would satisfy 
those constraints, but it is not the case. Furthermore, I have argued that persistence of 
illusion cannot be accommodated within the Belief Theory, since the attempts to 
retool the theory by the notions of 'suppressed inclination' or 'potential belief' are 
doomed to failure. In addition, contradictory and impossible contents may feature in 
perceptual experience in a way they cannot feature in belief. 
With respect to the second kind of arguments, in Section 2 I have considered 
different types of cases clearly showing that perceptual belief or belief-acquiring are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for perception. Change Blindness and Inattentional 
Blindness show that we can see objects and properties without noticing them, so 
without recognizing them, so without acquiring beliefs about them. On the other 
hand, any attempt to deny that conclusion by denying that we really see what we do 
not notice-recognize-form beliefs about, is dashed by other evidence as, for example, 
the Sperling Effect. The Sperling Experiments indubitably show that we must see at 
least something we do not either notice or believe to see at all, since we can be 
prompted to notice objects we are not in visual contact with anymore so we must 
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have seen them before. 
I have also considered Visual Associative Agnosia (VAA), a pathology involving 
dramatic absence of object-recognition despite vision is not impaired. VAA shows 
that there can be visual perception of objects without a respective belief-acquisition 
of what these object are, so that divorce between (impaired) recognition or belief-
acquiring, on the one hand, and (unimpaired) visual-perceptual capacities, on the 
other hand, strongly speaks for a distinction between the two. 
Moreover, Optic Ataxia also shows that there can be perception of spatial properties 
which suffices for fine-grained action-guiding, without any associated doxastic 
awareness of those perceived contents. That happens also in normal subjects, as the 
Tichener Illusion and other similar cases show. People behave as if they 'knew' that 
two circles are the same size, even though the very same circles consciously 'look' to 
be a different size, so there can be perception of spatial properties not only without a 
respective belief-acquisition, but also associated with the perceptual acquiring of a 
belief which contradicts the unawarely perceived content. The Belief Theorist could 
reply that at least conscious perceptual experience is belief-acquiring, even if there 
may be absence of belief-acquisition in perceptions without experience. I have 
argued that also that move is challenged by the well-known case of Blindsight, where 
there is perceptual belief-acquiring without any perceptual conscious experience. So, 
if there is perception without belief-acquiring as well as perceptual belief-acquiring 
without conscious experience, neither perceptions nor perceptual experiences can be 
just identical with belief-acquisitions. If conscious perception was identical with 
perceptual belief-acquiring, we would expect that a perceptual belief-acquisition 
without conscious perception would be impossible. Blindsight shows that is possible 
though. 
In the next Chapter, I will introduce the Content View as a necessary evolution of the 
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Chapter III - The Content View 
Introduction 
In this Chapter I introduce and start discussing the Content View. In Section 1 I 
introduce the Content View as a promising way of saving the virtues of the Belief 
Theory without facing its main problems. In Section 2 I argue that the Content View 
best captures our intuitions and does the greatest justice to the ordinary way of 
ascribing perceptual experiences analyzed at length in Chapter I. Section 2 
introduces the main issues that arise within the Content View and so prepares the 
more substantive discussion of the following Chapter. Finally, I will put these 
provisional conclusions together in order to sum up and state the points just acquired. 
 
Section 1 – The Core Idea of CV 
1.1 Introducing the Content View 
In the previous Chapter I have pointed at some important virtues of the Belief 
Theory. To recall them shortly, Belief Theory explains the intentionality of 
perceptual experiences, it explains their semantic evaluability – i-e. perceptual states 
can be taken as right or mistaken, as veridical or falsidical – and it explains why 
experiencing in this way, naturally involves taking things to be a certain way. 
Moreover, it was a better alternative to Direct Realism both than Sense Data theory 
(in facing the Arguments from Illusion and Hallucination without committing to a 
suspicious ontology) and than Adverbialism (in better doing justice to the articulate 
quality of perceptual information as well as to the 'purported objectivity' of 
perceptual experiences witnessed in their phenomenology, so in explaining how 
mind-independent objects could feature in the phenomenological character of 
experience).  
But I have also considered many reasons why the view should be rejected, and I 
argued that those reasons definitely overwhelm the advantages. Among those 
reasons, I have considered that belief involves concept-possession, its ascription is 
normative and subject to constraints of consistency and rationality, differently from 
perception. In addition belief is committal in a way perceptual experience is not (I 
can disbelieve my experience), but illusory experiences persist despite disbelieved 
(as beliefs do not), experiences can present contradictory and impossible elements, 
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and so on. Furthermore, I have recalled some pieces of empirical evidence globally 
showing that believing is neither necessary nor sufficient both for perceiving and/or 
perceptually experiencing. Another weakness of the view I have stressed so far is its 
phenomenological inadequacy. Experiencing does not introspectively seem to consist 
just of us acquiring an inclination to believe certain propositions, especially if that 
inclination is counterfactually specified. There must be something more in perceiving 
than being potentially committed to an abstract propositional content. 
A more promising view would be one which embeds the advantages of the Belief 
Theory without   its fatal problems. That is what the Content View (CV) aims at 
doing
1
. According to that view, perception has intentional content and it is normally 
belief-inducing but it is not belief or belief-acquiring. As some of the best known 
advocates of CV put it: 
 
“A perceptual experience represents the world as being a certain way” (Evans 1982, 
226; Peacocke 1992, 66) 
 
“Experiences may be correct or incorrect […] In short, experiences have 
representational or semantic properties; they have content” (Davies 1992, 22) 
 
“[...] experiences have contents, where contents are a kind of condition under which 
experiences are accurate, similar in many ways to the truth-conditions of beliefs” 
(Siegel 2010, 4) 
 
In perceptual experience, things are represented as being in a certain way. If that is 
the case – if CV is true – then the intentionality of perceptual experience can be 
explained by experiences having content. Likewise their semantic evaluability as 
correct or incorrect, veridical or falsidical, can be explained by them having 
correctness conditions determined by their contents. Finally, the acquisition of 
beliefs which in normal conditions perceptual experiences involve, can be explained 
by the subject doxastically committing to the content of her perceptual experience, so 
that she takes things to be the way her experience represents them as being.  
                                                
1 That label is of Brewer 2008. See Siegel 2011. 
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1.2 – CV and BT 
So the main fundamental virtues of the Belief Theory can prima facie be embedded 
in CV. Can the problems of the Belief Theory pointed above also be accommodated 
within CV? Let us see. 
Actually, the Belief Theory is a specific form CV can take. Indeed if experiences are 
belief-acquisitions, experiences are contentful states, they do represent the world as 
being a certain way; representing things as being such-and-so is just what a belief 
does. Although, CV as such is not committed either to take perceptions to be belief-
acquisitions or to take perceptual content as being the same in nature as the content 
of belief. Firstly, a CV theorist can distinguish perception from perceptual belief and 
attribute content to both. Secondly, given that believed contents are committal
2
, 
conceptual and propositional, as well as holistically ascribed and reasons-sensitive, 
as seen above, a CV theorist should attribute to perceptions a different kind of 
content from the kind of content which characterizes perceptual beliefs. In that 
version of CV, not only perceptions have content on their own without being belief-
acquisitions, but their content is also of a different kind from that of beliefs. How 
should such a content be characterized in order CV to preserve the virtues of Belief 
Theory without running up against its difficulties? Let us proceed by steps and 
cursorily retrace the main of those difficulties to assess at least how that alleged 
perceptual content must not be characterized. 
Firstly, the belief states are fully-fledged propositional attitudes involving possession 
and exercise of the concepts constituting the believed contents. Belief ascription is 
subject to the Rationality-Constraint and concept-possession ascription is subject to 
the Generality Constraint, but perceptually experiencing something as being so does 
not need to meet these demanding constraints. So, are perception to be contentful 
episodes, their contents must be free from both Rationality- and Generality 
Constraint. Indeed no such content can be a belief or be identical in kind to the 
content of a belief. 
Secondly, perceptually experiencing a as F cannot be as committal as believing that 
a is F. It must be at least possible that I take what I perceive 'at face value' and 
                                                
2 Believing that P is committing oneself to the truth of P. 
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disbelieve the content of my perceptual experience, as it happens for example in 
illusions known as such. So, if perceptual experiences are committal in any way, they 
cannot commit us to their contents the way beliefs do. Indeed beliefs are 




Thirdly, perceptual content cannot be as indifferent to its informational origins as 
belief-content is, rather the special way of accessing that content must matter to what 
that content is. That content needs be phenomenologically adequate, so it needs 
somehow to embed in itself the 'vehicle' through which it is acquired
4
. So, perceptual 
content cannot be just the abstract proposition which constitutes believed contents, 
even if it is in virtue of having a certain content that a perception induces in the 
subject acquiring certain empirical beliefs, rather than others. That calls for an 
epistemologically and semantically satisfactory account of the transition from 
perceptual experiences to perceptual beliefs, but that will be treated later on. 
In addition, perceptual content needs to be compatible with the experimental 
evidence I have recalled to make a case against the Belief Theory. If perceptions are 
contentful states, the kind of  content they bear must allow that we can have such 
contentful states without noticing (a part of) the contents of these very states 
(Inattentional- and Change Blindness, Sperling Experiments); without recognizing 
the perceived objects as being of a given kind of thing (Visual Associative Agnosia); 
without even being perceptually conscious of them (Optic Ataxia, Tichener Illusion, 
Blindsight). 
Maybe only a view involving a multi-layered content could accommodate all that 
evidence. Anyway, what is certain is that perceptual experiences cannot be beliefs 
and their content cannot be of a kind which is subject to the Rationality- and 
Generality constraints. Moreover, if GC is a good criterion for concept-possession, 
and if the arguments above are sound, then perceptual content needs be non-
conceptual. In other words, some of the arguments I have introduced above against 
the Belief Theory, are good arguments against Conceptualism as well
5
. Perceptual 
                                                
3 That is clearly shown by the Moore's Paradox: “I believe that P but not-P” is a paradox just 
because believing P is committing to the truth of P, so that self-ascribing the belief that P cannot 
be consistent with judging non-P. 
4 On that content/vehicle distinction and phenomenology, see Crane 2008, 23. 




 is that version of CV which holds that perceptual experiences have 
conceptual content. Even though experiences are not beliefs, in acquiring perceptual 
beliefs on their grounds a subject, endorses the very same kind of content which 
characterizes the experiences, so that having a perceptual experience with a certain 
content involves a display of the very same conceptual capacities which are operative 
in forming the respective perceptual belief. That idea is incompatible with the 
evidence just recalled, since seeing does not necessarily involve noticing, 
recognizing, conceptualizing, believing. So in seeing, for example, the very same 
“conceptual capacities which are operative in believing” are not to be found 
necessarily, even though seeing often involves attentive noticing, recognitional acts, 
as well as acts of conceptualization and belief-formation in those cognitive systems 
which are able to conceptualize and believe at all. More on that later. 
 
1.3 – Phenomenal character and representational content  
I have charged the Belief Theory with the accusation of phenomenological 
inadequacy. Before asking whether and how some version of CV could do any better 
than the Belief Theory in that respect, I want to briefly introduce the notion of 
phenomenal character, a central notion for the debate about the nature of perception. 
Whilst all take perceptual experiences as having a distinctive phenomenal character, 
CV is a 'two components view'
7
, insofar as it takes perceptual experiences to exhibit 
two fundamental features: phenomenal character, and representational content. 
While the representational content is the way experience represents the world as 
being – or the way the surrounding world seems to be to the subject according to her 
perceptual experience – the phenomenal character is the 'what it is like'- or subjective 
aspect of experience
8
. For example, there is something it is like to see (a certain 
shade of) red, which is subjectively different from what it is like to see (a certain 
shade of) green. A given conscious mental state has phenomenal properties if there is 
something it is like to be in it. Perceptual conscious states are such that there is 
something it is like to be in them, so I will say that they are phenomenal states 
                                                                                                                                     
containing the possessed concept as well as being able to make certain inferences. A concept 
determines and explains the inferential properties of the beliefs in which it occurs as a constituent. 
6 See McDowell 1994, Brewer 1999. 
7 See Maund 1994, Siegel 2010, Chalmers 2008. 
8 See Nagel 1974, who famously introduced such a 'what it is like'-characterization. 
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insofar they have phenomenal properties
9
. Also particular elements of a given 
perceptual experience can be said to have phenomenal properties. For example, if 
there is something it is like to see something bulgy, red and round, there is also 
something it is like to see something red, where such a phenomenal property is 
involved in the first complex phenomenal state. Of course a phenomenal state can 
very well be multi-modal. For example, there is something it is like to see certain 
objects and properties and hearing certain sounds at a given time. A global 
phenomenal state can also be not just perceptual but involving other emotional or 
'feeling-like' conscious properties of any sort. With Siegel 2010, 20ff., we can call 
overall experience a certain global conscious state with its many facets, at a time t, 
like looking at the clouds, hearing the wind, feeling the cold air on one's face, 
touching and guiding the handlebars, and feeling happy when cycling into the forest. 
Taken an overall experience, we can zoom in, for example, on its visual component, 
namely, on the visual phenomenal state involved in the overall experience
10
. We can 
further zoom in on an aspect of that global visual experience and consider what it is 
like to see a certain property (ex. a certain color of a certain cloud). That single 
phenomenal property could be shared also by other visual experiences as well as by 
other very different overall experiences. 
So a mental state has phenomenal character at all if there is something it is like to be 
in it, a mental state has the determinate phenomenal character it has according to 
what it is like to be in it for the subject being in it. The phenomenal properties of the 
state constitute 'what it is like' to be in that state. Often such properties are called 
qualia, but that word has many meanings and uses rather than a uniform and shared 
sense within the debate
11
, so I prefer to neutrally talk of the subjective, qualitative 
                                                
9 As Bayne 2011, 17, writes “phenomenal states are which it is 'something' it is like to instantiate”. 
In Tye's words: “Consider your visual experience as you stare at a bright turquoise color patch in a 
paint store. There is something it is like for you subjectively to undergo that experience. What it is 
like to undergo the experience is very different from what it is like for you to experience a dull 
brown color patch. This difference is a difference in what is often called 'phenomenal character' 
(Tye 2007). 
10 On that, see also Horgan and Tienson 2002. 
11 Tye individuates at least four uses of the word: 1) Qualia as those introspectively accessible 
qualities making up the phenomenal character of your experience 2) Qualia as those intrinsic and 
non representational features of non-physical Sense Data which are responsible of the phenomenal 
character 3) Qualia as those intrinsic, non-representational properties of experiences solely 
responsible for their phenomenal character, where that characterization is ontologically neutral 
about whether there are non-phyisical mental objects or not (Peacocke 1983, Nagel 1974) 4) 
Qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences which are also ineffable, non-physical and given 
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character of perceptual experiences, indeed their phenomenal character. 
I am conscious that such a characterization is not very clear. But more than providing 
a definition of that “what it is like” aspect of experience, on the whole, an appeal is 
made simply to our intuition and to our introspective capacities. As a matter of fact, 
there is no way of ostensively pointing at such a subjective aspect in a publicly 
accessible manner, so faute de mieux each one needs to do so by herself, so to speak. 
In any case, according to CV, perceptual experiences exhibit two fundamental 
features, whose relation will be carefully examined later on: representational content 
and phenomenal character. A certain state S is a representational state if it has 
representational properties (= a content). The very same state S is also a phenomenal 
state insofar as it has phenomenal properties (= its phenomenal character). So, the 
phenomenal character of a visual experience consists of properties of your conscious 
experience you can introspectively attend to, whilst the representational content of a 
visual experience consists of properties your experience represents things as 
having
12
. When I visually experience a red square, in normal conditions something I 
see is represented both as red and square in my experience, so these are the 
representational properties providing my experience with its intentional content. The 
phenomenal properties of that very experience make up that subjective visual 
phenomenology which is typically associated with experiencing something as red 
and square, so they are the phenomenal character. So far so good. 
 
1.4 – Transparency and Richness of Details 
What about the phenomenological adequacy of CV then? What kind of perceptual 
content would be phenomenologically adequate? It should be one that could do 
justice to the phenomenal character of experience, one which would 'respect' or be 
compatible with the way perceptual experience presents itself insofar as it is 
introspectively accessible by us. Of course it is not a priori ruled out that the 
spontaneous phenomenology of experience is systematically misleading, but a theory 
which was consistent with the way experience introspectively seems to oneself to be 
                                                                                                                                     
incorrigibly to their subject (Dennett 1991). We are concerned only with the use 1, the most 
theory-neutral, so that none would ever deny that each conscious experience has qualia, namely, 
has a distinctive phenomenal character. On the different notions of qualia in the current debate, see 
also Martin 2008 (II). 
12 On that, see Dretske 1995, Tye 2000. 
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featured, other things being equal, would be a much better theory than one which 
violated that Phenomenological Adequacy Constraint. Therefore, even if what I am 
calling Phenomenological Adequacy is maybe not an absolute theoretical necessity, 
still it is a relevant desideratum for a theory concerning our experiences and their 
manifest features, therefore concerning us as subjects of experience after all. 
Now I want to introduce two fundamental features of visual phenomenology which 
are introspectively assessable: transparency and richness of details.  
Transparency is that property of perceptual experience in virtue of which when you 
introspectively attend to the properties of your own experience you end up by 
attending to the properties your experience attributes to the objects you are 
perceiving
13
. In Harman's clear words: 
 
“Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual 
experience. I predict you will find that the only features there to turn your attention 
to will be features of the presented tree, including relational features of the tree 'from 
here'” (Harman 1990, 667) 
 
As soon as I search for the intrinsic properties of my experience, I only find the 
world and its properties or – to put it more exactly – the way the perceived world 
seems to be according to my experience. But that is nothing more than the 
representational content of my experience.  
Transparency has been appealed to, to argue for different and incompatible views
14
. I 
want to argue that the Content View is at least compatible with transparency. The 
phenomenology of our perceptual experiences is such that they present themselves as 
having an 'objective purport', as attributing features and properties to the real 
perceived world we are facing. That is why CV is, with that respect, 
phenomenologically more adequate than Adverbialism or Sense Datum theory. On 
the other side, it does prima facie better than Direct Realism because it can better 
accommodate the Argument from Illusion
15
. If our experience is falsidical, it cannot 
                                                
13 Transparency was firstly introduced by Moore: when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all 
we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous" (1922, 25). On transparency 
see Tye 2000, Siewert 2003, Stoljar 2004, Martin 2008. 
14  On that, see Martin 2002. 
15 Advocates of a disjunctivist version of Direct Realism (see Martin 2006, 2008, Fish 2009) claim 
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involve the real presence of (all) the properties we find in introspecting the 
experience itself, but it can well falsidically attribute to things properties things do 
not in fact have. So such a phenomenology of objective purport and 'direction to the 
world' is vindicated within CV, but also the eventuality that our experiences are 
illusory and may 'mismatch' reality, is not a puzzling problem anymore
16
.  
Often transparency is used by the representationalist advocates of CV
17
 to argue for 
representationalism, namely the view that phenomenal properties are identical to 
representational properties. But other versions of CV do not hold that identity
18
, so I 
leave aside that debate for the time being and take transparency just to fit very well 
with the general framework of CV as such. 
As I have said, Belief Theory is not phenomenologically adequate, even if taking 
perceptions as belief-acquirings would explain the objective purport experiences 
seem to have. Take visual experience for example. What is missing and being 
disregarded by Belief Theory is the relevance of the special way of acquiring 
information, which is so phenomenologically salient in visually experiencing, 
especially insofar as that special way involves a factor which characterizes visual 
phenomenology in a way that cannot be explained if perceptual experiences were 
nothing more than belief-acquisitions. Namely, the richness of details or fine-
grainedness of the visually conveyed information.  
Assigning a content to a visual experience must involve a kind of content which is 
consistent with such a special fine-grained and profuse way of (purportedly) “taking 
in concrete reality” (Crane 2008, 24) which vision introspectively seems to be, since 
the semantic characterization of perceptual experiences needs to fit their 
phenomenological features if it is to explain their relevance in our first-person access 
to the content itself. If content consists in correctness-conditions and we access 
(come-to-know) such correctness-conditions of our experiences in virtue of them' 
having a distinctive phenomenal character, then that phenomenal character must be 
somehow 'witnessed' in content. As we saw, perceptual content is not separable from 
                                                                                                                                     
they can accommodate the problem of Illusion and Hallucination without giving up Direct 
Realism. I will take that proposal into consideration later. See Chapter VI. 
16 I know things are not so easy, because the presentational phenomenology of hallucinations is still 
to be explained, but I will discuss the problem later on (see Chapter VI, Section 2.5). For the time 
being, these introductory remarks are sufficient. 
17  For example, Dretske 1995, Tye 2000. 
18  For example, Peacocke 2007, Block 1998. 
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its informational origins, differently from the content of beliefs
19
. Perceptual content 
and perceptual vehicle are originally entangled. 
The difference between a picture and a sentence maybe a good metaphor to render 
the difference between perceptual content as it is witnessed in visual phenomenology 
on the one hand, and the content of perceptual beliefs acquirable on the basis of 
accessing that content, on the other
20
. Perceptual content presents itself as analog, 
unit-free
21
, continuous and profuse. Perceptual beliefs are ways of “extracting” 
pieces of discrete and 'digitalized' content from a more basic experiential content 
which is recalcitrant – phenomenologically, in the first place – to be identified with 
the potential extractions it can give rise to. Extracting pieces of information in a 
'digital' form – as Dretske 1981 characterizes the doxastic form – involves a gain in 
classification (conceptualizing is classifying) but an impoverishment in terms of 
informational richness, a gain in quality against a loss in quantity of information. 
Consider an image as representing a scene. It is neither true or false in itself, it can 
represent a real scene in a more or less accurate way, with respect to different visible 
properties (colors, sizes, orientation, fidelity in morphological details, and so on). In 
visual experience the attended scene presents itself as a topic for further exploration, 
where indefinitely many details are potentially available for access, they are there at 
our reach, so to speak
22
. 
So, if we take that picture/sentence analogy seriously, we can make the first 
important point about  a phenomenologically salient difference in kind of content, 
between our experiences and our perceptual beliefs. Perceptual experiences can be 
more or less accurate, whilst beliefs are either true or false.  
 
1.5 – The Scenario Content introduced  
So, if representational content consists of correctness-conditions, the correctness-
conditions for beliefs are their truth-conditions, whilst the correctness-conditions for 
                                                
19 As Crane 2008, 23, puts that very same point, “it is central to the phenomenology of experience 
that what is conveyed to the subject includes its specific vehicle”. What is conveyed to the subject 
in experience, is the content. 
20 Besides Dretske 1981 and Crane 1992, 2011, also Fodor 2007 adopts that very analogy by taking 
perceptions as iconic (picture-like) representations on the one side, and perceptual beliefs as 
discursive (sentence-like) representations on the other side. 
21 For example, you do not visually experience a distance in feet or in meters. On perceptual content 
being analog and unit-free, see Peacocke 1986. 
22 As Nöe 2006, 422, remarks “Phenomenologically, the world is given to perception as available”. 
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perceptions are their accuracy-conditions in the first place. Accuracy is a gradual 
notion, which can do justice to the profuse and continuous nature of perceptual 
content as it is conveyed in our concrete experiences. 
The well-know notion of Scenario Content (SC) articulated by Peacocke is a way of 
semantically characterizing perceptual experiences which does justice to their fine-
grained phenomenology. SC is: 
 
“specified by the ways of filling out the space around the subject which are 
consistent with the representational content's being correct” (Peacocke 1992, 105) 
 
If the surrounding world instantiates the spatial type under which those 'ways' fall, 
then the content is exemplified and the perception is correct. That set of ways is to be 
determined egocentrically by firstly fixing an origin (for example the chest of the 
perceiver) and axes (for example, the directions back/front, up/down, left/right) with 
respect to the origin or center; then determining for each point  within that centered 
space – identified by its direction and distance from the fixed origin – “whether there 
is a surface there, and if so what texture, hue, saturation, brightness and temperature 
it has at that point, together with its degree of solidity” (ibidem, 106). Once that 
Scenario Content is ascribed to a perceptual experience, the experience can be 
semantically evaluated as soon as it is cast into a positioned scenario, namely, each 
point of the scenario-content is matched with a correspondent point in the real 
surrounding environment where the subject is and its 'origins' are located, according 
to real directions, places, and a real time as well. A positioned scenario is easily 
assessable for correctness and accuracy. For example, a piece of the content it carries 
could be specified as follows: “in that point (= at a certain distance and direction 
from the origin) of the positioned scenario there is a red solid surface, with a certain 
bright, saturation, hue and orientation”. Now, if the real space around the perceiver is 
characterized that way, in that point, and that point of the spatial type is instantiated, 
then the perception is accurate with respect to that point. If not, it is inaccurate. That 
content is a spatial type used to semantically characterized the experience, it is not to 
be found somewhere “in the head”. Nonetheless, that style of content-ascription is 
phenomenologically apt, because it embeds reference to typically visual properties, 
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as represented from the 'point of view' of the perceiver, with a profuseness and 
concrete richness of details which is typical of conscious visual experiences, and, 
without that perceptual content, is reduced to beliefs or abstract concepts. Indeed, the 
subject does not need to possess the concepts used to specify the content ascribed to 
her experience. For example, the concepts {red}, {saturation}, {distance} and the 
like. A fortiori, the subject does not even need to acquire a belief having these 
concepts as their constituent, in order to have such an experience assessable for 
accuracy and so semantically evaluable throughout.  
Now, that is not the only layer of content which experience is characterizable with, 
but it is a basic layer which already shows how a version of CV can be 
phenomenologically adequate, save the virtues of the Belief Theory and avoid at the 
same time those inescapable problems hinted at above. 
As we will see later, there are other layers of perceptual content which are more 
semantically articulated than SC insofar as they involve explicit reference to 
'discreet' objects as having types of properties, as involving 'thicker' recognitional 
acts, and so on. But now I am mostly interested in showing how CV can meet the 
main general desiderata a satisfactory theory of perception should meet, 
independently on how other more specific issues can be detailed and filled. 
 
Section 2 - Some prima facie Virtues of the Content View 
2.1 – Distinctive Features of States with Intentional Content  
In fact CV is too rarely defended as such against its alternatives
23
. Rather, it is 
articulated in specific ways, and some sub-options within CV are argued for against 
others. For these reasons it seems to me opportune to preliminarily argue for its 
plausibility specially insofar as an alternative view – the Disjunctivism cum Naïve 
Realism (DJ-NR) – is affirming itself and challenging the very basic assumption of 
CV, namely, the idea that perceptual experiences are contentful states
24
. According 
                                                
23  For example, Evans 1982 and Peacocke 1992 – the champions of CV – never defend the truth of 
CV as such. A relevant exception is Siegel 2010. 
24  See Martin 2002, 2004, 2006. Actually, a Naïve Realist does not need to deny that experience 
have content, it will suffice for her to hold that the notion of content is not so relevant in 
individuating and characterizing experiences. On the contrary, according to CV the content of a 
perceptual experience is an essential feature making the state what it is. Siegel 2010 argues for that 
Naïve Realism is compatible with CV. Although, as embedded in NR the notion of content 
becomes redundant. To say the least it ceases to be a key-notion. 
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to DJ-NR, perceptual experience is relational in a way experience could not be if CV 
was true. On that view experiences, when veridical, are relations having the world 
itself as a constituent rather than being representations of it; when falsidical, they are 
events of another kind which do not share anything with veridical experiences apart 
their subjective indistinguishability from them (each from its subjectively matching 
counterpart). So veridical cases are genuine relations to the surrounding world which 
is then 'directly manifested' rather than represented through them, and do not share 
anything essential or important with illusions and hallucinations, not even their 
alleged content. That is at least a well-known version of DJ-NR (Martin, Fish, 
Brewer)
25
. Other version of DJ-NR are available, but I will treat them later on.  
Of course, in order to defeat that global challenge it will be necessary to develop a 
detailed version of CV that is able to face the criticisms moved by the advocates of 
the recently revived Naïve Realism. But since CV is perhaps slowly ceasing to be the 
mainstream view, some preliminary arguments at least for its prima facie 
plausibility, need to be introduced.  
The first reason for taking CV as promising has already been recalled. Perceptions 
have intentionality, namely, they are states directed-upon worldly objects. 
Representing is a way of being about a represented target in representing the target 
as being a certain way.  
Intentionality as a property of representations has been characterized with three main 
features. Firstly, the power to misrepresent, which would occur when perceptions are 
incorrect or mistaken (their correctness-conditions are not instantiated)
26
. Secondly, 
the aboutness itself, insofar as an intentional state refers to some object or condition, 
it is about something indeed. That is also a feature which essentially characterizes 
perceptual experiences – they are about objects or circumstances in the environment. 
Thirdly, the aspectual shape. In being about an object O, a representation of O 
always represents it (as being) a certain way, as F or G. Again, that is also a typical 
feature of perceptual experience, for example when I see an object and it looks some 
way to me (red, square, big), that would be the way my experience represents the 
object as being, if experience was an intentional-representational state. As Dretske 
1995, 31, puts it “experiences are about objects, but one cannot experience an object 
                                                
25  See Martin 2004, 2006, 2008; Fish 2009; Brewer 2008. 
26  See Chisholm 1957. 
 105 
without experiencing it under some aspect”
27
. So, perceptual experience has 
intentionality, and these three fundamental features of intentionality would be well 
explained by appealing to the notion of intentional content. 
Crane 2010, 86, likewise identifies three main ideas that make necessary the 
introduction of the notion of content with respect to perceptual experience: Aspect, 
Absence, Accuracy. By 'aspect' he means what we have just called the aspectual 
shape, so that seeing something involves something's looking a certain way or its 
being visually given under some aspect. 'Absence' refers to the possibility for some 
intentional state to be about an object or a state of affair which does not actually 
exist
28
. For example, I can desire something which is not there, so my state has an 
intentional object which does not exist there, I can believe that a state of affairs 
holds, but that state of affairs is not satisfied by reality, and so on. Absence is also 
intimately connected with the power to misrepresent we have introduced above. If a 
state represents that something is the case and that fact does not hold, the absence of 
the represented fact is what makes the state a misrepresentation of the way things are. 
Also visual experiences can have absent objects, for example it happens in 
hallucinations or in illusions
29
. Last but not least, accuracy is a salient feature of 
experiences. So aboutness, (potential) absence, aspect and accuracy are salient 
features both of perceptual experiences and of contentful, representational states. A 
straightforward way of accounting for that striking parallelism, is that of taking 
perceptual experiences to be representational states. Nothing else other than a 
representation seems to have in itself these distinctive features of (possible) absence, 





                                                
27  If I perceive an object it looks some way to me. An object can look some way F to me if it is 
experienced by me as F. But experiencing an object as being a certain way F seems to require 
representing it as being that way, specially if we consider that S can experience O as F even if O is 
not F. On that see also Tye 2011, 185ff. 
28  See Brentano 1874, Husserl 1913/70, Searle 1983. 
29  Hallucinations lack a worldly object at all, illusions can represent a real perceived scene in such a 
way that it appears that a certain object is part of the scene but actually that object is something 
else. So, also a partial detail presented in an illusory experience can be 'about' non-existent objects, 
not only a hallucination. 
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2.2 – Perceptual Experience and Accuracy  
That visual experiences are assessable for accuracy means that they can match or 
mismatch more or less the reality, so their accuracy is 'measured' by the world
30
. 
How can that happen if not by experiences being about reality and representing it in a 
certain way
31
? If that argument does not prove the truth of CV, at least it seems to me 
to be a natural conclusion and a very plausible inference to the best explanation. 
A possible reply could be that many other processes or activities are more or less 
accurate, without being representations or contentful states, so being assessable for 
accuracy does not entail any possession of representational properties. For example, 
an occurrent example of digestion can be more or less accurate with respect to a 
standard of 'digestive efficiency' determined by the natural function, evolutionarily 
fixed, of the dedicated mechanism, but none would take a case of digestion to be a 
representation thereby. But that objection is resistible, because the accuracy-
assessability   involved in perceptual experience is not just a kind of generic bio-
functional well-working, it presupposes a positive matching between the experience 
and the environment. In other words, there is a set of circumstances, or at least a 
cluster of environmental properties, the experience can match (veridical experience), 
partially match (illusion) or totally mismatch (hallucination). All that involves the 
idea of a correspondence or a mapping-relation between two domains which is more 
than an appropriate reaction to some external condition. Accuracy concerns such a 
correspondence, whose accessibility is a matter of how much of a domain is 
instantiated in the other domain. 
So, as Siegel 2010 rightly remarks, the best explanation for the pre-theoretical 
distinction between partially veridical, falsidical and completely veridical 
experiences is that experiences have accuracy-conditions in virtue of which they can 
be more or less accurate, where the conditions of such accuracy are the contents 
indeed. Accuracy of perceptual experience has to to with experiences having the 
power of being veridical, partially veridical or falsidical, and these ordinary 
characterizations employ intentional and clearly semantic notions. In addition, the 
accuracy-conditions of perceptual experiences are conveyed to the conscious subject 
and have a phenomenological salience, to the effect that the properties presented in 
                                                
30  In Searle's words (see Searle 1983), perceptions have a world-to-mind direction of fit. 
31  An argument on these lines is to be found in Siegel 2010, 30ff. 
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experience make it accurate only if they are instantiated in environment. Other 
functions like digestion can be normatively evaluated as correct/incorrect and even as 
more or less accurate, but they do not involve that the very same properties that are 
presented need to be instantiated in reality in order for the very episode to be 
accurate. That is the difference between a response to an environmental condition, 
which is also normatively evaluable as more or less accurate, and a representational 
response to an environmental condition, whose accuracy is a sui generis accuracy 
consisting of a distinctive kind of correspondence where a certain spatial type may be 
or may not be instantiated by a worldly token. 
A set of accuracy-conditions which is conveyed to the subject through her 
experience's presenting properties that are instantiated when the experience itself is 
accurate, is a content. So perceptual experiences have accuracy-conditions conveyed 
to the experiencer in such a way that they cannot be other than contents. All that is 
enough to render CV at least a very promising working-hypothesis. 
I want to end the third Chapter by arguing that many fundamental properties of the 
ordinary ascriptions of episodes of vision and visual experiences – analyzed at length 
in the first Chapter of this work – fit very well with CV, so that CV would mostly 
'save' our pre-theoretical intuitions about seeing and visually experiencing, insofar as 
these intuitions are implicitly embodied in the ordinary perceptual vocabulary we 
adopt in everyday discourse. Not only then does CV seem to be phenomenologically 
apt, it also seems to be apt in vindicating the manifest image of us as subjects of 
experience capable of being in sensory contact with our environments.  
Normally, when S sees an object O, O looks some way to S, say F. But O's looking F 
to S does not entail that S comes to believe that O is F. Seeing is not believing or 
coming-to-believe indeed. Nonetheless, in normal conditions and in absence of 
collateral knowledge, when a seen object O looks F to us we do tend to come-to-
believe that O is F. When O is F, the episode of seeing happens to occur in normal 
conditions (without abnormal causal deviations etc.) and our visual apparatus is 
working well, we justifiably come-to-believe the true fact that O is F, so we come-to-
know that O is F. In other words, we see that O is F. It may also happen that we 
come-to-believe by visual means that O is F but O is not F, for example, the lines are 
not unequal as they appear to be according to our illusory experience we falsidically 
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trust or endorse. So, we come to acquire a false belief by visual means. Both in case 
of knowledge or false belief, we acquire a perceptual belief through an episode of 
seeing something, through a visual perception, but that visual perception is not 
identical to that acquiring it often and normally gives rise to. We could say that the 
Belief Theory wrongly equates seeing with seeing-that (or visually coming-to 
believe-that).  
Furthermore, not only can there be seeing without seeing-that, there can also be 
seeing without seeing-as as well as seeing-as without seeing-that
32
. In fact, S can see 
O without recognizing O as a kind of thing (as an F), even if it is true that seeing an 
object normally prompts certain cognitively 'thick' recognitions, namely, certain acts 
of seeing-as. So seeing is not necessarily either doxastic or recognitional but it does 
normally bring about perceptual beliefs in systems having beliefs and conceptual 
abilities, and does normally bring about recognitional acts both in systems having 
beliefs and conceptual abilities as well as in less sophisticated cognitive systems not 
endowed with conceptual capacities. In other words, not every recognition is a 
conceptualization, so recognitional seeing is more basic than visual belief-acquiring, 
and object-seeing is more basic than seeing-as. 
According to CV, seeing-episodes are representational episodes. According to a 
certain non-conceptualist version of CV such episodes are more basic acquisitions of 
information than beliefs, nor do they need concept-possession. Perceptual content 
can be – and it normally is – an object for further extractions so it can be material, so 
to say, for 'takings', recognitions, and finally for beliefs.  
We saw in Chapter I that object-seeing ascriptions are extensional and transparent 
ascriptions of an episode of discrimination involving the visual apparatus and caused 
by the discriminated environmental object itself. So the seen object is causally, 
contextually determined. Now, cognitive ascriptions are not transparent, so object-
                                                
32  The relation of entailment is: seeing-that (O is F) ! seeing (O) as (F) ! seeing (O), but it does 
not hold the other way round. No visual beliefs without visual recognition, no visual recognition 
without vision, but nothing prevents that there are episodes of vision without visual recognition as 
well as episodes of recognition without belief-acquirings and related acts of conceptualization. 
That absence of entailment defeats both the Belief Theory and the Conceptualist CV. Let us 
remember, for the sake of clarity, that being a Conceptualist does not entail being a Belief 
Theorist. For example, McDowell 1994, 1998 holds that perceptual content is conceptual but 
perceptions are not belief-acquirings. Rather, by acquiring a perceptual belief based on a 
perception, the subject just endorses the very same content of her perceptual experience, so that 
those contents need to be the same nature (=conceptual). 
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seeing as such is non-cognitive, at least in the broad sense that whether you see an 
object or not does not depend on whether you cognize it under a specific way. It is 
enough that you discriminate it some way, no matter what way.  
As we have seen in Chapter II, within a perceptual experience there may well be 
object-seeing without noticing, but any perceptual experience involves some noticed 
objects at least, which look some way to the subject. In any case, experimental 
evidence shows that object-seeing does not necessarily involve either noticing or 
recognition, so the extensionality of its ordinary ascription is empirically vindicated, 
so to speak. What we see does not depend on what we believe we are seeing, nor 
does it depend on what we recognize in what we see, it does not even depend on 
what we notice. 
Seeing-that ascriptions are ascriptions of fully-fledged propositional attitudes instead, 
so they involve respective ascriptions of concept possession and beliefs. They are 
referentially opaque and factive, to the effect that seeing that O is F is a case of 
coming to know by visual means that O is F. Anyway, seeing-that- ascriptions cover 
the success cases of the more general process of perceptual belief-acquiring, which 
may well be a cognitive failure, namely, the acquisition of a false belief. Again, all 
that fits very well with CV, according to which perceptual experiences have a 
content on their own which may or may not give rise to perceptual beliefs which 
conceptualize and endorse some aspects of that content by casting it into a 
propositional structure apt for it being believed.  
So, “seeing facts” is no more than seeing objects as having certain properties and 
relations and – truly and justifiably –coming-to-believe that a seen object has this or 
that property or entertain such and such relations with other seen objects. Seeing 
objects, properties and relations put us in a position to come-to-know facts 
concerning those objects, properties, and relations, but the episodes of a kind are not 
identical with episodes of the other kind. 
We have also discussed seeing-as ascriptions in Chapter I. Seeing-as when 
successful is recognitional seeing. Seeing-as is neither transparent nor factive and is 
normatively evaluable as right or wrong. It exhibits correctness-conditions measured 
by the way the world is arranged. Even when unsuccessful, seeing-as presupposes 
the possession of a positive recognitional capacity concerning a certain property, so it 
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is recursive and involves a categorization of the seen object. That is not 
conceptualization, nor does it involves belief-acquiring, rather it is the subsumption 
of a token under a type and does involve a 'taking', namely, a certain cognitive stand 
we could call a point of view on the perceived object. Such a cognitive stand is a 
belief-like state but it is not a belief, since it does not necessarily draw on inferential 
abilities and conceptual capacities. Actually seeing O as (an) F is the cognitive 
outcome of a perceptual episode, which is entailed by a belief that O is F but does 
not entail that belief. It amounts to seeing an F in O thanks to the exercise of a 
recognitional capacity prompted by the visual appreciation of O's sensible profile. 
Now, according to CV seeing O as (an) F is representing O as being an F thanks to 
the representation of O's sensible profile in the first place. A sensible profile is made 
of SCM-properties, so representing an object as having a certain sensible profile is 
representing it as having a complex of visible properties like colors, size, shape, 
spatial properties, orientation, solidity, texture, and the like. In perceptual seeing-as 
any thicker categorization (ex. seeing O as a [pig]) entails the appreciation of that 
complex of SCM-properties which is typically exhibited by examples of Fs, so the 
recognition of a visual type in the first place. 
Couched in terms of CV, in order to represent O as an F, when F is not a visual 
property, S' visual experience needs to represent O as having certain visual properties 
or exhibiting a distinctive sensible profile, recursively recognizable just-by-sight. 
 
2.3 – CV and the ordinary semantics of 'seeing' and 'looking' 
In Chapter I, I have discussed some relevant bits of the 'experiential' vocabulary, 
namely the logical behavior and the semantics of “looks”-/“seems”-/“appears”- 
ordinary ascriptions. There I argued for the same idea I have just stated: “In order O 
to look F, when F is not an SCM-property, O must look G in the first place, where G 
is a complex of SCM-properties which individuates a certain visual profile”. 
Provided that on CV O's looking F to S means S's visual experience's representing O 
to S as being F, then if we are to visually represent properties other than SCM, we 
would be able to do that in virtue of visually representing SCM-properties in the first 
place. So we can say that SCM-properties are the basic contents of visual experience. 
Actually, the Scenario Content introduced above is made out of those 'thin' 
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properties: colors, spatial relations, distances, shapes, and so on. 
So there seem to be both 'thick' properties and 'thin' properties involved in perceptual 
content. Their reciprocal relation has to be articulated, it is to be inquired whether 
'thick' represented properties – and which ones, eventually – may be considered as 
properties represented in perception instead of being represented by the subject just 
in virtue of the subject's having a perception in which only 'thin' properties are 
represented. I will leave this important issue aside though
33
. 
In any case, insofar as seeing O as an F is (pre-conceptually and pre-doxastically) 
taking something as a token of the type F, it amounts to representing something as 
being an F, so provided that perceptual experiences involve seeing-as episodes 
therefore their nature is well consistent with CV. 
In addition, CV also could explain the intimate entanglement between the different 
uses/meanings of 'looks'. If perceptual experiences represent the world as being a 
certain way, it is natural that what we have called 'epistemic look' and what we have 
called 'phenomenological look' are so inextricably blended with each other. The 
phenomenal character of experience 'maps' its representational content, as 
transparency shows, so that as soon as one attends to her own visual experience, in 
attempting to find visual 'looks' she ends up finding ways perceived things look to be 
according to her visual experience. So there are phenomenal properties in experience, 
but they cannot be picked out independently on the way things are represented to be 
when those properties are instantiated in experience. A visual experience presenting 
O as looking F in fact is a prima facie evidence that supports the proposition that O is 
F, because F is they way O looks to be in experience. 
Now I can couch in terms of CV an argument I put forward before with respect to the 
different uses of 'looks'. Any way of describing one's own visual experience by 
phenomenal 'lookings' – for example, 'looks F' – in non-representational terms, must 
finally rest on an hypothetical situation where O looks to be F, so where O is 
represented as being an F. For example, when we say the penny 'looks' elliptical 
even if we know it is circular and it even looks to be elliptical, still we are saying that 
another experience presenting the penny from a 'frontal' point of view would 
represent the penny as being elliptical. When we say that the big distant tree looks 
                                                
33
 See Chapter IV, p. 96, footnote 11. There I explain why I am more sympathetic with the liberal 
view. 
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smaller than the near small tree, we are saying that in another experience sharing 
with the actual one some phenomenal properties (perhaps not the 'focal' ones), the 
distant tree would be represented as smaller than the other, namely such an 
hypothetical experience would incline S to take it that that tree is smaller. 
In short, when visual properties are somehow instantiated but not represented as 
being had by perceived things, in fact these properties are still 'potential 
representational properties' of other experiences we need to counterfactually refer to 
when we adopt that sophisticated phenomenal introspective stand toward our actual 
experience. 
Within the framework provided by CV, also the related dependence of 'looks F' from 
'is F' I have argued for in Chapter I, is somehow explained. Something can 'look F' to 
S even if it is not believed by S to be F, only if S is able to recognize Fs just by 
looking, so only if S is able to correctly apply [ – is F] to seen objects. When O is 
claimed to look F even if it is known not to be such, what is claimed is “my 
experience is, at least with some relevant respect, as if I was experiencing an F”. So, 
visually experiencing something which is F as being F works as a 'standard 
experience' both for ascribing cases of 'just looking so' and for characterizing the 
experience itself with the phenomenal property [F]. Successful cases of seeing and 
seeing-as are paradigmatic in ascription of visual experiences, so that the ascriptions 
of an experience with a certain phenomenology and a certain content is 
asymmetrically dependent on ascriptions of veridical and successful experiences.  
That asymmetry between ascriptions of veridical experiences and non-committal 
'veridicality-neutral' ascriptions of experiences is explained within CV by 
considering that the accuracy conditions of an experience cannot be specified other 
than normatively, namely, other than referring to the circumstance in which such 
conditions would be fully satisfied (and the related contents would be instantiated). 
Just as belief-contents are specified by the circumstances that would obtain were the 
belief true, so perceptual contents are individuated by the way the world would be 
were the perception accurate. Meaning is not truth, but its individuation is truth-
dependent. 
Accordingly, the phenomenology of an experience – with its introspectable looking-
properties – is specified by implicit reference to the case in which an experience with 
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exactly the same phenomenology was an accurate presentation of that purportedly 
experienced scene.  
 
Conclusions 
In Section 1 of this Chapter I have outlined the core idea of the Content View (CV). 
I have argued that a non-conceptualist version of CV can embed the virtues of the 
Belief Theory without having to face its insurmountable difficulties. CV can be 
compatible with the experimental evidence speaking against the identity between 
perception and belief-acquiring, and can be immune to the main philosophical 
arguments showing the structural difference between belief-contents and perceptual 
content. In particular CV does not exhibit the phenomenological inadequacy which 
bears down on the Belief Theory. 
I have briefly introduced the fundamental notions of phenomenal character and 
representational content, the two basic elements of perceptual experience according 
to CV. Perceptual experiences present themselves as having certain 
phenomenological features, so a good theory should at least try to be compatible with 
these manifest features. Two important features of experience that are graspable by 
introspection, are transparency and richness of details. Both features are done justice  
within a non-conceptualist version of CV of the kind I will articulate in detail in that 
work. 
In considering visual content, I have briefly introduced the idea of a Scenario 
Content (SC) originally proposed by Peacocke, and I have argued that SC is a 
semantical characterization of perceptions that is phenomenologically apt, at least as 
a first basic layer of perceptual content. More generally, CV is in a position to make 
room for both transparency and richness-of-details, so CV does not make perceptual 
introspection into a systematically misleading activity. In addition, a style of 
ascription such as Peacocke's SC allows to assign 'iconic' and gradual accuracy-
conditions to perceptual episodes rather that 'yes-or-no' truth-conditions belief-
contents consist of, so it allows us to posit an unstructured content which can very 
well be both non-conceptual and profuse in nature
34
. 
In Section 2 I have put together some putative virtues of CV, which is so seldom 
                                                
34  As we will see, perceptual content can well be structured in a certain sense to be clarified, even if 
it does not exhibit the semantic structure of a proposition. See Chapter IV, Sections 1-2. 
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argued for as such. 
Firstly I have advanced some substantial reasons for taking CV as a promising view. 
Aspect, (possible) Absence, Aboutness and Accuracy are features of perceptual 
experiences that, taken together, strongly support the idea that perceptual experiences 
have representational content.  
In particular, experiences are assessable for accuracy and such accuracy-conditions 
are conveyed to the subject in the experience in such a way that experience can 
match or mismatch reality. But only a contentful mental episode can have 
correctness-conditions involving the instantiation in reality of properties presented to 
the subject in the very episode. 
In addition, I have argued that CV 'saves' our pre-theoretical intuitions concerning 
the possibility that our perceptual experiences are veridical, partially veridical or 
totally illusory. That idea may be given a sense only if we take perceptual experience 
to be able to partially match, totally match or totally mismatch the surrounding 
world, where the matching-relation is throughout representational. 
Finally, I have argued that CV is well compatible with the pre-theoretical intuitions 
conveyed by the ordinary ascriptions of 'seeing'-episodes and experiential predicates 
like 'looking'/'seeming'/'appearing' analyzed at length in Chapter I. So, CV is 
consistent with the manifest image of perception and experience as it is implicitly 
shown and witnessed in everyday discourse. 
The difference between seeing-O and seeing-that maps the difference between 
perceptually representing and coming-to-believe by visual means. So, seeing-that is a 
(true) doxastic representation which is based on a visual non-conceptual and non-
doxastic representation. For CV O's looking F to S amounts to S's experience's 
representing O as being F. Seeing-that is not necessary for seeing-O, even if quite 
often seeing an object O as having a property F makes us acquire the belief that O is 
F. 
Seeing-as or recognitional seeing is a middle-way representation which is not a belief 
or a fully-fledged propositional attitude but involves a cognitive stand toward a 
perceived object consisting of representing the object as falling under a type. When F 
is not an SCM-property, seeing O as an F entails that the related experience is a 
perceptual representation of a complex of SCM-properties composing a unitary and 
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distinctive sensible profile. Seeing-as is necessary for seeing-that but not the other 
way round. There is seeing without recognition, there is recognition without belief. 
I have also argued that CV explains why the phenomenal use and the epistemic use 
of 'looks' are so inextricably meshed. The phenomenal character of our perceptual 
experience maps its representational content, so introspecting an experience in search 
of 'phenomenal looks' turns out to be just finding those properties perceived things 
look to have, those ways these things look to be
35
. 
In the next chapter, I will articulate in more detail a specific version of CV, with the 
aim of showing later on how CV can well face the challenges put to it by the recent 
disjunctivist revival of Naïve Realism.  
                                                
35 But for a partial revision of that acquisition, see Chapter IV, Section 3. 
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CHAPTER IV: The Content View Articulated and Defended  
Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two sections. In this chapter I will articulate and defend a 
certain version of the Content View that can face those alleged problems of CV 
typically raised by their opponents.  
 
Section 1 – Layers and Components of Perceptual Content 
1.1 Beyond the Scenario Content 
In the previous chapter (2.6) I have introduced the notion of non-conceptual Scenario 
Content as a phenomenologically apt characterization of perceptual experience in 
semantic terms. Nonetheless, SC cannot capture other distinctive elements of 
perceptual content as well as that of the correlative phenomenological richness of 
perceptual experiences. Indeed, the very same SC or “way of filling out the space” 
around S may characterize two of S's experiences which still differ in terms of 
represented properties as well as in terms of phenomenology. This just means that 
the position of SC is necessary but not sufficient insofar as SC does not exhaust the 
semantic and phenomenal richness of perceptual experience. Two examples by 
Peacocke 1992 can make that clear. Consider a square rotated 45 degrees in such a 
way that its four angles are located up, down, left and right with respect to your point 
of view
1
. As Palmer 1983, 292, notes, that figure is often immediately seen as an 
upright regular diamond rather than as a tilted square, but it can also be seen the 
second way through a sort of voluntary perceptual 'switch'. The square/regular 
diamond was first cited by Mach 1987, who considered it as a case of ambiguous 
figure
2
. Ambiguous figures are such that you can alternatively see them in two 
different ways, where such a change – known as Gestalt switch – happens suddenly 
due to the saccadic nature of our visual perception. In any case, the square/diamond 
figure can be seen two ways, such that these ways are not taken by the perceiver as 
two rotational variant of the same shape, rather as two instances of different shapes, a 
                                                
1 Figure 4 (square/regular diamond):      
2 Also Palmer 1983 and Macpherson 2006 take it as an example of ambiguous figure. 
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(regular) diamond or a (tilted) square indeed. So if the same SC is compatible with 
different perceptual contents, SC cannot exhaust the whole intentional content of 
perception. 
According to Peacocke, whether we see the figure as a square or as a diamond 
depends on which symmetries we respectively perceive. When the figure is 
perceived as a regular diamond, the perceived symmetry is symmetry about the 
bisectors of its angles. When the figure is perceived as a tilted square, instead the 
perceived symmetry is a symmetry about the bisectors of its sides
3
.    Different 
symmetries are immediately considered/disregarded, so the visual experience 
changes accordingly both in content and in phenomenal character. 
Another example is related to spatial grouping. Consider a two-dimensional array 
made of nine ordered points forming a sort of square
4
. Now, you can alternatively 
see the array as a set of three rows or as a set of three columns. Provided that the 
array in view is the same in both cases so the SC is fixed, that also involves the 
presence of an additional perceptual content beyond SC
5
. This additional content is 
called by Peacocke proto-propositional (PPC). Proto-propositions are made out of 
individuals, properties and relations
6
, and a perceptual experience with a certain PPC 
somehow 'attributes' some property or relation to individuals, in virtue of having that 
PPC. For example in a certain visual experience a perceived individual may be 
represented as [square], [equidistant from], [parallel to] and the like. So that layer of 
perceptual content, even if it is non-conceptual and is not fully structured (is it not 
propositional indeed), involves a segmentation or the global scene into individuals 
                                                
3 For a detailed and critical discussion of that explanation by Peacocke, see Macpherson 2006. 
4    Figure 5 (rows or columns?):                           
5 Seeing certain figures as exhibiting certain symmetries, seeing a set of points as a part of a column 
or as a part of a row, make a difference in the nonconceptual perceptual content as well as in the 
phenomenology of the experience. Indeed, those differences do not rest on the exercise of concepts 
like [symmetrical to] or [column]. Noticing a certain symmetry does not require the 
conceptualization of something as symmetrical, grouping points into rows (horizontally) does not 
require the conceptualization of something as a row, so no concept-possession is needed. 
6 Such contents made out of individuals, properties and relations are standardly labeled as 
'Russellian'. Indeed a Russellian proposition is a proposition made out of individuals, properties 
and/or relations (instead of 'Fregean' constituents like concepts, senses or other). On that see 
Chalmers 2006. 
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and properties they are represented to have, and/or relations they are represented to 
entertain. So the examples above are examples of experiences with the same SC but 
different PPC. PPC is essential to recognition or seeing-as. Consider seeing two 
objects as square despite their difference in terms of size, orientation, color and the 
like. In this case two very different SC may share the same PPC. So two different 
ways of filling out the space around S may be associated with the same way of 
perceptually representing the perceived objects constituting the scene, likewise the 
same way of filling out the space around S may be associated with two different 
ways of representing the perceived scene. In short, you can have same SC with 
different PPCs, or same PPC with different SCs. Therefore, SC and PPC are not 
independent but they are to be neatly distinguished. Perceptual experience has a PPC 
in virtue of having a SC, but having a certain SC does not determine alone which 
PPC the experience has (nor is that the case the other way round). 
Not only does PPC contribute to determining the representational content of an 
experience, but it also contributes to determining the phenomenology of the 
experience. Seeing a set of rows or a set of columns are two phenomenally different 
visual experiences despite their sameness of SC, for example. As we will see, there is 
an intimate relation between phenomenal character and representational content, so it 
is no surprise that a change of the one involves a change of the other. 
On the one side visual phenomenology is profuse, continuous and fine-grained, on 
the other side it presents the subject with objects experienced as having certain 
properties, so visual phenomenology also exhibits a 'discrete' aspect. Visual 
experience is not just as if detailed global scenes were presented to the subject, it is 
also as if objects contained in the global scene were presented to the subject as being 




1.2 - Proto-propositional Content and Seeing-as 
Now I want to posit a parallel between the Peacocke's notion of PPC and the notion 
of seeing-as I have analysed in Chapter I (Section 4). I want to argue that that layer 
of perceptual content captures and explains what is involved in the ordinary 
                                                
7 As Chalmers 2006, 110, remarks “Phenomenology of vision seems to present a world that is 
carved into objects at its joints. One does not simply perceive a distribution of mass and color: one 
perceives objects on top of other objects, each of which may be articulated into objectual parts”. 
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ascriptions of seeing-as episodes. Likewise I will argue that the necessity of 
introducing PPC between SC and the propositional-conceptual content of perceptual 
judgments and beliefs explains and parallels the existence of seeing-as ascriptions as 
an intermediate and irreducible level between seeing and seeing-that.  
Firstly, PPC is assessable for truth. In perceiving something as a square, as 
symmetrical to something, as equidistant with something from something, you may 
be right or wrong, you may be in a true or in a false state according to how the world 
is arranged.  
Secondly, PPC needs to be introduced as an intermediate kind of content between the 
Scenario Content and the conceptual content of our perceptual beliefs. In particular, 
if explaining the acquisition of observational concepts like [square] or [symmetrical] 
is not to be circular, such a conceptual mastery must rest on paradigmatic 
experiences having a corresponding PPC
8
. I cannot acquire mastery of the concept 
[square] without having some preceding experiences with the very content [square], 
which cannot feature in SC for the reasons hinted at above
9
. So PPC also grounds 
and makes conceivable the transition from experiences to perceptual judgments and 
beliefs, just like seeing-as somehow mediates the transition from simple object-
seeing to epistemic seeing-that. 
Thirdly, PPC is of the greatest importance for recognition, cognitive maps and spatial 
reasoning, just because recognizing the same individual, place, relation or property 
over time and across different contexts of presentation is fundamental for memory 
and explains the intelligent behavior of animals not credited with concepts, beliefs 
and inferential abilities. It would be impossible to retain in memory many global 
Scenario Contents and compare them with respect to some aspects or parts of them in 
order to plan actions or to produce integrated representations of the environment, but 
it is quite possible to identify and re-identify two individuals over time on the basis 
of perception of some of their co-occurrent properties and recognition of them in 
different occasions of presentation. Therefore, a segmentation of the scene into 
                                                
8 “[...] if we are to have a non-circular and individuating account of mastery of this perceptual 
concept [straight], that mastery must be related to some feature of experience which does not have 
to be explained in terms which presuppose possession of the concept.” (Peacocke 1992, 121). On 
the argument from circularity, see Crane 1992, Speaks 2005, Bermudez 1995, 2007. 
9 I can accurately experience an instantiated way of filling out the space around me, which involves 
the presence of a square, without perceiving that region of perceived space as a square. 
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discrete elements like individuals, properties and relations is a pre-condition for 
perceptual recognition, memory and spatial reasoning. 
Therefore, PPC is typically recognitional and must be posited not only to explain our 
acquisition of observational concepts but also to explain intelligent behavior of non-
conceptual beings. 
Now, these are all distinctive features of seeing-as episodes. Seeing-as episodes do 
not involve concept-possession or conceptualization, so they are non-conceptual just 
as states with PPC are. 
Seeing-as is normatively evaluable as right or wrong, and it is essentially 
recognitional. Indeed, it is the positive exercise of a recursive, positive recognitional 
capacity, which entails the general sensitivity to a certain type. Just as a proto-
proposition attributes a property to an individual and so it brings the particular under 
a type – the experience represents an O as F, for example a line as symmetrical with 
another – a seeing-as episode takes an object as being of a certain type, so it is 
categorical, or category-involving. A possessed category is a disposition which can 
be recursively prompted, or activated, by the vision of a certain scene, but it is not 
necessarily entailed by the vision of the scene as such. I can see two symmetrical 
lines without seeing them as symmetrical. So, given a SC there can be different 
PPCs. If PPC is equated with the content of seeing-as episodes, so given a seen scene 
there can be different ways of categorizing its more basic content – say its SC – 
according to what is noticed, what is recognized, according to how the seen scene 
immediately and pre-doxastically strikes the subject, so to speak. 
So seeing-as episodes, as typically having PPC, involve the cognitive act of bringing 
a perceived particular under a certain, pre-conceptual, generality. Seeing-as contents 
are therefore general but still non-conceptual, and exhibit a certain 'bringing-under' 
structure, but still they are not propositional. So it is plausible to think that proto-
propositional content is recognitional insofar as it is the typical content 
characterizing seeing-as episodes. Seeing-as episodes have PPC-contents. 
Now, there is but an important asymmetry between seeing-as as I have characterized 
it, and proto-propositional perceptual states as Peacocke characterizes them. 




, like [curved], [distant from], [parallel], [bigger than], [diamond-shaped], 
whilst in an episode of seeing an O as an F, the F-category may well be 'thicker' than 
that, like for example [duck], [rabbit], [lemon], [prey]
11
. In treating seeing-as I have 
also argued  (1.4.3) that in order for S to see an O as F when F is not a SCM-
property, S must visually appreciate O's sensible profile in the first place. Namely, S 
must see O as having a certain typical and unified cluster of SCM-properties. So 
there is a 'thin' seeing-as and a 'thick' seeing-as which presupposes the first, and 
perceptual states with Peacockian PPC can only be equated to 'thin' seeing-as 
episodes. 
Although, the nature of that layer or perceptual content (PPC) is one thing, the kind 
or range of properties which could feature in such PPC, is another thing. Peacocke 
holds as a substantive additional thesis that only SCM-properties can feature in 
visual content
12
, but his position of PPC as a necessary layer of perceptual content is 
independent on that additional thesis. For the time being, let us say that PPC is 
necessary to do justice to both phenomenology and representational powers of 
perceptual experience, independently of whether one thinks that in perceptual 
experience only properties like [red] and [square] can be represented or that instead 
also properties like [being a rabbit] or [being a lemon] can be represented. In short, 
                                                
10 By SCM-properties I mean Spatial-Chromatic-Morphological properties, strictly visual properties 
so to speak. 
11 On the issue of which properties can be represented in perception, there is a ‘conservative’ view 
(McGinn 1982, Tye 1995, 2000, Dretske 1995, Price 2011), according to which only low-level or 
thin properties can be perceptually represented (those I have called SCM), and a ‘liberal view’ 
(Siegel 2006, 2010, Prinz 2006, Baine 2011), according to which also thick or high-level 
properties, like [chair], [dog], [table] can be perceptually represented. I am sympathetic with the 
liberal view: genuinely perceptual seeing-as episodes can involve thick categorical contents, 
provided that the thick property ([table], [chair], [my mother], [animal], [something I have already 
encountered], [something edible] and the like) is categorized thanks to the immediate appreciation 
of its typical sensible profile (a type-complex of SCM-properties), and the association between 
that sensible profile and the thick category is established by perceptual learning, without any 
inference or reasoning involved: once a new perceptual scheme is stabilized and becomes an 
immediate recognitional disposition ‘just by sight’, the recognized thick property is to be 
considered a genuine part of the perceptual content. So, SCM-representations are systemic and the 
relative mechanisms are wired-in, whilst perceptual representations of thick contents are typically 
dependent on individual learning, and depend on the biographical history of the perceiver: they are 
cognitive exploitations of low-level representations, on the basis of the appreciation of a visible 
profile as a type associated to a thick property. 
12 If one holds that only SCM-properties can feature in PPC, then 'seeing-as F' ascriptions where F is 
not an SCM-property – for example, seeing O as a rabbit, as a face, as a prey, as food, as the same 
I had met before – would not be literal ascriptions of seeing-as episodes, rather metaphorical 
ascriptions amounting to ascriptions of 'taking-as' cases which have not anything essential to do 
with perception. 
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be it thin or thick, perceptual content must involve PPC. 
 
1.3 – Scenario Content and Object-Seeing 
In Chapter 1 (Section 2) I have spelled out a set of conditions for a subject to be truly 
ascribed an episode of seeing something at all. Among those conditions was the 
subject's phenomenologically salient discrimination of the seen object from the 
surrounding environment. Call it the Discrimination Condition (DC). DC requires 
that the seen object must look some way to the subject so that it can be discriminated 
from its surroundings in virtue of that way, or these ways, it looks. DC is a very basic 
requirement. For example, you can well see a square in virtue of the square looking 
some way to you, but in order to see the square you do not need to see it as a 
square
13
. You just need to discriminate it somehow from the environment, for 
example by being visually sensitive to its contours so by appreciating certain 
contrasts and boundaries, or some other ways
14
. 
Now, it is arguable that DC can be satisfied just by reference to an experience's 
having a certain Scenario Content (SC). Indeed an experience with a certain SC 
presents the subject with a certain volume of surrounding space dense with 
discriminable features. For example, SC involves representation of a certain surface 
at a certain point of the objective space, with a certain color, orientation, brightness, 
saturation, and so on. The subject can well be credited with seeing an object in virtue 
of seeing its surface by locating it and discriminating it from the surrounding space
15
. 
In order to see an object there is no need to individuate it in a specific way, no need 
of perceiving it as being a thing of a certain kind, no need to take or recognize it as 
something. That has been duly emphasized before by pointing out that object-seeing 
                                                
13 An 'object' you can see need not be a chair or a table. If a neutron stream was visible, such that it 
made a visible path, then you could see a neutron stream, even if you would not have any clue 
about that you are seeing a neutron stream. 
14 Suppose a square object is suddenly thrown and its trajectory crosses your visual field. You see the 
speedily moving object without being able to appreciate its squareness. Nonetheless, you have 
seen the square object, in virtue of having discriminated it from its surroundings (otherwise, you 
would not have visually appreciate its movement). 
15 At the level of  Scenario Content, objects are not represented. Rather, an experience with a certain 
SC is sufficient for you to see an object in virtue of discriminating certain features of it. SC is still 
silent on objects as having properties. According to Clark 2000, our visual experience attributes 
colors to locations, rather than to objects. I do not agree in general, but that view can well be 
applied to visual Scenario Content, namely, to the basic semantic layer of visual experience. As we 
will see, there are other layers of perceptual content, involving objects, properties and relations. 
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is transparent and extensional (1.2.3). So SC is a basic layer of content that appears 
to be apt to capture the conditions for object-seeing. In order to see something you to 
not need to explicitly represent individuals as having certain properties and relations. 
It suffices to represent some properties that in fact characterize the seen object in 
such a way that representing those properties makes available for discrimination the 
object that has those properties  
Nonetheless, there is something to be noted here. In order for S to see something (O), 
S must have a visual apparatus, O must be there to be seen and O must 
(appropriately) cause the very episode of seeing O (see 1.2.1). Now, a certain 
experience could have a certain SC without any object being there to cause the 
experience itself, maybe even without that S actually being equipped with a visual 
apparatus. Visual hallucinations, indeed, can be semantically characterized by 
ascribing them a certain Scenario Content, but they are not cases of seeing, insofar as 
seeing involves a real relation to a seen object whilst visually hallucinating 
something does not involve any real perceptual relation. In addition, it is possible to 
imagine a visual experience – at least a conscious mental state subjectively identical 
to a visual experience
16
 – had by a brain in a vat or (more realistically) induced in a 
subject without a working visual apparatus. That experience would have a certain 
Scenario Content but for sure it would not be a case of seeing. So, given that all 
causal, existential, and relational conditions for seeing something are satisfied, SC is 
apt to capture the other condition for object-seeing (DC). If you see an object also in 
virtue of your visual experience having a certain content, that content is a Scenario 
Content, even if for a given visual experience to have a certain SC is not sufficient 
for that experience to be a case of seeing. So far so good. 
Now I have just proposed a double parallelism relating object-seeing to SC on the 
one hand, and seeing-as to PPC on the other. So, provided that there cannot be 
(literal) seeing-as without object-seeing, an important question is whether there can 
                                                
16 Whether we can call 'visual experience' a certain kind of hallucination, just depends of the way we 
interpret the adjective 'visual'. If an experience is visual only if it involves an act of vision, so a 
hallucination cannot be a visual experience (it may occur without any genuine act of vision). In 
that case, certain hallucinations introspectively seem visual experience without being such. In case 
an experience is visual if it involves the phenomenology typically involved in experiences of 
visual perception, then a hallucination can well be a visual experience, insofar as it exhibits a 
certain phenomenology which is indiscriminable from that associated with an act of visual 
perception.  
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be object-seeing without seeing-as. Even if their conditions are different, it may well 
be that the one cannot occur without the other. Given our parallelism, the above 
question is identical to the question of whether or not there can be visual experience 
with SC but without PPC, provided that there cannot be visual experiences with PPC 
but without SC
17
. I do not want to take a definitive stand on that, so I only argue 
according to the intuitive plausibility that 'normal' perceptual experience
18
 is always 
imbued with acts of recognition, acts of noticing, and that it naturally involves taking 
the seen objects as being such-and-so. So, maybe it is possible for some (abnormal) 
experience to have just a Scenario Content, but it is plausible to think that SC is a 
basic layer which acquires cognitive significance for knowledge, reasoning and 
action only insofar as it allows acts of recognition and categorization, insofar as it 
exhibits PPC. Especially, if we consider the essential belief-inducing role of 
perceptual experience, it appears quite reasonable that PPC is a fundamental feature 
of perceptual content, given that its presence allows the transition from perception to 
belief. So, given an experience with SC it seems that there must be a PPC. Given a 
case of object-seeing it seems there must be an act of seeing-as, but it is clear that in 
order for an episode of object-seeing to occur, there is not need that a particular act 
of seeing-as occurs
19
. Likewise, given an experience with a certain SC, there is no 
determinate PPC that experience must have in order to be possible. Though, it seems 
that there must be a PPC
20
. As we said before, you cannot overlook everything, so 
even if in a given experience you can see many things without noticing or 
                                                
17 Peacocke 1992 answers 'No' to that question. For him, SC is not autonomous indeed. 
18 In Chapter 2, Section 2.1-2.3 I have discussed experimental evidence that there is seeing without 
noticing. But the point here is not whether there can be something we see without noticing it, 
rather the point is whether there can be a perceptual experience in which we do neither notice nor 
recognize anything at all. 
19 As Dretske remarks, [..] in order to qualify as a perceptual state (seeing s) a structure must be 
coupled to a cognitive mechanism capable of exploiting the information held in sensory 
representation”. (Dretske 1981, 258, Chapter 6, footnote 29). See also Dretske 2000. Although, no 
particular way of exploiting that perceptual incoming information is required for the information 
to come in through a perceptual channel. 
20 Also Peacocke 1992, 124, denies autonomy to SC with respect to PPC, even if he does not really 
argue for that beyond the remark that that thesis is reasonable: “I doubt that we could ever justify 
the attribution of genuinely spatial content to an organism's state, of a kind going beyond 
sensitivity to higher-order properties of stimulation patterns, unless the subject were on occasion to 
employ states with these contents in identifying places over time”, where such identification is an 
example of experience with PPC. Anyway, one thing is to say that there are no organisms having 
experiences with SC that never have experiences with PPC, another thing would be to argue that, 
in organisms having experiences with both SC and PPC, an experience can occur on a given 
occasion, which does exhibit SC without exhibiting any PPC. After all, I think that that question is 
not among the fundamental ones. 
 125 
recognizing them, you cannot fail to recognize anything at all. 
 
1.4 – Three Layers of Content 
In Chapter 1 I have also analysed seeing-that ascriptions, besides object-seeing and 
seeing-as. I have argued for the view that these ascriptions attribute to a subject an 
episode of coming-to-know a fact by visual means. So seeing-that is visually 
acquired propositional knowledge, it is a propositional state involving a perceptual 
episode or state rather than just being a perceptual episode or state. In particular, 
seeing-that is the factive, successful ascription of a more general case of coming-to-
believe by visual means, namely, of perceptual judgment or belief. I have also argued 
that if you are to (literally) see that a is F, you must see a as an F, likewise if you are 
to see a as an F you must see a in the first place. So there is a transition involving 
three respective layers of content, from the SC which characterizes object-seeing 
(seeing a), to PPC which characterizes seeing-as (seeing a as F), to the conceptual 
and propositional content which characterizes the resulting perceptual belief or 
judgment that [a is F]. Such a threefold representational transition may be usefully 
represented into a scheme, which embeds our acquisitions about the special nature of 
perceptual content (Chapter 2): 
[Seeing O]                ! C
1      
(Scenario Content)                                             {discrimination} 
[Seeing O as an F]    ! C
2
  (Proto-propositional Content)                             {recognition}  
[Seeing-that: O is F] ! C
3
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These intimately related levels of content open the possibility for different kinds of 
mistakes to occur in perceptual judgment or belief. I can have an experience with an 
inaccurate SC, such that it constrains the possible PPC and gives rise to a false belief. 
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Or I can have an experience whose SC is accurate, but I fail to rightly recognize 
certain properties at a PPC level, so I come to acquire a false perceptual belief 
despite the basic SC of my experience being accurate. Or I can have an experience 
with accurate SC and also with a veridical PPC, so that I see Fs as Fs and Gs as Gs, 
but nonetheless I form the false belief that a is not F and b is not G, for example on 
the basis of fallacious collateral knowledge which makes me distrust my experience, 
or in virtue of some other cognitive defaillance of the 'central' belief-forming and/or 
inferential system. When everything goes well – which is mostly the case – 
perceptual beliefs are brought about by their correctness-conditions insofar as 
perceptual experiences are brought about by their correctness conditions and the 
content of perceptual experience being successfully conceptualized and given a 
propositional structure accordingly. In any case, it is very important to keep in mind 
that some mistakes in perceptual judging are not 'strictly perceptual' mistakes, on the 
one hand, and that when there are perceptual mistakes they can be of different kinds 
(inaccurate SC, inaccurate PPC, or both), on the other.  
 
1.5 – The Limits of Dretske's Theory of Seeing  
In this sub-section I want to critically evaluate Dretske's famous theory of seeing. I 
will argue that this view presents some very important weaknesses – it rests on a 
false dichotomy between two kinds of seeing
21
 – so that it must be either rejected or 
integrated with a missing part. 
 
1.5.1 – Two Ways of Seeing  
The core of Dretske's well-known theory of seeing (Dretske 1969, 1981, 1988, 1995) 
has remained the same through the years, despite some specific advancements and 
theoretical enrichment
22
. To sum it up very shortly, Dretske distinguishes 'simple -' 
or 'non-epistemic seeing' (SS) and 'epistemic seeing' (ES); the first is cognitively 
                                                
21 As I will show, it is not the dichotomy itself, that is false, it is rather its supposed completeness, 
that is wrong. 
22 In Dretske 1969 the theory is meant to address epistemological worries as well as to capture some 
theoretically relevant features of ordinary language. In Dretske 1981 the theory is embedded into a 
more general theory of information, so it is a theory of different ways for certain states of carrying 
information and for cognitive systems of picking up environmental information. In Dretske 1995 
the information-based theory is further enriched with a bio-functional and teleo-semantic 
component. 
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neutral and is equated to object-seeing, the second is cognitively loaded and is 
equated to fact-seeing. SS is of things like tables, chairs and the like, whilst ES 
involves knowing facts about seen things. In other words, ES amounts to seeing-that. 
Those different states respectively involve different kinds of awareness, object-
awareness and fact-awareness. In seeing a I become visually aware of a, in seeing 
that a is F I become aware of the fact that a is F. Seeing a in itself is concept-free, 
while seeing that a is F is a concept-charged mental state and hence it involves a 
belief, so it is propositional (perceptually acquired) knowledge: 
 
“If S is aware that x is F, then S has the concept F and uses (applies) it in his 
awareness of x […]. Perceptual awareness of facts is a mental state or attitude that 
involves the possession and use of concepts, the sort of cognitive or intellectual 
capacity involved in thought and belief” (Dretske 2000, 134) 
 
While sensory perception (object-seeing) is the pick up and delivery of information, 
cognitive perception (fact-seeing) is its utilization for identification, classification, 
recognition, and so on. Seeing objects amount to taking in information about them
23
 
in an analog form. A piece of information is carried by a state in analog form when it 
is not the most specific information carried by that state, rather it is carried with other 
information it is nested into. For example, the experience of a cup may carry the 
information that the cup has coffee in it in an analog way, indeed it is not the most 
specific information carried to the subject by the experience (you also necessarily 
experience how big the cup is, where it is, what color is, and so on). On the contrary, 
the belief that the cup has coffee in it, has the fact that [the cup has coffee in it] as its 
most specific carried information. The same information carried by a perceptual 
experience in an analog way could be carried, for example, by a sentence in a digital 
way, when you come-to-know that the cup has coffee in it because you are told it. So 
the cognitive use of perceptual experience is an extraction or “digitalization” of 
information carried by experience in an analog way, it is an analog-to-digital 
conversion, but perceptual experiencing is taking information, not 
                                                
23 “E is a visual experience of x in S if E carries information about x, the information is extracted 
from light by photoreceptors in S's eyes, and this information is directly available for control of S's 




“Perception is a process by means of which information is delivered within a richer 
matrix of information (hence in analog form) to the cognitive center for their 
selective use […] cognitive activity is the conceptual mobilization of incoming 
information and this conceptual treatment is fundamentally a matter of ignoring 
differences, of going from the concrete to the abstract, of passing from the particular 
to the general” (Dretske 1981, 142), but “perception in itself is cognitively neutral” 
(153). 
 
Later on, Dretske 1995, 19ff., distinguishes conventional and natural representations 
– defined as states having indicator functions – on the one hand, and distinguishes 
natural representations into sensory and conceptual representations, on the other 
hand. Sensory representations (like experiences, sensations, and feelings) have 
systemic, innate and philogenetically fixed indicator functions, whilst conceptual 
representations (like thoughts, judgements and beliefs) have acquired and 
ontogenetically determined indicator functions: 
 
“Experiences are to be identified with states whose representational properties are 
systemic. Thought (conceptual states in general), on the other hand, are states whose 
representational properties are acquired” (Dretske 1995, 15) 
 
This picture, though enriched with new bio-functional aspects, is consistent with the 
previous theory of seeing referred to above (1969, 1981). It still involves a clear 
dichotomy between sensation and cognition, where the cognitive element involved in 
perceptual knowledge is neatly distinguished from the sensory component and 
associated with conceptual capacities, involving belief and thought.  
 
1.5.2 – Two Ways aren't enough 
Now I want to argue that something essential must be missing in that view. In 
addition (next sub-section), I will show that the theory conflates into the same 
distinction (SS vs ES) two distinctions of a different nature. He starts from a 
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linguistic-ascriptive distinction in the first place, then he pretends to show that this 
ascriptive distinction tracks a real distinction between two different objective 
phenomena. Unfortunately, he then fatally conflates two different criteria of 
distinction, one of which is strictly epistemological, the other of which has to do with 
levels of cognition in a more liberal sense. Let us start from the more general 
criticism though. 
What makes the view incomplete, is the total absence of an intermediate level 
between object-seeing and fact-seeing, namely, of what we have called seeing-as and 
semantically characterized with possession of PPC. Actually the position of that 
hybrid mode of seeing appears to be inevitable – and Dretske's view appears to be 
insufficient thereby – by considering the following intuitively evident facts: 
1) Not every 'digitalization' is a conceptualization. To extract information from an 
experience so as to convert its analog and profuse content into more discrete 
contents, as it happens in perceiving something as F, I do not need to possess the 
concept F, nor do I need to have conceptual abilities at all. Non-conceptual animals 
can perceive object as being so and so, for example as moving or as being distant, 
without deploying the concepts [moving] or [distant]
24
. Especially if object-seeing is 
meant to be cognitively neutral, how then could a non-conceptual animal classify, 
identify, recognize objects over time and place, if the only cognitive use of 
perceptual information was conceptualization? So, there must be a 'general' 
perceptual content that is still pre-conceptual
25
. 
2) To make the same point in other terms, not only conceptual animals learn from 
experience. Perceptual learning presupposes a cognitively loaded experience, 
namely, the possibility for a system's perceptual experiences to acquire new 
representational functions through repeated perceptual encounters with 
environmental objects and conditions. If perceptual learning is possible for non-
conceptual beings, the assimilation of the sensation/cognition distinction to the 
systemic/acquired distinction and the conflation of both of them into the 
perceptual/conceptual distinction must be flawed, unless Dretske does buy into a 
                                                
24 On 'seeing x as an F' as being “conceptually undemanding”, see also Johnston 2006. 
25 Drestke 2003, 81, footnote 3, explicitly distinguishes “experience of M from recognizing (i.e. 
conceptually representing) something as M. The same assumption is made by Fodor 2007, for 
whom 'representing as' amounts to conceptualizing. 
 130 
very undemanding view on concepts such that any form of acquired recognitional, 
classificatory and identificational capacity involves concepts
26
. In that case, any 
learning animal would be a conceptual cognitive system thereby, but in that way the 
concept of 'concept' entailed by that view would fatally fail to capture the cognitive 
richness of our conceptual abilities, insofar as they are connected with inferential 
abilities as well as with rationality as such (see II, 1-1.6). Anyway, Dretske does not 
take that extremely reductive approach, so the inconsistency remains. 
3) Another way of saying the same thing is pointing out that not only beliefs are 
acquirable representational states, pace Dretske. No conceptual or inferential ability 
is involved in representing things as being a certain way through a perceptual 
experience in an ontogenetically acquirable way. A dog's experience of a doorbell 
ringing, if repeated, may well come to represent to the dog the presence of someone 
behind the door, for example, but none – or very few people – would credit a dog 
with the concepts [presence], [people], [being behind of], [door] and the like, or with 
a propositional belief that there is someone at the door. A representation with a 
certain content such that the subject having it needs not possess the concepts 
canonically used to specify that very same content, just is a non-conceptual content 
by definition
27
. So there must be non-conceptual but acquired and cognitively 
relevant content, there must be seeing-as in other terms. If we believe in the Kantian 
motto that intuitions without concepts are blind but concepts without intuitions are 
empty, we still need to posit an intermediate level of perceptual representation that is 
neither completely blind nor completely empty, which makes possible the application 




                                                
26 That there must be acquired but non-conceptual representational states (nonconceptual seeing-as 
states) does not entail that every seeing-as state must be ontogenetically acquired. For example, 
there seems to be evidence that in many mammals there is an innate (i.e. not acquired) 
recognitional ability, or perceptual category, for [animal movement] or [biological movement] as 
distinct from movement of inanimate, non-living objects. See Johansson 1973, Blake 1993, 
Vallortigara 2000, 46ff. Likewise it seem that the auditory perception-recognition of a [voice-of-a-
conspecific] is also an innate ability: a non-acquired seeing-as indeed. Of course there are also 
views – as Fodor 1998 – on which concepts themselves may well be innate. 
27 Cussins 1990 introduces non-conceptual content exactly like that. 
28 Another important difference between perceptual seeing-as and full-fledged deployment of 
concepts in perception, is that the very same deployed concepts can be activated by the subject in 
many other non-perceptual circumstances, whilst basic seeing-as episodes may well be passive, 
domain-specific and context-dependent.  
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1.5.3 – Two many distinctions at once 
Strictly speaking, cognition has essentially to do with truth, just like knowledge has 
to do with truth. A cognitive achievement is a successful way of being in the right 
relation with a certain domain in one's surrounding environment. For Dretske 
cognitive perception (see Dretske 1990, 133ff.) amounts to knowledge, for example 
cognitively perceiving a cat is visually acquiring the knowledge that the seen cat is a 
cat. On the contrary, simple seeing is not cognitive just because it as such does not 
have to do with truth (and knowledge): either you see the cat, or you don't, but in 
order to see it you do not have to come-to-know that it is a cat or anything else. You 
just simply see it in the first place. So you have a seen object (SS) and a knowledge 
about it (ES), i.e. that it is a cat or some other [F], and these are different episodes, 
even if an ES-episode presupposes an SS-episode and not vice-versa. 
Now, there are but two ways in which something – a state, a process, an episode – 
can be characterized as cognitive. One way depends on the state/process/episode 
being an epistemic achievement, so on its being a success such that the 
state/episode/process is true or at least results in a true state. In that strict sense 
untrue states are not cognitive states by definition, nor are cognitive those states that 
are neither true nor false (like object-seeing). In another sense, a 
state/process/episode is cognitive because it has a certain role in the system's use of 
information that normally allows the system to behave appropriately or to produce 
reliable representations, maps, or 'views' on the surrounding environment. In that 
second sense, a state may well be cognitive and untrue at the same time. Indeed a 
cognitive failure is no less cognitive than a cognitive achievement. A state produced 
by a mechanism that has the function of producing knowledge or veridical 
representations of the environment, is a cognitive state even if it happens to be a 'bad' 
or an unsuccessful token of the type of states produced by that very mechanism. 
Dretske does not distinguish these two senses. 
In addition, a certain state can constitute a cognitive achievement without being 
evaluable as true/false or as veridical/falsidical thereby. For example, it may be 
argued that seeing an object is a cognitive achievement, despite the fact that seeing 
an object is not something which can be characterized as such as true or false. Indeed 
you might fail to see an object that is at your visual reach, so seeing it is a successful 
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perceptual performance on your part. 
With all that in mind, let us consider again Dretske's distinction between two ways of 
seeing. SS is non-cognitive insofar as it does not require knowledge of the thing 
seen, whilst ES is cognitive insofar as it is just the episode of acquiring knowledge 
that the seen thing is such and such. But that distinction cannot be confused with 
another distinction, between states that can be true-veridical (or false-falsidical 
thereby), on the one hand, and states which cannot be true-veridical (nor false-
falsidical thereby). For example, a belief is a certain kind of mental state, which can 
be true or false, and more significantly it can be knowledge or not
29
. Now, you can 
see X and come to believe by visual means that X is a cat, or that x is square. That 
episode of belief-acquiring may or may not be an episode of knowledge-acquiring, 
for example surely it is not such in the case when the belief is false because X is not 
a cat, or X is not blue, as it seems to be to you in experience. So, for Dretske that 
episode should be non-cognitive, because the episode does not require knowledge of 
the thing seen! That conflation of two senses of 'cognitive' fatally undermines 
Dretske's global theory of seeing. For example, when he comes to talk of seeing-as – 
incredibly, the only time he has anything to say about seeing-as in the whole corpus 
of his writings is in a footnote! – he just leaves it aside as something unimportant:  
 
“[Seeing-as is] a hybrid form of perception, a way of seeing that goes beyond 
sensory perception […] but falling short of full cognitive perception (knowledge not 
being required). One sees a stick as a snake. The stick obviously does not have to be 
a snake for one to see it as a snake. Hence, this cannot be cognitive perception” 
(Dretske 1990, 133, footnote) 
 
So Dretske only recognizes two levels of seeing, either “seeing X, that is an F” or 
“seeing that X is an F”. In the first case (SS), F is just one of the possible 
descriptions the ascriber can use to pick out the object seen by S. In the second case 
(ES) F is a concept possessed and exercised by S within the very propositional state 
which amounts to visually acquired knowledge. So in the second case exercise of F is 
ascribed, in the first case it is rather used by the ascriber to ascribe something else. 
                                                
29 If the belief is true, it can be knowledge (given justification and some other ingredient), it the 
belief is false, it cannot be knowledge, since knowledge is factive. 
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With his purportedly exhaustive cognitive/non-cognitive distinction, where 
'cognitive' is implausibly equated both to 'epistemic' and to 'conceptual', Dretske 
cannot see any independent way of seeing besides his insufficient dichotomy of 
seeing an object and seeing that an object is such-and-so. For this reason he 
assimilates cases of seeing “where the cat is”, or “how big the tree is” to cases of 
seeing that the cat is there and seeing that the tree is that big, so to cases of 
conceptual and propositional epistemic states of knowledge
30
. On the contrary, a dog 
can well see where the cat is, indeed it cleverly runs in a certain direction to catch it, 
although it cannot see that the cat is down there, provided that seeing-that-P involves 
a conceptualization of the constituents of the fact making P true, and the 
endorsement of the fully structured propositional content of P. There is pre-
propositional cognition, there is pre-conceptual recognition, there is seeing-as 
between simple object-seeing and seeing-that, in other words. Dretske fails to give 
the right mediating role to seeing-as because its ascription is a non-factive context, 
but he does not consider that, just like successful belief may be knowledge, so 
successful seeing-as may be genuine recognition, 'animal knowledge' if you like
31
. 
Seeing-as stands to genuine recognition as visually-coming-to-believe stands to 
seeing-that, so to conceptual-propositional knowledge (based on visual perception). 
Seeing-as involves recognitional abilities, whereas seeing-that involves fully-fledged 
concepts able to be combined into beliefs
32
. 
                                                
30 Dretske holds that recognizing something as a triangle is seeing that X is a triangle (Dretske 1990, 
131), where seeing-that involves conceptualization of the [triangle]-property. But that is too 
demanding a condition for recognition, as I am arguing for: any recognition would be conceptual 
by definition, which is highly implausible and empirically puzzling, given the overwhelming 
evidence for recognitional abilities of non-conceptual animals. 
31 See Prinz 2006, 436ff. As Prinz notes, it sounds odds to say that S see a fork as a fork, because 
'seeing-as' is more often used – as for example in Wittgenstein 1953 – for cases involving a special 
interpretive act, like that involved in seeing a cloud as a warthog, or a drawing as a duck. But 
seeing-as is more basic than that, it is any act of visual recognition of a type T whose 
correspondent ability is stored in memory: it is a recognition triggered by the present of a token of 
T, when successful, but it may well be triggered by an object which is not a token of T, when 
unsuccessful. Seeing-as may be wrong, differently from seeing-that and like coming-to-believe-
that-P-by-visual-means. Since recognition is factive, visual recognition stands to seeing-that just 
like seeing-as stands to coming-to-believe-that-by-visual-means, from an epistemological point of 
view, but visual recognition stands to seeing-as just like seeing-that stands to coming-to-believe-
by- visual-means, from the point of view of cognitive articulatedness of the state, so to say. Of 
course the unsuccessful cases are conceptually parasitic on the successful cases, insofar as seeing 
is a success-verb in the first place. You pick out a wrong case of seeing-as by reference to a 
positive capacity, you pick out a falsidical case of coming-to-beleive-by-visual-means by reference 
to what it would be for such a mental state to be a case of seeing-that. 
32 Also Tye 2000, 215 has a doxastic model of object-recognition: object recognition is taken to be 
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As I will argue more in detail, seeing-as is a necessary level to explain the epistemic 
value of perceptual experience, to its very possibility of producing perceptual 
knowledge. How could you know that a is F by visual means if such visual means are 
conceived as being just episodes of object-seeing? If seeing a as an F is not somehow 
included in the visual means by which S comes-to-know that a is F, that transition 
from simple perception to perceptual knowledge is a mystery from an 
epistemological, a semantical, and even from a phenomenological point of view. 
More on that, later. 
 
Section 2 – Objects and Properties: How they Feature in Perceptual Content  
2.1 Back from recognition to discrimination 
In Chapter I (Section 1, 4.3-4-5) I have argued that seeing-as is recognitional and 
presupposes both possession and activation of a positive category or ability. That 
recognitional scheme is stored in memory such that recognition of an a as (an) F rests 
on a “matching” between the stored category and the perceived object a. Now, that 
capacity can concern different kinds of properties. I have argued that when F is not 
an SCM-property (a property constituting a's visible profile), seeing a as F 
presupposes the appreciation of a's sensible profile and the association of it to the 
property F. In other words, strictly visual properties must be appreciated in the first 
place in order to (literally) see a as F, when F is not itself a property that shapes a's 
visible profile. So the basic capacity to consider is that appreciation, namely, the 
ability to see an a as having a certain visible profile, or as being F, G, H where F, G, 
and H are SCM-properties, like [red], [square], [big], [distant-from], [symmetrical-
with] and so on. For example in order to see a, say, as a [prey], I must see a as [so-
and-so shaped], [so-and-so colored], [so-and-so big], [so-and-so moving] and the 
like. Now, what does it take to see, say, something as [red], provided that seeing-as 
                                                                                                                                     
“a matter of seeing that such and such type of object is present […] a matter of forming an 
appropriate belief or judgment on the basis of visual experiences […] there are two components in 
visual recognition a belief component and a looking component”. The same view is that of Lyons 
2005, 242: “to recognize an object, to categorize it, to identify it, is at least typically to judge it to 
be a member of a certain category”. Also for Fodor 2007 seeing a as F is conceptualizing it as an 
F, so forming the respective belief that it is an F. I am arguing that the two-component view is a 
consequence of neglecting the seeing-as level as a pre-doxastic one, a level which stands between 
these two alleged components (look and judgment). Recognitional acts are not necessarily 
conceptualizations or judgements that something is the case, otherwise non-linguistic animals 
could not possess recognitional abilities at all, nor could they ever learn. 
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concerning SCM-properties is more basic than seeing-as concerning non-SCM-
properties? In order to see something as red or as square, you must possess the [red] 
or the [square] category, namely, you must be able to (non-conceptually) recognize 
red or square objects as tokens of a same type, say [red] or [square]. 
Call seeing-as concerning SCM properties 'basic seeing-as'. Although, basic seeing-
as is still recognitional and therefore involves memory, so a matching between a seen 
object and an already stored perceptual ability. All that presupposes an even more 
basic visual capacity which we need now to consider: discriminating SCM-properties 
is a more basic operation than recognizing SCM-properties. As is well-known, 
discriminatory powers outstrip memory. For example, I can recognize a shade of red 
as the same as the shade of red of an object I had seen on another occasion, but the 
shades of red I can presently discriminate are more than the shades of red I can retain 
in memory and use later for recognitional purposes. So discrimination is more fine-
grained than recognition. In short, on the one hand recognition entails discrimination, 
on the other, discrimination outstrips recognition
33
.  
If perceptual discriminatory powers can be associated with object-seeing and 
accounted for by appeal to Scenario Contents (see above), perceptual recognitional 
powers can be associated with seeing-as episodes, episodes involving memory and 
accounted for by appeal to Proto-Propositional contents. 
How could one or more episodes of object-seeing enable respective episodes of 
seeing-as? To answer that question, we need to step back to object-seeing to see how 
reiterated object-seeing can prepare the constitution of a perceptual scheme which 
comes to be stored in memory as an acquired, recursively available recognitional 
ability. In order for that to be possible, there must be a way of visually representing 
an object as F already at the level of object-seeing. How does object-seeing involve 
representation of properties as possessed by seen objects? What is the semantic 
structure of the content possessed by states of object-seeing? 
 
2.2 – Object-seeing through property-discrimination 
Visual discrimination of an object through a property involves pre-recognitional 
representation of a certain property. Seeing an object O through discriminating its 
                                                
33 On that, see Tye 1995, Raffman 1995, Martin 1992. 
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contours – say, thanks to chromatic contrasts against the surroundings – is not yet 
seeing the object as having certain properties F, G, Z. Seeing-as is recognitional 
indeed. On the contrary, you can see an object thanks to being visually sensitive to a 
property of it, be it F, without explicitly recognizing the property as the property F 
you have a recognitional ability for, namely, without exerting the recognitional act of 
matching the perceived property to a category already stored in memory
34
.  
So far I have been using 'seeing' as an implicative verb always having particular 
objects as its possible direct complements. Instead of talking of seeing properties, I 
prefer to talk of seeing objects through visually discriminating some of their visible 
properties. Whenever we are perceptually conscious of a property, we are seeing an 
object having it thereby
35
. That is why 'seeing properties' is nothing more than seeing 
particular objects that have those properties
36
. So, seeing a yellow object thanks to 
visually discriminating its yellowness amounts to visually representing a seen object 
as yellow, so, as it is. 
But it may also happen that we see an object through representing it as having a 
property which it in fact does not have, still that circumstance can put us in a position 
to see the object. That is the case of visual illusion, which involves a seen object, 
although falsidically represented. If I see a red apple through visually representing it 
as green, I am undergoing an illusory experience, still I am having a perceptual 
experience of the apple, thanks to representing it as having a certain property which it 
does not have in fact. I am in a visual causal contact with the apple, my visual system 
represents that object as green, that visual representation is caused by the object and 
it is about it indeed, but the property the object is represented as having is not had by 
it. 
So, object-seeing always happens through property-discrimination, but it may also 
                                                
34 See Prinz 2006. 
35 Here I use the expression “perceptually conscious of” in a factive or implicative way, so that if you 
are perceptually conscious of a property, it is instantiated by an object perceived by you. The 
problem of what we are conscious of in illusion (when the property is not instantiated) or in 
hallucination (when not even an object is perceived), is another huge issue I will face later. I am 
just arguing that when you perceive a property, so when you are appropriately related to an 
instance of that property, you are perceiving an object thereby, that has the property. 
36 See Chalmers 2006. That is an oversimplification: we see the sky, shadow, a rainbow, and other 
'object's which are clearly not particulars. In addiction, our experience is never just of an object as 
having a property. That is a very scholastic way to describe experience by abstracting away certain 
features from the concrete flux and organized totality of the experiencing a continuous, complex 
scene over time. 
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happen through representation of the object as having a property not had by it. Visual 
illusion is still a successful case of object-seeing, although it is an unsuccessful case 
of property-representation. Visual illusion is an intentional relation grounded in a 
real relation between the subject and the perceived environment
37
. It is just in being a 
real relation that it can be an intentional (falsidical) relation about the real, perceived 
relatum. In fact, visual illusions are perceptions, so whenever a state of visual 
illusion is instantiated, a case of object-seeing is ipso facto instantiated. Differently 
from visual hallucinations – which are not perceptions despite their perception-like 
phenomenology – perceptual illusions are always about environmental objects the 
subject is genuinely related to. But the object-less content of hallucinations will need 
to be treated in another chapter. So far, it is enough to remark that 1) object-seeing 
involves property-representation 2) property-representation needs not be seeing-as or 
recognitional seeing, and 3) also a case of wrong property-representation may well 
put the subject in the position of seeing an object. 
 
2.3 - Which Basic Semantic Ingredients Do Shape the Content of Visual Perception? 
Perceptual experiences are relations to environmental objects, given to the subject 
'under' certain properties through a certain perceptual apparatus (vision, touch, 
hearing etc.) that also determines a way they are experienced. Call it a Mode. The 
very same property can be given in experience in a visual or in a tactile way (ex. 
[square]), in a visual or in an auditory way (ex. [overhead]), in an olfactory or in a 
taste-way (ex. [sour]), and so on. The Mode is not just a matter of which apparatus is 
causally involved, it is also a matter of which distinctive phenomenological effects 
that involvement has, so that seeing something and visually representing it as square 
is not like touching the same thing and realizing it is square, despite the sameness of 
perceived object and represented property
38
. 
                                                
37 As McGinn 1982, 50, notes “you do not cease to see a thing just because your experience credits it 
with properties it does not objectively has”. 
38 That is why I call it Mode rather than Modality. Whilst perceptual modalities are individuated by 
mechanical facts, by the apparatus involved, the Mode as I mean it has to do with the 
phenomenological dimension related to a specific modality, not just with the modality. I agree 
with Lyons 2005, 241, on that “what distinguishes one kind of perceptual system from another, is 
the kind of information they process, rather than any phenomenal experiences they produce”, none 
the less the conscious character associated to each perceptual modality is different and exhibits a 
proper phenomenological salience. That such a salience is not the criterion for distinguishing 
perceptual systems in cognitive sciences, is another matter. 
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So a certain perceptual experience is a mental episode individuated by the following 
elements:  
 
1) a Subject who/which undergoes the perceptual experience. 
2) an Object in the environment the Subject is causally and perceptually related 
to. 
3) a Property (or the Properties) the object is represented as having in the 
experience.  
4) a Mode or a way in which both the object and its represented properties are 
given in the experience.  
5) a Time in which the episode takes place. 
 
So a certain perceptual experience PE could be individuated as follows: 
 
  in PE at t the object O is represented as being F by the subject S in the Visual Mode 
 
We have an object-dependent Content, made out of the perceived object, on the one 
hand, of the properties the object is represented as having, on the other hand. Apart 
from the experiencer and the time at which the very experience takes place, the other 
element not involved in the Content is the Mode. Often it is said that, in perceptual 
experience, what is perceived is always given in a certain way, so a distinction is 
made between what is perceived and how it is perceived. The what/how distinction is 
very important and useful, provided that the two possible interpretations of it are not 
conflated or confused with each other. By “'how' O is given in experience”, one 
could mean: a) how the object is represented as being = the properties it is 
represented as having in the experience; b) how both the object and the represented 
properties are experienced = which Mode they are perceptually represented (visually, 
auditorily, and so on). I will call the first content and the second Mode. So, the 
Content (upper case) of a perceptual experience is constituted by its object and its 
content (lower case): 
 
content + object = Content  
 139 
 
The perceived object together with the properties it is represented as having, is then 
the Content of a given perceptual experience. The Mode does not directly enter to 
constitute the Content, even if it contributes to determine it. In fact the perceptual 
Mode constrains the range of properties that can or cannot be represented in a given 
perception. For example the Visual Mode determines that the experience will 
represent the object as having certain colors, but not as having certain smells
39
. 
The Content of a perceptual experience (PE from now on) is that in virtue of which 
the PE is semantically evaluable as correct/incorrect, accurate/inaccurate, 
veridical/falsidical. The Content constitutes the world-to-mind Conditions of 
Satisfaction of the PE
40
, namely, the way the world should be in order the PE to be 
accurate-correct-veridical. The perceived object both causes the PE and constitutes 
its target, whereas the properties the targeted object is represented as having, the 
content (lower case) of the PE, are what is “measured” by the properties the target 
actually has. Thus the perceptual content exhibits an analogous structure with that of 
a standard propositional function, which can acquire a certain truth-value according 
to which argument it is 'saturated' with
41
. For example, {------- is wise}, can get the 
value (true) if it is applied to the individual Socrates, or the value (false) if it is 
applied to someone else who is not wise. So the argument for the Content of a PE is 
furnished by the world, namely, by the perceived object which causes the PE itself, 
and the value (accurate/inaccurate, veridical/falsidical) is given by the eventual 
matching between the represented properties and the properties actually possessed by 
the worldly target. If the seen object is F, a PE that represents it as F is accurate, a PE 
that does not, is inaccurate. So, worldly objects are accuracy-makers for perceptual 
                                                
39 Of course our perceptual activity is essentially multimodal and integrated, on the top of involving 
continuous income of information of a whole complex 'scene' over time, so this representation of 
'a' perception as indexed to a specific Mode and involving 'an' object and 'a' property, is a 
philosophical abstraction. It is important to keep that in mind. 
40 To use the language of Searle 1983, 1992, perceptual experience has a World-to-Mind direction of 
fit, differently from other types of intentional state. For example, a desire or an intention have a 
Mind-to-World direction of fit. 
41 See Frege 1891/1980. Russell 1910, 28, defines a propositional function as “something which 
contains a variable x, and expresses a proposition as soon as a value is assigned to x. That is to say, 
it differs from a proposition solely by the fact that it is ambiguous: it contains a variable of which 
the value is unassigned”. Only when a value is assigned to the variable the function become a 
genuine, truth-evaluable sentence. In the same vein, only by considering the real object which is 
perceived, a perceptual representation becomes an accuracy-available semantic episode.  
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contents insofar as they possess or lack those very properties the PE represent them 
as having. Perceptual Contents are de re Contents. 
I introduce the notion of accuracy-maker instead of talking about truth-makers, 
because that notion is compatible with the basic content of perceptual experience 
being neither conceptual nor propositional, as I have held and will argue it is the 
case. Only sentences, and sentence-like mental states like thoughts and beliefs, can 
properly be true and made true by truth-makers accordingly. But if truth and false are 
yes/no notions
42
, on the contrary accuracy may well come in degrees. Not only can a 
perceptual experience be accurate or inaccurate full stop, it can be semantically 
evaluated as more or less accurate or inaccurate. So it makes sense to evaluate how 
accurate a perception is, in a way in which it does not seemingly make sense to 
evaluate how true a proposition is. 
So we have a worldly object O with its real properties, a certain set of represented 
properties putatively belonging to the perceived object, and a matching-relation 
between the set of real properties of O and the set of properties represented in the PE 
as had by O. The matching-relation can make the PE accurate (PE-content and object 
do match), inaccurate (PE-content and object to mismatch), or partially accurate (PE-
content and object do match with respect to certain properties, but they mismatch 
with respect to other properties), according to the way the worldly relatum is. 
We can stipulate that a PE is veridical when it is fully accurate, namely, when all the 
relevant properties the perceived object is represented as having, are actually had by 
it. Likewise a PE will be falsidical when it is inaccurate in many relevant respects, 
namely, in case many or all the relevant properties the object is represented as having 
by the PE, are not actually had by the object.  
What matters though, is that accuracy comes in degrees, even though it can make 
sense and be theoretically useful to semantically characterize a PE as veridical or 
falsidical. Likewise, instead of considering global veridicality we can introduce the 
notion of veridical-with-respect-to-a-property, so that: the more accurate a PE is, the 
bigger the amount of properties with respect to which it is veridical. In any case, the 
Content of a PE consists of its accuracy-conditions, namely the objective conditions 
under which the PE would be accurate. Those conditions – the Content – involve the 
                                                
42 At least that holds in standard logic. Fuzzy logic and other non-standard logics admit degrees of 
truth, but I am not concerned with them here. 
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perceived object as a constituent, and the properties represented as had by the object 
– the content – as another constituent. Only together can they provide an accuracy-
value for the PE. 
 
2.4 – Object-dependency and Singularity 
2.4.1 Introducing object-dependency 
I have been arguing that perceptual Content is object-dependent
43
, insofar as it 
involves the perceptual object, a worldly particular, as one of its semantic 
constituents. That picture also fits with the transparent behavior and implicativity of 
object-seeing ascriptions, which depends on object-seeing being a real relation. If 
perceptual Content contains worldly particulars, then it is partially determined by 
external factors. Indeed holding object-dependency involves committing to Content 
externalism. Indeed there are external, extra-mental factors that co-determine 
perceptual Content. 
It is difficult to deny that in perception we become conscious of worldly particulars. 
But is it necessary to hold that those worldly particulars also constitute the perceptual 
Content itself, instead of being just among the items that make the contents 
accurate/veridical? 
In what follows, I will present some arguments for the necessity of including the 
particular worldly perceived entities in the Content of PE. 
 
2.4.2 The Generality Thesis 
As it has been made explicit in Chapter I, it is among the conditions of object-seeing 
the circumstance that the seen object must (appropriately) cause the very episode of 
seeing it. That object-dependency of perception does not only rest on our ordinary 
concept of perceiving. It  appears to be necessary, from an intentional point of view 
at least, to make logical room for the very ideas both of non-veridical perception and 
                                                
43 I have called Content of a PE the semantic structure involving both the object and the properties it 
is represented as having in PE. I have called content the set of these properties. So by definition 
Content is object-dependent. To avoid confusions, I want to argue that what is standardly called 
perceptual content in the debate, is object-dependent, and it identical with what I call Content. 
What I call content (the properties O is represented as having) is not object-dependent just because 
it is only an ingredient of the perceptual content standardly meant. The reason why I call such set 
of properties 'content' – at the price of raising some confusion in the reader – will become clear 
later. 
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of 'veridical' hallucination. A non-veridical perception is an illusion, for example a 
case where you see an object but your PE credits it with properties the object does 
not have. So, the content of your perception is non-veridical, but it is such just 
because it is non-veridical of the seen object, so the object makes the PE true or false 
insofar as it is seen. 
Hallucinations are experiences where it seems to you to perceive an object with 
certain properties but there is no perceived object at all, so a fortiori those properties 
are not instantiated by anything you perceive. 'Veridical' hallucinations are cases 
where you hallucinate a scene that happens to match the real scene before you, but 
the latter is not (appropriately) causing your experience, so the experience is not an 
experience of it. Here is a well-known example by Grice 1962
44
: you are seeing a 
clock on the shelf, then a neuroscientist stimulates your visual cortex in such a way 
that you do not notice anything changing in your experience, so he removes the 
clock. As Grice points out, there is a strong intuition that you did not see the clock 
even when it really was before your eyes as soon as you began to be artificially 
stimulated, just because your experience started to be caused by the visual cortex 
stimulation rather than by the clock itself. 'Veridical' hallucinations are cases where 
the content of your experience perfectly matches the surrounding reality, but that 
matching is intuitively not enough for the experience to be a veridical perception. 
The properties the experience represents are actually instantiated, but they are not 
instantiated by a seen object, insofar as no object is seen, even though in the 
hallucination it seems that there is an object located there having this and that 
property. So, that is not veridical perceptual experience but a 'veridical' hallucination 
just because the causal factor, the environmental relation to an object, is missing. 
Accounting for the difference of their contents is a problem for those who hold that 
perceptual content does not involve particulars and that worldly particulars with their 
properties are what (may) satisfy the content rather than being part of the content 
itself. How can perceptual content of a PE be sensitive to its causes, if none of its 
causes is part of it? However, how could hallucinations be 'veridical' if they are 
completely detached from the environment they purport to present to the subject?  
According to the Generality Thesis, when a subject perceives the world the content 
                                                
44 On veridical hallucinations, see also Lewis 1980. 
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of her perception “is not to be specified by using any terms that refer to the object of 




Generality Thesis (GT) = perceptual content is always general and does not contain 
particulars 
 
If GT is true, perceptual content must embed an existential component, for example a 
certain PE could be ascribed the following sort of content: 
 




So, GT entails that perceptual content is existentially quantified
47
. Although, that sort 
of content could well by satisfied by the clock on the shelf in Grice's thought 
experiment. Provided that content consists of accuracy- and veridicality-conditions 
of the PE, if there is something that is a clock located at a certain distance and 
direction from the cortex-stimulated subject, then her PE is throughout veridical. But 
if we are to save the intuition that it is a hallucination after all, we need to do justice 
to its 'strange', hallucinatory veridicality. Specially, it is implausible that the 
veridicality (or accuracy) of a perceptual experience could be evaluated 
independently of whether any object is perceived, and independently of which object 





                                                
45 Others who hold the Generality Thesis are Lewis 1980, Searle 1983, McLaughlin 1989, Davies 
1992. In discussing the Generality Thesis, I will mainly follow the extraordinarily clear and 
insightful Soteriou 2001. I find that his criticism of the Generality Thesis is very convincing. 
46 Location L should be specified egocentrically, like: 'at such a distance and direction from me', and 
so on. 
47 McGinn 1982 states the Generality Thesis, Davies 1992 explicitly holds that if perceptual content 
is general, it must be existentially quantified. Such a transition seems to be inevitable. Either 
perceived objects are demonstratively presented and content is not general, or those objects need to 
be non-demonstratively present through the PE representing certain properties of them, where such 
a representation cannot be neutral about these properties being instantiated in the environment. But 
a property is instantiated when there is some object which possesses it. 
48 On this point see Soteriou 2001, Sainsbury 2006. In addiction, the Generality Thesis is also 
phenomenologically implausible. In perceptually experience it does not introspectively seem to us 
as if we were entertaining existential and general content, like there being an O that is such and so. 
The felt reality of perception involves that in experience we purportedly refer to particulars in a 
demonstrative way. We introspectively seem to experience this and that as such and so. 
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2.4.3 Searle's Account of Perceptual Content  
Assuming that the content is general and then existentially quantified, in order to 
distinguish the accuracy-value of 'veridical' hallucinations from those of veridical 
perceptions we need to further enrich the general content with a causal element. That 
is, notoriously, Searle's move (Searle 1983, 1991)
49
. In Searle's view perceptual 
content must contain a reference to a causal element as well as a (self)-reference to 
the very perceptual experience the content is content of, on the following lines: 
 
If I have a visual experience so that it visually seems to me that an F is G: 





So we have a general, existential, causal and self-referential content of perceptual 
experiences
51
. There is an object O, which is F, and the object's being F is causing 
that very experience according to which there is an object O that is F. If the world 
satisfies all that, then the PE is true. Evidently that veridicality condition is not 
satisfied by a 'veridical' hallucination, insofar as the clock's being on the shelf out 
there is not causing the experience as of there was a clock on the shelf out there. 
Rather, the brain-manipulation is causing that experience. So, 'veridical' 
hallucinations are not veridical after all
52
, if the content of perceptual experience is 
articulated that way. 
So, if GT is true and the veridicality of a PE has to do with the question of whether 
an object is perceived as well as with the question of which object is perceived, then 
the Searle's move appears inevitable: we need to embed into an existential content a 
causal and a self-referential component. 
One could still reject the intuition that veridicality of PE must depend on whether an 
                                                
49 See also Chalmers 2004, 2006. 
50 That account is exposed in Searle 1992, 288ff. See the critical discussion of that view by Soteriou 
2001. 
51 I will leave aside the idea that perceptual content is introduced as a that-clause. Searle holds that 
perceptual content is propositional. But that idea is relatively independent on its account of 
perceptual content as general and involving causation on the one side, and self-reference to the 
experience itself, on the other side. 
52 'Veridical' hallucinations are not veridical as perceptual experiences. That does not prevent certain 
correspondent beliefs from being true. If I form the belief that there is a clock of the shelf at a 
certain distance from me in virtue of having a certain hallucination, I form a true belief, even 
though it is an unjustified belief of course. 
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object is perceived and on which object is perceived. However, that intuition can also 
be argued rather than stating that it is too strong an intuition to be dropped. Soteriou 
2001 provides a powerful argument – based on cases of veridical misperception – for 
the view that visual experiences cannot be given accuracy-conditions independently 
on how we settle both the question whether an object is perceived and the question of 
which object is perceived. I freely and sketchy re-state it. 
According to the Content View, if S misperceives a part of her surrounding 
environment, then S's experience represents that part as being different from the way 
it actually is. Now, suppose you are wearing displacing glasses such that you do see a 
round red object but it looks to you to be located to the left of where it actually is. So 
you misperceive the object by your PE representing it as being in a wrong location. 
At this point, if we put an identical round red object at the real location where your 
experience wrongly represents the seen object to be, we obtain a veridical 
misperception: a seen object is causally responsible for the experience, your 
experience is as if there is an object with such and such properties at a certain 
location, that is now the case, so that general content is satisfied
53
. So we have a 
'veridical' misperception. But to really call it veridical entails treating it as fully 
accurate, therefore we should implausibly reject the following principle: if some part 
of the subject's environment is different from the way it is represented to be, the 
experience cannot be fully accurate, so it must be partially non-veridical. How is it 
possible that parts of the perceived environment are different from the way they are 
represented in the PE, and yet still the PE is veridical? It is not, it cannot be
54
. So, we 
                                                
53 If the new object is also perceived on the left of the location it actually occupies, we can put a third 
round object in the real location where the second round red object is represented to be by 
S'experience. Going ahead we will end up by constructing a perfect veridical misperception, as 
soon as the new object is displaced by the glasses out of S's visual field. Suppose the surrounding 



















, as it is the case. 
Although, O
2
 is located where O
1
 is represented to be, O
3 
is located where O
2 
is represented to be, 
O
3
 is not represented because it is out of S's visual field. 
54 Soteriou's argument could be challenged as follows: actually in 'veridical misperception' there is 
no part of the environment that is represented as different from the way it is. Take an objective 
portion of the surrounding environment, and tell how it is according to your PE: you will correctly 
describe what is there. At L there really is a red round object, for example. Soteriou would reply 
that your PE represents that object you perceive, as being at L, not the object which actually is at 
L. But so he is re-stating that perceptual representation is demonstrative, namely, that it has 
particular contents. I do not want to say that the argument is fully circular or formally wrong. 
Rather, I take it as a good argument, but it is based on another intuition, namely, that if you 
perceive O and in virtue of that perception your experience represent that there is an object at L, 
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have a case in which there is misperception and so non-veridical perception, even if 
the general content is satisfied. This means that the veridicality-conditions of a PE 
cannot be settled independently of which objects are perceived and, a fortiori, 
independently on whether any object is perceived.  
Another similar example is provided by Tye 2011. Suppose that unknown to you 
there is a mirror in front of you placed at a 45
o
 angle, behind which there is a yellow 
cube. To the right of the mirror there is a white cube that is reflected on the mirror, 
but due to unusual lighting conditions it looks yellow. Now, in your PE it looks to 
you as if there was a yellow cube at a certain location, and that is the case, since 
there really is a yellow cube at that location, therefore the existential-general content 
is fully satisfied. If that was the content of PE, then that PE should count as fully 
accurate, despite the evident fact that you are perceiving a white cube as being 
yellow, and as being in a location where it is not. So, if the question of veridicality 
could be settled independently of which object is being perceived, we should treat as 
accurate experiences which clearly represent certain objects as being other than they 
are
55
. We need to do justice of the intuition that I misperceive that cube, that I 
misperceive that round red object, so the experience is a misperception insofar as 
that cube is not as it seems to me, that that red round object is not where it seems to 
me to be, even though another cube is the way PE represents that cube to be, and 
another red object is where PE represents that object to be. 
As the above examples neatly show, there are no strictly speaking either veridical 
perceptual hallucinations or veridical misperceptions – given that veridicality entails 
accuracy – even if the world satisfies a certain general content associated to them, 
like 'there is an O that is F at L'
56
. Something is missing from that sort of content: the 
                                                                                                                                     
then your experience represents that perceived object as being at L, not just that there is an object 
at L. It is still a (legitimate) appeal to our intuitions. 
55 As in the previous example by Soteriou, that case is not a knockdown argument, rather it is a way 
of making our intuitions more evident and compelling. If fact if you hold that perceptual content is 
general and existential, you may hold that the above PE is accurate. The intuition that it is 
inaccurate depends on the intuition that your PE represent this particular as being such, not only 
that there is a particular which is such. But that is exactly the thesis to be argued for, therefore it 
cannot be used as a premise to defeat the opposing view. Although, the intuition is so strong that 
abandoning it entails abandoning in toto our ordinary notion of perception as well as our relative 
spontaneous ascriptions of accuracy/inaccuracy. That can constitute an argument to the best 
explanation, in my view. 
56 One could defend the Generality Thesis by arguing that a hallucination which perfectly matches 
the surrounding environment is 'veridical' after all, at least in some sense, and if perceptual content 
is to be evaluated by reference to a perceived object, then hallucinations would be not evaluable, 
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very perceived particulars seem to be the best candidates for filling that semantic 
gap. 
Alternatively, Searle's causal plus self-referential conditions provide the resources to 
make these cases of misperception non-veridical, because the experience that there is 
an object O at location L is not caused by the object that is at location L. So it is true 
that there is an object that is F and G at location L (the general-existential content is 
satisfied) but it is not true that there is an object F and G at location L and that object 
is causing this very experience of there being an object F and G at location L. Given 
Soteriou/Tye argument summed up above for the view that veridicality cannot be 
settled independently on which object is perceived and on whether an object is 
perceived, then we need either to drop GC itself – so to admit particulars into the 
content – or to accept the causal and self-referential characterization of experiential 
content provided by Searle. No other way. 
 
2.4.4 The Implausibility of Searle's Account  
Now, Searle's view is implausible for many respects. Some weaknesses of it have 
been emphasized by many opponents, including Soteriou himself
57
. Let us consider 
the most embarrassing ones. 
Firstly, there is an issue of phenomenological adequacy
58
. If perceptual content has 
somehow to reflect perceptual phenomenology
59
, then it is really hard to accept that 
the immediate phenomenology of perceptual experience involves our awareness of a 
causal relation between the apparent object and the experience itself. From that point 
of view, the self-referential component is even harder to accept than the causal one
60
. 
Can we really make sense of a child or a non-conceptual animal having an 
experience whose content involves a reference to its very experience being caused by 
an object's being such and so? Such an articulated content seems to be adequately 
                                                                                                                                     
neither as 'veridical' nor as 'falsidical'. As I will argue for later (see Chapter VI, Section 2.5), in 
fact hallucinations are neither veridical nor falsidical, and the intuition that a 'perfect' hallucination 
is veridical at least in some sense, depends on the veridicality of the beliefs immediately produced 
by hallucinatory states as their natural cognitive effects. A belief that 'there is an O that is T at 
location L' is well veridical and truth-evaluable, but it is not the case for the hallucination the 
belief is brought about by.  
57 See Soteriou 2001, Armstrong 1991, Burge 1991, McDowell 1991, Millar 1991. 
58 On that see also Chalmers 2006. 
59 On that, see Section 1 of the next Chapter. 
60 For example, there are people, like Siegel 2006, 2010 and Butterfill 2011, who hold that in visual 
experience we do represent causal relations.  
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ascribed only to cognitive systems endowed with introspective powers and capable 
of structured propositional attitudes. 
A possible defense could insist that just because perceptual content is non-
conceptual, therefore the subject does not need to possess the concepts of 
[causation], [one's own experience] and the like, in order to have a mental state with 
these objective contents
61
. Nonetheless, even if perceptual content is non-conceptual, 
there is a threshold of semantic complexity that cannot be crossed in ascription of 
intentional mental states to non-conceptual beings. In order a mental state to have 
certain contents, at least the subject credited with that mental state must be a 
conceptual being. You cannot entertain the content [quark] or [neuron] or [toaster] if 
you don't possess conceptual abilities at all. Likewise, it is implausible that the self-
referential content [myself being caused by the object's being the way I represent it to 
be] can characterize the perceptual experience of an animal or a child. As a matter of 
fact, from a developmental point of view our experiences have contents before we as 
children begin to entertain the very content of [experience]
62
, be it conceptually or 
non-conceptually. 
In addition, there is also the issue of deviant or non-standard causal chains to be 
considered
63
. An object being a certain way may well cause my experience of that 
object being that way, but in an inappropriate way. So, either these cases of non-
standard causation satisfy the content and make PE veridical and accurate, or the 
normative clause of appropriateness should also be included within the content, to 
the effect that a PE has a content like: that F is G, and the fact that F is G is causing 
this very experience that that F is G in an appropriate and non-deviant way. Is this 
not too much?
64
 As is well-known, it is very problematic to spell out what that 
'appropriateness' amounts to
65
. Such a highly theoretical notion, which is so puzzling 
even for the thought itself, should be an experiential content! So, the 
                                                
61 This line of defense is taken by Chalmers 2002. 
62 On children' development of the power to ascribe and self-ascribe experiences and perceptions, see 
Nudds 2011. 
63 See Grice 1961, Lewis 1980.  
64 On this point, see Tye 2011. 
65 As it is well-known, that is perhaps 'the' problem for causal theories of content. If the content of a 
mental state is taken to be determined by what causes it in 'normal conditions', or in 'appropriate 
causal chains' and the like: the problem is just such notions of 'normality' or of 'appropriate 
causation' are normative notions which go beyond the merely causal characterization, against the 
reductive intentions of the causal semantics theorists. 
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Phenomenological Adequacy Constraint is violated, on the one hand, and the view is 
developmentally implausible, on the other. Indeed, the content of perceptual 
experiences of children and non-conceptual animals should contain a sort of sketchy 
theory of perceptual experience, including clauses of appropriateness in causation! 
Secondly, content ascription should be constrained not only by phenomenological 
elements, but also by considerations about explanatory relevance with respect to 
behaviour and observable cognitive abilities
66
. Ascribed contents should not be over-
sophisticated with respect to the discriminatory abilities shown in behavior, 
especially by non-linguistic animals
67
, if such contents are posited just to account for 
these very abilities
68
. Thus, not only are causation and self-reference not testified to 
in our visual phenomenology, they are not even necessary to explain discriminatory 
abilities of perceivers. 
So, the Phenomenological Adequacy Constraint and Behavioral Discriminatory 
Constraint may be thought as not absolutely normative, if considered distributively, 
so to speak. For example, it may well be the case that certain visual contents are not 
testified to in our visual phenomenology
69
, but they are to be postulated in order to 
explain certain discriminatory abilities we have. Vice-versa, our visual 
phenomenology may make our experience seem more rich and detailed of contents 
than it really is. So nothing prevents visual content from being richer or poorer than 
what phenomenology and introspection 'tell' us. Nonetheless, we assess that gap just 
by evaluating certain discriminatory abilities or certain discriminatory inabilities. But 
if a certain content does not explain either distinctive features of phenomenology or 
any discriminatory ability, then ascribing that content is explanatorily redundant. 
What I am arguing for, is that the two constraints for content ascription introduced 
above are weakly normative if each of them is considered independently, but they 
become strongly normative if taken together, to the effect that: if a certain content-
ascription violates one of them, there must be a good reason to violate it, and that 
reason must be grounded in the necessity of respecting the other constraint (for 
                                                
66 This point has been duly emphasized by Soteriou 2001. 
67 Obviously, in evaluating cognitive abilities of non-linguistic animals we only have their 
observable behavior. 
68 As Soteriou 2001, 183, points out: “What discriminatory abilities are left unexplained if one does 
not include the causal component in the content of visual experience?” 
69 For example, I have considered the cases of Blindsight, Inattentional Blindness and the Sperling 
Effect. See Chapter II, Section 2. 
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example, to explain certain discriminatory abilities or inabilities it can be necessary 
to 'discredit' certain elements of our visual phenomenology). But an ascription that 
violates both constraints must be mistaken or arbitrary at the very least. 
Thus, no independent reason other than the necessity of saving GT can support 
Searle's account of perceptual content. But the implausibility of that account is 
theoretically much more pressing than the opportunity of saving GT
70
. If perceptual 
content is purely general, we need to buy Searle's implausible account. Therefore, 




2.5 – Demonstrative Contents and Semantic Gap 
Given this argumentative vindication of the particularity of visual perception, we can 
go back to our Content/content distinction introduced above. The object-dependent 
Content of PE is made out of the object plus a content (= properties the object is 
represented as having). A De re or demonstrative Content takes the following form: 
 
Of/about O: PE represents properties F, G, H 
 
At least when there is a perceived object, perceptual Content is object-dependent. If 
the object is an accuracy-maker, it is such only insofar as it has certain properties. It 
can be an accuracy-maker by being part of the evaluable content, because, strictly 
speaking, its properties are the entities whose eventual matching with the experience 
needs to be evaluated. So, the object is what the experience is an experience of, that 
of which the represented properties belong to, if the experience is accurate. To be 
more precise, the object does not make the experience accurate/inaccurate, rather it 
makes the experience accuracy-evaluable by being part of its Content, whereas the 
                                                
70 As Tye 2011 notes, in any case the Generality Thesis cannot commit to a purely general content, 
rather it is inevitable to refer to some demonstrative elements in specifying that general, existential 
content. For example there must be a reference to a particular time, like now, as well as to a 
particular subject, me. For example, according to my PE there is a red round cube at a certain 
distance and direction from me, now, not yesterday or with respect to another point in the space. 
So a particular subject, a particular time and a particular egocentrically specified place need to 
influence the accuracy-conditions of the PE, so its content. Even if content was general, it should 
be impurely such. If there was no reference to perceived particulars, still there would be reference 
to other particulars. 
71 For further arguments in favor of the particularity of visual perception, see Sainsbury 2006. 
Chalmers 2004 and Siegel 2010 have a mixed view, according to which PEs have both singular 
and non-singular contents. 
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accuracy depends on the matching-relation between the content of the PE and the 
properties of the perceived object
72
. 
Illusions are made falsidical not by the object, rather by the properties belonging to 
the object the perception is a perception of. The seeing-relation fixes the aboutness of 
the representational episode involved in that seeing, where such aboutness is not 
itself represented, not even in terms of causal factors, pace Searle. Seeing-episodes 
are contentful episodes in which certain properties are represented as possessed by 
the very seen object, even if it is only by representing some properties of it, that a 
seeing-episode can take place. So seeing-episodes have an object in virtue of having 
a content, but they have a certain Content in virtue of having a certain object as a part 
of that Content itself. Change the seen object, and the Content changes. That is the 
object-dependency of PE. Relationality is essential to their Content. 
There must be an object not only for a PE to be accurate, but also for a PE to be 
inaccurate. Misperceptions are inaccurate representations of the respectively 
perceived object in question.  
What are hallucinations inaccurate representations of? That delicate question calls for 
a different treatment of illusory Contents on the one hand, and hallucinatory 
'contents' on the other. Illusions are perceptions, hallucinations are not. Perceptual 
illusions and veridical perceptions have the same semantic structure, an object-
dependent Content made accurate or inaccurate by certain properties had by the very 
perceived object. 
To recall our analysis of look-ascription in Chapter I, perceptual Contents are 
fittingly expressed by ascriptions like “O looks F to S”, instead of by ascriptions like 
“It looks to S as if O is F”. The latter, indeed, is neutral on the existence of O as well 
as on S's PE being a perceptual relation to O
73
. 
Particularity of visual experience also fits with visual phenomenology. In perceptual 
experience it is not just as if there was an X that is such and so, rather we seem to be 
demonstratively related to particulars, to this and that, so that this and that visually 
                                                
72 The perceived object needs not be a thing like an apple or a table. There can be objects like a 
rainbow, the sky, or a foggy area in the air, or whatever. Normally perceptual experiences are 
relations to of an objective global scene populated with many objects having properties and 
entertaining relations with each other. So, when I talk of 'the perceived object', it is just an 
oversimplification to make the exposition and the reasoning more clear. 
73 See Chapter I, Section 5.3. 
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look such and so. Perceptual awareness is the basic way of being acquainted with 
worldly objects. If perceptual content was general and existential, our perceptual 
access to the world would be description-like, not an acquaintance. 
Although, the issue of hallucinatory contents, hinted at above, specifically arises by 
considering that hallucinations have a 'demonstrative' phenomenology as well, 
despite the absence of object and therefore despite the absence of Content (object + 
content). If perceptual Content is object-dependent, the ascription of hallucinatory 
content, if any, opens a big puzzle, since hallucinations are objectless states by 
definition, they are non-relational states. They are not perceptions, in short. 
In addition, there is a strong intuition that hallucinations are inaccurate, but that does 
not fit with the real properties of a perceived object being the accuracy-makers of 
perceptual experiences. By definition there is nothing whose properties can make an 
hallucinatory content accurate or not, just because there is nothing hallucinations are 
perceptions of. If in order to be inaccurate an experience must be accuracy-evaluable 
in the first place, but in order to be accuracy-evaluable it must involve an object in its 
content, we should conclude, against a strong intuition to the contrary, that 
hallucinatory experiences are neither accurate not inaccurate, rather they lack 
semantic value. 
Object-dependency of perceptual content together with the absence of object that 
characterizes hallucinations, leads to what I will call the puzzle of the Semantic Gap 




:       object +  content          =               Content            
accuracy-value 
a) Veridical PE: content exemplified by the object           !             satisfied            veridical  
b) Illusory PE: content not exemplified by the object       !      not satisfied             falsidical  
 
Hallucination (H):                         ------  + content             =                    ?                falsidical? 
                                                
74 Even if it is unusual in the literature, I will use 'perceptual experience' only for illusions and 
veridical perceptions, not for hallucinations. The reason is that perception is a relation to the 
world, hallucinations are not genuine relations, so a perceptual experience is really perceptual only 
if it involves a perception. A visual hallucination is an experience which is indiscriminable from a 
perceptual experience. That indiscriminability, though, is not sufficient for making it a perceptual 
episode. A hallucination is an experience as of a certain perceptual experience was taking place. 




The Semantic Gap is a problem which any view on Perceptual Content faces, which 
takes particular perceived objects as essential ingredients for the truth- or accuracy-
evaluable Content of PE. If the object is essential to Perceptual Content, 
hallucinations should be Contentless mental episodes insofar as they are objectless 
mental episodes. That is highly counter-intuitive though, since in hallucination the 
world seems to us to be certain ways – at least it seems to seem so – and 
hallucinations may be subjectively indiscriminable from genuinely perceptual 
experiences. So, how can they have same phenomenology but no Content? How 
could they be Contentless in the first place? If these problems were not satisfactorily 
addressed, the Particularity Thesis would be flawed. 
Actually, GT straightforwardly avoids the problem of Semantic Gap: if perceptual 
Content is existential and general, hallucinations are not semantically gappy at all, 
instead they are just like veridical and illusory perceptions. Hallucinating a red cube, 
veridically perceiving a red cube or perceiving a green cube that falsidically looks 
red, would be states with exactly the same existential content, namely, that there is 
something which is red, which is a cube, which is located at L. But, as we have seen, 
in order to distinguish 'veridical' hallucinations from both illusions and veridical 
perceptions the view must implausibly embed a causal and self-referential element 
into the content. 
So we are left with a dilemma: the Generality Thesis (in its existential version) is 
implausible, the Particularity Thesis seems much more plausible – for the many 
reasons hinted at above – until it is asked to account for the possibility of 
hallucinatory Contents.  
A reason for GT, sometimes stated and more often presupposed, is the intuition that 
if two experiences are phenomenally identical they must have the same Content. For 
example McGinn 1982, 39, argues that perceptual Content must be general “on pain 
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but their Content is different since it involves different environmental objects whose 
properties are respectively represented. 
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Though, that internalist intuition in favor of GT is not necessary. Externalist theories 
of Content just deny that: a causal, external factor contributes to determine the 
Content in a way that may be not reflected in phenomenology. After all, it is O
1
 that 




. After all, an hallucination 'of' O
3
 is not a perception, 
still it introspectively seems exactly the same as a PE. 
Two different but connected principles seem to me implicitly at work to make people 
find GT so compelling. One could be called Cartesian Principle: according to it the 
very nature and type of a certain conscious experience must be fully available to the 
subject by introspection, so that: 
 
Cartesian Principle (CP): If two mental states are subjectively indiscriminable, they 
have the same nature and the same type 
 
The Cartesian Principle entails that a veridical experience VE and a hallucination H 
subjectively indiscriminable from VE must be the same kind and type of mental 
state
75
. So, if we combine that principle with the intentionalist idea that the Content 
of a mental state individuates it and is essential to it, then we are compelled to 
conclude that a VP and an indiscriminable H must share their Content. 
According to another principle which could be called the Accessibility Principle, the 
Content of a certain experience must be fully available by introspection, so that: 
 
                                                
75 For a strong criticism of what I am calling Cartesian Principle, see Martin 2002, 2004, 2006. 
Martin argues against a similar principle to support a disjunctive, naive realist view of perceptual 
experience. As I will argue later on (see Chapter VI), not only may such a principle be denied by 
an intentionalist, but it must be denied by a coherent intentionalist.  
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Accessibility Principle (AP): If two experiences are subjectively indiscriminable, 
they must have the same Content 
 
According to the Cartesian Principle, if a veridical perception indiscriminable from a 
given hallucination is a contentful state, then the hallucination is a contentful state 
thereby. It is ruled out by that Principle that a state could subjectively seem to be 
contentful without being such. 
According to the Accessibility Principle, not only being indiscriminable from a 
contentful state is sufficient for being contentful, but also being indiscriminable from 
a state that has a certain Content is sufficient for the state having exactly that 
Content
76
. That rules out object-dependency, because not only an hallucination could 
be indiscriminable from a perception without having objects at all, but also a 
perception of a qualitatively identical but numerically different object than the object 
of a given perception could be indiscriminable from that perception. 
So hallucinations must be contentful, experiences of identical objects must be 
identical in Content, therefore perceptual Content cannot involve particulars. So GT 
must be true, if CP and AP are true. 
Now, both principles are false, as I will argue at length later on
77
. I will argue that 
hallucinations are contentful states in a certain special sense, but not because of the 
truth of the Cartesian Principle. Indeed, the Cartesian Principle is false and 
hallucinations are mental states of a different kind from perceptions, be them 
veridical or falsidical. The Generality Thesis must be rejected for the reasons already 
provided above, on the one hand, but it is important to make clear that the implicit 
Principles that seemingly make it seem so compelling are false Principles, on the 
other hand. 
Before saying something more on hallucinatory contents, I want to stress a relevant 
consequence of the Particularity Thesis with respect to the relation between 
intentionality and phenomenology, between representational content and phenomenal 
                                                
76  It could be though that Accessibility Principle 'screens off' Cartesian Principle in being sufficient 
to rule out that two subjectively indiscriminable states are of the same nature and type, as well as 
that they have the same Content as well. But without Cartesian Principle, Accessibility Principle 
could well allow that two indiscriminable states have the same Content without being of the same 
kind and type. For example, one could be a perceptual experience with content C, the other could 
be another type of contentful state (say a desire, an intention, a belief) with content C. 
77 See Chapter VI, Section 2.5. 
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character. Intimate as the relation is between perceptual Content and phenomenal 
character, that relation cannot be one of identity. At least the Content can change 
despite constancy of phenomenal character, for example you can remove O
1
 and 
substitute it either with O
2,
 or even with nothing, if you rightly stimulate the subject's 
brain so to bring about a matching hallucination. Content changes, phenomenal 




Therefore perceptual Content, as involving the perceived object, is wide, insofar as it 
depends on the world the subject is causally connected to, namely, on which object 
she is perceiving as well as whether she is perceiving anything at all. Whether what I 
have called content – the properties the perceived object is represented as having – is 
wide or narrow, is another huge but independent problem
79
. Even if it was narrow, 
that could not prevent the Content it is a part of, from being wide. 
In the next section I will treat the issue of the relation between phenomenal character 
and representational Content in a general way, in order to finally face the problem of 
hallucinatory contents – the Semantic Gap Problem – we are left with by now. 
Although, to be able to treat the Semantic Gap Puzzle in detail we will have to 
patiently wait until Chapter VI. 
 
                                                
78 Byrne 2001 distinguishes weak representationalism (the supervenience-thesis) from strong 
representationalism (the identity thesis) about phenomenal character. Another relevant distinction 
is that between intermodal and intramodal representationalism: for intermodal representationalists 
(Dretske 1995, Tye 2000) the represented properties fully determine the phenomenal character, so 
seeing something as [overhead] and hearing something as [overhead] is phenomenally different 
only because in each case other properties are represented besides the [overhead] property (for 
example, colors in the first case, pitch, volume and tone in the second case). Another distinction is 
that between restricted and unrestricted representationalism: according to the first, any conscious 
experience has a content which determines its character (Dretske 1995, Tye 2000, Bain 2003), 
according to the second only certain phenomenal states (like perceptual experiences) have content, 
and it determines the respective phenomenal character of the state. Here I am arguing for a weak 
and intramodal representationalism. I find the unrestricted representationalism very implausible, 
but since I am concerned with perceptual experience, that issue will be not relevant: what matters, 
is that perceptual experiences are contentful states and their contents determines their conscious 
character. 
79 To report Chalmers' clear and simple definition: “A property is narrow when necessarily, for any 
individual who has that property, an intrinsic duplicate of that individual has that property 
(regardless of environment). A property is wide when it is possible for an individual to have the 
property while an intrinsic duplicate lacks that property” (Chalmers 2004, 108). So, if the 
instantiation of a mental property, like having a certain content, or having a certain Content, 
depends on external factors, that property is wide. If it is independent on external factors, then it is 
narrow. 
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We are left with the hard problem of the Semantic Gap. As we will see in the next 
Chapter, Phenomenal character is determined not by the Object but by the properties 
the PE represents the Object as having, so Content is object-dependent but 
phenomenal character is not. Now, also the properties the PE represent the Object as 
having, are 'wide' in another, further sense from the sense in which the Content is 
wide as being object-involving: they depend on external factors in a historical way 
which is still to be explored. In any case, given that the Object does not determine 
the phenomenal character, we still need to account for the content of hallucinatory 
states, namely for the semantic evaluability of objectless mental states which are 
phenomenally identical to perceptual states whose evaluability essentially involves 
perceived objects. Before finally facing that problem (see Chapter VI), in the next 






CHAPTER V: Phenomenal Character and Kinds of Perceptual Content. 
Section 1 – Phenomenal Character and Representational Content  
1.1 – Reconsidering Looks within the Content View 
The Content View can vindicate a relevant sense of ordinary ascriptions of 'O looks 
F' by equating them to ascriptions or self-ascriptions of experiences that represent a 
seen object as being F. That is the sense I have called epistemic, following Chisholm 
and Jackson among others
1
. Something O looks F when it looks to be F according to 
one's experience of it, so when there is prima facie visual evidence that it is F. Such 
look-attributions are objective. O exhibits a certain objective look, a way of 
appearing, which may well justify the proposition that O has a certain property, the 
very property it looks to have.
2
 When O looks F in that sense of looking, F is the 
objective property the experience attributes to the seen object. The Content View 
suitably accommodates the idea that something can look F without being F: 
representational contents may be not satisfied by the world. 
So, when O looks F to S, S has a visual experience of a perceived O, that represents 
O as F, where O is the object, F is the content and the couple [object + content] 
together compose the Content. 
Now, the Content of a PE consists of its veridicality-conditions. So if the seen object 
has the property the PE represents it as having, then the PE is veridical, or accurate, 
which means that the represented property is the very same property actually had by 
the seen object, if the PE is accurate. 
Properties or relations like F could be [red], [square], [moving to S's direction], 
[distant from S], [bigger-than], and the like: they are intentional properties, or 
representational properties shaping the Content of PE, together with the perceived 
object/objects. 
A PE is a conscious episode with a phenomenal character, with a way it is like to be 
in it. Let us call a property, among those which constitute the phenomenal character 
of a PE, a phenomenal property
3
. So, a PE has intentional properties and phenomenal 
                                                
1 Actually it would be more opportune to call it doxastic, because calling it epistemic may give the 
impression that it has to essentially do with knowledge, whereas it has to do with prima facie 
evidence for beliefs or belief-like states instead. Moreover, it could be confused with Dretske's 
'epistemic seeing', with which it has nothing relevant to do. 
2 If other collateral knowledge does not defeat that evidence, other things being equal, and so forth.  
3 See Chalmers 2006, Siegel 2010. 
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properties. Intentional properties are those in virtue of which the PE is accuracy-
evaluable so it is a contentful state, phenomenal properties are those in virtue of 
which the PE is a conscious episode, so it has a certain subjective character. 
What is the relation between the intentional properties and the phenomenal properties 
of a PE? How are we to pick out the ones and the others, in a given PE? How could 
we ever assess whether and how they are related, whether they are identical or 
different, whether they overlap or not? 
A way to get into the matter, is that of considering the other ordinary look-ascriptions 
analyzed in Chapter I, in order to realize whether and how the Content View can 
vindicate also those other uses
4
, or whether it may be compatible with them at least. 
It may well be that the non-epistemic uses – other than (prima facie) 'looking to be' – 
somehow map or track other non-intentional features of PEs.  
The comparative use attributes to two things a common or similar distinctive 
appearance, as in “A looks like B”. Attributing such a commonality of appearances is 
by no means representing a sameness of the compared things. A can look like B 
without that being an evidence that they are objectively the same in some respect, 
apart from that partial sameness in their appearances themselves
5
. I have already 
argued that comparative look-ascriptions presuppose another non-comparative use of 
'looks', otherwise the very comparative use would be circular: A looks like B, but 
how does B look? Like A, of course, but how does A look? Like B? If B looks like 
C, well, how does C look? And so on and so forth. There must be a way A and B 
look on the basis of which the very comparison is made, and that 'way' cannot be a 
way attributed by an epistemic look-ascription, because if it was, then 'A looks like 
B' would amount to 'there is (prima facie) evidence that A is F and there is (prima 
facie) evidence that B is F as well'. But that would amount to 'there is (prima facie) 
evidence that A and B are the same, namely, items of the same kind or type F”. But 
we had ruled out the idea that comparative looks involve such objective 
commitments, as if you looking like a poodle – in certain circumstances – should 
                                                
4 Of course, the issue of the relation between phenomenal character and representational content, is an 
issue internal to the Content View. Indeed, only for those who hold the Content View PE have 
representational content at all. 
5 If something a looks like something else (an F) they must have something in common, but not 
necessarily the property F used to specify what a looks like. For example, a looks like an F, so it 
must have some property in common with F (at least a certain distinctive appearance), but that 
property needs not be the property F itself. 
 160 
entail a prima facie evidence that you are a poodle! 
This non-epistemic and non-comparative use of 'looks', implicitly involved in both 
these uses
6
, is what I have called the phenomenological look. The existence of a 
phenomenological look explains why something can look red without looking to be 
red, something can look elliptical without looking to be elliptical, and so forth. This 
look does not seem to directly concern intentional properties, since intentional 
properties shape perceptual Content, and perceptual Content consists of the PE's 
veridicality conditions, O's being F would make veridical and accurate the PE 
according to which O looks F, but in that case 'looks F' should amount to 'looks to be 
F', given that the PE is true if O is F. 
 
1.2 - The case of Perceptual Constancy 
1.2.1 – Perceptual Constancy and the Ways of Looks 
The well-known phenomenon of perceptual constancy is a good example from which 
one could  account for such a non-intentional use of 'looks'. Standard cases of 
perceptual constancy, for example, are provided by Peacocke 1983, 2007 as evidence 
for the existence of 'primed' or 'sensational' properties, namely, of properties that 
subjectively characterize the perceptual experience without being represented in the 
experience as had by the perceived objects themselves, as instantiated by the 
perceived world: ways things look which are not ways things look to be. 
Here is an example which is not a case of perceptual constancy but still it involves it. 
You see two trees, the bigger one is far away from you, the smaller one is very near 
to you. Still, there is a seemingly legitimate sense in which their sizes look the same 
from your point of view, without looking to be the same
7
. Actually that is the same 
visual phenomenon involved in size-constancy, only comparatively considered. In 
virtue of size-constancy, when you see an object moving toward you, even if it 
comes to occupy a bigger and bigger portion of your visual field as soon as it gets 
                                                
6 As I have made clear in Chapter I, also the epistemic look involves the phenomenological look. The 
visually acquired evidence that a is F, in “a looks F”, is visually acquired indeed: such a visual 
acquisition of evidence about how the world is arranged must consist in a conscious appreciation of 
certain visible ways things appear. That does not prevent the phenomenological use to be dependent 
on the other uses as well (specially on the epistemic or intentional one). The uses are deeply 
interwoven, without any of that being causally or explanatory prior to the other. 
7 Peacocke 1983, 12, calls it the “problem of Additional Characterization”. See also Byrne 2001, 
221ff. 
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nearer, despite that phenomenological change your PE represents it as being constant 
in size. But even if it looks to be the same in size, nonetheless it seems to look 
different as well, at least it looks different as given in visual phenomenology. 
Something changed in the way the object appears.  
Imagine the object is round, but while moving toward you it slowly rotates in such a 
way that at certain moments its oblique orientation makes it change the ways in 
which its actual size occupies your visual field, so that the region of your visual field 
it occupies sometimes is an ellipsis
8
. So, despite the phenomenal changes due to the 
respective changes in orientation when the object is rotating, your PE keeps 
representing the object as being constant in shape, namely, as round. Still, it is hard 
to deny that at certain times the object 'looks' elliptical as well, even though your PE 
represents it as being round and makes you believe that it is round.  
Imagine also that this rotating object has parts of its surface perfectly illuminated by 
the sun and other parts on which shadow is cast. There is a sense in which your 
visual experience of the object is not chromatically homogeneous, indeed you notice 
a sharp difference between the fully illuminated parts and the shadowed parts. 
Suppose the object is yellow. Your PE represents the object as being yellow, but the 
shadowed parts of it look 'greenish' in some sense, despite no doubt the fact that they 
look to be yellow in the first place. Even if distribution of shadowed and non-
shadowed parts changes during the rotation, that phenomenal change does not 
amount to your PE representing parts of the object as suddenly changing their colors. 
This is color-constancy.  
Why should size-constancy, shape-constancy, and color-constancy make a case 
against the idea that the only properties of perceptual experiences are their 
intentional properties? Because your PE represents things as being the same through 
time or space, but something else, something phenomenally relevant, changes 
through time or space
9
. Vice-versa, your PE may represent things as changing 
                                                
8 On sensational properties as irreducible to represented properties, see Peacocke 2007. 
9 It is important to remark that the sameness of size, shape and color despite other phenomenal 
changes, is not just judgmental, rather it is phenomenologically given in PE. I do not just judge that 
the tilted coin is round 'despite the appearances', rather the coin visually appears to be round 
(despite it presents, in another sense, also an 'elliptical appearance'). If it did not violate the 
phenomenology, treating the sameness as result of a judgment could have been a way out. But it is 
not an available way, given perceptual phenomenology of constancy. Indeed your judgment of 
sameness does not contradict your experience at all, as it may happen in cases of perceptual illusions 
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despite a sort of phenomenal sameness of their visual look. Suppose an object is 
getting smaller and smaller such that its moving toward you is 'compensated' by its 
getting smaller so as to 'look' to you constant, in a certain sense of 'look' at least. 
Suppose you experience a wall whose surface phenomenally looks uniform despite 
the fact that parts of it are clearly shadowed. Suppose a round object really gets 
elliptical but at the same time it changes its orientation in a way that the portion of 
your visual field covered by it is constant, such that it 'looks' to you constant. Same 
represented properties with phenomenal change, different represented properties 
without phenomenal change. So, there must be phenomenal properties beyond the 
representational ones, which are irreducible to them, in PE. This is the inference, in 
short. If A and B do not systematically co-vary, they cannot be either identical or 
related by a relation of supervenience. Given A, it is not given B thereby, and vice-
versa. After all, if both the 'look'-properties were representational, our PE would 
have contradictory contents. The same object would be represented by the same PE 
as being round and elliptical at the same time, as being big and small at the same 
time, as being yellow and green at the same time. But that is impossible, not so much 
because PEs with contradictory contents are a priori impossible
10
, but because we 
experience that phenomenon of sameness-despite-phenomenal-difference and 
difference-despite-phenomenal-sameness, as something quite natural, as what exactly 
is to be expected in PE, as something far from requiring contradictory beliefs to be 
endorsed by us!  
In addition, if the same objective color can look many ways (ex. green, yellowish, 
orange), then “looks F” cannot just individuate one objective color represented as 
had by an object in the PE. The same goes for sizes and shapes. Vice-versa, if a 
certain way of looking (be it F) can represent to the subject different objective colors 
(or shapes or sizes), F cannot be a representational property such that the PE 
representing it is true if the perceived object is F full stop. 
                                                                                                                                     
known as such, rather it endorses the experiential content itself. On the contrary, it is only by 
reflection that I become conscious of the 'elliptical appearance' of the tilted round object, of the 
'different appearance' of the shadowed and unshadowed parts of the surface, of the different 'size-
appearance' of the same object seen from near and from far away. Instead, perceptual constancy is 
easily achieved by infants much before any showing of introspective abilities. On perceptual 
constancy in infants ! even in few-days infants! ! see Slater 1998. 
10 On the contrary, there are experiences with contradictory and/or impossible contents. For example, 
Escher figures, the Waterfall Illusion, the Penrose Triangle, and so on. Cfr Crane 1988, Ernst 
1996. For experiences of impossible colors, see Churchland 2005. 
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The story about the relation between the phenomenal level and representational level 
of PE must be more complicated, so it is in need of a positive account. So let us ask: 
given that there are phenomenological looks which are not directly and 
straightforwardly amenable to intentional looks, what is the relation between the first 
and the second looks? What are phenomenal properties in the first place? 
Given all that, it would be natural to think that the phenomenological look is 
irreducible to the epistemic look the same way as the phenomenal properties of PEs 
are irreducible to their intentional-representational properties. But still there are some 
ways one could reply to that idea. 
 
1.2.2 - A possible Reply Against Representationalism  
A radical counter-move is that of plainly denying that there are ways things look 
without them looking to be these ways thereby. Therefore, if O really looks F in S's 
PE, then O looks to be F, such that if O was F, S's PE would be accurate and 
veridical. There are only intentional properties in PE's phenomenology, there are 
only intentional looks which can be correctly attributed to the world as experienced.  
For example: when you see the two trees in the case above, the far one looks to be 
much bigger than the near one, whereas there is no clear and independent sense in 
which the two trees look the same size. They just do not look the same in size at all, 
because distance is visually represented, so the distant tree appears the way distant 
trees of a certain size are supposed to appear to an observer. So appears the near tree: 
as it should appear when seen from here. 
When you see a tilted round object, it just looks to be circular, there is no sense at all 
in which it looks elliptical. Orientation in space is visually represented, so the way 
the object looks is the way a tilted round object is supposed to look to an observer so 
positioned. Nothing looks elliptical then
11
. 
When you see a yellow object whose surface is partially shadowed, the surface looks 
                                                
11 One could reply that the retinal image produced by the tilted round object is in fact an ellipsis. But 
that is a bad reply: why should the way something looks be the same shape as the retinal image? 
The retinal image is just a certain gradient of light distribution, it is a step of the total information-
processing involved in vision, nothing more. Of course the retinal image has to do with the final 
conscious vision of the object, so also with its distinctive looks in experience. But there is no need 
of a shape-similarity between looks and causal-physical basis of the visual episode. Otherwise, 
why don't we argue that the way O looks must share a shape with the excitation of the optical 
nerve at a certain point? On the inappropriateness of calling 'image' the retinal information, see 
Nöe 2004, Chapter 2.2.  
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chromatically uniform, it looks to be yellow indeed, it does not look differently 
colored in its parts. Illumination conditions, as well as shadows, are visually 
represented, so the way the surface looks is the way a yellow partially illuminated 
surface is supposed to look to an observer. So, nothing looks greenish at all
12
. 
In short, it is not true that there are phenomenal changes without representational 
changes, in perceptual constancy. What phenomenally changes depends on 
representational changes, for example on variations in represented distance, 
orientation, illumination, and so forth. Phenomenal differences despite constancy are 
differences in what is represented by PE rather that differences in how PE represents. 
So there is no phenomenological look which is not amenable to an intentional look: 
phenomenal properties are completely exhausted by representational properties. That 
is the representationalist version of the Content View. On that version of CV, not 
only are perceptual experiences representational episodes, but also their 
representational properties are the only properties we are aware of in PE. So the 
phenomenal character of a PE is completely determined by its representational 
content. Thus, nothing looks F in PE unless it looks to be F according to the PE. 
 
1.2.3 A counter-reply 
I do not want to argue against that reply, rather I want to point out its insufficiency. 
Indeed, that view overlooks a genuine phenomenological feature of visual 
experience. It is true that the trees do not properly look the same size, that the surface 
does not properly look differently colored in its shadowed and unshadowed parts, 
that the object does not properly look elliptical. Although, provided that that way of 
ascribing looks is linguistically inappropriate, still we understand what it means that 
in experience the trees 'look' the same size, the surface 'looks' differently colored, the 
object 'looks' elliptical. That immediacy in understanding, or at least vaguely 
grasping, that even strange way of speaking must be somehow rooted in 
phenomenology and calls for an explanation. Just getting rid of it sounds 
                                                
12 Besides the example of the shadowed surface, color-constancy is responsible for our experiences 
of colors being relatively independent from the time of the day. For example, both in daylight and 
in the dark, red surfaces appears to be red despite change of illumination, just because the 
illumination conditions are visually represented. Also in that case one could reply that in daylight 
as well as in the dark, red surfaces just look to be red, so any look is intentional. So it is a mistake 
to take it that red things look brown when scarcely illuminated. Instead they look scarcely 
illuminated red surfaces, and they look to be such. 
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unsatisfactory.  
So, what do we grasp in the idea that the trees look the same size, the surface looks 
differently colored, the object looks elliptical? As I have already argued in Chapter I 
(5.5), we grasp a certain partial similarity between our actual experience and another 
eventual experience of something different. For example, if I was seeing a small but 
near tree, in some respects my experience would present it in a similar way to the 
way my actual PE presents that big but far tree. Of course distance is visually 
represented, indeed that similarity holds only in some respects and not in others: for 
example, that comparison abstracts from focus, perspectival relations with other 
objects, and any other features of my PE that are cues for appreciating distance-
properties
13
. Grasping such a hypothetical similarity rests on a highly sophisticated 
counterfactual operation, but it is grounded on our introspective powers of 
comparing actual and possible (or past) experiences. Likewise, illumination-
conditions and shadows are visually represented, but that does not prevent a subject 
from appreciating that the actual experience of a portion of shadowed yellow is 
similar in some respects to a hypothetical experience of an unshadowed green
14
. That 
comparison abstracts from illumination conditions, shadows and so forth, but it is 
grounded in my actual experience anyway. There is nothing illegitimate in 
appreciating that that yellow surface with distributed shadows on it looks the way an 
unshadowed surface colored with green and yellow parts would look to be.  
In the same vein, a round tilted object is present in my PE in a partially similar way 
to the way in which an elliptical non-tilted object would be presented by another 
hypothetical PE. Of course orientation is visually represented, so in order to make 
that comparison the subject needs to disregard those visual properties which make 
her appreciate the orientation and so make her take the object as round instead of as 
                                                
13 We could distinguish a holistic phenomenology of PE, and an atomistic phenomenology. The 
overall visual phenomenology of a PE, is such that distance is represented together with sizes, 
color is represented together with illumination, shapes are represented together with orientation, 
and so forth. Besides that spontaneous, holistic phenomenology, an introspective focus on details 
and particular features of our experienced scene may allow us to isolate certain 'apparent 
properties' in abstraction from their relations to the global visual experience. So we can take a sort 
of 'atomistic' attitude toward our own experience, and even compare two phenomenological atoms, 
so to say, belonging to different PEs. That sophisticated operation underlies our mastery of 
phenomenal looks- ascriptions. 
14 I want to point out that it is an objective fact about yellow surfaces and green surfaces, that a 
yellow surface in the dark is similar to a green surface under the sun. Nothing intrinsically private 
is involved in that circumstance. 
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elliptical. Still, with certain respects, an elliptical frontally-oriented object would be 
present in a PE in a similar way.  
What does all that amount to? Is the meaningfulness of that comparative talk about 
lookings and visual experiences, evidence against representationalism?  
Different representational properties may be phenomenally similar, and vice-versa, 
but picking out a phenomenal property F is possible only by reference to a 
paradigmatic experience in which something is represented as F. So, there seems to 
be a way something looks without looking to be that very way, but only insofar as it 
looks the way something else would look to be in another PE. 
That asymmetry is of the greatest importance, but what matters here is the possibility 
of comparing two different representational properties as being 'experientially' 
similar despite their objective difference. If yellow things in bright light, in some 
respects, look the way green things in dark light look, then two things can look to be 
different despite looking similar in that very respect. 
In Chapter I I have argued that the comparative use presupposes a phenomenological 
use of 'looks', otherwise the comparative use would involve a regressus. Given that 
A looks like B, how does B look? So there must be the phenomenological look of A 
and that of B in order for them to be compared. 
Now we have just seen that the attempt to reduce the phenomenological look to the 
intentional look ('looks F' to 'looks to be F') is blocked by the possibility of 
comparison between PEs that represents different properties. I think that the 
following moral could be drawn from all this: 
If you reduce the comparative look to the phenomenological look, then you need to 
admit the phenomenological look as distinct from the intentional look. If you reduce 
the phenomenological look to the intentional look, then you need to admit the 
comparative look as distinct from the intentional look. In any case, the intentional 
look alone does not cover our ascriptive uses, our intuitions, our phenomenology. As 
a consequence, the phenomenological look is dependent on but irreducible to the 
intentional look, and that irreducibility despite the dependency is what makes also 
the comparative look irreducible to the intentional. The phenomenon of elliptic-
looking of the tilted penny, so the phenomenological variations of 'apparent shape' 
despite perceptual constancy of roundness representation, testifies that irreducibility 
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of the phenomenological look to the intentional look. Their dependency has been 
argued for before (Chapter I, Section 5.5): something phenomenologically looks 
elliptical if experiencing it is, for some specific respect, as if one was seeing an 
elliptical object from a privileged (frontal) perspective, in paradigmatically optimal 
circumstances. 
So, even if we assume we are aware just of representational properties in PE, our 
introspective access to our PEs allow us to compare and couple certain ways these 
representational properties are given to us in different PEs. That is true even if we 
pick out those 'ways' as ways a certain object was represented to be in another 
paradigmatic experience. These 'ways of being given' are not reducible to ways the 
world is represented to be in a certain PE, even if it is picked out only by reference to 
the content of another PE. We can meaningfully claim that a looks F (without 
looking to be F) in the actual PE, because we know what it is for something (else) to 
look to be F, because we know what it is like to experience an F, in other terms. 
That view gives explanatory and phenomenological priority to representational 
properties: what is fundamentally given in PE are objects and the ways they are 
represented as being. But our introspective powers, conjoined both with a 
sophisticated counterfactual capacity and with memory/imagination of a non-actual 
experience, allow to us to compare two experiences having different representational 
properties, under certain respects. So, no phenomenal property could be picked out if 
it was not a 'potential' representational property
15
. 
That view is well compatible with transparency of PE. In introspectively attending to 
your own experience of a red round vase of flowers, you will find the properties that 
characterize the vase according to your PE of it. That is true, but the [roundness] 
represented in your PE can be taken by you as being represented in such a way that it 
has some distinctive appearances in common with the way an elliptical, frontally 
oriented vase would have if you experienced it. The property [elliptical] is not 
directly represented in your PE, but that way of the property [round] being given can 
remind you of the way “it would be like” to see an ellipsis differently oriented
16
. 
                                                
15  That fits well with the conceptual and explanatory dependence of “looks” from “is”, I have argued 
for – with Sellars – in Chapter I (5.6). 
16  That is why these apparent properties, like the elliptic look of an object which looks to be round, 
are no less public properties than the properly intentional properties of the PE, like [round]. The 
'elliptical' way of appearing of a tilted round object is something intersubjectively assessable, it is 
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1.2.4 PEs are Egocentric Representations 
The complex properties of being [round + at-that-orientation], [big + at-that-
distance], [red + in-that-illumination-condition] are representational properties 
throughout then. They belong to the Content of PE. Skipping over the color-case for 
the moment, let us notice that something with a certain size appears differently 
according to its distance from me, something with a certain shape appears differently 
according to its orientation with respect to me. So, even if we accept the argument 
that the respective phenomenological variations are representational variations 
(change in distance or in orientation), still these represented spatial properties must 
be represented egocentrically, as ways the world is with respect to me, rather than 
allocentrically, as ways the world is full stop
17
. 
If the phenomenological change of the cases above is accounted for in terms of 
representational change, then the very same perceiver must be somehow involved 
into the Content itself. If perceptual constancy does not speak in favor of the 
awareness of non-representational properties in PE, and so any phenomenal variation 
is in fact a variation in Content, then any phenomenal feature of the PE which is 
clearly dependent on my actual point of view, must be accounted for by including 
myself, the perceiver, in the Content.  
The availability of the world for our action is the fundamental character of our 
perceptual encounter with the world, so it is quite natural that perceptual 
representations are egocentric and subject-indexed. Something is represented as 
being at a certain place, distance, orientation, with respect to me and to my body. 
When something is distant, it is distant from here in the first place, not from a neutral 
point among the points in the represented surrounding space. The location of my 
body is not one among other places that my PE represents, rather it is where all the 
other places are represented to spatially relate with, in the first place. Likewise, a 
coin is tilted or not just from my point of view. 
Although this to-me component of perceptual phenomenology is something we are 
                                                                                                                                     
an objective feature of the perceived entity. There is nothing intrinsically subjective in these 
apparent properties. So, they are not qualia in the strongest sense, rather they are ways-things-
seems-to-be-from-that-point-of-view, where anyone else could occupy that point of you. 
17 On PE as having an egocentrically-indexed content, see Burge 2005, 68ff, Peacocke 1992, 70ff, 




, it is not a non-representational property of our experience of the world we 
are aware of, it is rather a property of the way the world is represented in the 
experience. So, a representationalist view could accommodate that egocentric aspect 
by including it within the representatata we are aware of in PE,  without having to 
accept that it is a property of the representation itself, namely of the state. 
As Dretske 2003, 78, notes, nothing prevents a perceptual experience from having 
'egocentric' properties among its contents. For example, the trees can be represented 
as being one smaller than the other and nearer than the other, on the one hand, and as 
occupying the same portion of the subject's visual field – what we have called 
'looking the same size' – on the other hand. The ways the trees 'appear' to the subjects 
are represented properties, which make the representation have egocentric contents 
besides its allocentric contents. Relational properties are then represented in PE, 
properties that characterize the objective spatial relation between the perceived 
objects and the perceiver. The point-of-view we have on the world in experiencing, is 
something we access in experiencing and in being aware of the egocentrically 
specified properties of the perceived world, it is not something we access by being 
'directly' aware of the experience itself, of its alleged phenomenal, non-
representational properties. For example, the perspectival properties of the visual 
appearances are ways in which PE represents objective features with respect to our 
actual location, so “from here”, they are representations of objective relations 
between us and the perceived world. 
So, neither the phenomenon of perceptual constancy nor the egocentric character of 
PEs seem to be enough to make up an argument against representationalism. If we 
are able to compare ways of appearing of different properties, it is because our PEs 
have a Content involving information about the relation between us and the world, 
regardless of the information about the world as such. So a coin tilted if seen-from-
here looks a bit like a coin non-tilted but seen-from-there. 
Movement-perception is another good example of spatial representations being 
subject-indexed and therefore relational. The very idea of an objective space rests on 
the immediate grasp of the difference between certain apparent movements as due to 
the movement of the perceiver, and other apparent movements as due to objective 
                                                
18 On the to-me component of perceptual representations, see also Crane 2011. 
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movements of perceived things
19
. In addition, the appreciation of objective 
movement also depends on the movement of the eyes. If you track a constantly 
moving object by gradually turning your head, your retinal image of the object is 
constant, but you see it moving because the brain receives coordinated information of 
movement of your eyes as well as of your head. So visual representation of 
movement involves a complex representation of the relative spatial relations between 
the perceiver's body, the perceiver's eyes, and the moving object. 
To draw an overall conclusion: perceptual constancy does not speak in itself in favor 
of the existence of phenomenal non-representational properties of PEs we are 
allegedly aware of, but it shows that: 1) in our PE's representing the world as being a 
certain way we can have at a time an introspective access to a) certain egocentric 
elements, which are themselves represented rather than being properties of the 
representational state itself; b) certain relational properties connecting us and the 
world, which are also represented in the experience rather than being properties of 
the experience. 
We have the capacity to compare these 'egocentric ways' across experiences with 
different representational properties. We are points of view on the world, and our 
being such is introspectively accessed by us through visually experiencing the world, 
not through seeing our own experience of the world as some sort of internal eye
20
. 
There is no need of being aware of non-representational, qualitative properties of the 
experience itself, to become aware of the perceived world as perceived from a 
(certain) point of view. 
 
1.3 How are we aware of the PE's Mode? 
The phenomenal character of PE cannot be identical with its Content, because PE's 
Contents are object-involving, whereas the phenomenal character of a given PE can 
                                                
19  See Evans 1982, Chapter VI. In the very phenomenology of PE objects are given as subject-
independent, on the one side, and the experiential relation to the perceived world is given as 
perspectivally connected, on the other side (see Siegel 2010, Chapter 7, on that). If I change my 
perspective on the object, I do not take the object to be moving thereby (subject-independence). 
Instead, if I change my position, my phenomenology will change as an effect of that, so in 
changing my position I expect certain distinctive phenomenological changes (perspectival 
connectedness). Subject-independence and perspectival connectedness are are two sides of a same 
coin. 
20 To get how it is possible to go beyond the perception-model of introspection, I have benefited of 
the reading of the PhD by Conor McHugh, Self-knowledge in Consciousness, Edinburgh 2008, 
available online. 
 171 
be shared both by another PE of another visually indistinguishable object and also by 
an objectless hallucination
21
. But a representationalist could still argue that the 
phenomenal character of a PE is identical with its content rather than with its 
Content: it may be that the properties the PE represent the (putative) object as being 
– which constitute the content, so compose the Content of a PE together with the 
object the PE is of – are identical with the PE's phenomenal properties, namely to the 
PE's phenomenal character. In other words, it may be the case that, even though 
Perceptual Content is object-dependent in a way in which phenomenal character is 
not, so they cannot be just identical, still the phenomenal character is identical to the 
content, namely, to the properties the PE represent the (putative) object as having. 
For example: I see an apple and my PE represents it as round and green. The 
phenomenal character cannot be identical to the Content, because another identical 
apple or even a hallucinated apple could be the 'object' of PEs with the same 
phenomenal character. Nonetheless, the phenomenal character could be identical to 
the [round]/[green], to the represented properties.  
We have just been considering this hypothesis (representationalism about properties). 
We have noticed that the represented properties are always egocentrically 
represented, from a point of view and in relation to the perceiver. Properties like 
[distant-from-here], [so-oriented-with-respect-to-my-position] and the like, are 
represented relations involving both the perceiver and her surroundings as relata. In 
experience we are perceptually aware of the world from our point of view. 
If that point-of-view is 'made out' of the properties things are represented as having, 
then property-representationalism is true. Now, it seems that any representation of 
properties as objectively related in certain ways to the perceiver cannot exhaust alone 
the egocentric representation of the objective properties themselves. Let us more 
closely explore that apparent gap between represented egocentric features and 
elements, on the one hand, and the egocentric way of representing features and 
elements, on the other. 
In visual perception, any worldly objects and features are represented within an 
egocentric frame of reference, within an egocentric space
22
. The perceiver is not just 
                                                
21 Disjunctivists about phenomenal character deny that (see Martin 2006, Fish 2010). I will argue 
later why they are wrong in that (see Chapter VI). 
22 See Evans 1982, especially Chapter 7. “There is only an egocentric space, because there is only a 
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represented as an object among other objects: that would be an allocentric 
representation including myself within its targets. Likewise, whenever I hear a sound 
coming from a certain direction, I am immediately disposed to do various things, so 
my spatial representations are egocentric in a strong sense, they are not just objective 
representations of many things among which there is also myself or my body as 
occupying a certain position in the objective space. Rather, all perceived things are 
perceived in a way which presents them from my point of view, for me, to me, for 
my action, for my further exploration. The primitive connection of perception to 
(possible) action deeply influences the way the information is taken in, and that is 
reflected in perceptual phenomenology as well. There is 'up' and 'down', 'left' and 
'right, 'in front' and 'behind' just by reference to myself as an agent, in a way which is 
completely different from the way my PE may well represent an object as behind 
another object, under or above another object, as to the left or to the right of another 
object. In these cases, both objects would be represented from my point of view and 
in spatial relation to myself anyway, but not the other way round. So there is an 
asymmetry between myself and the represented surroundings, we cannot account for 
by appeal to the mere fact that I am also represented as occupying a place just like 
the other objects my PE is of. Indeed, there is not even the need that my body is 
visually represented in order for my visual PE to egocentrically represent all the 
surrounding objects and their properties, namely, to represent them with respect to 
myself. On the contrary, my own body is usually not represented in visual PE, whilst 
anything is perspectivally represented. The very fact that PE's phenomenology 
exhibits certain ways of appearing of objective properties besides the properties 
themselves – for example, the 'elliptical' mode of presentation of the tilted round 
object – is due to the fact that PEs are egocentric ways of representing the world, not 
just representations of the world which include the subject within their many 
contents. That 'to-me' dimension is more than having me as a content. 
To couch that point in other terms, it seems that the egocentric aspect of PE's 
phenomenal character cannot be exhausted by the egocentric contents of PEs, which 
anyway explain many aspects of the first-person phenomenology of PEs. In PE, 
relations are represented, not only between perceived objects and their represented 
                                                                                                                                     
behavioral space”. 
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properties, but also between objects, their properties and myself, the perceiver. 
Nonetheless, that important fact is not sufficient to explain the egocentric character 
of perceptual experience. Where does that special first-person character come from, 
if not from the content? Should we concede that in PE we are aware of qualia or 
property of the experience in the first place? 
There is a third way between reducing phenomenal character to represented 
properties and accepting the existence of qualia-like entities as direct objects of 
perceptual awareness. 
In Section 2.3 of Chapter IV I have introduced the basic ingredients for individuating 
a certain PE: a Subject, an Object, a set of Properties, and a Mode. I have ruled out 
that the phenomenal character of PE depends on the Object, so from the Content as 
composed by Object and content. Now I have argued that the egocentric component 
of PE cannot be exhausted by content alone either. In other words, the egocentric 
content of PE cannot alone account for the egocentric conscious character of PE. 
There is another element left, which may be the key-element to explain the gap 
between representational content and phenomenal character. That element is the 
Mode. 
A perceptual experience of an Object, with a certain content, is a different mental 
state from a belief about the very same object and with the same content. The two 
intentional states differ in their Modes, they are different kinds of attitudes toward 
the same Object and content, so toward the same Content. Now, by 'Mode' I do not 
just mean the kind of attitude, like perceiving or believing or desiring or hoping or 
fearing
23
, but also the determinate perceptual modality of the determinable 
'perceptual' attitude
24
. For example, vision is a different Mode from hearing or 
tasting. So, a perceptual experience in the Visual Mode can share an Object and a 
content (so a Content) with a perceptual experience in the Auditory Mode, or with a 
perceptual experience in the Tactile Mode. Seeing something moving is different 
from hearing something moving, seeing a square is different from touching a square, 
                                                
23 What I call Mode here, with Crane 2007, is called quality by Husserl 1901, and manner by 
Chalmers 2004, 2006. 
24 By 'attitude' I do not mean propositional attitude but semantic attitude in general. An attitude 
toward a content does not have to be a propositional attitude, insofar as there are non-propositional 
contents. If perceptual content is not propositional, as I have argued for, above, then the 
'perceptual attitude' is not a propositional attitude although it is a certain attitude toward a content. 
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and so on. Is the Mode of a PE relevant for its phenomenal character? 
As Chalmers 2004 and Crane 2007 put it, we can distinguish a pure and an impure 
representationalism. According to pure representationalism, the content of a state 
fully determines its phenomenal character (weak pure representationalism) or it is 
identical to it (strong pure representationalism). According to impure 
representationalism, the content of a state together with its Mode fully determines its 
phenomenal character (weak impure representationalism) or it identical with it 
(strong impure representationalism)
25
. I will argue for weak impure 
representationalism, namely for the view that the Mode co-determines PE's 
phenomenal character together with the content
26
. I will then argue that the 
egocentric character of PE also depends on its distinctive Mode, besides its 
egocentric and relational contents. Phenomenal character is not fixed by content 
alone. 
If the Mode is sufficient for explaining the phenomenal difference between PEs with 
same content, then there is no need to appeal to phenomenal, non-representational 
properties, namely, to qualia-like properties of the experience we would be conscious 
of in the first place, when we enjoy a PE
27
. 
It strikes me as a compelling evidence that visual awareness of a property 'feels' 
different from auditory or tactile awareness of the same property. Seeing a square 
feels different from touching it, hearing something moving toward me feels different 
                                                
25 A parallel distinction similar to the pure/impure one, is that between intermodal and intramodal 
representationalism,  proposed by Byrne 2001. According to the first view, phenomenal character 
is fully determined by representational content, given a modality (see Lycan 1996, Harman 1996). 
For example, two visual perceptions with same content must have the same phenomenal character. 
According to the second view, sameness of content fully determines sameness of phenomenal 
character independently on modalities (seeing, hearing, tasting and so on). Another distinction is 
that between unrestriced and restricted representatonalism. On the first view (Dretske 1995, Tye 
1995, Bain 2003), any conscious state is a representation, so it has a content, included orgasms, 
tickles, moods, depressions, physical pain and so on. On the second view, only certain kinds of 
conscious state have content and intentionality, like perceptions, beliefs and thoughts (McGinn 
1988). I think that unrestricted representationalism is very implausible, but I will not try to argue 
against it. Instead, my concerns are perceptual content and perceptual experience, not 
consciousness in general or intentionality in general. Here I am not interested in whether 
depression has an object or a content of any sort. 
26 Also shifts in attention can change the phenomenal character of a PE. But attention may be taken 
to modify phenomenal character via determining which, among the properties falling under your 
visual field, are represented and which are not. In addiction, each perceptual Mode allows and 
enables certain distinctive shifts in attention. In any case, differences in content as given under the 
Mode, account for phenomenal differences due to attention. On attention as co-determining 
phenomenal character, see Fish 2010, 58ff., Price 2011. 
27  Qualia realists are Block 1990, 2003, Shoemaker 2006, Thau 2002. 
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from seeing something moving toward me. That primitive intuition is not shared by 
everyone, though. Pure representationalists (Dretske, Tye, Lycan, Bain) usually 
account for that phenomenal difference in terms of difference of represented 
properties
28
. For example, when you see a square your PE also represents its color, 
when you touch a square your PE also represents its texture, at least the PE 
represents the texture much more fine-grainedly than a visual PE would do. So, the 
represented properties vary. It is just a contingent fact that vision does not represent 
pitch and timbre, that touch does not represent color, that hearing does not represent 
texture, and so on. Still, the Mode has only an indirect role in determining 
phenomenal character, insofar as the Mode determines which properties are 
represented, so it determines representational content. It remains true that 
phenomenal character is fully fixed by representational content alone. 
That reply, although apparently straightforward, seems to me to deeply violate our 
phenomenological intuitions. Of course we will never have an auditory PE of a 
moving object without a related perception of timbre, pitch and other auditory 
properties. We will never have a visual PE of a moving object without any 
perception of some chromatic contrast or of some other morphological properties of 
the moving object, and so on. But the distinctive phenomenal character of a visual 
experience of a square does not introspectively seem exclusively due to other 
concomitantly seen properties like colors. Likewise, touching a square does not seem 
to feel different from seeing it just because you also perceive texture and fail to 
perceive colors. There is a distinctive phenomenology of seeing certain properties 
which cannot be reduced to the experience of that property being or not being 
accompanied by simultaneous experiences of other properties.  
Moreover, in having a visual experience of an F you are in a position to immediately 
self-ascribe not only a mental state with that content (an F), but also a mental state 
with that Mode (a Visual Perception). Just by seeing something you become 
                                                
28  That argument is put forward by Dretske 1995, 2003, by Tye 2006, by Bain 2003, Byrne 2001. 
Byrne provides an argument for pure intentionalism, which unfortunately begs the question: 1) if S 
has two consecutive PE which differ in phenomenal character, she will notice the difference 2) If 
she notices the difference, the way things seems to her will change 3) The way things seems to S 
in PE is the content of the PE, so difference in phenomenal character entails difference in content. 
The argument does not work because it presupposes that a change in phenomenal character is 
identical with a change in the way things seem to be to the subject. But that assumption just 
amounts to the assumption of pure intentionalism itself! For a similar criticism, see Chalmers 
2004, Crane 2007. 
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immediately aware that your are seeing it, instead of hearing or touching it. That 
primitive fact can be hardly explained by appeal to presence or absence of certain 
other represented properties. In being immediately and non-inferentially conscious of 
enjoying a visual experience, I do not 'check' the range of properties my PE is 
representing, I just feel myself seeing and just enjoy the distinctively visual 
appearance of the seen things
29
. My awareness is awareness under a certain Mode, 
even though, of course, my overall experience is normally an integrated and 
multimodal flux. Consider seeing and hearing an object moving toward you. If you 
focus your attention just on that property of moving toward you, still you may well 
introspectively tell apart the Visual and the Auditory phenomenology of that very 
same property. That is not to deny that there is distinctive phenomenology of the 
complex, bi-modal experience of seeing-with-hearing that movement, that is rather to 
claim that we can introspectively attend to the basic 'mono-modal' elements of that 
complex phenomenology in a separate way
30
. 
In addition, we do not have any imagination of what it could be like to hear colors, 
or of what it could be like to see pitches and timbres. So it is distinctive of the visual 
phenomenal character, that there are certain exclusively visual properties like colors, 
not the other way around. In hearing a moving object from the left overhead down to 
the right and in seeing the same moving object, we have two PEs which partially 
share their phenomenal character and partially do not share it. They share it insofar 
as the phenomenal character is determined also by the content. They do not share it 
for two reasons: firstly, the Mode is different so also the shared represented 
properties are given under a different Mode, under a different phenomenal character; 
secondly, there are other properties which are represented in a PE and are not 
                                                
29 Noë 2004 points out that being visually conscious of a property involves appreciation of certain 
sensory-motor dependencies of visual sensations from certain possible bodily movements, and 
such dependencies will be different in case you are conscious of the same property through touch. 
Noë's so-called enactive theory is not in principle incompatible with the Content View, rather it is 
a view on how perceptual content is determined. I will not be concerned with enactivism, but that 
remark about the dependence of qualitative character of perception from certain expectations 
connected to bodily movements, well explains the influence of the Mode on the phenomenal 
character. 
30 Imagine you close your eyes when hearing that the object – be it a small toy plane – is moving 
toward you. If you are attending  just to the object and its movement, the phenomenal difference 
before and after closing your eyes, does not seem to be reducible to the fact that you do not see 
colors or other visual properties anymore. There is a further element which makes a phenomenal 
difference: you are not visually representing that property anymore. 
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represented in the other PE. So, the difference in represented properties does 
determine a difference in the overall phenomenal character of the two PEs, but that 
fact does not account alone for the difference in phenomenal character of perceptual 
representation of the common represented properties (like: [object moving from my 
left overhead down to my right]). For example, the perspectival representation 
involved in vision, is something which does not characterize in the same way the 
phenomenal character of touch. You can very well represent something as round by 
touch, but it will not 'look' elliptical at all, not even in the sophisticated sense in 
which I have claimed it is legitimate to talk with respect to visual appearances
31
. So, 
the same represented property, can have a different 'look' of that very represented 
property. Phenomenal looks depend on Modes, besides the content, that is why they 
are irreducible to intentional looks. 
So, the phenomenal character of PE depends both from the content and from the 
Mode. In particular, the Mode determines the relevant egocentric character of the PE, 
the 'to-me'-component of the character. 
That the phenomenal character is determined by the Mode, does not entail that we 
can introspectively pick out certain properties of our experience independently of the 
content of our PE. When we attend to our visual experience, we find out properties 
things seem to have, but we are also aware that they are properties things visually 
seem to us to have
32
. That awareness is essentially intertwined with the awareness 
that they are properties things seem to have 'to me', or from my point of view, with 
respect to me. The egocentric aspect of PE is essentially determined by the Mode. It 
is by having a Mode, that PE is not just a representation of the way things are, but it 
is a point of view on the way things are
33
. It is to the subject, that things seem a 
                                                
31  See that Chapter, 3 1-2. 
32  Lycan 2003, a pure representationalist, admits that the modes or 'guises' can be “phenomenal 
properties of some sort, perhaps higher-order properties” of the intentional properties of PE. But, 
he remarks, these guises cannot be supposed to come apart from the intentional qualia they 
present. Fair enough, the property of visually seeming F cannot be told apart from the property of 
seeming F in the first place, still, visually seeming F is phenomenally different from auditorily 
seeming F, for example. I cannot get how Lycan can maintain a pure representationalist view, if 
for him phenomenal character may depend on 'guises' in which the intentional properties are 
presented. The core-principle of pure representationalism is the supervenience claim 'same content 
" same phenomenal character'. But that does not work if 'same content + different Mode " 
different phenomenal character'. If something which is not the content (the Mode) makes a 
phenomenal difference, then pure representationalism must be false, full stop. 
33  On that constitutive point-of-view-ness of PE, Crane rightly insists in Crane 2007, 19ff. 
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certain way, in a PE
34
. But we are never aware of a Mode as such, independently on 
what is given under that Mode, on the properties the PE represent things as having. 
So we cannot ever be 'directly' conscious of a perceptual Mode, rather we become 
conscious of the represented properties as given under that Mode, for example, of 
[square] as visually given. That is why the contribution of the Mode in determining 
phenomenal character does not entail that we are aware of intrinsic properties of our 
PEs independently of our PE's having the contents they have. A Mode is always a 
Mode for intentional properties to be given in experience. This is why that view is 
still a form of representationalism, though 'impure' or non-reductive. 
The idea that phenomenal character is co-determined by content and Mode, may also 
account for certain features of perceptual phenomenology which seem to be non-
intentional at first. A quite usual example is that of blurry vision
35
. As soon as you 
take off your lenses your visual experience becomes blurry, without but attributing 
that blurriness to anything in the world. So, some argue, voilà a property we are 
aware of in visual experience, which does not belong to its representational content, 
namely, to the ways PE represents the perceived world as being. Since blurriness is 
not attributed to anything perceived, it must be a phenomenal property of the 
experience itself: a quale. 
Now, that property could be rather accounted for as a property of the Mode, namely, 
blurry is the Mode through which your PE represents the world. The vision is blurry, 
not the world, according to the PE. You do not perceive your own vision, but the 
visual Mode immediately contributes to your 'blurry' phenomenology in such a way 
that you come-to-take the seen world not as blurry, rather as 'blurrily' seen by you. 
So, only an impure representationalism can handle cases like blurriness. 
Since your conscious PE involves an awareness of the Mode besides the conscious 
entertainment of the content
36
, the experienced blurriness rests on the Visual Mode 
                                                
34  As Crane 2007, 22, remarks, impure representationalism is more plausible than pure 
representationalism because “impure representationalism accommodate the way in which the 
'seeming' itself can enter into the phenomenal character of the experience”. Within the framework 
of impure representationalism, the irreducibility of phenomenal look to intentional/evidential look 
can be accommodated, without need of committing to qualia (Block, Shoemaker, Peacocke), on 
the one hand, but also without need of reducing the phenomenology of visually representing 
certain properties to the very properties represented (Tye, Dretske, Stalnaker). 
35 See Bach 1997, Boghossian and Velleman 1989, Baldwin 1990, Dretske 2003, Crane 2006. 
36 It is important to emphasize that consciously entertaining a content and being aware of the Mode 
under which that content is given, are two inseparable and intertwined elements of a conscious PE. 
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rather than on special qualia as primary objects of awareness. Blurriness is not a 
represented property, it is a feature that characterizes the Mode of representing, 
namely the visual vehicle of perceptual information, and that feature of the Mode is 
reflected in phenomenology
37
. So such a phenomenon does not speak against 
representationalism as such, at the very least it speaks against pure 
representationalism, according to which the represented properties exhaust the 
phenomenal character of PE.  
So, impure representationalism is phenomenologically adequate, and is compatible 
with the  transparency of PE. In attending to your PE you always find out the 
properties things are represented as having, but in experiencing you are conscious 
that represented properties are under a Mode, where that Mode contributes to shape 
the distinctive phenomenology of your PE. 
This view is different both from pure representationalism about phenomenal 
character, on the one hand, and from qualia-realism, on the other. By qualia-realism 
I mean the view that in PE we are aware of intrinsic properties of our own 
experiences, something like a 'mental paint' (Block 2003), or nameless 'appearance-
properties' (Shoemaker 2006, Thau 2002)
38
. Pure representationalism does not do 
justice to certain fundamental phenomenological features of PE, qualia-realism does 
not do justice to transparency of PE either: PEs seem to attribute intrinsic properties 
to things, exactly those properties we are thematically aware of as soon as we 
introspectively attend to our own PEs. Moreover, qualia-realism is unsatisfactory in 
explaining the intimate, seemingly non-arbitrary connection between the 
                                                                                                                                     
You are not aware of the Mode as a quale, as an entity, rather your consciously entertaining a 
content under a certain Mode, puts you in a position to immediately and non-inferentially know 
that it is under that Mode, that you are entertaining that content. You would never introspectively 
pick out the Mode, if that Mode was not a Mode for a determinate content to be perceptually given 
to you in experience. The irreducibility of the Mode-consciousness to the content-consciousness 
does not deny that perceptual consciousness and perceptual phenomenology are essentially 
intentional. 
37  Besides the appeal to the Mode, a further important way of rejecting blurry vision as an evidence 
against representationalism, is pointing out that PE may represent properties of the channels and 
states of the perceiver as well. For example, the property [blurry] could be represented by the PE 
as a bad state of acuity of the visual Mode in the actual circumstance. That consideration is 
compatible with the appeal to the Mode, it is not alternative to it. For representationalist treatments 
of the case of blurry vision, see Dretske 2000, Lycan 2003, Tye 2002. 
38  Under that label (qualia-realism) I mean to subsume any view which explains perceptual looks in 
terms of the  production of a certain quale the subject becomes aware of, where that quale can be 
picked out independently on the content of the PE and/or on the potential judgments the subject 
could make on the basis of that PE. See Pettit 2003. 
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phenomenology of PE and its intentionality
39
. 
Impure, Mode-based representationalism accounts for the egocentric character of PE 
by appeal to the Mode, so it does justice to the point-of-view-ness, or the  'to-me 
component' of experiencing. On the other side, that view also accounts for 
transparency and the essentially intentional nature of phenomenal character itself. 
Indeed, the properties we find in introspection are the properties things are 




1.4 From Content-externalism to Phenomenal Externalism? 
1.4.1 If content is not in the Head, where are Qualia? 
We have been arguing that the phenomenal character of PE supervenes on perceptual 
content plus the distinctive perceptual Mode under which that content is given in PE. 
Perceptual Content is wide insofar as it is object-dependent, it is a de re Content. 
What about perceptual content, i.e. the properties the Object is represented as 
having? Is it narrow or wide? Representationalism about phenomenal character is 
generally committed to content-externalism
41
. The represented properties – the 
content – may depend on factors external to the psycho-physical constitution of the 
individual perceiver, so that two micro-physical twins can in principle differ in the 
representational contents of their PEs: such contents are called 'wide'. 
We will deal later with the issue of how mental states like PEs may come to acquire 
and possess the content they possess. In any case, we may already legitimately 
assume that the content of our PEs must somehow depend on the evolution of our 
perceptual systems in a given environment, on the survivor-and adaptational value 
                                                
39  Also Fregean views on phenomenal content (Chalmers 2004, 2006, Thompson 2003), as we will 
see soon, have problems in positing an internal connection between phenomenal character and the 
properties it represents. 
40  Tye 1995, 134-7 argues that pure representationalism is the simplest explanation of why a change 
in phenomenal character always involves a respective change in content: because they are one and 
the same indeed. Impure representationalism seems to me the simplest explanation of why 
phenomenal character and content are so intimately coordinated, on the one side, and of why each 
sensory modality has an additional phenomenological salience which does not only depend on 
which property is represented, but also on how the property is represented. 
41  You can be representationalist about phenomenal properties and content-internalist. You need to 
hold that your PE has only phenomenal content, namely, a content which just supervenes on the 
phenomenal character of the individual perceiver. It is hard, though, to individuate a set of 
veridicality conditions of your PEs which would not change by changing deep causal facts about 
the perceiver-environment relation, about the properties that systematically cause this or that 
experience, and so on. On phenomenal content, see Kriegel 2002, Horgan and Tienson 2002, 
Chalmers 2004, 2006. 
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associated with our ability to detect certain environmental properties
42
. So, the 
reasons why a certain (type of) perceptual state represents the properties it represents, 
are outside our phenomenological accessibility. These reasons go back to causal and 
evolutionary relations between certain types of states and certain environmental 
properties. Nonetheless, we can immediately access the content of our PEs in virtue 
of PEs having a phenomenal character. So the phenomenal character somehow 
'tracks' the represented properties and makes them accessible. That basic fact may be 
explained by considering that the conscious character of PE is also an outcome of 
evolution. Our capability of consciously entertaining a content must have grown out 
of our capability to possess contentful mental states at all, so that, as an unsurprising 
consequence, conscious perceptual experience tracks and 'traces' perceptual contents, 
making us conscious of them, at least conscious of a part of them
43
. A conscious 
information may be used many ways, far beyond the context of its acquisition. The 
content of a certain PE depends on the function of the type the state is a token of, and 
representational functions, as any other proper functions, are acquired by evolution
44
. 
So, not only is the Content object-involving, but also the content (represented 
properties) is environment-dependent in that broader, historical sense. 
Now, if content also depends on external factors, there may well be elements and/or 
layers of content which are not present in phenomenology. So phenomenology 
makes content subjectively available, on the one hand, but may not exhaust its 
informational richness, on the other. 
In any case, inasmuch as phenomenal character makes content available to us, a 
representationalist view of phenomenal character, even an 'impure' one, faces the 
'problem' of phenomenal externalism. If phenomenal character is made out of 
intentional properties, then since intentional properties are wide phenomenal 
character is also wide thereby. Phenomenal externalism seems prima facie a 
'problem' because the way it feels, the what-it-is-like dimension of my conscious 
experiences seems to be a purely subjective matter, an intrinsic, private feature of 
them, hardly dependent on external factors. It intuitively seems that I could be 
                                                
42  This is the most plausible naturalistic story about how we are endowed with perceptual systems at 
all. 
43  There are also unconscious and unnoticed contents in our perception, as we have seen. See 
chapter II, Section 1.2. 
44  See the next Chapter, for further details of that view. 
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hallucinating everything, I could be a brain in a vat, I could even have had a totally 
different evolutionary history, yet the conscious character of my actual experiences 
could be identical, provided that I am in that psychological, internal state. 
Let us sum up. If content is wide, then it does not just supervene on individual 
subjects but also depends on the environment: two perfectly identical twins located 
in different environments could have PEs with different contents. Here I have 
assumed that content is wide, a view which I will try to argue for later. Now I will 
focus on a further question. The further question is: even if content was wide, what 
about the phenomenal character, which is determined by content plus Mode? Would 
it be wide or narrow? Does content-externalism entail phenomenal character-
externalism? Or can an impure representationalist block that entailment? The answer 
is No, there is no way of blocking the entailment. To give up phenomenal 
externalism you must give up either representationalism or content externalism, or 
both. 
If perceptual Content consists of veridicality-conditions, the properties which 
compose it together with the Object are physical features of the environment 
normally detected by our perceptual systems. If an S's PE is veridical and has [O's 
being F] as its Content, then F (the content) is the very physical property instantiated 
in S's environment by the perceived object O. Now, the phenomenal character of a 
PE is made out of intentional properties as egocentrically given under a Mode, and 
for an impure representationalist, the intentional properties determine it. 
Let us call qualia – on a very liberal and generic use of this controversial term – the 
properties which make up the phenomenal character of a PE. Now: 
1) content is wide (content externalism) 
2) qualia either (a) are the content or (b) supervene on it (representationalism)
45
 
3) qualia are wide (phenomenal externalism) 
                                                
45  The case (a) is called strong representationalism, the case (b) is called weak representationalism 
(see Tye 2012). A case of same content with different phenomenal characters would refute both (a) 
and (b), a case of different content with same phenomenal character would refute only (a). If 
phenomenal properties are identical with intentional properties, then the implication must be bi-
conditional. If phenomenal properties only supervene on intentional properties, it may still be the 
case that the same phenomenal property could be determined by different intentional properties. 
As noted above, even if an object-dependent Content determines phenomenal character, that very  
phenomenal character may be had by a PE with different Content, for example a PE of an another 
indistinguishable but numerically different object, or even an objectless hallucination with the 
same represented properties. 
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So, assuming content externalism and representationalism, phenomenal externalism 
must follow. Maybe another assumption would be needed, in case one opts for 2b 
(supervenience rather that identity), the assumption that: “if a mental property 
supervenes on another wide mental property, it must be a wide mental property”. In 
any case, that assumption is really difficult to question. If it is true that given content 
C the phenomenal character P is given thereby, then C's depending on external 
factors entails P's depending on the very same external factors
46
.  
To repeat the above point, impure representationalism is also committed to the thesis 
that the content (co)determines the phenomenal character of PE. Indeed, if the 
content C given under the Mode M determines phenomenal character, it suffices that 
content C is sensitive to external factors for phenomenal character being sensitive to 
external factors accordingly. In other words, even if the Mode was narrow – shared 
by any intrinsic duplicates across different environments – the couple [Mode + 
content] would be wide anyway, provided that a constituent of the couple, the 
content, is wide. The very notion of 'wide', as employed by externalists, is that of a 
property's being determined also by external factors, not that of being determined 
only by external factors. So both pure and impure representationalism seem to be 
committed to phenomenal externalism, at least those versions of them which are 
committed to content-externalism. Phenomenal externalism is so counter-intuitive, 
prima facie at least, that is often considered as a positive reason for rejecting the 
views which entail it. For a content-externalist, it is even worse: it would be that of 
separating content and phenomenal character and so making their seemingly 
intimate connection a mystery or a systematic mistake. Namely, it is the strategy of 
denying representationalism, even the impure version of it. But we have seen above 
that perceptual introspection reveals intentional properties in the first place, and that 
we access perceptual content in virtue of perceptions having the phenomenal 
                                                
46  For that entailment from 1) and 2) to 3), see Byrne/Tye 2006. If you want to reject qualia 
externalism, you must reject either content externalism or representationalism, or both. To see the 
incompatibility, take Mario and Franco with phenomenally different experiences. We can 
construct two intrinsical duplicates of them, two different environment which make identical the 
intentional content of their experiences. So, if content is external and qualia are internal, 
representationalism is false. If representationalism is true and qualia are internal, content is not 
external. As Ellis 2012, 2, straightforwardly puts it “if experience's phenomenal character is 
exhausted by its representational content, and if representational content is externally individuated, 
then phenomenal character itself is externally individuated”. 
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character they have. So, phenomenal character must systematically track the content 
– the represented properties – and the best explanation of that tracking is that 
phenomenal properties just are the properties things are represented as having by the 
subject under a certain Mode. 
 
1.4.2 Inverted Earth and Inverted Spectrum 
Another powerful argument usually advanced against representationalism, is the 
Inverted Spectrum-Hypothesis
47
, which purports to depict a scenario of qualia-
inversion without illusion. Two subjects' PEs (in that world or in another possible 
world) could have some phenomenal properties inverted, such that the experience 
caused by instances of color A in S
1
 are phenomenally the same as the experiences 
caused by instances of color B in S
2





understand each other, they would be apt to detect instances of A and B in their 
common environment, their perceptual phenomenology would successfully (though 
differently) track different properties, their beliefs about colors would be justified 
('that is blue'), finally the intentional contents of their PEs of real A-color would be 
the same despite the phenomenal property of that experience of A undergone by S
1
 
would be the same as the phenomenal property of an experience of B undergone by 
S
2
, and vice-versa. As Blocks puts it, IS opens a scenario where “things we agree are 
red look to you the way things we agree are green look to me” (1996, 511). Here 
'look' is meant phenomenally rather than epistemically or intentionally, of course. 
So, if Inverted Spectrum is theoretically possible or at least consistently conceivable, 
then phenomenal properties could be associated with different intentional properties, 
in such a way that the first cannot simply supervene on the second, much the less 
they cannot be identical with the second. So representationalism, be it weak or 
strong, is false. 
Many philosophers reject that hypothesis as inconsistent or impossible
48
. Anyway, 
without entering into the details of that difficult and multifaceted debate, I want to 
consider a famous intrapersonal version of the IS-hypothesis, which does not have 
the many problems the classic interpersonal version has. The intrapersonal IS is at 
the core of a well-known thought experiment proposed by Block, the so-called 
                                                
47  See Shoemaker 1982, Palmer 1999. 
48 For example, Dennett 1991. 
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Inverted Earth experiment (IE from now on). 
As it is well-known, the Twin-Earth thought-experiment was firstly introduced by 
Putnam 1975 to argue in favor of meaning externalism. In Twin Earth all is like 
Earth apart from the fact that a liquid XYZ, superficially indistinguishable from 
water but with a different molecular structure, occupies the place of water, and in 
Twin-Earth's language, people call XYZ “water”. Putnam brilliantly showed that 
Mario- and Twin-Mario's utterances about “water” would have different meanings in 
Earth and in Twin-Earth, so 'meanings ain't in the head', rather they are sensitive to 
causal, external factors. So, at least certain mental contents are 'wide', not 
supervenient on individual psychologies and neuro-anatomies: they need not keep 
constant across intrinsical duplicates. Later on, wideness has been extended to other 
kinds of contents, like object-dependent, de re thoughts and beliefs (McDowell 1984, 
Burge 1979, 1991), memory-contents (Burge 1991, Davidson 1982) or more 
generally to the contents of propositional attitudes (Stich 1980, Fodor 1980). 
Block (1990, 1996) uses a similar thought experiment to argue not only for the 
wideness of perceptual content – which he accepts anyway – but also for the 
narrowness of qualitative character, as well as for the consequent irreducibility of 
(narrow) phenomenal character to (wide) content. In short, IE is directed against 
representationalism in the first place. Here is a version of the experiment: 
In Inverted Earth (IE) things have complementary colors to the colors of their 
counterparts on Earth. The sky is yellow, grass is red, ripe tomatoes are green, and so 
on. The population of IE visually detects these properties and undergo experiences 
with the respective intentional contents, so people form perceptual beliefs that grass 
is red, the sky is yellow and the like. Although, IE-people have an Inverted 
Language, so they call the color of their sky “blue” and the color of their grass 
“green”, just like us. 
A night, when you are asleep your are kidnapped by a team of scientists and 
transported in IE. Before you wake up, they put behind your retinas inverting lenses 
that shift your visual experience from a color to its complementary color. Now, when 
you see the yellow sky in IE, your experience is like your normal experiences of the 
sky your acquainted to on Earth, so you think and say that the sky is blue just like the 
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people of IE say. You do not even notice any difference from the day before
49
. If 
your experience is wrong unknown to you (after all, the sky is yellow, you see it blue 
just because of your inverting lenses, you do not notice you are wrong only because 
of a linguistic coincidence, IE-people call 'blue' the yellow that you mistake for 
blue), one can think that in the long run the intentional content both of your PE's and 
of your utterances about colors would 'attune' with those of IE-people. By keeping in 
long and repeated causal contact with the environmental properties of IE, your 
mental states would finally shift their original intentional content. Now, there is a 
strong intuition that your qualia would not change accordingly, so IE-thought-
experiment shows that the phenomenal character of PE cannot just be either identical 
with- or supervenient on intentional content. The first can keep constant through 
change of the second. IE-experiment has a basic advantage on the usual hypothesis 
of Inverted Spectrum: it is a science-fiction case of course, but nothing seems to 
make its theoretical possibility suspicious. On the contrary, the hypothesis of 
Inverted Spectrum as such – the idea that my experience of yellow objects 'feels like' 
your experience of blue objects and vice-versa, but that phenomenal difference  does 
not make any intentional difference, neither perceptual nor linguistic – has been 
criticized as inconsistent, as an empirical or a metaphysical impossibility
50
. Once 
your perceptual contents are attuned with your new environment and community in 
IE, you may remember what the sky was like years ago, during a period before your 
(unknown) transportation to IE. So, your memory would remind you to an 
experience which is just like the experience you have now when you look at the 
yellow sky. So, that reference to your memories perfectly shows that the 'blue' 
phenomenal character is introspectively constant – we assume your memory is well-
working – but that very same type of experience had the [blue] property in the past 
and has the [yellow] property now, as its intentional content. Therefore, 
                                                
49 The scientists also pigment your skin so that it looks to you as before, despite the presence of the 
inverted lenses. 
50 Block 1990 had already proposed an intrapersonal version of Inverted Spectrum. Inverted lenses 
are put on Mario's eyes. Then, he adapts, come to use the language of the community, even if he 
remember the past (the sky looks now as the lemons used to look before). Then, he has an amnesia 
about the past. Since it is implausible that the qualia are re-inverted just because of the amnesia, 
then he still has inverted qualia. This version, as often is the Inverted Spectrum hypothesis, is an 
example of qualia inversion despite intentional constancy. On the contrary, Inverted Earth is an 
example of intentional change despite phenomenal constancy. The result is the same: that of telling 
apart phenomenal properties and intentional properties. 
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representationalism about phenomenal character must be false. That is the core of the 
argument. 
The argument is a way of making the idea conceivable that our distinctive experience 
of a property A (ex. [green]) may have been typically caused by the property B (ex. 
[yellow]), so a phenomenal property A could have represented the objective property 
B by tracking it and being related to it with a systematic causal relation. That 
possibility undermines representationalism because it is incompatible with 
phenomenal properties being the very properties that PE attributes to perceived 
objects as intrinsic properties of them. For a representationalist, all phenomenally 
identical experiences must attribute the same objective properties to the perceived 
objects. If that was the case, the possibility that another phenomenal property could 
have represented the same objective property should be ruled out a priori. But these 
scenarios (IS and IE) seem to consistently allow for that possibility.  
 
1.4.3 - A Representationalist Reply 
The IE thought experiment may be used to argue against functionalism or against 
reductive, 'pure' representationalism about phenomenal character. Often 
representationalism is associated with functionalism, so qualia are taken to be 
functionalizable qua intentional, or intentional qua functionalizable.  
I am not concerned with functionalism here, but only with representationalism and 
content-externalism. The three are related but different issues. My critical target will 
rather be the idea that:  given content-externalism, if IE is possible then 
representationalism must be false. 
There are some basic assumptions in the very depiction of the IE-scenario provided 
by Block: 
1) The intentional properties of my visual experience will change through a long-
term exposition to the IE-environment. 
2) My PEs would become veridical despite my having inverting lenses on my retinas 
3) The phenomenal character of my PE will not change even through long-term 
exposition to IE-environment 
I want to argue that these assumptions are far from being obvious, rather they are 
specially compelling only for people who are already anti-representationalist, and/or 
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internalist about qualia. Take away one of 1-3 and the IE-scenario does not show 
anything relevant anymore. So if we have reasons for rejecting 1 or 2 or 3, or if  we 
just have no compelling reasons for accepting all of them, then we have no reasons to 
endorse the conclusion that qualia cannot be intentional properties. 
Let us begin with assumption 1).  
You come to IE with a perceptual apparatus, and a brain, and a global cognitive 
system, which are designed for you – as a member of your species – to successfully 
cope with your environment. The basic cognitive functions of yours, at least those 
which are phylogenetically fixed rather than acquired through individual learning, 
are relational functions which can be picked out only by reference to the environment 
they are supposed to relate you to. That is the environment in which they have been 
selected, so the one you live in insofar as it is common to the one your ancestors used 
to live in.  
Now, it is controversial whether, and to what extent, visual perception is sensitive to 
learning, other background knowledge and cognitively higher information (memory, 
expectations, reasoning, and so on). But there seems to be evidence for that at least 
color-perception, as depending from the so-called Early Visual System, is 
cognitively impenetrable and informationally encapsulated in Fodor's sense
51
. Thus, 
color-perception is a wired-in proper function of a relatively independent module, so 
its contents are not influenced by other acquired knowledge or individual learning. 
Now, if that is the case, the type-state your visual system occupies when you see a 
blue object in normal conditions, is supposed to represent [blue], no matter if a token 
of that state is caused by something yellow, no matter if a token of that state is 
caused by anything else in another Earth you are  knowingly or unknowingly 
transported in, no matter if a token of that state comes-to-be normally or 
systematically caused by another property, in an environment which is not the one in 
which your visual apparatus had been selected because of what it did there. So, if 
color-perception is a wired-in proper representational function and wired-in proper 
representational functions are species-specific and acquired by selection within a 
given environment, therefore your mental state normally caused by [blue] on Earth 
will continue to represent [blue] in IE, even after long exposition, and independently 
                                                
51 See Fodor 1983, Pylyshyn 2006. For that reply, see also Tye 1998, Lycan 2003, 27. 
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on linguistic factors and social mutual understanding. Provided that your belief-
contents, your memories and other intentional states can change, all that would not 
change your visual contents like color-representation. So, there is no visual (at least 
chromatic) 'content -attunement' in IE, despite the fact that you and IE-people 
understand each other and communicate. You will be wrong, at least perceptually 
wrong, about the color of the IE sky. 
Your perceptual states will ever indicate the presence of [blue] when you see 
instances of yellow, even though you call that instance “blue”, even though that 
instance of yellow wrongly looks to be blue to you due to the lenses. There is illusion 
then, no matter if you or others do not notice it. If you suddenly take off your lenses, 
then you veridically see the IE-sky as it is, yellow. So, the intentional content of your 
PEs does not change either the day after the transportation or twenty years later. 
Thus: the argument aims at showing that in IE, in the long run, there will be 
intentional shift of your color-PEs without qualitative shift of them. But it is far from 
obvious that there would be intentional shift in the first place. There is an empirical 
basis to think that it would not be the case. 
Assumption 2) is connected to assumption 1). According to 2), inverting lenses do 
not prevent your PE of the sky in IE from being veridical, at least in the long run. 
You look at the yellow sky and it looks blue to you. Your internal state is that which 
is supposed to occur in presence of blue, but there is nothing blue before you. You 
mistake yellow for blue: lenses deceive you, rather than saving you from a mistake. 
That your systematic color-deception saves you from social isolation in IE, is another 
matter. Even in the long run, your mutual understanding with IE-people rests on a 
coincidence, it is a misunderstanding. Your mental state represents what it is 
supposed to represent in normal conditions, but the presence of inverting lenses in 
your organism makes your conditions abnormal. Lenses make you see things other 
than they are. That remains true wherever your are transported, independently on the 
time of your permanence in your destination
52
. 
                                                
52 Another empirical possibility, is that the effect on the lenses would be compensated in a while, so 
that the sky will begin to appear yellow (as it is), the grass red, and so on. On that case, the subject 
would suspect that either he is dreaming, or he is not on earth, or he is hallucinating, or something 
like that.  Adaptation to strange, color-distorting spectacles has been experimented, with surprising 
results, by Kohler 1964. He gave to the subjects goggles with vertically-bisected lenses, each of 
which had the left part blue and the right part yellow. After less than 50 days the subjects 
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The key-point is that 'normal conditions' – from which intentional content depends – 
are relative to the environment where the perceptual system has been selected, not to 
the actual environment. Making conditions 'normal' in another environment through 
putting inverting lenses and waiting a lot of time, does not help to change the original 
content. The content of your lenses-inflenced PEs is wrong and will be ever such. 
Take them off after ten years and you will see things as they are. 
Of course, my PEs in IE make me individuate objects, contours, movements, and 
every visible feature whose detection depends on color-detection. My behavior 
would be successful. Moreover, I perfectly communicate with IE-people. These 
conjoined facts make us think that everything is all right with my PEs, but it is a false 
intuition: my PEs will be veridical in many other respects, besides allowing me to 
speak IE-language. But they will not be veridical with respect to color-
representation. 
Again, it is far from obvious that there is intentional change at all. On the contrary, it 
is plausible to suppose that no repeated causal contact with IE will magically make 
inverting lenses into a virtuous means for turning my deceiving PEs into veridical 
PEs.  
By critically discussing assumptions 1) and 2) I have shown that there is a plausible 
view on the content of color-perception, which does not entail the supposed 
intentional change over time. But some could refuse the 'teleo-functional' account of 
perceptual content, and take these replies to be ad hoc. On another theory of content 
which grounds content in actual causal co-variation or in anything else, for example, 
these replies would not be available. Still, they are a possible way out: maybe it 
could also be argued that such a teleo-functional view on visual content appears 
plausible also because it 'saves' representationalism – which is a plausible option for 
many other, independent reasons – from objections based on IE thought-experiments.  
Alternatively, it suffices to question Assumption 3 for blocking the anti-
representationalist conclusion from IE-scenarios. Even if Assumption 1 and 2 were 
true or inevitable, if Assumption 3 is not inevitable then the argument would be 
                                                                                                                                     
recovered their previous color-detection skills, their ability to detect and categorize colors. As soon 
as they had the goggles removed, they had a complete distortion just opposite to the distortion they 
had had as soon as they put them. Why could a similar adaptation to to-complementary shifting 
lenses not happen also on IE? That is an empirical issue, but it could undermine the very 
presuppositions that are at works in constructing the IE-scenario.  
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undermined anyway. Assumption 3 is that there would not be any qualitative change 
in your experiences, before and (a long time) after your trip. Indeed, even if there 
would be intentional change thanks to time and lenses (Assumptions 1 and 2), it is to 
be argued that there would not be qualitative change. In fact, in case there was both 
intentional and qualitative change, then not only representationalism is not refuted, 
rather it is reinforced by the experiment.  
What does support the Assumption 3? Firstly, an internalist intuition about the 
phenomenal character. Your internal state when you see yellow on IE is the same as 
that you normally used to have on Earth before blue-instances, so your related 
experiences must be qualitatively the same. That intuition is undeniably strong and 
hard to get rid of, but we do not have to forget that it is already hidden in assumption 
3, so it cannot be taken as a conclusion of the argument. If you think – or do not a 
priori rule out – that phenomenal character can be partially determined from external 
matters, you may well not accept that the phenomenal properties of your PE's of the 
sky are constant across transportation, especially if you have accepted that there is 
intentional change. 
For a representationalist, qualia are the properties your experience represents things 
as having (given under a Mode, for an impure representationalist). They are the 
properties that would be actually had by perceived objects, if the PE was veridical. 
Now, if the content of the your PE changes after ten years on IE, so that your PEs of 
the sky really come to represent it as yellow (as it is), then the qualia must have 
changed accordingly. Otherwise, the qualia of your PE could not be the properties 
perceived things are represented as having. Indeed, your PE before the trip could not 
represent a different property from the PEs long after your trip, if the before-PE and 
the after-PE had the same qualia. If it does seem a question-begging reply, it is 
because it is such. Now, the experiment does not show that qualia do not change, it 
rather postulates it, therefore it is no less question-begging. But the burden of 
showing that representationalism is false should be borne by the argument against it. 
Certainly a representationalist cannot be asked to concede it in advance. 
Even if we concede that the intentional properties change (Assumption 1 and 2), all 
the experiment shows is that intentional change across Earths entails phenomenal 
externalism, namely that content-externalism entails phenomenal externalism, it does 
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not show that qualia are not intentional properties (unless one assumes that qualia 
must be internalistically determined)
53
. 
Are there any substantive arguments, besides that internalist intuition, which support 
the view that qualia would not change over time? Block 1990, 1996 argues for 
unchanging qualia across different Earths by appeal to what your visual memory 
would be after transportation. 
For example, if you look at the yellow sky at your birthday on IE, you may 
remember how looking at the sky used to feel to you a long time ago. Given that 
your memory is working well, your experiences would introspectively seem the same 
to you, so their phenomenal character must be the same despite their difference in 
content ([blue], [yellow]).  
However, such an appeal to memory and comparative introspective judgements 
presupposes that phenomenal memory is reliable across Earth-to-IE transportation. 
But if phenomenal character was externally determined, then we should conclude, 
instead, that such a memory is deceiving. So, the absolute reliability of phenomenal 
memory across transportation is intuitively irresistible only on the basis of an 
internalist intuition about phenomenal character! Tye 1998 questions the strength of 
that intuition by firstly pointing out that also classical, Putnamian externalism about 
belief- and thought-contents involves the prima facie counter-intuitive abandonment 
of the first-person authority of memory. If you move to Twin Earth for a long time, 
your utterance will change on content: “water is drinkable” would come to mean: 
XYZ is drinkable. So, suppose you think that you did drink much more water at your 
tenth birthday than you are drinking now at your birthday. Unknown to you, you are 
thinking that you drank much more water then than XYZ now, so you would be 
deceived about your own past in thinking that you drank the same stuff then and 
now. So, despite intuitions, memory of our own past may be tricky for a content-
externalist. Why could what happens for propositional memory not happen for 
experiential memory? As Tye argues, memory-contents must actually be wide, 
                                                
53  Note that the qualia-externalism involved in historically-based teleological views of color-
content, is an externalism which is compatible with invariability of qualia under transportation. 
Once an individual has born, given its evolutionary history as a member of its species, you can 
displace it wherever you want, for how much time you want, a very basic layer of its perceptual 
contents (including colors) will remain unchanged. What matters for color-contents are not the 
actual causal connections, rather the causal connection of the species with the environment the 
species has evolved in. 
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namely, not necessarily shared by intrinsical duplicates: a native inhabitant of Twin 
Earth remembers her past drinking spree of XYZ, you on Earth, without 
interplanetary transportation, remember your own drinking spree of water. That is 
evident without putting magic trips out. Both of you utter “I had a big drinking spree 
of water”, you are micro-physical duplicates, yet your thought and utterance is about 
a water drinking spree, her thought and utterance is about her XYZ drinking spree. 
So, external factors matter for memory-contents
54
: what is remembered is external to 
you. Change the past, and your memory becomes inaccurate, other things being 
equal.  
Now, we could suppose that phenomenal memory works a similar way across 
transportation and long-term permanence. I remember that the sky used to look blue 
to me just like now. However – a phenomenal externalist could say – it is a mistake, 
because now the sky looks yellow. That color is yellow indeed, I just call it “blue” 
because I am an IE-language speaker. I notice no difference, but there is a difference.  
Block replies, not without reason, that such an appeal to memory-externalism 
neglects a very strong intuition on privileged access and authority of introspection, 
on the on hand, and “assumes that as far as memory goes, phenomenal character is 
representational content” (1996, 45), on the other hand. That is true, but it also holds 
the other way around: the very intuition that qualia would not change under 
transportation and long-term permanence, as memory allegedly shows, just assumes 
that phenomenal character is not representational content as long as the latter is 
externally determined. Likewise it assumes that phenomenal memory is internally 
determined. 
Therefore, it seems that the IE-experiment does not show that representationalism is 
false, unless one already has anti-representationalist intuitions!
55
 Perhaps it helps to 
make these intuitions explicit. 
In any case, the IE-experiment seems to show that if you are a content-externalist and 
a representationalist, you must be externalist about phenomenal character and/or 
                                                
54  On externalism about memory-contents, see Davidson 1982, Burge 1998. 
55 Note that also belief-internalism, before Putnam/Burge arguments, was a very compelling 
intuition. His strength has been gradually dismissed by objective the force of the arguments 
against it, but the removal of a natural, strong intuition is not sudden, it needs to be metabolized. 
Phenomenal internalism seems to be even more recalcitrant to negative arguments, yet that is not a 
reason for its truth. In general, the first-person authority on our own mental states seems absolute 
to us, but that is false, and accepting that falsity may be not easy at all at first. 
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about phenomenal memory. 
It may be still replied that phenomenal character cannot shift without that being 
unnoticed by the subject. But the very experiment supposes a long-term and gradual 
change of content. Even if we accept that an unnoticed sudden shift of phenomenal 
character is inconceivable, that does not prevent the phenomenal character from 
gradually shifting without being noticed, in such a way that this gradual shift 
perturbs the reliability of phenomenal memory. In addition, if the phenomenal 
character changed gradually, that change would be no more mysterious than the 
gradual change of content from [blue] to [yellow]. As Tye 1998 notes, the privileged 
access that characterizes perceptual consciousness holds with respect to the present 
states, to what it is like to have that experience now, it does not hold also with 
respect to the past states, to what it used to be like to have that remotely past 
experience. If you have independent reasons for representationalism, you have room 
for rejecting the absolute authority of phenomenal memory, in case you accept that 
there is an intentional shift after transportation to IE.  
A reason why this strategy finds our resistance, may be a naïve idea of phenomenal 
memory as of a sort of inner picture you store and look at again when you remember 
the experience. That “photography-model” of phenomenal memory, as Tye 
opportunely calls it, may on its own depend, I would suggest, on a perception-model 
of perceptual introspection. If introspecting one's own experience amounts to seeing 
it with an inner eye or something like that, then remembering your past experience 
amounts to somehow recalling to the mind that picture-like inner image and “seeing” 
it again. I do not even want to enter into the intricate discussion of which model of 
introspection best fits the empirical data on visual memory and other philosophical 
constraints; nonetheless, I want to point out that if the inner-eye model is a 
problematic model of introspection, the photograph -model of phenomenal memory 
is even less compatible with evidence about the way visual memory works. If we 
consider that phenomenal memory is a reconstruction which starts from poor cues 
and instructions and is filled also through using actual beliefs and knowledge, then it 
becomes less implausible that a our access to our past experiences could mislead us. 
All that considered, a representationalist can take it that if intentional content changes 
after a long time on IE, then also my phenomenal image of the past on Earth, now 
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inaccurately represents the earthly sky as yellow, even in the case where my 
phenomenal memory inaccurately made me take the experiences as phenomenally 
indistinguishable. 
To sum up this cursory discussion of the IE-experiment: For a representationalist 
(who is a content-externalist) there is more than one way to resist the argument based 
on the IE-experiment. She may reject Assumption 1) and hold that there is no 
intentional change over time, because color-contents are teleo-functionally fixed so 
they are insensitive to trips, lenses, learning, belief- and language-change. She may 
also question Assumption 2 on the same basis: in being teleo-functionally fixed, 
color-contents are also insensitive to the presence of inverting lenses: the internal 
state I am in as I look at the sky on IE, is a state I am supposed to have before blue 
things, not before yellow things, full stop. As a consequence, there is no attunement 
of perceptual content, no learning or socializing that may ever compensate the 
deceiving effect of inverting lenses. She may question Assumption 3 and reject the 
idea that phenomenal character does not change over time after transportation. Note 
that it suffices that one of the Assumptions is false – specially 1) and 2) – that the 
experiment ceases to threaten representationalism at all. Either intentional content 
does not change, then phenomenal character's not changing is what a 
representationalist would predict to be the case, or phenomenal character does 
change with intentional content, so it is again something a representationalist would 
predict. However, the representationalist needs to choose a unique line of defense: 
Neither 1) nor 3) seem absolutely compelling, but at least one of them must be true if 
representationalism is true. Indeed, rejecting both of them would entail that 
intentional content does not change whereas phenomenal character does change. 
Paradoxically, that would be an anti-representationalist conclusion! 
Although, what matters here is that the IE-experiment does not entail at all the 
negation of representationalism, because it is based on hidden assumptions a 
representationalist would have the right to deny. Actually, presupposing that 
phenomenal character keeps constant means committing to phenomenal internalism, 
so to anti-representationalism if you are content-externalist. But presupposing that is 
begging the question. Likewise, rejecting that the phenomenal character remains the 
same just because it is throughout intentional, just begs the question in favor of 
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representationalism. That just means that the IE-experiment as such is neutral about 
the issue of representationalism, since it becomes a case against representationalism 
only by surreptitiously adding to it anti-representationalist assumptions. In that case, 
the argument is question-begging. 
A positive lesson we can draw from the IE-experiment, is that content-externalism is 
in tension with phenomenal internalism, even if it is not in tension with 
representationalism. But no argument based on IE consistently speaks against 
phenomenal externalism, as we have seen
56
. 
Until this point, I have argued that even if the IE-scenario was possible, there would 
be available interpretations of it which are perfectly compatible with 
representationalism: either there is both qualitative and intentional change, or there is 
neither a qualitative nor intentional shift, under transportation to IE. 
Now, I want to point out that there are reasons for rejecting the possibility of the IE-
scenario, reasons which may involve a parallel rejection of the more classical 
Inverted Spectrum Scenarios. 
Both IS and IE depict a situation where there is a qualia-inversion without illusion 
(IS) or an intentional inversion without qualitative inversion (IE), despite the fact that 
everything else is perfectly identical: communication, language, belief-formation, 
recognitional abilities, behavior, and so forth. 
Supposing that on IE there are sunrises, sunsets and nights, we need to suppose that 
the color of the sky gradually changes according to the Twin-Sun illumination, in 
such a way that everything else will change its apparent color. Even if color-
constancy holds also on IE (better: just because of it), the apparent color of I-Earthly 
things will change with variations of illumination, so the reciprocal relations 
between the colors of things will continuously change accordingly. But there are 
reasons to doubt that every behavior and belief directly or indirectly involving colors 
could be identical despite such a color-inversion. The many possible relations 
between colors across changes of illumination are likely to be not perfectly preserved 
                                                
56 Often though-experiments against phenomenal externalism just beg the question and assume 
phenomenal internalism within the argument. For example, Rey 1988 holds that a Brain in a Vat 
identical to you would have the same phenomenal character your experience has now. So, 
phenomenal character does not depend on external matters. But it is only because Rey supposes 
that phenomenal character is insensitive to external matters (=narrow), that he finds compelling the 
Brain-in-a-Vat case. On that see Lycan 2003, Tye 2010. 
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in a world where everything has the complementary color of the color it has on 
Earth. For example, the perception of the color of an object is influenced by the 
colors of the background and of the objects contiguous to it
57
. Now, we could expect 
that the influence of a yellow background on a red object is slightly different from 
the influence of a blue background on a green object, especially if we consider that 
influence diachronically, over time across gradual illumination-change. Change of 
illumination will change every relation between every color. That extraordinarily 
complex and 'holistic' color-representation of an IE-native's PE  is likely to be not 
preserved in toto if we change each color with the respective complementary. We 
can expect that some judgments by natives about colors, like: “in the early morning, 
with that lighting-conditions, that color-shade of that surface has a hue, a brightness 
and a saturation which has this and that relations with the hue, brightness and 
saturation of that other color-shade of that other surface”, will be different from your 
judgement. If even one of these indefinitely many relations is not totally preserved, 
then, even with inverting-lenses, there will be a phenomenal difference between you 
on IE and the natives, as soon as you are transported. So even with perfect inverting 
lenses the IE-surrounding will not appear to you exactly as it appears to a native. 
Sooner or later, due to some strange judgement or behaviour toward colors, some 
native would suggest you to have your eyes visited by an IE-ophtalmologist. So the 
very possibility of the thought-experiment is undermined, despite its prima facie 
conceivability. 
That objection is similar to more immediate objections which could be moved 
against the very possibility of an Inverted Spectrum. Invert a quale with another, and 
you will have somewhere a change in some representation within the global system 
of color-relations. For example, colors can be given a place within a scale from the 
darkest to the brightest, from the maximal to the minimal hue, from the maximal to 
the minimal saturation. For each shade of color you can discriminate, it will occupy a 
specific point in each of these three scales, so the discrimination-relations between 
                                                
57 Many color-illusions are built and based upon the well-known phenomenon of influence-by-
contiguity: for example, the Checkerboard Illusion, among others (see Adelson 1995). It is 
remarkable, for our concerns, that these illusions generally work only with certain contiguous 
colors. So a locally spectrum-inverted subject is likely to be representationally different from a 
normal subject with respect to their sensitivity to certain color-illusions.  
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each shade of discriminable colors is throughout relational and incredibly complex
58
. 
Invert a quale of a darker color with the quale of a brighter color, and you will upset 
the representation of 'darker-than' and 'brighter than', if you do not want people and 
inverted people to judge differently about which color or shade is darker than which. 
But changing the 'darker-than' relation you will end up changing the saturation-
relation, the hue-relation, and other represented properties thereby, so you will not 
have the desired scenario of qualia-inversion without illusion, other representational 
facts being equal. Each discriminable color has a point on a global space, where that 
point is individuated by its relations to any other points, so that you cannot arbitrarily 
invert two points without changing many relations between all other points. 
Conceivability of Inverted Spectrum is considered sufficient to prove the falsity of 
representationalism. But even if that was conceded – I have argued above that there 
is no compelling reason to concede it anyway – it can be argued that such a 
conceivability becomes more and more problematic to grant as soon as we detail our 
hypothesis and take its consequences seriously. In addition, according to the 
empirical data available about color-discrimination, which confirm its relational and 





In this Section, I have broadly considered the relation between phenomenal character 
and representational content of PE. I have argued for an impure representationalist 
version of the Content View. I have considered the case of Perceptual Constancy as a 
possible basis for an anti-representationalist argument, and I have given a negative 
answer: phenomenal change involved in constant representations of sizes, shapes and 
                                                
58  See Churchland and Churchland 1997, Matthen 2005.  In inverting a color with another, you will 
end up disrupting many other relations of similarity or dissimilarity between perceived colors. 
59  According to the so-called “Opponent Process Theory” of vision, three types of color-sensitive 
cones are to be found on the retina, each type sensitive to different visible spectrum-wavelenghts. 
A type of cells registers the value of incoming light on a continuum from red to green, another 
type on a continuum from yellow to blue, another type on a continuum from black to white. Each 
cell computes the ratio between the inputs from some combination of cone types (that combination 
varies through cell-types). Each cell has an activation level which constitutes a triplet of outputs 
that conjointly produce a certain value in a three-dimensional space of possible activations. That 
global model for the neural implementation of visual discrimination, involves that you cannot just 
shift a color with another without disrupting the relevant properties of the whole discrimination-
system. On the Opponent Process Theory, originally proposed by Hurvich and Jameson 1957, see 
Churchland 2005, 2007, Pautz 2006, Byrne/Tye 2006. 
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colors can be accounted for in terms of represented variations (of distance, 
orientation, illumination). Nonetheless, a genuine look at the phenomenology 
involved in visual constancy shows that PEs are egocentric representations. I have 
argued that the egocentric character or PE can be only partially explained by its 
egocentric, subject-involving contents. To do justice of the point-of-view-ness or 'to-
me'-component of PE's phenomenology, we need to take into account the Mode 
under which perceptual contents are given. That Mode co-determines phenomenal 
character: impure representationalism, which is a tertium between qualia-realism and 
reductive representationalism, can embed the advantages of these alternatives 
without inheriting their problems, especially insofar as it respects the perspectival-
aspectual and the intentional-representational components of perceptual 
phenomenology, and accounts for their intimate relation.  
In succession, I have taken into consideration the anti-representationalist arguments 
based on Inverted Spectrum- and Inverted Earth scenarios. I have tried to show that 
such arguments do not seriously threaten representationalism, since they rest on 
hidden assumptions which would and should not be shared by a representationalist. 
However, reflection on the Inverted Heart shows that, given representationalism 
about phenomenal character, content-externalism entails phenomenal externalism. 
Again, that is an objection to representationalism only if phenomenal internalism is 
assumed. Phenomenal internalism must be resisted though, despite its intuitive force 
on us. 
 
Section 2 – Fregean vs. Russellian Content 
2.1 To Recap Where We Are 
Perceptual experiences are states there is something it is like to be in, which 
represent the world. On the version of the Content View I have been arguing for, 
PEs' phenomenal character (the way it is like to be in them) cannot be picked out 
independently on their intentional content (the way they represent the world to be) 
which co-determines it together with their Mode. Indeed, phenomenal properties are 
intentional, represented properties given to the subject under a Mode. The conscious 
character and the intentional content of a PE content cannot be told apart
60
, even if 
                                                
60 That does not prevent from there being conscious states without content, or contentful states 
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the first is not sufficient for fully determining the second. 
I have argued that Content is constituted by the perceived Object and a set of 
properties (the content) the PE attributes to that Object. Perceptual Content is a 
condition of satisfaction in the world for the PE: it is the way the world would be if 
the PE was accurate-veridical. If the perceived Object has the properties the PE 
attributes to it, then the PE is accurate and veridical. 
I have also argued that the phenomenal properties of a PE are determined by those 
ways the PE represents the Object to be (i.e. by the content), on the one hand, and by 
the Mode under which those properties are given to the subject, on the other, but they 
are not determined by the perceived Object as such
61
. However, if not only the 
Content is wide but also the content (represented properties) is wide, then also the 
phenomenal character, as determined also by the content, must be wide as well. That 
the Content is wide on that view, is evident from the fact that it is singular and 
object-involving: remove the Object, or change it with another identical object, 
without changing the internal constitution of the subject, and the Content will 
change. That is what 'wide' means. 
The properties the PE represents the Object as having are wide in another, historical 
sense. Whilst the Object is actual, what determines which properties a PE represents 
'its' Object as having, is the function of the type of state the actual PE is a token of, 
where such a function is acquired evolutionarily by wired-in mechanisms of our 
perceptual apparatuses
62
. Now, if the representational power of our internal states 
depends on past causal connections between members of our species and certain 
environmental properties, therefore the represented properties must be wide, namely, 
they cannot supervene on the intrinsic constitution of the actual perceiver, rather they 
diachronically supervene on the environment in which the selection of these 
                                                                                                                                     
without consciousness. I think that both of these cases hold. 
61 So, perceptual experiences are individuated by their respectively perceived Object, their Contents 
are also individuated by their perceived Object, but their phenomenal characters are not individuated 
by their perceived Object (so, nor are they individuated by their object-dependent Content), rather 
their phenomenal character is individuated together by the content and by the Mode, where the content 
is the set of properties the Object is represented as having. 
62 As I will argue later, only the basic perceptual contents of our PEs are phylogenetically fixed (for 
example: color, size, shape, position, distance and movement for vision). There is another layer of 
perceptual content, corresponding to seeing-as episodes, which may well be determined by individual 
learning. Our species-specific representations are a basis which can be enriched by ontogenetically 
determined contents, like recognition, identification, categorization and the like. There is perceptual 
learning indeed, which is made possible by previous wired-in representational mechanisms. 
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representational functions in the perceiver's species had occurred. Assuming that as a 
plausible story without arguing for it, I have argued that, if that is the case, and 
phenomenal character is inseparable from represented properties
63
, therefore 
phenomenal character must also be wide, or externally determined. 
Our spontaneous and inevitable resistance to phenomenal externalism, shows how 
rooted  phenomenal internalism is in our intuitions, how psychologically compelling 
it is, so to speak. 
For that reason, other options have been proposed to save phenomenal internalism 
and narrowness. One is the combination of content-internalism with 
representationalism (McGinn 1982, Siewert 1998, Horgan and Tienson 2002). If two 
PEs with the same phenomenal character share their content, therefore content needs 
to be narrow, if phenomenal character is narrow. Instead, I have argued that content-
externalism is the most plausible option, so rejecting it is too high a price for saving 
an even stronger intuition in favor of phenomenal internalism. Intuitions are better to 
be saved, but good arguments cannot be ignored either
64
. 
Another option is anti-representationalism about phenomenal character, so to 
combine content-externalism with phenomenal internalism. That is the option of 
qualia-realists (Block 1990, 1996, Shoemaker 1994, 2001, 2006, Peacocke 1983, 
2007). I have argued against this option because, among other reasons against it, it 
entails an implausible separation between phenomenal character and representational 
content, which does not do justice to perceptual phenomenology, and moreover 
cannot account for the circumstance that our PEs are assessable for accuracy just in 
virtue of having a certain phenomenal character
65
. If the relation between 
                                                
63 I stress the word 'represented' because the standard term 'representational' may result ambiguous: a 
property of a mental state can be representational without being identical with the property the state 
represent something as being (= the represented property). For example, even a quale may be taken to 
be representational insofar as it is attributed to it the property of representing things. 
64 Horgan and Tienson 2002 appeal to our phenomenological intuitions to show that conscious 
phenomenology is throughout intentional. Their examples and and their detailed first-person 
description of our experience as intrinsically representational, are undoubtedly efficacious. But then 
they seem to argue the same way (appeal to first-person intuitions) also to show that 
phenomenological intentionality is narrow. But that phenomenology is narrow, cannot be shown by 
appeal to phenomenology itself: phenomenology, just because it is so 'near' to us and directly given to 
us, is silent about whether an intrinsical duplicate of ourselves would have an identical 
phenomenology or not. Phenomenal character is silent about its eventual essential relation with 
external and causal matters, so it is silent also about the absence of such an essential relation. It rather 
seems that such an appeal to intuitions conceals a philosophical prejudge. 
65 To be more precise, phenomenal character constrains which contents perceptual experiences have, 
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phenomenal character and content is contingent and extrinsic, what does make the 
access to the second through the first other than arbitrary and mysterious? That is 
also an epistemological worry, besides phenomenological issues. 
Now I want to take into consideration a third option, which accepts the 
representationalist constraint, on the one hand, but posits two different kinds of 
contents for PEs, one the other. A Fregean content, which is supposed to be narrow 
and intimately connected to phenomenal character, and a Russellian content, which is 
supposed to be wide so only contingently connected with the (internally determined) 
phenomenal character. That is Chalmers's third option (2004, 2006), defended also 
by Thompson, Kriegel, Rey, and Levine among others
66
. I will focus specially on 
Chalmers's version of the view, which seems to me the most well-worked and 
detailed one. 
 
2.2 - Chalmers's Third Way: The Double-content View 
Frege 1892 explained the informativeness of identity-statements by appeal to the idea 
that the same referent can be given different ways or according to different Senses. 
'The Morning Star' and 'The Evening Star' are two Modes of Presentation of the same 
referent, Venus. Their different cognitive roles account for the fact that 'The Morning 
Star is the Evening Star' can be object of a discovery so it is far from being a trivial 
and uninteresting identity. More generally, we can see beliefs as made out of 
concepts, each of them having certain extensions. For example, 'The Morning Star is 
bright' is composed by the concepts 'the Morning Star' and 'bright', having 
                                                                                                                                     
so in virtue of that fact we may consciously assess our own PEs for accuracy. As we have seen before 
(see Chapter 2), there can be perceptual contents which are not testified at all in phenomenology: there 
is evidence for that, coming from Sperling Experiment, Blindsight, the distinction between Dorsal and 
Ventral Stream dramatically shown by cases of Visual Associative Agnosia and Optic Ataxia, and so 
forth. Often we are not phenomenally conscious of the perceptual cues our systems use to detect 
certain properties, for example, to recognize a face, to classify things, and the like. The chicken-
sexers' case – people who are able to visually tell apart males and females, but do not have access to 
how their visual experiences enable them to do that – is only a curious example of a very common 
phenomenon. Not all perceptual contents are conscious, but we can access the conscious ones in virtue 
of the phenomenal character of our PEs. More generally, the Content View as such does not entail that 
we can introspectively access 'the' content of our experiences. There may be features of that content 
which are introspectively accessible and features which are not. In any case there is phenomenal 
content of PE, the content which is subjectively accessible in virtue of the PE's having a certain 
conscious character. On the notion of phenomenal content, see Kriegel 2002, Horgan and Tienson 
2002, Chalmers 2004, McGinn 1988. 
66 See Thompson 2003, 2008, Kriegel 2002, Rey 1998, Levine 2003. See also Horgan and Tienson 
2002. 
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respectively Venus and the property [bright] as their extensions. That merely 
extensional content of a belief is what is usually called its Russellian content, a 
content made out of objects, properties, and relations
67
. Besides a Russellian content 
or extension, each concept composing the belief-content is associated with a certain 
condition on worldly entities for being the extension of the concept itself. For 
example, Venus is apt to be the extension of the concept 'The Morning Star' insofar 
as it is the first star that appears on the sky in the early morning, so Venus satisfies 
the condition of that concept. A concept picks out a referent in the world (object, 
property or relation) insofar as that referent satisfies that condition, which can be said 
to be the sense or mode of presentation in which the referent is given according to 
that concept. So concepts have both sense and reference, they are specific ways in 
which certain referents are given or presented
68
. 
Now, if we shift from belief- and linguistic contents to perceptual contents, we may 
apply the same distinction between referents/extensions of a PE and their Modes of 
Presentation: call the firsts Russellian content, the seconds Fregean content. So, a PE 
may be thought of as having a Russellian content, made out of objects, properties and 
relations, and a Fregean content, made out of the Modes of Presentation of those 
objects, properties, and relations (MP from now on). Of course, perceptual contents 
are not made out of concepts as beliefs are, provided that perceptual content is non-
conceptual (see Chapter 3). Nonetheless, the notion of the Mode of Presentation 
(MP) of an object, a property or a relation may play the same role in PE as the role 
played by MP as a conceptual way of an object/property/relation being given in 
belief, thought and other language-like propositional attitudes. Namely, a non-
conceptual MP or way for an extension to be given to the subject. 
If objects, properties and relations are given in perception under respective Modes of 
Presentation, then the phenomenal character could be taken as determined by these 
Modes of Presentations instead than by the very represented properties and relations. 
In other words, phenomenal character could be determined by Fregean content 
instead of Russellian content. If we add to that the idea that MPs are narrow, we will 
                                                
67 That is the content of propositions according to Russell, which is why that content is called 
Russellian. See Russell 1919. Anyway, I am not concerned with historical matter here, so I just use 
the common label. 
68 See Peacocke 1983, Chalmers 2004, 2006. 
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obtain a double-content view, according to which PEs have a narrow Fregean 
content, supervenient on phenomenology and only internally determined, and a wide 
Russellian content, not supervenient on phenomenology and also externally 
determined.  
It is important to point out that MPs are not to be confused with what I have been 
calling the Mode. The Mode is a manner for a content to be given to the subject – for 
example, visually – it is not part of the content itself. On the contrary, MPs are 
(Fregean) contents. They are accuracy-conditions. 
What kinds of conditions of satisfaction on Russellian extensions are Fregean 
contents? What does make them accurate, if not the Russellian properties the Object 
is represented as having? The answer given by the advocates of the double-content 
view, like Chalmers, is: the most natural condition a property must satisfy in order to 
be the property attributed by the PE, is that of being the normal and appropriate 
cause of experiences of that phenomenal type the PE in question is a token of: 
 
(PE):  Russellian content: O is: [F] (= Russellian, physical property, like [red]) 
(PE):  Fregean content:     O is: [the property which normally causes phenomenally-
red experiences] 
 
So, a more articulated Fregean content for a PE's representing O as being F, would 
be:  
 
“The object causing this experience has the property that usually causes experiences 
of phenomenal redness” (Chalmers 2008, 110) 
 
So, the Mode of Presentation of the Russellian property [red] is another content than 
the Russellian one, not less objective, consisting in a causal condition on a type of 
experience. That Fregean content, made out of MPs, has straightforward conditions 
of satisfaction, so it is semantically evaluable vis-a-vis to the world. If the seen 
object has the property which normally causes my phenomenally red experiences, the 
Fregean content of my PE is satisfied, otherwise it is not. Given an environment in 
which that phenomenally red type-experience was normally caused by green objects 
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rather than by red objects, then the very same Mode of Presentation could be a way 
for another Russellian property ([green]) to be given. So, the same Fregean content 
could be associated with different Russellian contents, according to environmental, 
extrinsic matters of causal co-variations. 
The double-content view easily accommodates the possibility of the Inverted-
Spectrum: two identical phenomenal states, say identical to your usual red-
experience, could represent their objects as having respectively a [red] and a [green] 
color, given that each of these phenomenal states is usually caused respectively by 
red and by green objects. My red-experience could have been usually caused by the 
[green] property. Namely, that very Mode of Presentation could have been the Mode 
of Presentation of another Russellian property than the property it is a MP of. The 
very same MP may pick out different properties in different environments, as well as 
in different creatures. 
So, representationalism is true, but the phenomenal character of PE supervenes on 
Fregean content, rather than on Russellian content. Phenomenal character supervenes 
on contents involving a causal component, a self-referential component concerning 
the experience itself, and especially involving reference to experiential types, like 
'phenomenally red' or 'phenomenally F' in general. In this way, it can be true that a 
given phenomenal character unequivocally determines a narrow content, made out of 
Modes of Presentation, so phenomenal internalism and representationalism are 
vindicated, without even denying the possibility of Inverted Spectrum scenarios or 
Inverted Earth-like scenarios. 
Before critically discussing the double-content view, I want to briefly clarify a point 
in order to avoid possible confusions. The Fregean content exemplified by Chalmers 
in the above quotation, includes reference both to the object which causes the very 
experience the content is content of, on the one hand, and to the property that usually 
causes that very experience, on the other hand. However, I have already argued that 
perceptual Content is object-dependent, so the real seen object, not a mode of 
presentation of it, enters into the Content. The double-content view in itself is neutral 
about whether perceptual Content is object-dependent, or existential, or anything 
else
69
. So, given that I have already argued for object-dependency of perceptual 
                                                
69 Chalmers himself holds a multiple-contents view, according to which a PE can have a singular 
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Content, I will consider the double-content view as a view concerning the 
represented properties, what I have called the content (lower case). A version of the 
double-content view which embeds object-dependency, would have the following de 
re characterization: 
 
Fregean de re content: of the seen object O – PE represents [the property which 
normally causes this phenomenally-red type-experience] 
Russellian de re content: of the seen object O – PE represents [red] (= physical, 
Russellian property) 
 
So far so good. Now, I will argue that the double-content view is untenable and must 
be abandoned. 
 
2.3 - The Weaknesses of the Double-content View 
To begin with, Fregean content is specified by Chalmers by reference to a causal 
element and a self-referential element concerning the very experience, the same way 
as Searle (1983, 1991) specifies perceptual content. I have already argued (Chapter 
IV, Section 2.4.4) that such a view is implausible, so I only cursorily recall those 
critical remarks here. Firstly, there is an issue of phenomenological inadequacy: no 
causal element seems to be reflected in visual phenomenology, much less does it 
appear to be the case that a visual experience presents the subject with features of the 
visual experience itself. In addition, such contents are too sophisticated to plausibly 
characterize the experience of a child or or a non-linguistic animal, even if we 
consider that such a content is non-conceptual so the perceiver does not have to 
deploy the respective concepts. Our experiences have a content before we begin to 
entertain contents like 'my own experience' or 'my experience being caused by P', be 
it conceptually or non-conceptually. Furthermore, the causal element included in the 
content must be enriched with a normative clause or appropriateness, so to avoid 
deviant or abnormal causal chains making the content satisfied and the perception 
veridical. Chalmers explicitly inserts that clause into the Fregean content: “the 
property which normally and appropriately causes phenomenally red experiences” 
                                                                                                                                     
content, which hallucinations lack, an existential content, which is shared by perceptions and 
hallucinations, and so on. 
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(2004, 106). That such a problematic notion as that of 'appropriate causation' should 
enter into experiential, non-conceptual contents seems highly implausible, and not 
only from a phenomenological point of view. As I noted above by discussing Searle's 
analog view, there are no discriminatory abilities in perceivers one could not account 
for without positing such a sophisticated content, so positing it is explanatorily 
redundant if not simply illegitimate.  
Other difficulties are germane to Chalmers's specification of the Fregean content. 
Here are some. 
Firstly, besides the causal, the normative and the self-referential element, there is a 
reference to a phenomenal property. That is why Chalmers takes his narrow 
representationalism to be non-reductive, insofar as it does not aim to get rid of 
phenomenal notions by reducing them to non-phenomenal notions. Now, the Fregean 
content of my PE of a red object is accounted for by appeal to 'phenomenally red' 
experiences. That means that I am supposed to be able to pick out such a phenomenal 
property independently of the property my PE seems to attribute to red things, 
independently of what the double-content advocate calls the Russellian red, the red 
as represented  'out there'. I have argued in Chapter I that the 'phenomenal' looks are 
conceptually and phenomenologically parasitic on intentional looks: on the one hand, 
I can master and understand the notion of 'looking F' as long as I master and 
understand the notion of 'looking to be F'; on the other hand, I can master and 
understand the notion of 'looking to be F' as long as I can master and understand the 
notion of being F (see Chapter 1, 5.4-5.6). It is only by detecting, sorting and 
recognizing red things, that I could learn to detect, sort and recognize phenomenally 
red looks, so 'red experiences'. Moreover, there is no uniform phenomenal experience 
caused by red things, which can be picked out without considering what worldly 
things our visual experiences prompt us to take as being red. Perceptual constancy 
teaches us that 'red experiences' may be significantly different from each other, so 
that they fall into the same type only insofar as they are all experiences which make 
us take things as objectively red
70
. Even if Chalmers presents his view as a (Fregean) 
representationalism, actually the representational aspect of the PE's phenomenal 
                                                
70 It will not do to restrict the phenomenally red experience to the experience caused by red things in 
standard or paradigmatic conditions. Indeed, there is no way to single out standard conditions for 
color-vision. On that, see Hardin 1987, 1993. 
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character is not so intrinsic to the latter to prevent the independent individuation of 
phenomenal properties. The Fregean content is an abstract condition on a property, 
that of appropriately and normally causing a certain type of phenomenal property in 
my PE. If perceptual phenomenology is intrinsically representational in that way, 
then that view is not clearly distinguishable from a form of qualia-realism: qualia are 
intrinsic properties of the experience we are aware of in experiencing
71
. In fact that 
criterion of ascription of Fregean content needs the position of phenomenal 
properties as qualia: if the Fregean content is specified as 'whatever objective 
property appropriately causes that property of my experience', then the phenomenal 
red is a property of the experience in the first place, which has only an extrinsic 
connection – via normal causation – with the represented property.  
Paradoxically enough, that view is supposed to save certain basic phenomenological 
intuitions (specially, the phenomenal internalism intuition), but it radically neglects 
perceptual phenomenology. Visual experience is transparent: the properties we 
attend to in introspection present themselves as being the properties of perceived 
things, not as being the properties of the experiences which are normally caused by 
certain properties of perceived things. Visual experience attributes to worldly objects 
those very properties that are present in visual phenomenology, not other properties 
which purportedly cause them in normal conditions and in the appropriate way. 
Chalmers considers this issue of phenomenological adequacy
72
, and replies that in 
fact we 'see through' the Modes of Presentations, in such a way that we are 
perceptually aware both of the MPs and of the properties given under these MPs, so 
transparency is vindicated. But that reply is  unsatisfactory: indeed what he calls the 
Mode of Presentation of a property, is only contingently such, indeed it is a quale 
normally caused by that property, which could well be the Mode of Presentation of 
another property, if it was normally caused by another property. Modes of 
Presentation are not phenomenologically connected, so to speak, to the properties 
                                                
71 Pettit 2003, 225ff., presents the qualia theory as follows: A color looks red if it produces a red 
quale in the perceiver, such that: a) the way the object looks is independent of the perceptual 
abilities typically enabled by the object having such a look b) the way the object look is manifest 
to the perceiver c) the object's looking so enables the perceptual abilities like sifting the object 
from other object of different color, and sorting the object in a same category of same-color 
objects, and so on. So, the quale is a property of the experience you are aware of, then it enables 
certain judgments, recognitions, comparisons, but it can be picked out independently on the way 
you take the world to be. See also Lewis 1995. 
72 See Chalmers 2004, 2006. 
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they present. Actually, on that model perceptual introspection consists of attending to 
the qualia included in the Fregean contents or MPs, it does not consist of attending to 
Fregean contents or MPs. In introspecting you do not attend to whatever property is 
causing your phenomenally-red experience, you rather attend to your phenomenal 
red, to your qualia. That is incompatible with transparency, pace Chalmers. 
According to transparency, in introspection you attend to properties of seen things. 
Another big problem that can be envisaged, concerns the interpretation of “normal 
causation” and “appropriate causation”, clauses included in the Fregean content of 
PE. What does fix normality and appropriateness in the first place? If normality is 
just a statistical notion, then the Fregean veridicality conditions of my PE would be 
satisfied even if I was systematically misperceiving colors and other visual 
properties. Suppose both green and red things 'normally' cause in me phenomenally 
red experiences. So, a PE of a green thing would be veridical insofar as [green] 
normally causes phenomenally red experiences in me. My perceptual system could 
even be so disrupted that my phenomenal color-types do not track or map any types 
of properties in the world. Suppose my phenomenal red is 'normally' caused by a 
certain shade of red, a certain shade of blue, and a certain shade of yellow, whilst my 
phenomenal green is 'normally' caused by another slightly different shade of red, 
another shade of blue, and another shade of yellow. So, in that case the first three 
shades would make veridical my PE instantiating phenomenal red, the other three 
shades of the same objective color would make veridical my PE instantiating 
phenomenal green. In both cases the perceived property is that which normally 
causes – among others
73
 – a certain type of experience. Fregean contents would make 
such fuzzy PEs into veridical PEs. 
If “normally” is not a statistical notion but has a stronger normative dimension, such 
an additional normativity must be explained within the view. If by normal is meant 
the same as appropriate, again the appropriateness-clause must be accounted for. It 
seems to me hard to define the appropriateness of the causation of a phenomenally 
red experience without reference to red things as appropriate causes. But of course 
that move is not allowed by the double-content view advocate: physical red is 
Russellian indeed, but by definition the phenomenally red experience could have had 
                                                













In addition, in that view there seems to be a problem similar to the so-called 
disjunction-problem, which affects causal theories of mental content
75
. In accounting 
for content in terms of normal causation, informational-causal theories have troubles 
in making room for mistakes or misrepresentations. A misrepresentation is a 
circumstance when a representational state is tokened but its content is not 
exemplified. Now, if the content is whatever causes the type of the tokened mental 
state, any token of the state will always be true, its content coming to include the 
actual property which causes it
76
. Now, if I have a phenomenally red experience 
before a blue object, then what normally causes my phenomenally red experience 
will become the disjunctive property ([red] or [blue]), so the content will be satisfied 
and the experience veridical. It will not do to say that the instance of blue – in our 
environment and for our perceptual systems – is not the 'normal' cause of the 
phenomenally red experiences, but it is an 'abnormal' cause. Many visual illusions 
are perfectly 'normal' indeed, this is why they are intersubjectively shared. Not every 
circumstance which our PE misrepresents, is an abnormal one
77
. Perceptual mistakes 
are quite common, also under the sun and when we are in perfect shape. 
Besides, if by 'normal and appropriate causation of phenomenally red experiences is 
meant normal causation in me, then it is to be decided how far in the past – or 
perhaps in the future – the 'normality' goes. For example, if I am transported to 
Inverted Earth, would my Fregean visual contents change? In the long run, as Block 
notes, the normal causes of my phenomenally red experiences would become the 
                                                
74 Chalmers 2004, 114, consider the possibility of specifying the Fregean content in terms of my 
community rather than individually, on these lines: “the property that normally causes 
phenomenally red experiences in my community”. That possibility is rejected by Chalmers 
himself, who points out that in that case a spectrally inverted individual in her community would 
have systematic illusions.  
75 See Fodor 1990, Dretske 1986, Jacob 1999.  
76 Suppose you mistake a cow for a horse, so the concept [horse] is tokened in your mind. Now, if 
the content of your mental state is whatever property causes it, or whatever property that type of 
mental state counterfactually depends on, then its content should be [cow OR horse] rather than 
[cow], but in that way the representation would be correct. 
77 At this point, one could appeal to optimal conditions or other similar normative notions. The 
problem is that is seems hopeless to specify optimality of conditions for phenomenally red 
experiences without referring to red things as the optimal causes. One should be able to tell why a 
circumstance where a phenomenally red experience is caused by a blue thing is not optimal, 
without any reference to the [red] property as the good referent of that type of PEs. 
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green things, so the property [green]. Now, if that is the case, then the Fregean 
content changes across transportation. But that is contrary to the original hypothesis 
that Fregean content is narrow, different from Russellian content which is wide. So 
in that case Fregean content would not be able to vindicate phenomenal internalism 
either. If we want Fregean content to be narrow, perhaps we need to bind the 
'normality' to my more remote past. Maybe we should specify the Fregean content 
like this: “the property that normally causes phenomenally red experiences in me, 
provided that I stay in my original environment or that no inverting lenses or other 
artificial modifiers are put on my eyes”. As it is self-evident, these clauses would in 
fact dash the initial hope of keeping the Fregean content narrow, namely exclusively 
supervenient on the subject's internal constitution, which was the only reason for 
introducing a Fregean content at all, besides the Russellian content. In short, since 
the normality-clause must be more than statistical but more strongly normative, and 
both 'normality' and 'appropriateness' have a normativity depending on them being 
indexed to an environment, then a change of environment, for example from Earth to 
Inverted Earth, would change what 'normally and appropriately caused' refers to, so it 
would change also the Fregean content. Not only the normal cause changes, but also 
what it is for a certain type-experience to be normally caused, will change. Not only 
the Russellian content, but also the Fregean content. 
Another natural move would be that of changing the reference to me with a reference 
to my species, like: “the property which normally causes phenomenally red 
experiences in members of my species with well-working visual apparatuses”, or 
something like that. Again, firstly that would prevent the possibility of an inverted 
spectrum without illusion for members of the same species, contrary to the 
desideratum of accommodating Inverted-Spectrum scenarios. Secondly, and most 
importantly, that would prevent again the Fregean content from being narrow, since 
the PE of an intrinsic duplicate belonging to another species (or a Swampman 
belonging to no species at all) would have different or no Fregean content at all. 
 
2.4 - Perceptual Content and Character are Wide, External, Russellian 
To sum up our critical point on the double-content view: the view is untenable, so it 
cannot be taken as a virtuous 'third way' mediating between the extreme views of 
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qualia-realism and externalist representationalism. The attempt to save phenomenal 
internalism by introducing a narrow content on which it should supervene – a content 
like [the worldly property which normally causes that type of phenomenal property] 
– is doomed to failure. I have shown it by means of three main arguments. 
Firstly, the causal and self-referential component cannot plausibly enter into 
perceptual content, because they are phenomenologically inapt and there are no 
discriminatory abilities they only could account for. Even more unpalatable is the 
inclusion of an appropriateness-clause into the content. Rather, the PE's being caused 
by an Object makes the PE to be about it, the PE's being appropriately caused by the 
properties had by the perceived object, results in a successful representation of these 
properties. The contextual and causal conditions which make a PE about an object 
and represent its properties due to the appropriateness of that causation, are objective 
conditions obtaining in the perceiver-environment relation, they make the 
representation possible but they are not represented as such by the PE. A perceptual 
state's successfully representing its causes by being appropriately caused by them, 
does not have to represent itself being caused by these causes, nor does it have to 
represent that its own causation is appropriate. It suffices that the latter is such in 
fact. Perceptual contents are satisfaction-conditions, not representations of all it 
would be contextually required for these conditions to be satisfied. 
Secondly, the posited Fregean content includes the phenomenal property [F] as one 
which can be picked out independently on the reference to any worldly represented 
property F. Indeed, [F] is only  contingently a Mode of Presentation of F, it could be 
as much a MP of G, or of whatever else could normally cause it. That priority of the 
phenomenal on the intentional seems to turn priorities upside down, insofar as it 
presupposes the original givenness of a quale of [F], introspectively accessible as an 
intrinsic property of our PE. That is hardly compatible with the view's being a 
representationalist view, though of a non-reductive sort, rather it makes it analog to 
qualia-realism. Indeed it inherits its problems, for example that of the separation 
between phenomenal character and represented properties (phenomenal/intentional 
couples taken as contingently related and reciprocally invertible), and that of the 
inability to do justice of transparency of perceptual phenomenology (which attributes 
to things the properties we are aware of, not their normal causes). 
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Thirdly, the reference to 'normality' and 'appropriateness' of causation into the 
content, is highly problematic for many reasons. First of all, many illusions and 
misperceptions are 'normally' caused, the apparatus is working well and the 
conditions are not abnormal. So there must be accurate and veridical misperceptions, 
at least according to their Fregean content. Secondly, the notion of 'normality' is 
vague with respect to temporal and modal extension. If you are transported to 
Inverted Earth and stay there for a while – or perhaps it suffices that it is just simply 
possible – not only do the properties which normally cause your phenomenally red 
experiences change (so the Russellian content change), but also what-it-is-to-be-
normally-caused for that type of experience, change (so the Fregean content change). 
Any move of introducing into the content clauses which index the content to one's 
own environment, would only emphasize that Fregean content is not narrow, 
contrary to the desideratum of saving narrowness of phenomenology through 
introduction of Fregean content. There is no 'normality' which is not environment-
indexed, so there is no narrow normality. Therefore, there cannot be any narrow 
content including normality. If there was Fregean content it would be wide, but then 
we better use the Occam Razor and stay content with the Russellian one. 
If 'normality' is just a statistical, not environment-involving notion, like 'most of the 
time caused in me', then a perceiver who systematically misrepresents, or has 
experiences sorted into phenomenal types which do not map at all color-properties in 
her environment, would have accurate experiences with satisfied Fregean contents. 
The purely statistical interpretation of 'normal' would also open a disjunction-
problem for Fregean contents. You have a phenomenally red experience caused by 
an example of worldly blue, so the property which most of the time causes your 
phenomenally red experience, becomes now the disjunctive property: ([red] or 
[blue]), therefore any mistake is turned into a veridical perception by contributing to 
change what 'normal causation' is for that phenomenal type. Finally, any other 
manoeuvre to get a more-than-statistical normativity for 'normally caused'-clause, 
like interpreting the condition as 'normally caused in members of my community' or 
'normally caused in members of my species', would patently re-introduce wideness 
into the content and so prevent inverted spectrum-scenarios within communities or 
species. 
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It seems that to make room for misrepresentation – even the Fregean one – we need 
to refer to a certain environment we are causally connected to, not just to 'whatever 
environment I could be in', so it seems that perceptual content cannot be other than 
wide. 
The moral I draw from all this, is that perceptual content is Russellian, external and 
wide, and so it is phenomenal in character thereby, as long as representationalism is 
the best account of the phenomenal character of PE. The double-content view fails in 
trying to save phenomenal internalism by introducing a narrow content of PE. Such a 
content would not be narrow either, so any reason for introducing it, drops as a 
result. The overall moral is that phenomenal internalism cannot be saved. 
We are left with our wide, Russellian, impure, non-reductive representationalism. It 
is non-reductive not because there is a content which cannot be specified without 
qualia-like phenomenal notions, but because the represented, Russellian properties 
our PEs attribute to perceived things, are represented by the PE under a Mode, for 
example the visual Mode or the Auditory Mode, and Modes are phenomenologically 
salient. The Mode is not a Mode of Presentation, if by MP we mean another sort of 
content besides the Russellian properties attributed to things: there are no other 
represented properties in PE besides them. The Mode is a way for that content to be 
given to the subject, and it makes a phenomenal difference without being part of the 
content. The most relevant difference between the Mode and the Fregean Modes of 
Presentation, is that MPs are supposed to be picked out independently on the 
properties they present. That is why there can be inversion between properties and 
MPs of them such that a phenomenally green MP could come-to-present the property 
[red] and vice-versa. On the contrary, the Mode is a way for certain Russellian 
properties to be given to the subject, but the phenomenal character as co-determined 
by that Mode, still cannot be in any way separated by those Russellian properties that 
co-determine it with the Mode.  
To a certain extent, the Mode does the explanatory job which Modes of Presentation 
were supposed to do: it accounts for the aspectuality of perceptual phenomenology, 
as well as for its egocentric dimension. In PE the world is given in such a way that 
the perceiver is a point-of-view on such a given world. That point-of-view-ness of 
 215 





In this Chapter I have faced two issues. Firstly (Section 1) I have proposed a form of 
impure representationalism on phenomenal character of visual experience. Secondly, 
I have critically considered the Double Content View – proposed by Chalmers and 
others – according to which perceptual experiences have two kinds of content, a 
Fregean one and a Russellian one.  
According to my impure representationalism, the phenomenal character of visual 
perception is made out of intentional properties represented under a Mode: the Mode 
co-determines the phenomenal character, so my view is opposed to reductive 
versions of representationalism, like identity theories, as much as to anti-
representationalist views (for which phenomenal properties are just others than the 
ways perceived things look to be). I have considered the phenomenon of perceptual 
constancy as a potential challenge to representationalism, and I have argued that the 
phenomenology involved in perceptual constancy is not a real challenge, at least for 
an impure representationalism: indeed in visual experience certain environmental 
properties are represented egocentrically, and such a perspectival dimension of visual 
phenomenology is made possible by the Mode under which such objective properties 
are represented.  
Successively, I have considered the Inverted Earth- and the Inverted Spectrum 
hypotheses as arguments against representationalism, and I have shown that no valid 
arguments against representationalism can be construed out of such hypotheses, 
unless the falsity of representationalism is already circularly presupposed.  In 
addiction, I have provided some arguments against the prima facie conceivability of 
Inverted Spectrum Scenarios. 
In Section 2 I have argued that perceptual content is throughout Russellian, so 
perceptual experiences have no Fregean contents. The notion of perceptual Fregean 
content proposed by Chalmers – something like [the property that is (normally) 
                                                
78 I am a bit abstractly focusing on visual experience here, but our concrete perceptual experience, 
considered as a continuous, unitary flux involving integration of many modalities, exhibits a 
complex phenomenal character with many levels of aspectuality and 'perspectivity' due to the 
synergic influence of the interplaying Modes. 
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causing this phenomenal property of my experience] – is highly problematic. First of 
all, it involves the notion of causation, even that of normal causation, which is 
implausible as a constituent of a perceptual, non-conceptual content. Secondly, such 
a content is phenomenologically inapt, insofar as it is incompatible with 
transparency: when we attend to our own experiences, we seem to be confronted 
with properties things look to have, not with the normal causes of these properties. 
Thirdly, Chalmers assumes that one can pick out a phenomenal property 
independently on the way things seem to objectively be arranged according to one’s 
experience, but that possibility is far from obvious. From these and other arguments I 
have concluded that the Double Content View is untenable, and that visual content is 
Wide, Russellian, External, and such must be the phenomenal character as well. The 
narrowness of phenomenal character, despite a compelling intuition in favor of it, 
cannot be saved, not even by a Double Content Theory. Phenomenal externalism 





CHAPTER VI: Bringing The Disjunctivist Challenge Into the Intentionalist 
View 
Introduction 
In that Chapter I will do three things. Firstly, I will present the disjunctivist view of 
perceptual experience and the main reasons the advocates of this view adduce for 
holding it. Secondly, I will show that such reasons can be respected also within my 
version of the Content View, so that there is no need of abandoning the Content 
View, but rather a moderately disjunctivist version of the Content View itself is to be 
preferred to the anti-intentionalist disjuncivisms, like Naïve Realist disjunctivism. 
Thirdly, I will argue that within a moderately disjunctivist version of the Content 
View, the Semantic Gap Problem – the problem of ascribing a semantically 
evaluable Content to objectless states like hallucinations – can be successfully 
treated. 
 
Section 1 – Disjunctivism Introduced 
1.1 – What is Disjunctivism? 
Disjunctivism (DJ) about perceptual experience comes in many flavors. The basic 
idea of DJ is that veridical experiences and deceptive experiences (like 
hallucinations) should be told apart as being mental states of two different kinds, 
namely, they should be given a disjunctive treatment along the following lines: 
 
DJ: Either E is a manifestation of such-and-such worldly objects and properties to 





DJ rests on the rejection of a principle which – according to disjunctivists like 
McDowell and Martin – often works as a hidden assumption, the “Common Highest 
                                                
1 As we will see, the 'other kind' for hallucinatory states could be taken to be a “mere appearance” 
(McDowell 1982), or a 'spurious' kind consisting in anything which is indiscriminable from a 
certain veridical perception (Martin 2004, 2006), or something else. See McDowell 1982, 1994, 
2008. Disjunctivism about PE was firstly proposed by Hinton 1967, 1973. Other advocates of 
disjunctivism about PE are Snowdon 1981, 2005, Putnam 1999, Martin 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 
Brewer 2008, Travis 2004, 2006, Campbell 2002, Johnston 2004, 2006, Fish 2009 among others. 
Important contributions on the subject are collected in Haddock and Macpherson 2008, and in 
Byrne and Logue 2008, Howthorne and Kovakovich 2006. 
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Factor Assumption” (McDowell 1982) or the “Common Kind Assumption” (Martin 
2004): 
 
CKA: Whatever kind of mental event M occurs when you veridically perceive, that 




Both DJ and the related rejection of CKA also entail the rejection of two prima facie 
plausible principles: the first one, which I have already introduced in Chapter III, 
Section 2.5, is the one I have called Cartesian Principle: 
 
CP: If two mental states are subjectively indiscriminable, they are mental states of 
the same nature, kind and type 
 
Given that a certain hallucination could well be subjectively indiscriminable from a 
certain veridical perception, then DJ and its related rejection of CKA are ipso facto 





 is sufficient for their sameness in kind. 
The second principle a disjunctivist must reject, has to to with the sufficiency of the 
proximate causes of a mental event for its individuation as an event of a certain 
mental kind
3
. According to the Proximate Cause Principle: 
 
PCP: A mental event E
1




 is brought 




Given that a certain hallucination could in principle be brought about by a certain 
neural proximal stimulation, committing to DJ and to the related rejection of CKA is 
                                                
2 For a detailed discussion of CKA, see Martin 2004, 2006. 
3 See Martin 2006, 356ff. 
4 The rejection of CPC does not involve at all the rejection of what Martin calls “Experiential 
Naturalism” and introduces as the principle that “our sense experiences are themselves part of the 
natural causal order, subject to broadly physical and psychological causes” (Martin 2006, 357), so 
our PE are “subject just to broadly physical causes […] (Martin 2004, 273). Rejection of CPC only 
denies that the identity in kind of proximate causes are sufficient for the identity in kind of two 
mental events, so there must be identify in kind of distal causes, or some other non-causal 
condition must be satisfied, in order two mental events to be of the same kind. That is not to deny 
that experiences are, in general, subject to physical laws and parts of the causal order, of course. 
That would be obscurantist, at the very least. 
 219 
ipso facto committing to the the rejection of the principle: same kind of proximate 
cause ! same kind of effect. Indeed, according to DJ a certain hallucination and a 
certain veridical perception could well have the same proximate kind of cause 
without being mental events of the same kind. So DJ entails the rejection of PCP.  
Therefore there must be some non-causal conditions for two experiences be of the 
same kind. 
 
To sum up, DJ rests of rejection of CKA and CKA entails the rejection of both CP 
and PCP. 
 
1.2 – The reasons for Disjunctivism: The Detachment Problem  
With all that in mind, let us now turn to the positive reasons why the disjunctive 
treatment of PE should be adopted according to their advocates. Without any aim 
either at suggesting a hierarchy or at being exhaustive, I will sequentially present 
four kinds of typical reasons for DJ, i.e. phenomenological, epistemological, 
semantical, metaphysical reasons. Although such levels are deeply interwoven in the 
debate about DJ, it may be useful to introduce them one by one, in order to gain in 
clarity even at the price of a bit of abstraction. Actually, all the four kinds of reasons 
ultimately rest on the idea that disjunctivism is the only way of solving what could be 
called the Detachment Problem: any non-disjunctivist view on PE seems to drive a 
fatal wedge between the perceptual experience and the world. That is, at least, what I 
think it is the key-problem that underlies and shapes the debate in various forms and 
dimensions. 
 
1.2.1 – Phenomenology  
The phenomenology of perceptual experience exhibits the property of transparency 
(see Chapter II, Section 2.4). In attending to your own experience of an object, the 
only properties you will end up attending to, will be the properties your experience 
presents to you as the very properties of the object you are perceiving, so the 
properties the object would have, was the experience true. 
But there seems to be another property, besides transparency, which PE 
introspectively seems to have, namely, the property of actuality and immediacy. In 
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attending to your experience of an object, not only do you attend to the 'putative' 
properties your experience attributes to the object (transparency), but your 
experience also presents itself as the very presentation of such properties of the 
object; the so presented properties offer themselves, in experience, in their bodily 
presence 'out there', as actual and as immediately given to you. So besides a 
phenomenology of transparency, in PE there is also a phenomenology of actuality 
and immediacy; in experience the world itself seems to be in view, manifested to the 
subject. PE just seems to be, introspectively, such a manifestation of the world with 
its objects, properties and relations. The presentational phenomenology of PE is 
specially compatible with Direct- or Naïve - Realism, according to which PE are 
direct relations of presentation of the world to the subject. 
As Martin 2002 points out, the classical sense-data theory vindicates actuality: 
sense-data are there, present as mental objects genuinely related to the subject
5
. But 
unfortunately it falls short of vindicating transparency. The properties you are aware 
of in your experience are not properties things look to have, rather they are properties 
of sense-data indeed. Conversely, intentionalism vindicates transparency but seems 
to fall short of vindicating actuality. In fact, if the PE was falsidical the content of PE 
would not be exemplified, so it would not be actual by definition. Only Direct 
Realism can vindicate both transparency and actuality at once
6
. According to Direct 
Realists the properties we are aware of in PE are properties things seem to have, on 
the one hand, and they are also worldly properties in the flesh and bones the subject 
is presented with in her experience, on the other. So, Direct Realism appears to be 
phenomenologically apt with respect to transparency and to actuality, on the top of 
capturing the Commonsense view on perceptual experience. 
But illusions and hallucinations are possible, that is just what intentionalism aims at 
doing justice to through the notion of content. Indeed, illusion is the “mother of 
                                                
5 Price 1932 holds that when you have an experience as of a tomato, nothing could be more certain 
that you are aware of something: something is there before you to be experienced, be you 
hallucinating or not. The Actuality Intuition is related to the presentational phenomenology of PE We 
can call that thesis, with Pautz 2006, Item Awareness. 
6 I remark en passant that the other remaining classical option, Adverbialism, does not vindicate 
either transparency or actuality. On the adverbial view experiences are ways of a subject's being 
modified: so in experience we are not aware either of properties the experience represents things as 
having (transparency), or of worldly and actual objects, properties and relations (actuality). So, at least 
from a phenomenological point of view, Adverbialism is an error-theory. I have already suggested that 
the adverbial theory of perception is phenomenologically inapt and leaves unexplained certain 
apparent properties of perceptual experience: see Chapter II, Section 1.3. 
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intentionalism” (Johnston 2004, 115)
7
: in illusion and hallucination actuality does not 
hold by definition, since the property you experience the object as having is not 
actually had by the object (illusion) or the very 'object' is not actual because it does 
not exist (hallucination). Nonetheless, according to Martin, Fish and others a 
disjunctive treatment of deceptive experience could save the virtues of Naïve 
Realism without embedding its vices, on the following lines: when the PE is 
veridical, it is the direct, Naive-realist presentation of worldly items, when it is not 
veridical (illusion, hallucination), it is not a presentation of worldly properties but 
something else, an episode of a different mental kind which is but subjectively 
indiscriminable from a certain genuine presentation of the world. 
Although not all disjunctivists are Naive-realists like Martin and Fish – for example, 
McDowell does not reject the Content View – the anti-intentionalist use of 
disjunctivism is very important in the debate. Insofar as such a version of DJ posits 
itself as a deep criticism to the Content View, I will give it a special consideration: I 
will call it Disjunctivism-cum-Naïve-Realism (DJ-cum-NR). 
In any case, according to DJ veridical PEs are genuine manifestations of the 
surrounding world to the subject, and their presentational phenomenology would be 
best explained just be taking such PEs as being episodes of presentation, as being 
what they introspectively seem to be. According to DJ-cum-NR our veridical PEs' 
being genuine manifestations of the surrounding world is incompatible with 
intentionalism. A presentation of the world presupposes actuality in a way a 
representation of the world does not: a represented world is not a necessarily present 
world. 
A conjunctive view on PE
8
 would posit a non-world-involving common factor shared 
by veridical experiences and deceptive experiences – for example, the content – plus 
some additional element which plausibly would be present in the veridical case but 
absent in the deceptive case, whereas a disjunctive view starts from the 'good' 
disjunct considered as an essentially world-involving manifestation, and 
distinguishes it from the 'bad' disjunct considered as a mental event of a different 
kind which only (introspectively) seems to be a genuine manifestation of the 
                                                
7 On the incompatibility between illusions and Direct Realism, see Smith 2002. 
8 The opposition between disjunctive and conjunctive views is proposed by Campbell 2002 and 
Johnston 2004. 
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surrounding world.  
On that account, according to the DJ-cum-NR version of disjunctivism, deceptive 
cases do not speak against Naïve Realism, because only the non-
illusory/hallucinatory disjunct is given a naïve-realist account, whilst the illusory or 
hallucinatory disjunct is told apart as something which is just indiscriminable from a 
certain veridical experience, without it falling into the same mental kind just in virtue 
of such an indiscriminability-property. Two things can be subjectively 
indiscriminable without falling under the same kind
9
: this is another way of saying 
that the Cartesian Principle is false. 
To sum up, the presentational phenomenology of PE involves the purported actuality 
of the manifested world, and it is best explained by this actuality, at least in the 
veridical cases. Such a phenomenology is hardly compatible with any conjunctive 
view on PE which allegedly drives an unbridgeable wedge between the subject and 
the world. If a veridical experience is individuated and characterized independently 
on its being a genuine manifestation of the world, such an experience could present 
the subject with the world only 'indirectly'. That is problematic from a 
phenomenological point of view in the first place. Indeed the issue of 
phenomenological aptness is a first facet of the Detachment Problem. 
 
1.2.2 – Epistemology 
Through our perceptual experiences we come to acquire knowledge about the 
surrounding world outside us. Therefore perceptual experience has a key 
epistemological role in “anchoring” our thoughts and empirical judgments to the 
world
10
, in providing our empirical thoughts with an objective purport. Now, if 
perceptual experiences are to ground and justify our empirical judgments about the 
surroundings, they cannot also make available for us what illusion and hallucinations 
make available for us. If what is given in perceptual experience was just an 
'appearance' shared by illusions and hallucinations, then the justificatory power of a 
perceptual experience would be as defective as the justificatory power of a 
hallucination. In that case the very external world would not give any relevant 
                                                
9 On that, see Austin 1962, Martin 2006. 
10 That epistemological reason for disjunctivism is provided by McDowell 1982, 1994, 1995, 1998, 
2008 as well as by Travis 2004, 2006, and Campbell 2002. 
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contribution to our empirical knowledge
11
, which is simply absurd. The skeptical 
challenge would easily rise at this point, and become inescapable, to the effect that 
our everyday perceptual judgments, even produced in optimal conditions, could 
never count as genuine knowledge as we want them to be
12
. 
In other words, if we tell apart the 'appearing' involved in perceptual experience from 
the worldly items such an appearing is a manifestation of in the veridical cases – as 
do the conjunctive views which posit a neutral 'appearance' sharable by veridical 
perceptions and hallucinations – we fatally introduce an irreparable gulf between our 
experience and the world. That is indeed the epistemological facet of the Detachment 
Problem. On the face of it DJ aims at radically overcome any “interface model of 
perception” (Putnam 1999, 42), any idea of perceptual experience as a “veil between 
us and the world” (McDowell 1982, 215), the very idea which is originally 
responsible for the rise of the Detachment Problem. The latter can be left behind only 
by conceiving two classes of epistemically distinct experiences: those occurring 
when the way things are 'makes itself perceptually manifest' to a subject, and those 
occurring when it merely seems to the subject that things are a certain way (where 
the experiences of the second class misleadingly present themselves as belonging to 
the first class). Thus, the only radical solution is the disjunctive treatment of PEs. 
 
1.2.3 – Semantics 
Russell used to distinguish descriptive knowledge from knowledge by acquaintance: 
the second way makes the first possible, and involves a direct epistemic contact with 
an object, without any inferential, predicational, descriptive mediation
13
. The typical 
way of getting acquainted with a worldly object is perception. Perception offers the 
demonstrative, referential basis for any  predication, for any descriptive knowledge 
of the environment around us. In other words, perceptual experience makes available 
to us, worldly particulars as 'topics' for empirical judgments about them, and for 
                                                
11 The world would contribute to the knowledge of the world only in an externally causal way, not in 
a constitutive way. 
12 The very idea of perceptual experience as a “common factor” to deceptive and veridical cases 
“seems incompatible with the supposition that we ever know, strictly speaking, something about 
the surrounding environment” (McDowell 2008, 381). 
13 “We shall say that we have acquaintance of anything of which we are directly aware, without the 
intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths” (Russell 1912, 25). On the 
difference between acquaintance and descriptive knowledge, see also Lewis 1983. 
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propositional knowledge of them.  
As Evans 1982 vigorously pointed out
14
, perceptual discrimination is the basic way 
in which our empirical thoughts can be anchored to the world, namely, perceptual 
discrimination of certain objects provides original referents for empirical judgments 
which 'directly' involve such perceived objects. In other words, perceptual experience 
basically makes demonstrative thoughts about the world possible
15
. In that way, 
perception grants the very aboutness of empirical thinking. 
According to Campbell, Johnston
16
 and Travis, only the 'revelatory' nature of 
perceptual experience could account for our capacity of making de re judgments 
about the surroundings. The very particulars' being directly presented to the subject 
in experience, without any semantic intermediary like representations, can enable us 
to judge directly about them, not just through mental representations of them. As 
Johnston 2006, 265, writes “without sensible consciousness we would not have any 
singular thought about perceivable objects”. Our PEs “introduce particulars as topics 
for thought” (Johnston 2004, 130) and “make external entities available as objects of 
immediate demonstration” (Johnston 2006, 282). Without that function of 'bringing 
into view' realized by our PEs, not only could the world not control our empirical 
judgments, but our very scheme of descriptive identification would collapse. 
Empirical judgments are exposures to error just because they presuppose that 
something worldly has being perceptually brought into view in the first place, the 
worldly object the judgment is about and which can make the judgment true of false.  
So perceptual experience is not a representational phenomenon but a way of directly 
“bringing the surrounding into view” (Travis 2004), whereas empirical beliefs and 
judgments are representations about portions of the world which perceptual 
experience has so brought into view and made available as a referent for true or false 
judgments. The role of PE is not that of representing the world. Rather, “the central 
task of seeing […] in a thinker's life is to allow the world to bear, for that thinker, on 
what he is to think (and do) according as it bears on what is so” (Travis 2006, § 5). 
                                                
14 See Evans 1982, Cap. 4, Cap. 6. See also McDowell 1984. 
15 On these semantic reasons for disjunctivism, Campbell 2002 insists emphatically. See also Travis 
2006. On singular thoughts and object-dependency, the classical works are Evans 1982, Kaplan 
1989, McDowell 1984, 1986. A singular thought about a perceived object is made possible by the 
very existence of the perceived object, i.e. that thought – with that content – could not be 
entertained without the existence of the perceived object it is about. 
16 See Johnston 2004, 2006. 
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Again, conceiving veridical PE as the direct presentation of particulars as 'topics' for 
empirical thoughts is a way of avoiding the Detachment Problem which allegedly 
weighs on the Content View as well as on any other non-disjunctivist views. As it is 
evident, the semantic issue is deeply interwoven with the epistemological issue. So 
for advocates of DJ any semantic and/or epistemic 'interface' between the subject and 
the world would confine the mind within itself, and make it impossible for any 
knowledge of the world on the one hand, and any reference to the world on the other 
hand. At least the veridical experiences are to be thought as genuine presentations of 
worldly particulars so as to guarantee that Mind-World cognitive contact: that is the 
only way to cope with the Detachment Problem. 
 
1.2.4 – Metaphysics 
Perceptual experiences are mental states
17
 of a certain kind, which have a certain 
nature. As for any other entities over which we quantify, some criteria for the 
identity and the individuation of a given perceptual experience must be available, 
some type- or kind-individuation must be possible. Furthermore, among the many 
types and kinds under which a PE may fall, there must be a 'fundamental kind'
18
 the 
PE belongs to which can somehow capture the deep metaphysical nature of such an 
entity. 
From an intentionalist point of view, PEs are essentially individuated by their 
semantic properties, namely, by their respective representational content. A PE is 
what it is insofar as it possesses certain accuracy-conditions, independently on 
whether such conditions are satisfied in the world, i.e. on whether the content is 
exemplified or not. As a consequence, the very nature of the mental state a certain PE 
consists of must be indifferent to how the represented world is actually arranged. 
Indeed the semantic evaluability of a PE is possibile just because the individuation of 
                                                
17 I have clarified (Chapter II, Section 1.1) that PEs are episodes rather than states. Here I just adopt 
the current use in order not to overload the discussion with terminological subtleties. It suffices to 
keep in mind that fact. 
18 Martin insists on that a given PE must belong to a fundamental kind. The fundamental kind to 
which an experience belongs is “its most specific kind; it tells what essentially the event or episode 
is” (Martin 2006, 361). Whilst an item may have many natural properties, an item must fall in just 
one fundamental kind. That is what Wiggins 1980, 65, calls the 'ultimate sortal' of a thing. I 
personally find that notion highly suspicious, if it is meant to metaphysically 'carve the thing at its 
joints', rather than being more modestly meant as the result of a pragmatic taxonomy useful for 
certain descriptive or explanatory purposes. 
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such a state is independent on its semantic value (true/false, accurate/inaccurate). 
That seems to entail that a certain veridical PE could well have been an illusion or a 
hallucination – if things would have been different in the surrounding world – 
without being of a different kind or nature thereby. In other words, if the fact that a 
certain PE possesses a certain content fundamentally individuates that PE, and such a 
content is possessed by the PE independently on whether it is a veridical PE, an 
illusory PE or a hallucinatory PE, therefore the veridical perception being a genuine 
relation to the world – say, a relation of manifestation of the world to the subject – 
must be totally inessential to the nature of that PE. The PE is what it is independently 
on the world and on being a genuine relation with the world; the metaphysical nature 
of the PE, even of veridical PEs, is essentially world-independent. 
Also from a metaphysical point of view, any conjunctive view for which a veridical 
perceptual state can be factored out into a world-independent psychological state, on 
the one hand, plus a certain arrangement of the world, on the other, is doomed to fail 
in accounting for the PE's being a cognitive contact to the world in which the world 
itself becomes manifest and 'disclosed' to the subject. In particular, if perceptual 
experience was representation, it could never be a presentation of the world itself in 
flesh and bones, because a representation is what it is independently of its content 
being or not being exemplified, whilst a presentation-manifestation of the world has 




As a consequence, only a disjunctive view is able to account for the relationality of 
veridical perception, by assigning to the latter a different fundamental kind from that 
of illusions and/or hallucinations
20
. Hallucinations must be thought of as having a 
different metaphysical nature from veridical perception. Like the latter, they 
introspectively seem to be genuine relations of manifestation, but they aren't, so 
hallucinating involves a double mistake: about how the world is arranged, on the one 
hand, about the very metaphysical nature of one's own state, on the other hand
21
. 
                                                
19 On the opposition between an intentional view and a relational view on perception, see Crane 
2006. 
20 As we will see, some disjunctivists oppose veridical perceptions to illusions and hallucinations 
(ex. Martin), other disjunctivists oppose veridical perception and illusions to hallucinations (ex. 
Snowdon, Langsam, Fish). 
21 On hallucinatory states being inaccurate both with respect to the world and with respect to the 
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The metaphysics of perceptual states cannot be given a conjunctive treatment, on 
pain of distancing the world from the subject also with respect to veridical cases, on 
pain of making the relationality of veridical states metaphysically irrelevant so to 
close the Mind in itself and leave the World outside. As it is conspicuous, that is 
nothing more than the metaphysical facet of the Detachment Problem. 
 
Section 2 – The Good, The Bad and the Neutral 
2.1 – The Priority of the Successful 
Disjunctive views on perceptual experience take the veridical experience as basic and 
analyze the deceptive cases (ex. hallucinations) in terms of the veridical experience, 
they make no room for any neutral experiential states. Putatively neutral states are 
treated as states which must be either instances of the successful disjunct or instances 
the unsuccessful disjunct, where the disjunction is usually interpreted exclusively. So 
ascribing a 'neutral state' can only mean labeling it as a state you do not know 
whether is an instance of the one or of the other disjunct, rather than picking out a 
common ingredient to successful and unsuccessful states. Since the unsuccessful 
state on its own is analyzed in terms of the successful state, ascribing a 'neutral' state 
amounts to ascribing a state which at least seems to be a successful state but that 
seeming is not completely endorsed by the one who ascribes or self-ascribes the 
state. 
Conjunctive views on perceptual experience take the neutral case as basic, and 
analyze the successful case by factoring it out into the neutral case plus some further 
ingredient. The unsuccessful case will be characterized by the lack of that further 
ingredient which determines success. The neutral case is instantiated both in the 
successful case and the unsuccessful case, as a common factor which makes up the 
successful case when conjoined with the further ingredient. 
Apart from Radical Disjunctivism, a Disjunctive Treatment of PE may well involve a 
commonality of positive features between successful and unsuccessful states (say, 
VP and H). What matters for a view to be a form of DJ, is that the common features 
are not seen as the most relevant features in kind-individuating the two states as 
mental states, so that what the successful and the unsuccessful states 'fundamentally 
                                                                                                                                     
subject's introspection of those states themselves, see Martin 2006. 
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are' is common to them. Given that a mental feature can be more or less relevant in 
characterizing and individuating a mental state, it follows that there can be more or 
less moderate versions of (non-radical) DJ. I will argue that there is not an aut-aut 
opposition between conjunctivist views and disjunctivist views; some features may 
be common to the successful and the unsuccessful case and also mentally relevant to 
both, even if the unsuccessful case is analyzed in terms of the successful case and so 
the successful case is conceptually, explanatorily and metaphysically prior. I will 
argue that a moderately disjunctivist intentionalism is just such a view, on the top of 
being the most promising view in addressing the demand of Cognitive Contact raised 
by disjunctivists, i.e. in putting us in a position to solve the Detachment Problem. 
In Chapter I I have argued that perceptual verbs and locutions like 'seeing' and 
'seeing-that' are success-verbs, so the ascription of them encodes perceptual success. 
I have also argued that 'looking-F' conceptually depends on 'being F', so the idea of 
experiencing something as of red conceptually depends on the idea of successfully 
seeing something red. Also at the level of ordinary ascriptions the success-case is the 
basic one, by reference to which the deceptive cases are ascribed and understood.  
The Content View can vindicate these ordinary intuitions about perceiving and 
experiencing, and also the disjunctivist core-idea that the success-case must be taken 
as the basic case by reference to which the neutral and the unsuccessful case are to be 
characterized. Nonetheless, the explanatory, conceptual and metaphysical priority of 
the success-case does not rule out the idea of a mentally relevant common factor 
between successful and deceptive experiences, between VP and H. 
In order to show that, I will firstly introduce the basic teleo-functional framework, a 
particularly promising version of the Content View. Without arguing for the truth of 
that version, I will suppose it is true and argue that it is a good example of how the 
Content View can embed the intuition of the Good/Bad asymmetry and also meet the 
demand of Cognitive Contact which typically inspires the disjunctivist proposals. 
Differently from the radical DJ-cum-NR, a moderately disjunctivist Content View 
will not entail any obscurantist consequences about the apriori unaccountability of 
hallucinations: indeed, if the indiscriminability between a veridical perception and its 
hallucinatory counterpart had an explanation of any sort, this explanation would 
appeal to properties common to the hallucination and the veridical perception, but in 
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this case it would be not true anymore that the H and the VP have nothing relevant in 
common other than their subjective indiscriminability, as the radical disjunctivists 
like Martin and Fish hold. 
 
2.2 - Function and Content  
2.2.1 – Where Do Semantic Properties of Perceptions Come From? 
No one would reasonably deny that perceptual capacities have been acquired by 
biological systems through evolution, in virtue of the survivor-value associated with 
them. A capacity realized by a mechanism which has been selected because the 
capacity it realized had a survivor-value, is a teleo-function. If a function – a 
mechano-function – is a causal role, a teleo-function is a causal role which has been 
selected because it contributes to the survivor and fitness of the organism equipped 
with the mechanism that implements that causal role. Biological functions are teleo-
functions, so also perceptual functions, being biological functions, are such. 
According to teleo-semantic accounts of perceptual content
22
 (TS), the content of a 
perceptual state is determined by the teleo-function of that state. The teleo-function 
of a certain type of internal state is not just its actual causal role, rather it is the causal 
role that type of state has been selected to realize. The basic perceptual teleo-
functions are selectionally acquired by organisms through the history of the evolution 
of their species, indeed they are phylogenetically fixed and wired-in. Then individual 
learning may expand and determine perceptual deliverances by individually and 
ontogenetically 'selecting' other more fine-grained discriminatory capacities through 
exploiting the basic species-specific capacities. 
Let us consider an environmental property, like [red]. According to a certain version 
of TS
23
 an actual internal state you are in when you successfully discriminate 
something red, has the semantic content [is red] because the state is a token of a type 
of state produced by a mechanism which has been selected because the states 
produced by it reliably co-varied with the presence of something red, and having 
been so selected amounts to having the function of producing states which indicate 
                                                
22 See Millikan 1984, 2000, Dretske 1988, 1995, Papineau 1990, Cummins 1994, Neander 1995, 
Jacob 1999. 
23 That is, for example, a view preferred by Dretske, Neander and Jacob. It is the information-based 
teleosemantics. 
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the presence of something red. Perceptual functions come from the evolution-based 
'exploitation' of certain relations of co-variation between internal states and 
environmental conditions. 
Suppose this sketchy story is true, so we have a plausible, naturalistic account of why 
certain states have certain contents, indeed such contents are objectively determined 
by specific indicator functions historically established through evolution at the level 
of species. Thus, to schematize things as briefly as possible, we have the following 
picture: 
 
1) A token of a perceptual state derives its semantic properties from the type it is a 
token of: that type of state has the function of indicating certain environmental 
circumstances. 
2) The type to which the token belongs derives its semantic properties from the 
mechanism which has the function of producing states of that type. 
3) The mechanism that produces that type of state derives its 'content-giving' function 
from evolutionary selection, which has maintained that mechanism as a phylogenetic 
trait of the species because the states produced by it indicated certain environmental 
conditions (whose discrimination was somehow relevant for acting in a survivor-
preserving way). 
 
So, representational functions depend on biological functions, biological functions 
depend on the history of evolutionary selection. The content represented by a certain 
token is the environmental condition in presence of which the mechanism producing 
the type has the evolutionarily acquired function of producing a token of that type. 
The teleo-functional proposal on perceptual content has the important virtue of 
accounting for the possibility of misrepresentation, differently from non-teleological 
causal-informational semantics
24
: the content is fixed not by whatever may cause the 
state, rather by the condition the state has the function of indicating. Normally the 
mechanism produces a token of its type in presence of the 'right' cause, but it can be 
                                                
24 The classical informational semantics is that articulated by Dretske 1981 and Fodor 1983. Whilst 
Dretske has realized the insufficiency of causal semantics and has integrated the causal component 
into a teleo-semantic theory (Dretske 1986, 1988, 1995), Fodor keeps skeptic about the teleo-
semantic approaches. See Fodor 1990. 
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improperly activated by a different cause from that which it has the function of 
indicating. As a consequence, the content of an occurring state can very well be not 
exemplified, so the state can be incorrect/inaccurate/false
25
. If the content was fixed 
by whatever may cause the state, then each token would be a priori 
accurate/correct/true, so misrepresentation would be impossible. In fact, normally 
perceptual states are caused by their correctness-conditions, i.e. their contents, but in 
order them to have correctness-conditions it could not be that they must be caused by 
their correctness conditions. That they are mostly caused by their correctness-
condition is not a mysterious pre-established harmony, rather is accounted for by the 
selectional logic of function-acquisition. The very reason why a mechanism has been 
acquired that produces that type of states, is that the occurrences of this type of state 
are reliably correlated with the presence of a certain property (which can be said to 
be 'the content' of these states only once the function has been established: then some 
tokens of the state can be false). That means that the acquisition of a function by a 
mechanism originally depends on a real relation between certain internal states and 
those environmental properties that now are the contents of these states. A function 
of "-ing is acquired by a mechanism because the mechanism has been successful in 
"-ing and "-ing is relevant for survivor and fitness. That is why a function is defined 
by reference to its successful exercises, not by reference to its failed exercises, even 
if failed exercises can well occur. But again, they are failed exercises of that function 
just because the function is defined by reference to its successful exercises. 
To sum up that fundamental point: past successes in "-ing are the reason why a 
mechanism which "-es acquires the function of "-ing: when "-ing is producing 
certain states S in presence of certain conditions F, what is to be expected is that 
tokens of S are normally caused by F, i.e. by their contents. The reason why a 
perceptual state has the content it has, is the very same reason why a mechanism 
having the function of producing states representing that content has been selected in 
                                                
25 Suppose a token of the type which has the function of indicating [red] is actually caused by an 
instance of [green]. It can be a misrepresentation because its content is not fixed by whatever may 
cause it – in that case it would have the disjunction [red or green] as  (a part of its) content – but 
only by that sub-set of potential causes the state has the function of indicating. That is known as 
the 'Disjunction Problem', which may be overcome by a causal-informational semantics only 
insofar as a teleo-functional component is added to the view. Causal roles alone cannot generate 
the right normativity for the property of misrepresenting to be consistency applicable. On that 
problem, see Jacob 1999, 78-140. 
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the first place.  
With all that in mind, let us firstly state a general principle about the Good/Bad 
asymmetry: 
 
Principle of Dependence (PD): There is a conceptual, explanatory and natural 
asymmetrical dependence of the Bad cases from the Good cases 
 
A misrepresentation is such because it is a token of a type having the function of 
indicating something else than the property that has caused the misrepresentation 
itself. A failed exercise of a perceptual function is what it is because of the functional 
type it is a token of, so its characterization and definition are conceptually, 
explanatorily and in primis naturally ('metaphysically') dependent on the function of 
its type, which is determined by the cases in which the function is successfully 
exercised. The occurrence of a state with content C when C is not exemplified is the 
occurrence of a state whose type-individuation involves reference to a circumstance 
in which C is exemplified, namely, to a Good token of the same functional type. The 
content consists of the conditions under which the state would be correct, so it is 
specified by a situation in which a state of that type is caused by what it is 'supposed' 
to be caused by. The Bad case is analyzed by reference to the Good case, and not 
vice-versa. A neutral case is just a case for which it is not specified whether it is 
Good or Bad, but also the Neutral is ultimately characterizable only by reference to 
its Good counterpart. 
Consider a hallucination as of something's being F. The content of that experiential 
state cannot be specified other than by reference to how the world would be, was the 
state not a hallucination but rather a veridical perception. A state caused by its 
content and representing it, a state through which a subject would become conscious 
of something perceived and of the real way it is, of it's being F. 
Functions – be they successfully or unsuccessfully exercised – are positive 
capacities, general dispositions. Also perceptual functions are perceptual capacities. 
As such, their unsuccessful exercises are essentially 'privative' episodes, failures of 
the function they are exercises of. 
The metaphysical relation between a function and its exercises is that between a 
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general positive capacity and the particular occurrences of that capacity, some of 
which realize the very what-it-is of that capacity (ex. "-ing), some which do not do 
that, even though they are still exercises of it.  
A functional disposition can be exercised recursively, and some tokens of the 
functional type are failed tokens of their type, they do not do what they are 'supposed' 
to do as exercises of their function. So, what do a veridical and a correspondent 
deceptive experience have in common? 
 
a) They are both occurrences of the same type, exercises of the very same functional 
type  
b) One is a failed exercise of its functional type, one is a successful exercise 
 
What is common to them is absolutely relevant for their description, their 
explanation, their very nature as mental episodes: they share a certain 
representational function, specified by the content they have. It is an essential feature 
of a token-exercise of an objective bio-function its being a token-exercise of that 
function. It is not a contingent feature of it, but a maximally relevant feature.  
As we have seen, Martin introduces the idea of a “fundamental kind” each of our 
perceptual experiences should fall into, and holds that Hs and VPs cannot share their 
fundamental kind
26
. I do not want to discuss subtle issues concerning the (suspicious) 
essentialist metaphysics of 'fundamental kinds', but a plausible and non-ideological 
way of kind-individuating mental states like perceptual experiences, specially if we 
stay within a broadly naturalistic framework, is that of appealing to the natural 
functions of these states, something which is observer-independent
27
 and explains, 
after all, why these states occur to us at all and why they have the features they have.  
So the taxonomy of perceptual states and their subsumption under types and sub-
types is an empirical affair dependent on facts about evolution and natural history. A 
heart may have a morphology similar to that of a closed fist, perhaps a color similar 
                                                
26 The Aristotelian idea according to which any item must fall in one and only one fundamental kind, 
has been deeply articulated by Wiggins 1980. 
27 Even if some deny that biological functions are objective and observer-independent (for example, 
Dennett 1978, 1991), among the philosophers of biology and the biologists themselves functional 
realism is overwhelmingly the mainstream view. On functions, see Allen/Bekoff/Lauder 1998, 
Buller 1999, Ariew/Cummins/Perlman 2009. 
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to that of a lung, it may make a certain noise, and so on, but such features are totally 
irrelevant for kind-individuating it. Rather, it is essentially defined by its bio-
function, which is that of pumping blood through the circulatory system, any other 
apparent feature of it has to be explained with respect to its fundamental function: for 
biological organs, states or traits, their function just tells what they are, they are what 
they are insofar as they have a certain natural function. Perceptual states are no 
exception. 
A malfunctioning heart that does not pump blood is still a heart – only in being a 
heart it is properly characterizable as malfunctioning – likewise a successful and a 
correspondent deceptive experience have the same function, and that also accounts 
for the fact that one is the deceptive counterpart of the other. If perceptual states are 
functional states, as it is very reasonable to hold, radical DJ must be false. Instead a 
moderately disjunctive treatment of the Good and the Bad – one which does not rule 
out that the Good and the Bad share positive and relevant properties – could be 
spelled out as follows: 
 
Teleo-functional DJ: 
Either the state/process/event S is an actualization of the function to realize which it 
has been produced, or S is a failed exercise of that function, that only seems an 
actualization of the function " but does not perform ". 
 
Perceptual Teleo-functional DJ: 
Either PE is an occurrent exercise which successfully realize the positive 
function/capacity of making one conscious of certain environmental circumstances 
through representing them accurately, or PE is an unsuccessful exercise of the same 
function/capacity that only seems to successfully perform the capacity it is a (failed) 
exercise of. 
 
Such an exclusive disjunction embeds the idea that the Good is definitionally, 
conceptually and explanatorily prior to the Bad, indeed the Bad is characterized just 
be reference to the Good. The Bad is a failed example of that of which the Good is 
the paradigmatic and normative example, but still the Bad seems and 'looks like' the 
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Good, so it may be not discriminable from the Good. 
In addition, the disjunctive treatment of PE in such terms also embeds the idea that 
the Neutral is not an autonomously characterizable situation, rather its ascription just 
rests on the subject's condition of not being in a position to tell whether she is in 
presence of the Good or of the Bad disjunct. Therefore, there is no definitional, 
conceptual, or explanatory independence of the Neutral case, so a fortiori there is no 
priority of the Neutral over the Good and the Bad cases, as in the conjunctivist views 
as opposed to the disjunctivist ones. 
The asymmetric dependence of both the Bad and the Neutral from the Good is 
compatible with the fact that the Good shares with the Bad positive relevant features 
(functional facts above all)
28
, those in virtue of which it is not a mystery that the Bad 
may falsely seem an instance of the Good till the point to be subjectively 
indiscriminable from the Good.  More on that, below. 
 
2.2.2 - Perceptual Capacities Realize Relational Functions 
A perception is a certain kind of causal and cognitive relation of the subject with the 
surrounding environment. Perceptual capacities are an example of those functions 
that put the organism in relation with the environment by being activated by a certain 
condition outside the perceiver. A perceptual state is something that happens inside 
as a consequence of something that happens outside that the perceptual state itself, in 
being caused by it, somehow indicates or represents. 
In Chapter III have argued that visual perception is a real relation to the environment, 
the seeing-relation (see also Chapter I), which involves a representation of a 
perceived object as being such-and-so, where these properties are represented under 
a phenomenologically salient Mode. 
I have also argued that perceptual Content is object-dependent, so perceptual 
experiences are de re states with a demonstrative Content. The Content is made out 
of the Object plus the content, where by 'content' (lower-case) is meant the properties 
the PE represents the Object as having (under a Mode). As a consequence, what 
                                                
28 As we will see, these functional facts, in case of conscious perceptual experiences, can be reflected 
in phenomenology. In fact, our very perceptual phenomenology has the function of making us 
conscious (in certain distinctive ways) of the representational states we are in, so of the 
environmental features they represent when successful. 
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makes a PE accurate or inaccurate is whether – and to what extent – the properties 
the PE represents its Object as having are properties that the perceived Object 
actually has. Being the PE essentially object-dependent, its Content and also the kind 
it belongs to, are dependent on causal and external factors, they do not depend only 
on subjective factors. So, also for the version of the Content View I have been 
articulating, the Cartesian Principle must be false: 
 
 # CP: It is not true that: if two mental states are subjectively indiscriminable, they 
are mental states of the same nature, kind and type 
 
PE are object-involving relational states, so a state subjectively indiscriminable from 
a certain PE  obtained by the removal of the PE's distal object, would not be a PE 
anymore, but something else. 
For the same reason, also the Accessibility Principle (see Chapter III, Section 2.5) 
must be false: 
 
# AP: It is not true that: if two experiences are subjectively indiscriminable, they 
must have the same Content 
 
Subjective indiscriminability does not even entail sameness in Content. Change the 
object with another visually indiscriminable object, and the Content will change: the 
PE will represent another Object as having certain properties, the Content of the PE, 
being a de re content, would involve another res. Remove the Object completely, and 
you will not have a PE anymore, since the Content of a PE is essentially relational 
and object-involving. 
But subjective indiscriminability – contra Radical DJ – is grounded on a positive 
phenomenal character which the indiscriminable experiences share. Therefore, the 
phenomenal character cannot be determined by the Object, rather it is determined by 
the properties the (putatively) perceived Object is represented as having, and by the 
Mode under which these properties are represented (ex. Visual Mode with its 
distinctive phenomenology), according to the following scheme: 
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content + Object     = Content  
                       Mode + content      = phenomenal character  
 
Therefore the Mode does not determine the Content, the Object does not determine 
the phenomenal character. 
Another principle that that version of the Content View must reject – so that, again, it 
embeds another demand advanced by disjunctivists – is the Proximate Cause 
Principle (PCP): 
 
# PCP: It is not true that: a mental event E
1





 is brought about by the same kind of proximate cause as E
2 
 
Again, the existence of a distal cause (an Object) is essential for a certain experience 
to be a perceptual experience, namely, a relational event. A relational event and a 
non-relational event could have the same kind of proximate causes, but still they will 
not have to be mental states of the same kind, insofar nothing will ever make the 
subjective appearance of a perceptual relation to a distal object into a genuine 
perceptual relation, if the distal object or cause is removed. But sameness in kind of 
proximal causes is compatible with absence of distal causes, therefore that sameness 
cannot be sufficient for making two mental states identical in kind. 
 
To sum up, subjective indiscriminability between two experiences is not sufficient 
either for their sameness in kind, type or nature (CP is false) or for their sameness in 
Content (AP is false), nor is sameness in kind of proximate causes sufficient for 
sameness in kind, type and nature. But indiscriminability is grounded in sameness of 
positive phenomenal character, which depends on the Mode and on the properties the 
experiential state represent the Object as being, where there is an object at all, or the 
'putative' Object as being, where there is no Object. Before saying something about 
that puzzling introduction of the notion of a 'putative object', I want to remark that 
this version of the Content View does represent a form a moderate DJ, but the 
relevant disjunction needs to be spelled out not by contrasting veridical perceptions 
against hallucinations, but by contrasting genuine perceptual experiences (veridical 
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and illusory) against hallucinations, which are not perceptual experiences despite the 
subjectively 'look' to be such. Let us see. 
 
2.3 - Where Do We Put Illusions? 
Until now, we have considered the disjunctivist proposal as contrasting 
hallucinations (H) with veridical perceptions (VP). Tertium datur, though: indeed 
perceptual illusions, or inaccurate perceptions, are neither hallucinations nor 
veridical perceptions. Be them I, between H and VP. 
Perceptual experiences are not intra-mental events, rather they are subject-
environment relations. Perceiving is being in causal and cognitive contact with an 
external object, that is also entailed by the fact that the perceptual object enters into 
the accuracy-conditions and so provides the PE with a demonstrative semantic 
content. The object is the target of the perceptual representation, and it's having or 
not having the properties represented by the PE of it, is what makes the PE accurate 
or not. It is in being of the object O, that the PE is evaluable for accuracy with 
respect to the represented property F. A PE is essentially about its environmental 
object, which also is its distal cause. Therefore such an aboutness is causally, 
contextually determined, and makes the PE true of false of its object.  
Now, an illusory perceptual state is a perceptual experience which is still successful 
in being a genuine perceptual relation, on the one hand, despite that it is unsuccessful 
in representing a certain (inaccurate) way the object the state is a genuine relation to, 
on the other hand. For example, an illusory visual experience is a case of 'seeing-O', 
which involves a certain discrimination-relation with an environmental object which 
causes the very state (see Chapter I), but it is a case of unsuccessful representation of 
the seen object as being in ways which happen to be different from the ways this 
object actually is. 
Now, for Martin and others the disjunctive treatment of PE should contrast H and I 
with VP, namely, deceptive or Bad cases with Good cases. But there is Bad and Bad: 
illusions and hallucinations are radically different types of mental states, the first is a 
real relation with an environmental object, the second is not a real relation at all but 
just a subjective appearance of that. 
 
 239 
As a consequence, the right and relevant disjunction should not be: 
 
a) PE: Either VP or (H, I)  
but rather: 
b) Either PE (VP, I) or H 
 
a) contrasts veridical perceptions with deceptive perceptions, independently of 
whether deceptive perceptions are hallucinations or illusions, whereas b) contrasts 
relational experiences with non-relational experiences, independently on whether the 
relational experiences (PE) are deceptive or not. These contrasts are very different 
ones, and give rise to very different sorts of disjunctivism. 
According to b) – for which I am arguing for – hallucinations are not perceptual 
experiences, but illusions are perceptual experiences. An illusion makes a wrong 
comment on a real perceptual target, whilst a hallucination only seems to make a 
comment on a real perceptual target but it is 'targetless', it is only an appearance of a 
relation but in fact it has no objectual target. 
Consider a VP, a H and an I which are 'correspondent' and subjectively 
indiscriminable, so they share their phenomenal character. What do they differ in 
fundamentally? 
The VP is a real relation with an environmental object which it represents as being 
the ways it is, so it is successful both in making the subject visually conscious of a 
seen object, and in making the subject visually conscious of their properties (by 
accurately representing these properties). So, VP is successful in a double sense. It is 
an example of the Good as a real environmental-representational relation, and it is an 
example of the Good as the particular environmental relation it is, namely, as a 
representation which accurately represents its environmental target: the content is 
exemplified. 
The Illusion is still a real relation with the environmental object, but it represents the 
object as having properties that the object does not have. So, it is successful in 
making the subject visually conscious of an object and in representing certain 
properties as of the object it is (successfully) about, but it is an example of the Bad in 
being the particular representational relation it is, namely, in having a content which 
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is not exemplified by the perceived object. 
The Hallucination is not a real relation with any environmental object, so it is an 
example of the Bad in being the failure at being a subject-environment relation, and 
it is an example of the Bad in representing things as they are not. Not only is it an 
only apparent relation to an environmental object, but it represents the 'putative' 
object (it is an apparent relation with) as different from they way any real object in 
the surrounding actually is
29
.  
Accordingly, I and H, with respect to VP, involve different levels of introspective 
mistakes. A VP introspectively seems to be a real relation with a perceived object 
having the properties it appears to have in the PE. Since the VP is a relation to a 
perceived object, and the object is as it appears to be in the PE, a VP normally gives 
rise to two levels of introspective success: the VP 'looks' the way it is insofar as it 
looks like a perceptual relation, and the VP looks the way it is insofar as it looks like 
a successful perceptual relation, namely the properties it attributes to the object are 
the right ones. 
An illusion involves an introspective mistake, because it subjectively seems a VP, 
namely, a successful perceptual relation which attributes to the perceived objects 
properties the object has. It is not what it seems, because the apparent properties of 
the object are not properties actually had by it. Yet an illusion involves introspective 
success, because it subjectively looks like a real relation to a perceived object, and 
from this point of view an illusion looks just what it is. 
A hallucination involves two levels of introspective mistakes,. On the one hand, it 
subjectively looks like a perception (a genuine relation to an environmental object) 
without being such; on the other, it subjectively looks like a veridical perception, a 
perceptual relation which accurately attributes certain properties to an object it is 
putatively related to. But it is not accurate as it seems. 
A H, an I and a VP may well be subjectively indiscriminable, but their phenomenal 
character is radically deceiving in the case of H (a H misleads us about the deep 
nature of the state we are in), it is moderately deceiving in the case of I (an I misleads 
                                                
29 Here I do not consider the case of veridical hallucinations. Normally, hallucinations make us 
represent the surrounding world as different from the way it is, even if an extreme coincidence 
could occur in which we hallucinate a world that happens to be identical to the real world we are 
actually facing. 
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us about the accuracy of the state but not about the deep nature of the state we are 
in), and it is not deceiving in the case of VP. VPs are generally what they seem to be, 
perceptual relations to an object which present us with the actual properties of that 
object. 
We may then contrast either I with VP, or PE (I, VP) with H, but these contrasts are 
very different ones: 
 
1) Illusory/Veridical Disjunction: 
Either PE is a subject-environment relation that successfully represents its object, or 
it is a subject-environment relation unsuccessful in enabling the subject to access to 
(some of) the perceivable properties of the object, even if it introspectively seems to 
be successful. 
 
2) Perceptual Experience/Hallucination Disjunction: 
Either E is a perceptual relation to the environment (be it accurate [=VP] or 
inaccurate [=I]) or it is a state which only seems to be a perceptual relation with the 
environment but it is not such [=H] 
 
It is 2), not 1), the most significant disjunction. An accurate and an inaccurate PE are 
the same type of relation, they have the same function of representing an 
environmental target and they are successful in doing it, although only VP is 
successfully also in accurately doing it
30
. 
Above all we need to contrast relational states with non-relational states. Only the 
first are genuine perceptual experiences, even if the second kind may be 
indiscriminable from the first and have a misleading relational introspective 
appearance. So disjunctivists are right in saying that hallucinations have a different 
nature from veridical experiences. But on the one hand, such a difference in nature 
does not prevent them from sharing a positive phenomenal character with perceptual 
                                                
30 That the right disjunction is the perception/hallucination one rather than the veridical/deceptive 
one, is embedded in the disjunctive treatment proposed by Snowdon 1981, 202: “it looks to S as if 
there is an F: either [there is something which looks to S to be F] or [it is to S as if there is 
something which looks to him (S) to be F]”. The first disjunct expresses a de re seeming, whereas 
in the second disjunct the object falls under the scope of the seeming-operator. Note that the first 
disjunct would be satisfied also by an illusory experience. 
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experiences, pace radical DJ; on the other hand, the difference in deep nature as 
mental kinds is not between veridical experiences and deceptive experiences in 
general, but between relational experiences (veridical and illusory perceptions), and 
non-relational experiences (hallucinations). The point is relationality, rather than 
deceptiveness. 
 
2.4 – A Problem: The 'Function' of Hallucinations 
I have argued that mental states should be teleo-functionally type-individuated, so a 
functional identity is sufficient for sameness in type. Since phenomenal character 
tracks intentional content (see Chapter V)
31
 and content ultimately depends on teleo-
functions, a sameness of functions could account for the sameness of phenomenal 
character, on which indiscriminability is grounded. 
On the other hand, I have proposed a disjunctive treatment of perceptual experiences 
and hallucinations, so the indiscriminability and the commonality of phenomenal 
character between PE and H cannot be sufficient for sameness in type. But if type-
individuation should be based on teleo-functions and phenomenal character is also 
dependent on teleo-functions, is it not incoherent to say that PEs and Hs belong to 
different types of mental state, on the one hand, and that they may share their 
phenomenal character, on the other? Do PEs and Hs have then the very same teleo-
function? But if so, should we not reject any disjunctive treatment of them? 
The objection could be formulated like this: granted that any taxonomy and type-
individuation of mental states should be based on teleo-functional factors
32
, 
presumably also hallucinatory states have the double function of:  
 
1) being a perceptual-representational relation with environmental objects 
2) being an accurate and veridical relation with such environmental objects. 
 
                                                
31 Remember that by content (lower case) I mean the properties the Object is represented as having 
in the PE. The Object is the other component of the Content (upper case), but the Object does not 
determine phenomenal character. While the Content is object-dependent, i.e. it is a de re content, 
the phenomenal character is not. 
32 At least, any taxonomy of perceptual states. One can doubt about the efficacy of a naturalization 
based on a teleo-semantic account of thoughts, beliefs and propositional attitudes in general. But 
perceptual states are more evidently, and less problematically, to be considered as produced by 
functions which are a byproduct of evolution. 
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1) and 2) can be considered to entertain a determinable-determinate relation. 
Although both of them are frustrated functions of H, I have argued so far that being a 
successful or a failed example of a certain teleo-function does not prevent a token to 
be typed according to its function. Indeed what type-individuates a teleo-functional 
state is what it is supposed to do, not what it actually does. Therefore we have a 
problem in justifying why hallucinations and perceptual relations should be told apart 
even if they share their teleo-functional type, since that seems inconsistent with the 
teleo-functional account we have used to criticize radical and anti-intentionalist 
forms of disjunctivism. Wasn't sharing the function sharing the most relevant 
feature? 
The problem should be faced by firstly coming back to the very notion of relational 
teleo-function
33
. A relational function is a function of doing something when some 
external condition occurs. Perceptual functions are relational functions par 
excellence, because they just represent certain external conditions when they occur. 
More precisely, given an object that causes the perception and is its target, the 
perceptual episode represents it as being such and so, say F and G. 
A relational function is just a potential function before being applied to a concrete 
context it is supposed to be set off by. Only the application of the function to a 
certain external circumstance, context or domain of reality can be considered as a 
genuine exercise of it. Before being exerted, a function is just an abstract disposition, 
a potential cognitive reaction to certain circumstances. Now, it is completely 
different from a mechanism to be activated without any pertinent circumstance at all, 
or to be activated by the wrong circumstances. A wrong relation is not an absent 
relation. 
Moreover, the environmental context provides the 'adaptors' which make the general 
function an adapted function, a function applied to a concrete domain of reality. Let 
us make some examples. 
Consider the mimetic function of a chameleon. His skin has the general function of 
[becoming of the color of the background]. Given a certain background – say, a 
certain shade of green – the general function is adapted to the concrete context and 
becomes the function of [becoming of that shade of green]. Provided that the 
                                                
33 Such a notion has been articulated by Millikan 1984.  
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evaluation of accuracy for such a function depends on the fine-grainedness of the 
chromatic adaptability (that depends on the very function of the chromatic 
adaptation, which is that of not having been spotted by certain predators having a 
certain visual acuity and normally being at certain distances, and on and on), but the 
exercise of that general function once adapted to the concrete contexts can be 
successful or unsuccessful. Suppose the chameleon becomes yellowish and makes 
itself more noticeable, then the token-exercise of that general function is inaccurate 
because its accuracy is measured by the contextual domain of reality. It is measured 
by the objective color of the background the function is a function of 'becoming-like'. 
The background in which the animal is actually located is the occasional target of the 
mimetic function, that which measures the success of that relational function. The 
color-change is a real relation between the chameleon's skin and the color of its 
background-space. Given some other conditions – noise, danger, unknown 
environment – the target of that function of [becoming the same color of] causes the 
activation of the function itself, it is an environmental input. The skin has to become 
like that. Now, imagine that the mimetic mechanism is activated without any relation 
to the surroundings, not as a reaction to any environmental stimulus but just because 
of some internal malfunctioning. The activation of a certain relational mechanism 
without the presence of any relatum to which the mechanism is normally supposed to 
react (suppose it is triggered during the night) would not be a genuine exercise of the 
relational function. An exercise of a relational function, be it Bad or Good, would be 
a genuine relation with an environmental target, with a standard domain of 
application. Generally speaking the animal is in a 'mistaken' or incorrect state, 
because a mechanism is triggered for no reason, perhaps with useless dissipation of 
energy and increase of risks. But that would not properly be a wrong exercise of the 
function ", insofar as is a relational function which is exerted only when applied to a 
certain target-domain. Rather, the state is a state that would be an exercise (failed or 
successful) of " if there was a causal context which would work as an 'adaptor'. Such 
a context of application would also be the context of normative evaluation for that 
exercise. Without such a causal context, without a proper environmental 
cause/input/target, the state is not an inaccurate exercise of the relational function, 
rather it is the absence of the exercise of a function, despite the respective 
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mechanism has been triggered which produces tokens of the type normally having 
the function of "-ing. A failure at being a relational function is something radically 
different from a genuine relation which is a failure as such (as a relation). We should 
not confuse an unsuccessful relation with the failure at being a relation. The second 
is a mistake of a higher order, it is not a mistake as a normatively evaluable relation, 
or as a reaction to a certain condition, which is not as it should be. Here there is no 
reaction to external condition at all, neither proper nor improper. It is a sort of meta-
functional mistake, so to speak. 
Consider the digesting function. Digestive apparatus is a very complex mechanism 
composed by many sub-mechanisms which cooperate by implementing sub-
functions that together enable digestion. It is the function of metabolizing or 
processing incoming food. But the digestive apparatus does not have the function of 
being a relation with the food assumed by the animal. Rather, given a certain amount 
and type of food, the digestive apparatus has the function of processing it. Given the 
target, the function is that of reacting to that target in certain appropriate ways. The 
digesting-relation involves the presence of food as its causal, triggering context, there 
is no digesting function of being a relation with the food; rather, to repeat the 
fundamental point, once there is incoming food, then a dedicated mechanism has the 
function of processing it.  Imagine that the digestive process is activated without 
reason when no food is coming in: broadly speaking, that situation would be a 
'mistake' of the mechanism of course, but by no means could that situation be 
compared with one in which the incoming food is being processed in a wrong or 
inaccurate way. In that latter case, the food is the real, normal relatum, the domain of 
reality to which digestion applies. But an activation of the same process without 
incoming food is not a digestive process at all, it is not a genuine exercise of the 
digestive function, neither a Good nor a Bad one. There is no relation with any food, 
so no relational function is exercised, rather a mechanism is improperly activated 
which should have been activated only to exercise a relational function in presence of 
a certain relatum. 
Now consider perceptual experience in the same vein. Perception is a relational 
function such that, given an environmental object which causes the perception, it has 
the function of representing it as being a certain way. Perceptual functions do not 
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include the function of being a causal relation. Rather, given the causal relation with 
the relatum (an object), perceptual states have the function of being a Good relatum, 
so to speak, that of representing their target accurately. That is why hallucinations are 
not perceptual experiences even if they may have some functional analogies with 
them (analogies plausibly responsible for the sameness in phenomenal character). No 
colors, no mimicry; no food, no digestion; no environmental object, no perceptual 
experiences, full stop. 
Illusions and veridical perceptions possess a genuine 'environmental intentionality', 
an aboutness determined by them being real perceptual relations to worldly objects. 
Since their Content is demonstrative, their Object measures their veridicality, so their 
having an Object is the reason why they are semantically evaluable at all. It is about 
their target, that they make certain 'comments', and it is the way their target is, that 
makes these comments veridical or falsidical. 
Despite their subjective indiscriminability and their commonality of phenomenal 
character, perceptual experiences (illusory or veridical) and hallucinations do not 
possess the same nature. They do share certain functions though. Hallucinations are 
also states which 'should' be triggered by a perceived object, so they 'should' be 
perceptual relations but they aren't, they are non-applied functions, non-
demonstrative states, but they exhibit the appearance of perceptual relations because 
the original function of that type of states should have been that of representing the 
surrounding environment. This only potential commonality of basic functions 
account for their commonality of conscious phenomenal character, at least that seems 
to be a very good working-hypothesis.  
Without entering in that delicate topic, I just suggest that it is reasonable to take our 
capacity of having perceptual states with a conscious character (so, subjectively 
accessible and introspectable) as a byproduct of our evolution. Even if it is far from 
clear why certain states have certain phenomenal characters and other states have 
others, it is highly plausible that the tracking-relation between our phenomenal 
character and the objective content of our perceptual states, depends on the value of 
our conscious access to our perceptual states for our lives, for our success in acting, 
planning, reasoning, and so on. Conscious experience track representational 
functions 'for us'. 
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In fact, in case of hallucination the phenomenal character is still made out of 
representational properties, but nothing environmental is represented as having these 
properties. That opens what I have called (in Chapter III, Section 2.5) the Problem of 
Semantic Gap, which I will face now. 
 
2.5 – The Semantic Gap of Hallucinatory Contents 
2.5.1 Introducing the Problem  
Hallucinations exhibit a presentational phenomenology just like veridical 
experiences (and illusions). Their conscious character of 'felt reality' needs to be 
given an explanation within an intentionalist view. If hallucinating is sensorily 
entertaining a content which is not exemplified, what is then exemplified or at least 
'present before the mind' when one is hallucinating? What is the hallucinatory 




Besides that phenomenological issue, there is a related semantical issue, concerning 
the very content of hallucination. A very peculiar semantic structure, different from 
that of perceptual experiences, needs to be assigned to Hs. Indeed, according to the 
Singularity Thesis I have defended (see Chapter III, Section 2.4) the Content of 
perceptual experiences contains worldly particulars, so it is a de re, demonstrative 
content. But hallucinations are not perceptual experiences, even if they seem to be 
such because of their tricky PE-like phenomenology. They have no Object, so they  
must be taken to have no Content but rather just content. There are properties 
represented, but there is no worldly Object these properties as represented as 
belonging to. So, if PE's Content is object-dependent and H's Content is not, what 
does determine the accuracy-conditions of Hs? Of what are hallucinatory comments 
veridical or falsidical, what do they match or mismatch with, in not with an Object?
35
 
In fact, hallucinations intuitively seem to be mistaken or inaccurate states. In order to 
                                                
34 See Smith 2002, 224-5: “We need to be able to account for the perceptual attention that may be 
present in hallucination. A hallucinating subject may, for example, be mentally focusing on 
another element in a hallucinated scene, and then another, describing in minute detail what he is 
aware of. In what sense is this merely 'mock'? […] The sensory features of the situation need to be 
accounted for. How can this be done if such subjects are denied an object of awareness?”. On the 
topic of attention in hallucination, see also the remarks of Johnston 2004. 
35 The scheme proposed in Chapter III, Section 2.5, makes the problem visible. Hallucinations have 
no Content. 
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be such they must have a semantic content, but their content cannot have the object-
dependent semantic structure of the PE's Content. What does make Hs inaccurate or 
falsidical, if they are such at all, provided that the accuracy of PEs can be 
semantically evaluated only because their content is de re? If the Singularity Thesis 
is true for PE, we have an asymmetry with hallucinatory contents that needs to be 
accounted for. How can an Object-less sensory content be semantically evaluable? If 
hallucinations have instead a general and not object-involving content, why should 
the Generality Thesis not hold also for PEs? That is the Semantic Gap Problem, 
which I will treat in what follows. 
 
2.5.2 – Perceptual Content and Perceptual Awareness 
Intuitively a H that shared its conscious character with your actual experience would 
share with the latter also its phenomenology of 'felt reality' (Smith 2002, Siegel 
2008) or 'bodily presence' (Husserl 1900). Hs have a presentational phenomenology, 
just like VPs and Is. This intuition can be made explicit and embedded into a 
principle we can call Principle of Item-Awareness, following Pautz 2007: 
 





IA may lead to Sense-Data theory, if that S is aware of is identified with a mental 
object
37
. Given the possibility of illusions and hallucinations, what S is always aware 
of when having a visual experience cannot be mind-independent objects and 
properties, since in illusions some properties you seem to see are not actually there, 
in hallucinations the very object you seem to see as having certain properties is not 
there either (so neither the putative object nor 'its' putative properties are there). By 
                                                
36 Actually I consider 'visual' a determinate of the determinable 'perceptual', so a hallucination cannot 
be a visual experience, insofar as it is not a perceptual experience. Here by visual it is to be mean 
“as of visual”, or having the subjective character normally bona fide visual experiences have. 
Visual experiences are seeing-episodes indeed. 
37 IA is not identical to the principle Robinson 1994, 31, calls Phenomenal Principle (PP): “If there 
sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possess a particular sensible quality then there 
is something of which the subject is aware which possess that sensible quality”. IA just says that in 
having a sensible appearance you are aware of something, PP says that if you have an experience 
as if something has a certain property, there must be an object that actually possesses that property. 
PP naturally leads to sense-data, IA is neutral about whether the 'something' you are aware of is an 
object having the property it seems to you something has in experiencing, or anything else. 
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generalizing the case of H and I, Sense-Data theorists conclude by generalization that 
in visually experiencing we are always (at least directly) aware of Sense-Data, even 
in case we are veridically perceiving (see Chapter II, Section 1.1.3). 
As already noticed
38
, the Content View has been proposed – firstly, in the Belief-
Theory version – as a way out from the unsatisfactory alternative between Sense-
Datum theories and Direct Realism. If also visual hallucinations make us aware of 
something (IA), then what visual experiences as such make us aware of cannot be 
mind-independent items; since it cannot be sense-data either – given their 
extravagant ontology, their indeterminacy, and other problematic properties – what 
visual experiences make us aware of must have to do with the represented content, 
which for the intentionalist version of CV determines the phenomenal character of 
the visual experience, namely its being a state of conscious awareness. 
A visual experience purports to present the subject with objects and features. Such a 
purporting-to-present nature of visual experience is analyzed by CV in terms of 
representing things as being a certain way. But the content of a veridical experience 
is not its Object. The Object of your VP is the perceived worldly object you become 
aware of, together with its properties (those your VP veridically attributes to it). That 
Object it is part of the object-dependent Content, so in consciously entertaining the 
Content of a PE we do become aware of its Object, besides becoming aware of 
certain properties it possesses (those properties your PE veridically represents it as 
having = the content of the PE). 
According to certain versions of intentionalism, the items you are aware of in H are 
particulars which do not exist, so-called Meinongian objects
39
. When visually 
hallucinating a pink rat, you do see a pink rat, a bona fide particular you can 
demonstratively refer to, attend to, explore and so on; it's just that it does not exist, 
which is why you are said to be hallucinating it instead of perceiving it. So, there is a 
particular pink rat you are aware of, though a non-existent one. The Singularity 
Thesis can be straightforwardly maintained if we go Meinongian. Visual experience 
                                                
38 See this chapter, Section 1.2.1; Chapter II, Section 1.3. 
39 According to Meinongianism (see Meinong 1904, Parsons 1980) there are some objects that exist 
and some that do not: intentional objects, imagined objects, desired objects, fictional objects are of 
the second kind. A hallucination has a Meinongian object, indeed it is about a particular which 
does not exists. The Meinongian ontology has been applied to solve the puzzle of hallucination 
firstly by Grossman 1974 (131ff.) and then by Smith 2002, chapter. 8.  
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always involves particulars, but sometimes – when we hallucinate – these particulars 
that are involved in our experience do not exist. Existence is to be meant as a 
property that only certain particulars possess. 
I do not want to discuss in too much detail the difficulties of that extravagant 
'solution'. It is not clear to me whether such a version of CV is really different from 
sense-data theory. Is the non-existent rat mind-dependent or mind-independent? If it 
is mind-independent (so it is not a sense-datum), is it causing my very experience of 
it, as existent objects of perceptual experiences are expected to do? Could a non-
existent rat ever cause anything? In addition, Meinongian particulars inherit all the 
puzzling problems had by sense-data, for example their indeterminacy
40
, their bizarre 
ontological status
41
, and so on
42
. Introducing an ad hoc ontology does not look that 
promising. 
Smith 2002 courageously advocates the Meinongian solution but he adds that the 
awareness-relation of H with non-existent particulars should be understood neither 
ontologically nor semantically but phenomenologically. Such a restriction seems to 
be very reasonable, but at the same time it apparently makes the proposal a re-
description of the problem rather than a solution of it: the “phenomenology of 
singularity” exhibited by hallucinations is not under discussion indeed. No one 
denies that in H it is phenomenologically as if we became aware of particulars, that is 
but the problem itself, not the solution. Given that we seem to be aware of something 
when hallucinating, what are we aware of in fact? If the answer is that we are aware 
of Meinongian particulars phenomenologically meant, are we saying something more 
than that hallucinations have a presentational phenomenology in which it seems to 
the subject she is becoming aware of seen particulars? Moreover, I am trying to 
address the Semantic Gap Problem, which is interwoven with the phenomenological 
                                                
40 Smith 2002, 247 gets rid of the problem by pointing that Meinongian objects do not exist, so we 
should not worry about their indeterminacy. I find that answer unsatisfactory. After all positing 
non-existing objects as objects of awareness in hallucination, does not avoid the original puzzle: 
“how can one be aware of something which does not exist?”. For arguments in favour of 
Meinongianism, see also McGinn 2004. 
41 Where are they, for example? One could reply: “well, they are nowhere, since they do not exist, so 
where is the problem?” The problem is exactly that if they do not exist, they cannot do the 
ontological and semantic job of being genuine relata of a subject-world relation. They are neither 
'into' the mind (otherwise they would be sense-data) nor in the world (otherwise they would exist 
and have causal powers).  
42 A criticism of the Meinongian solution to the puzzle of the hallucinatory object is to be found in 
Pautz 2007. 
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issue, but which concerns the gappy Contents of hallucinations and their apparent 
lack of evaluability. If a PE is accurate/inaccurate only insofar as it has a worldly 
object – that may or may not be the way the PE represents it to be – how can a 
Meinongian object make the hallucination accuracy-evaluable at all? Ex hypothesi 
the Meinongian object is the way the H represents it to be (the non-existent rat is 
pink). If that non-existent particular did the semantic job the perceived object does in 
perceptual experiences (veridical or illusory), than Hs would well be  de re states 
with the same semantic structure as PEs, but unfortunately they would be always 
true. Indeed, a PE is veridical when its Object is the way the PE represents it as 
being. But the Meinongian hallucinated rat is pink, so the respective hallucination, as 
any other H, is accurate and veridical! 
Such an outrageous result makes me conclude that Meinongianism on hallucinatory 
contents is either a truistic escamotage for hiding a problem by re-stating it another 
way, or it is a bad solution of the problem, since it does not does justice of the 
intuitive inaccuracy of hallucinatory contents. 
Now, the problem of Semantic Gap for H is: how can a H have accuracy-conditions 
at all if it is Objectless, since at least no normal worldly object is there to measure the 
accuracy of the H, i.e. since H lacks an object whose actual properties could be 
matched or mismatched by the 'comments' the H makes? On what object-topic does 
the H make its comments? On nothing at all? 
Instead, the Item Awareness issue is for H is: what are we aware of in H, if by 
definition we are not aware of any worldly objects? The H's lack of an object must be 
somehow consistently reconciled with the phenomenological appearance that in H 
you are aware of 'something' after all (Item Awareness Issue), as well as with the 
intuition that Hs have fully-fledged accuracy-conditions which make them evaluable 
as inaccurate (Semantic Gap Problem). Both phenomenologically and semantically, 
'something' seems to do the job the worldly Object does in PE (veridical or not). 
Of course there is an intimate connection between the topic of Item Awareness in 
hallucination and the topic of hallucinatory contents. Before facing the Semantic Gap 
problem, let us then continue to consider the Item Awareness Issue for a more 
moment, because inquiring the latter will be of help in treating the first, as we will 
see soon. 
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Having left behind the Meinongian proposal as patently inadequate, another more 
promising idea is that when hallucinating we become aware of properties, if not of 
particular objects. That is a more attractive option
43
. So the Principle of Item 
Awareness holds, but in H we are aware just of properties and never of particular 
objects. Let us call it the Property View. 
When veridically perceiving we become aware of the perceived objects as well as of 
their properties, through representing them accurately. The perceived object is the 
way our experience represents it to be, so veridically perceiving it makes us aware 
both of it and of the properties it actually instantiates. VP are episodes of object-
awareness and property-awareness at a time.  
When having an illusion, we become aware of a perceived object, but (some of) the 
properties that it looks to have according to our PE are not instantiated by it. Now, 
are we aware of the properties the perceived object look to have, even if these 
properties are not instantiated by the object? 
When hallucinating, it is as if we were seeing a particular, and it is as if we were 
becoming aware of certain properties of that putative particular. Provided that we are 
not aware of any particular, are we aware at least of the properties our H attribute to 
the putative object it purports to present us with? In the illusory and in the 
hallucinatory case, there are properties our experience represents, which are not 
instantiated by any perceived object. In the illusory case, the experience represents 
the perceived object as having such properties, so it is inaccurate and falsidical 
because of the way the worldly object actually is. In the hallucinatory case, we also 
have the semantic problem of justifying inaccuracy. Illusions pose a 
phenomenological problem (Item Awareness), hallucinations pose also a semantic 
problem (Item Awareness and Semantic Gap) in addition. 
Thus, even if we take it that in H we aware of properties – following the Property 
View – the Semantic Gap Problem would not disappear as a result. Although, this 
view about Item Awareness in H could be a way toward a satisfactory treatment of it. 
Let us see if it is the case. 
According to Dretske, Tye and Johnston
44
, in hallucination we are aware of a “cluster 
                                                
43 See Dretske 1999, Johnston 2004, Tye 2005. The view is deeply analyzed and discussed by Pautz 
2007. 
44 See also Foster 2000 and Forrest 2005. 
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of uninstantiated properties” (Dretske 1999, 102), a set of “properties with no bearer” 
(Tye 2005, 169),  “of uninstantiated sensible profiles” (Johnston 2004, 135). The 
idea – which can be spelled out in different ways
45
 – is that in H we are not aware of 
objects but the phenomenal character of 'felt reality' depends on a complex of 
properties our H represents as being instantiated and of which we are aware. Such 
properties we are aware of in H are uninstantiated universals (Dretske 1999), which 
misleadingly seem to us to be instantiated by something. So, in H we are aware of no 
particulars at all but only of universals or uninstantiated properties, but it just seems 
to us that we are aware of particulars. Our H subjectively seems to be a PE. A cluster 
of uninstantiated properties (ex. [red] and [round], [small], [smooth] and so on) we 
are phenomenally aware of can make us wrongly take our state as the factive 
awareness of a particular apple, but there is no apple there we are aware of instead: 
the hallucinated 'apple' is not a particular – not even a Meinongian particular – but a 
cluster of uninstantiated properties. I add that such clusters must be thought of as 
structured: visually hallucinating a red circle on a green square is not the same as 
hallucinating a green circle on a red square, even if the two Hs involve the same 
properties [red], [green], [circle], [square]. Each of the two Hs makes us aware 
respectively of a different Structured Property Complex, even if these complexes are 
made out of the same (uninstantiated) properties. The phenomenal character of a H is 
determined by the properties the subject is aware of, and by the specific way they are 
related in the Structured Complex in which they are involved (and by the distinctive 
Mode, ex. Visual). Such structured complexes of universals are all we are visually 
aware of in H. On the contrary, in PE we are aware also of the particular objects 
which instantiate the properties, at least of those objects which our PEs represent as 
having certain properties. In illusion we are aware of genuine particulars and 
uninstantiated universals, in hallucination we are aware just of uninstantiated 
universals. 
Such a view is consistent with the disjunctive treatment that contrasts PE with H. 
Whilst in PEs we are genuinely related to worldly objects and we become aware of 
these objects through perceiving them with their properties, in Hs we only seem to be 
related to worldly particulars having certain properties, therefore we only seem to be 
                                                
45 See Pautz 2007 for a careful consideration of the many options on the market. 
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aware of particulars, but we are aware only of structured complexes of uninstantiated 
properties. The presentational phenomenology and the phenomenology of singularity 
possessed by H are misleading features of H, due to the fact that Hs seem to be PEs. 
I have argued that hallucinations have a positive phenomenal character that they 
share with veridical and illusory perceptions, contrary to what radical DJ holds. 
Since I have also argued for the Singularity Thesis, hallucinations have an Object-
less, 'gappy' content, made out of intentional properties, the properties that the 
hallucinatory experience, if it was a perception, would represent its Object as having. 
But Hs do not represent any object as having certain properties. Rather, in 
hallucinating it introspectively seems to us that we are aware of an object, and it also 
seems that such a putative object is represented as having certain properties. H's 
phenomenal character is determined by these represented properties, i.e. by the 
content. That content would be part of an object-dependent Content, if the 
hallucination was a perception, if it was what it subjectively seems. 
All that means that the phenomenal character does depend on represented (structured 
complexes of) properties in such a way that it is independent on whether such 
properties are instantiated by particulars or not. Phenomenal character of visual 
experience is then object-independent, even if our experience is not neutral about 
whether there is an object which has these properties. In visually experiencing it does 
seem to you that you are aware of particulars having these properties, but if you are 
hallucinating it does wrongly seem to you so. 
It is opportune not to hide that such an account of property-based phenomenal 
character is not fully satisfactory. What does it mean 'being aware of uninstantiated 
universals'? Is positing an awareness of uninstantiated universals a 
phenomenologically apt account of phenomenal character of hallucinations (as well 
as of perceptual experiences)? Can the 'felt reality' and the feeling of 'bodily 
presence' be explained by the awareness of universals? How can an awareness of 
universals exhibit a sensuous character? Could I be aware of an universal [greyness] 
if my actual PE was a hallucination of my laptop? How can I be aware of something 
which is not instantiated anywhere?
46
 
                                                
46 We cannot say that the universal of [grey] is instantiated in my mind: at that point it would be 
natural to re-introduce a mental object that instantiates the property, so rather than an 
uninstantiated universal it would be better thought of as a property instantiated by a sense-datum. 
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However, at least that is a tentative explanation of the hallucinatory phenomenal 
character and of its indiscriminability from the phenomenal character of veridical 
perceptions. Other views on perception are not in a better position to explain this. As 
we have seen, DJ-cum-NR leaves such indiscriminability as an insuperable mystery 
and has nothing substantive to say about the positive conscious character of 
hallucinations, a Content View that is committed to Meinongian objects is 
ontologically unsatisfactory and does not account for inaccuracy of hallucinations, a 
Content View which reduces hallucinatory objects of awareness to beliefs – on the 
lines of the Belief-Theory – is even more phenomenologically implausible, and so 
on. 
Another radical solution is that of rejecting the very Item Awareness Principle (IA), 
namely, denying that whenever you have a visual experience you are aware of 
something. In ruling out particulars but accepting uninstantiated properties as 
hallucinatory objects of awareness, the Property View tries to account for 
hallucinations on the light on IA, which does appear to be intuitively true. But if that 
intuition was unreliable, then we would have no need of committing to the idea that 
there must be some item we are aware of in hallucination. That is the radical view 
explicitly hold by Pautz 2007, and already endorsed by Evans 1982: in hallucination 
you are not aware of any 'item' at all, neither particulars nor properties
47
. Where 
does IA's prima facie plausibility come from then? 
According to Pautz, the intuition in favor of IA embeds the same mistake into which 
sense-data theorists have been trapped: the need of hypostatize the sensory content 
into 'items' you are supposed to be in genuine contact with. Instead of mental objects, 
the Property-View (as a version of the Content View which accepts IA) postulates 
that in H you are aware of uninstantiated properties on the basis of the following 
reasoning: since there are no worldly objects in H you are aware of (by definition), 
but in H you must be aware of some 'item' (IA), then you must be aware at least of 
the properties your H represent a putative object as having. The reasoning is the same 
                                                                                                                                     
We would be back to the sense-data theory with all its puzzles. 
47 See Evans 1982, 199ff: “[...] when a person hallucinates, so that it appears to him he is 
confronting, say, a bus, then, whether or not he is taken in by the appearances, there is literally 
nothing before his mind”. The appearance of having something before the mind does not entail 
that there must be something before the mind (not even something 'mental'). Rather, “to 
hallucinate is precisely to be in a condition in which it seems right to the hallucinator to say that he 
is actually confronting something”.  
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as that which led to the position of sense-data, even if now it posits ontologically 
more plausible 'items' (uninstantiated properties) than sense-data. 
But sensorily entertaining a content is not the same as being aware of 'items' that 
content is made out of. Having an H as of a red and round object, amounts to 
sensorily entertaining a certain content involving the properties [red] and [round], 
not to being aware of these properties. Bearing a relation to a content, for a given 
conscious state, does not amount to bearing an awareness-relation to the properties 
that content is the representation of. We are not aware of contents in the same way in 
which we are aware of objects and properties. Objects and properties can be 
represented by contentful states, they do not need to be object of awareness for a 
subject having those conscious contentful states
48
. The relation of 'being represented' 
is not the relation of 'being object of awareness'. My belief can represent unicorns as 
moving, but I do not need to be aware either of unicorns or of the property of 
movement, in order to have the belief. Rather, I need to entertain that content, so to 
represent unicorns and movement, but just in the same way in which I am not aware 
of any unicorn (they do not exist indeed) I am not aware of their movement either, 
nor am I aware of the [movement]-property, even if I exert the respective concept.  
If we drop IA, then we can allow that in hallucination we are not aware either of 
particulars or of properties. Awareness is to be thought of as a factive or implicative 
relation: if you are aware of X, then X is there as a genuine object of your awareness. 
On the contrary, representation is not factive or implicative. If your experience 
represents F, not only does it not mean that F exists, but it does not mean either that 
F is a genuine object of your awareness.  
So hallucinated properties are not properties you are aware of, rather they are 
represented properties, properties your hallucination represent as being instantiated 
and which then seem to you 'items' you are aware of. Just as the rat you hallucinate is 
not something you are aware of, also its pinkness is not something you are aware of, 
even if in hallucinating you entertain a content involving the attribution of pinkness 
to something. The phenomenal character of a VP makes you conscious of objects and 
properties, even if it is not something you are sensorily conscious of; the phenomenal 
character of an H fails at making you conscious of objects and properties, but it is not 
                                                
48 Even though in case of perceptual contents the Object is a constituent of the Content itself. 
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something you are sensorily conscious of. You do not 'see' your visual phenomenal 
character the way you see objects and properties, or the way it phenomenally seem to 
you to see objects and properties. On this basis, you self-ascribe a certain content to 
your experience, but that self-ascription is done by looking at the world, or at what 
seems to you to be the world according to your experience. In order to self-ascribe an 
experience with a certain content (made out of properties represented as instantiated 
by a putative object) on the basis of being in a certain conscious state, you do not 
need to see that conscious state itself, so of being sensuously aware of the very same 
conscious state of sensory awareness
49
.  
Instead of being aware of items in H, we consciously entertain a content that can be 
ascribed to our experience insofar as that experience has a certain phenomenal 
character. Our being in a state with a certain conscious character puts us in a position 
to self-ascribe a state with a given content, but we do not 'see' the phenomenal 
character of our experience with an inner eye. Since we do not come to grasp the 
content of our experience by innerly perceiving the very experiences we have, there 
is no need to think that in order to consciously entertain a content we must be aware 
of the properties that our experience represents as instantiated by something
50
. 
Rather, we are aware of these properties only when the experience is veridical, so the 
properties are instantiated by a perceived object and then experience makes us 
factively conscious of them. 
An experience exhibits a distinctive phenomenal character: in having the experience, 
you are in a state of awareness which has a phenomenal character, instead of being 
sensuously aware of your experience, or of its phenomenal character. You are aware 
of 'items' (objects and properties) only when they are exemplified, otherwise you 
enjoy a conscious state with such a phenomenal character that puts you in a position 
to self-ascribe an experience with a certain content. Sensorily entertaining a given 
content, for an experience with a certain phenomenal character, does not involve 
                                                
49 As Evans writes “there is no informational state which stands to the internal state as that internal 
state stands to the state of the world” (Evans 1982, 227-8). When it visually seems to you as if 
things are such and so, you self-ascribe a conscious perception with a content, but you do not 'see' 
either your own perception or its content, rather you self-ascribe your experience on the basis of 
what it seems to you to be there. 
50 That difference between 'sensorily entertaining a content' and 'being aware of items' is articulated 
by Pautz 2007. I have benefited of the reading of the PhD Thesis by Conor McHugh, Self-
knowledge in Consciousness (Edinburgh, 2008). 
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being aware of the properties and objects which would satisfy that content, were the 
experience veridical. Only when the content is satisfied, are you aware of such 
objects and properties. No need to be “aware of uninstantiated properties” in having 
an H with a certain content, you only need to be in a phenomenal state whose 
properties are the properties your H represents as being instantiated. To repeat the 
point, the properties your H represents as being instantiated do not need to be 
properties you are aware of. If you become aware of the represented properties of 
your hallucination, it is just because you self-ascribe an experience with a certain 
content. But that self-awareness – the awareness that you are having an experience 
with a certain phenomenal character and with a certain content – is not a sensory 
awareness anymore, rather it is a conceptualization of your sensory state and 
involves belief that you are having a state such-and-so
51
. The phenomenal character 
can well be made out of intentional properties given under a Mode – see Chapter III, 
Section 3 – even if one is not aware of these intentional properties and of the Mode 
itself. Rather, these properties given under a Mode are what make your state a 
conscious state with a certain phenomenal character, not something you are sensorily 
conscious of. 
To conclude that survey of the available options: if we accept IA, the “items” we are 
aware of in H can be either particulars or properties or both. Particulars could be 
sense-data or Meinongian objects, so within the Content View if H involves 
awareness of particulars it must involve awareness of Meinongian, non-existent 
particulars. But Meinongianism on hallucinatory content is implausible, not only 
because Meinongian objects are ontologically problematic just as classical sense-
data are, but also because such a view would entail that hallucinations are a priori 
accurate, which is absurd. It remains as the only plausible option that the items we 
are aware of in H are properties. Since in H we do not see anything actually having 
the properties we are aware of, these  properties H makes us aware of must be 
Structured Complexes of Uninstantiated Universals. That view is 
phenomenologically unsatisfactory, and poses some problems. It is not clear what it 
could be for a sensuous state to involve the awareness of, say, the universal [red] and 
[round]. Nonetheless, no other view on perceptual experience does any better, so that 
                                                
51 On that view on perceptual introspection, see Evans 1982, cap. 7; Dretske 1995, cap. 2; Tye 1995. 
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perfectible account is better than nothing. 
Another possibility is that of denying the Item Awareness Principle and holding that 
in Hs we are not aware of anything, either particulars or properties. Rather we 
consciously entertain a content such that we are in a position to self-ascribe an 
experience which, if it was veridical, would involve the awareness of certain objects 
and properties. That view entails a rejection of a perception-model of perceptual 
introspection. In introspecting your perceptual experience you do not become 
sensorily aware of the phenomenal character of your own experience – rather, your 
experience is a conscious state because it exhibits a phenomenal character, and you 
are in that state – but you judgmentally self-ascribe an experience with a certain 
character and content, on the basis of how things seem to be to you on the basis of 
that experience. That means that having a sensory state with a certain conscious 
character and content, and introspecting it, does not mean being aware of that 
character and content as 'items' you have a quasi-perception of. You cannot perceive 
your own perceptual state, its character and its content (where perceiving entails an 
awareness-relation), rather you can become judgmentally conscious of the fact that 
you are having a visual experience having a certain conscious character and a content 
(a content you entertain instead of being aware of it). 
I find that account very convincing, but it is true that it entails a specific model of 
perceptual introspection that could not by easily shared by many. In any case, the 
only palatable alternative is that in H we are aware of uninstantiated properties: the 
choice between the two alternatives also depends on how we interpret the 'awareness 
relation'. If we allow that we are aware of the contents of our experiences, so of the 
properties represented by the experiences as being instantiated by something, then 
we can buy the Property-View, but we should keep in mind that we are adopting a 
loose notion of awareness, which in any case is not the same factive notion according 
to which we say that in veridical perceptions we become aware of worldly objects 
and properties. If we reject the Item Awareness principle, then we reserve the 
awareness to worldly objects and properties, so that hallucinations do not make us 
aware of anything. Hallucinations seem to be states of Item-Awareness but they 
aren't, they are deceptive both about the world and about themselves. That fits well 
with our moderately disjunctive version of the Content View. Either Hs seem to 
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make us aware of particulars and instantiated properties but they only make us aware 
of Structured Complexes of uninstantiated Universals (Property-View with IA), or 
Hs seems to make aware of particulars and properties instantiated by them, but they 
do not make us aware of anything at all (Rejection of IA). Both ways are plausible 
and present certain virtues. I do not want to argue for one or other option. 
Independently of which of the accounts one prefers, what remains to be treated is the 
Semantic Gap Problem. Indeed in both accounts it is accepted that in H we are not 
aware of worldly particulars, so the content of H cannot be object-dependent. How 
can H be accuracy-evaluable and inaccurate? 
Here is a proposal compatible with our moderate disjunctivism: hallucinations, 
strictly speaking, lack proprietary accuracy-conditions so they are not inaccurate 
either, rather they are neither accurate nor inaccurate just because there is no worldly 
object they represent as having the properties they represent, no object having 
properties which could be matched with the hallucinatory content. Hallucinatory 
content is essentially gappy, it is like a potential singular proposition where the box 
for the singular term is empty. There is no truth- or accuracy-maker, in other words. 
So there is not even inaccuracy. Hs make comments on no particular worldly topic. 
But on the other side, hallucinations have a cognitive role, just like veridical 
experiences. They result in perceptual beliefs, and also in pre-doxastic 'stands' 
towards the environment
52
 which orient behaviour, intentions, desires, planning, 
reasoning and so on. The cognitive effects of an hallucination (due the the original 
function of this type of state) – their causal and cognitive role in the economy of 
one's mental life – are the same as those of a certain veridical perception with the 
same content. 
When I hallucinate a pink rat, there is nothing in the environment that I mistake for a 
pink item and for a rat. But I subjectively seem to be presented with a particular, and 
my state subjectively seems to attribute to 'that' putative particular the [being a rat] 
                                                
52 Also non-conceptual beings can hallucinate, and the apparent inaccuracy of their state needs an 
account which does not appeal to beliefs. But there are cognitive stands toward the environment which 
are pre-doxastic, for example the acts of 'seeing-as' which I have investigated in Chapter I, Section 4. 
Hallucinating animals have inaccurate stands toward the environment, but their hallucinatory state is 
not inaccurate in itself, since its Content is gappy. Their mistake has to do with the cognitive effects 
and consequences of the hallucinatory state: on the basis of their H they come to represent the 
environment wrongly, but the hallucination in itself is not a representation of any environmental 
object. 
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and the [pink] properties. My H is indiscriminable from a PE, so I introspectively 
mistake my state for a state of another nature. In particular, I mistake a non-
relational, non-object-dependent and non-accuracy-evaluable state for a relational, 
accuracy-evaluable and object-dependent state. That mistake makes me take a 
cognitive stand toward my surrounding environment – consisting of beliefs and 
perhaps other more basic belief-like states – which is accuracy-evaluable, it is 
inaccurate. These representations, which are  typical cognitive effects of the 
hallucinatory state, have a general content. For example “there is a pink rat there, 
which is moving in that direction”. Of course I can believe a representation to be 
demonstratively referring to “that” pink rat there, but my act is a failed act of 
demonstration, grounded on a false belief about there being a particular I am seeing. 
A failed act of demonstration is not an act of demonstration, rather something which 
I take to be such but which fails at being such.  
When having a H we also form immediate (not inference-based) beliefs that: a) we 
are having a VP b) we are aware of particulars which are presented as being such-
and-so. Both beliefs are wrong, the one about the nature of our state and the one 
about what is there in the world and how it is arranged. But the hallucination is not 
inaccurate in itself, rather it is mistaken for an accuracy-evaluable state because it is 
subjectively indiscriminable from a state of that kind. 
So the intuition of inaccuracy of hallucination is vindicated and accounted for in two 
ways: 1) by arguing that it is a wrong intuition after all, since Hs are not accuracy-
evaluable as they seem to be 2) by explaining why that intuition is so strong and 
apparently compelling. It is such because a cascade of immediate and 
psychologically compelling cognitive effects of H (beliefs and pre-doxastic cognitive 
stands) make us take the environment as being a certain way, so we are in an 
inaccurate state. The inaccuracy is of the states is immediately dependent on the H, 
not of the H itself.  
 
To sum up the discussion above: in H either we are aware of uninstantiated 
properties or we are not aware or anything. Without having to take a definitive stand 
toward these two options, what matters for the Semantic Gap Problem is that in any 
case hallucinatory states do not involve awareness of particulars. Accordingly, Hs 
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have gappy contents without Objects, and that makes them not accuracy-available. 
The Semantic Gap Problem must be treated by recognizing that gappy nature of 
hallucinatory contents, in the first place, and by doing two more things: firstly, we 
must recognize that the intuition in favor of the inaccuracy of H is wrong, secondly, 
we need to account for the compelling appearance of the intuition. The apparent  
inaccuracy of Hs depends on the cognitive effects of them: they result in beliefs and 
other cognitive stands toward the surrounding environment, which are inaccurate. So 
Hs are not inaccurate, but typically produce inaccurate states. 
 
2.6 Beyond The Detachment Problem  
2.6.1 The Content View and the Detachment Problem 
In Section 1.2 on this Chapter I have introduced the Detachment Problem, then I 
have argued that the different reasons adduced by most disjunctivists against the 
Content View – problems CV would entail and which allegedly could be solved only 
by abandoning CV in favor of a non-CV version of DJ – are all amenable to the 
Detachment Problem. I have grouped these reasons into phenomenological, 
epistemological, semantical, and metaphysical reasons.  
Now that I have developed a moderately disjunctive version of the Content View, I 
will come back to these problems and argue that the above articulated version of the 
Content View can well meet the demand of Cognitive Contact, so it can avoid the 
various difficulties I have grouped under the idea of Detachment Problem. As a 
result, a moderately disjunctive version of the Content View appears to be the most 
promising view also in addressing those problems that some disjunctivists wrongly 
take to be intrinsic to CV as such. Not only does the idea that perceptual experience 
is representation not prevent veridical experiences from being episodes of genuine 
contact with the world, but in addition, the representational view on perceptual 
experience is the only view which puts us in a position to satisfactorily explain how 
that contact can be possible at all. 
 
2.6.2 Phenomenology 
The phenomenology of perceptual experience exhibits the properties of 
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transparency, actuality, immediacy and singularity. According to DJ
53
, the Content 
View cannot allow that perceptual phenomenology gets things right with these 
properties, not even in the Good case. Indeed, if perceptual experience was 
representational, it could not involve the genuine presentation of the subject with the 
world, the direct contact to an actual world bodily present and disclosed by the PE to 
the subject. If PEs were representations, they could not be manifestative, world-
revealing episodes. Thanks to the disjunctive treatment of the Good and the Bad, we 
should go Direct Realist about the Good cases and abandon CV. In addition – they 
argue – not only is Direct Realism phenomenologically apt, but it also captures the 
commonsensical intuitions about what we seem to be doing when we perceptually 
experience the world and have it simply 'in view' before us. 
Now, transparency is compatible with an intentionalist version of CV, on which the 
phenomenal properties are properties represented as had by something. I have argued 
for an impure intentionalism about phenomenal character (see Chapter IV, Section 
3), on which the phenomenal character is determined by the represented properties 
plus the Mode. In attending to your PE you will attend to the objects and features 
which your PE purports to present you with. CV analyzes that purporting-to-present 
relation in terms of representing: the properties your PE represents the (putatively) 
perceived object as having, are the properties you attend to in introspecting your PE. 
Also attending to illusions and hallucinations is attending to the purportedly 
presented objects and to the ways in which your experience represents them as being. 
On the moderately disjunctive version of CV I have been proposing, in H you only 
attend to represented properties
54
, but you wrongly seem to attend to particulars 
which instantiate these properties. So, VP, I and H are transparent, but in 
introspecting VP you attend to the properties your experience veridically represents 
the perceived object as having; in I you attend to the properties your experience 
falsidically represent the object as having; and in hallucination you falsely seem to 
attend to properties instantiated by an object you falsely seem to be in perceptual 
                                                
53 In that context, with the label 'DJ' I will refer only to these forms of disjunctivism (like Radical 
Disjunctivism cum Naïve Realism) that are incompatible with the Content View, namely, to the 
anti-intentionalist disjunctivism. 
54 If we buy the Property-View, on which in H we are aware of uninstantiated properties, then in H 
we attend to properties even if 'attending to' is used factively, as 'being-aware of'. Otherwise, if we 
deny the Item Awareness Principle and at the same time interpret 'attending-to' relation as a factive 
one, then in H you seem to attend to properties but you do not attend to anything.  
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contact with. 
It is true that perceptual phenomenology is presentational, it is true that in deceptive 
experience our mistake is not only about the world but also about our own 
experience. Illusions and hallucination introspectively seem to be episodes of 
presentation but they aren't
55
. Veridical perceptions seem to be episodes of 
presentation and they are such. The opposition presentation/representation is a 
misleading and unnecessary opposition. In fact, the Content View does not have to 
deny that in veridical perception we are genuinely presented with the world. The 
representational episode the PE consists of, is just the way in which we manage to be 
presented with our surrounding world. 
As I have argued for, the Good/Bad explanatory, conceptual and metaphysical 
asymmetry is entailed at least by a teleo-semantic version of CV (which I find 
particularly promising). The Bad case needs to be characterized by reference to the 
Good case. A visual experience as of [a's being F] is an experience that looks just 
like an episode of seeing a's being F, so of being in 'genuine contact' with the object 
a and the property F instantiated by it. Successfully representing an object as having 
a property, for a visual experience, just amounts to being genuinely presented with 
the object and with its property. Representations are not veils between us and the 
world, they are episodes which make it possible at all for us to be in cognitive 
contact with the surrounding world.  
Therefore, it is not true that CV must be an error-theory with respect to the 
phenomenology of immediacy, actuality and singularity. The apparent immediacy or 
actuality of PE is not a systematic mistake, rather it is a mistake only when we have 
deceptive experiences, which do not do what they seem to do. When I have a PE it 
seems to me that I have the world in view in its bodily presence, manifested to me. 
That seeming is reliable when my PE is veridical, it is also reliable when my PE 
involves an illusion. Indeed, I am in real contact with environmental objects, 
although for some respects it looks different from the way it is. When my PE 
veridically represent the object O as being F, my PE manages to make me aware of O 
as well as of F as instantiated by O. Veridical experiences do make me conscious of 
worldly objects and features. Their being representational episodes does not prevent 
                                                
55 To be more precise, illusions are episodes of presentation of an object, even if the object is 
wrongly presented (at least for some respect). 
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them from being factive awareness-episodes. There is no reason for thinking that if 
perceptual experience is representation then it can make us only indirectly aware of 
objects and properties. Representations are not mental objects of awareness like 
sense-data. 
Disjunctivists characterize perceptual experiences as episodes of “cognitive contact 
with the world” (McDowell 1982, 2008), as “states which reveal the world we live 
in” (McDowell 1986), “fusions with the things themselves” (Sartwell 1995), ways of 
“having the surrounding things in view” (Travis 2004). In experience “facts make 
themselves manifest” and “disclose themselves to the subject (McDowell 1998, 
2008), so our senses should be conceived of as “windows” (Campbell 2002). All 
these characterizations are interesting and emphatic metaphors, which unfortunately 
are too seldom analyzed or explained by their proponents
56
. Why could a 
representational episode not be a fusion with the world, a way of reveling or 
manifesting the world to the subject, why should our sensory apparatuses not be like 
windows opened to the world itself, if CV is true? 
Insofar as these proposals conceive themselves as incompatible with CV, it seems to 
me that a misleading notion of representation is surreptitiously at work. It is as if a 
CV-theorist had to hold that in PE we are directly conscious of representations, so 
anything else we would be conscious of (worldly objects and features) would be 
something we can be only indirectly conscious of
57
. But as I have said 
representations are not like sense-data, they are not direct objects of conscious 
awareness. Rather, they are states which (can) make us conscious of worldly objects 
and features. Far from being an interface between us and the world, perceptual 
                                                
56 About the vagueness and metaphorical status of these typical characterizations, Lowe 2000, 148ff., 
and Burge 2005, 49, rightly complain. 
57 For example, Campbell 2002, 188ff., proposes an opposition between the “relational view” of PE 
and the representationalist view, and calls the first the window-model of perceptual experience. 
Suppose you see a dagger through a pane of glass: “to hold that the only way in which it can 
happen that you see a dagger through a pane of glass is by having a representation of the glass 
appear on the glass itself, would plainly be a mistake”. It seems to me from that analogy that 
Campbell thinks of Representations as if they were sense-data,-like entities, something like 
pictures before the mind, such that we would see only the representations, the effect of things on 
us rather than the things themselves. If that was Representationalism, then no doubt it should be 
abandoned. But the Content View is not to be contrasted to the “relational view of experience” 
because it is compatible with the idea that PEs are essentially relational, as we have seen. The 
metaphor of the pane of glass is ill-conceived, because the content of a conscious perceptual state 
is not something you are aware of instead of the worldly objects and properties, in the way in 
which you would be aware of a representation of a dagger depicted on the glass instead of the real 
dagger. 
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representations are states that enable us to have the world in view. Nothing prevents 
a representational episode from being a presentational episode. 
Sensorily entertaining an exemplified content amounts to being conscious of worldly 
objects and features which exemplify that content. Contents are semantic properties 
of our conscious states, they are not the only objects of awareness we are directly 
conscious of in PE. Instead, in veridical PEs we become conscious of the perceived 
world though being in such contentful states as the PEs. When the content of a 
perceptual experience is exemplified and the experience is in the right causal contact 
to its object, the perceptual experience makes the subject 'directly' conscious of 
objects, aspects and features of that surrounding environment which is the target or 
the experience and causes it. 
The phenomenology of singularity is also accounted for by the demonstrative 
structure of perceptual content, so by the Singularity Thesis: perceptual content is de 
re, it is not general and existential, so when we attend to our PE we attend to the 
worldly objects 'directly', as object we are acquainted with which are available to us 
for comment, descriptions, attributions or properties. Of this object which is here in 
view, my PE represent this or that property. The perceptual object is there, made 
directly available by the PE. So perceptual experiences are genuine relations to the 
world, be them veridical or illusory. Only in H the phenomenology of singularity is 
misleading, because Hs introspectively seem to be de re states without being such. 
That is the moderately disjunctive CV. 
To sum up, it is not true that CV is not phenomenologically apt: the jargon of 
“revelation”, “manifestation” and “disclosure” is interesting but it does not explain 
so much about what perceptual episodes are, and how they can be presentations at 
all. All these evocative ways of pointing to the presentational nature of perceptual 
experience can be consistently embedded into the Content View. Finally, CV can 
successfully vindicate the phenomenology of transparency, immediacy and 
singularity which distinctively characterizes our perceptual experiences. 
 
2.6.3 Epistemology 
Through perceptually experiencing we come to acquire knowledge about the 
surrounding world, so we come to form true and justified empirical beliefs. But if 
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what veridical perceptions make available to us was the same as that which also 
illusions and hallucinations make available to us, not even veridical experiences 
could justify our empirical beliefs and ground perceptual knowledge. 
That is why some disjunctivists argue that the Content View is epistemologically 
inadequate, i.e. it falls short of accounting for perceptual knowledge. Instead, they 
argue, in perception the world must be though of as directly available to us, not just 
as represented into an appearance-episode which is a Common Factor sharable by 
certain illusions and hallucinations. If it was so also the justificatory power of our 
veridical experiences would be as defective as that of correspondent illusions and 
hallucinations. In addition, in that case the world itself would not give any direct 
contribution to our empirical knowledge – apart from an exterior, causal contribution 
– which is absurd. So, CV necessarily opens the way to the skeptical challenge 
therefore it must be abandoned. 
Now, the polemical target of that criticism is a purely conjunctivist version of CV, 
for which the fundamental nature of a perceptual experience is that of being nothing 
more than a mere appearance – a purely subjective state – which in certain cases is 
caused by the 'right' causes (VP), in other cases by the 'wrong' causes (I), in other 
cases by no external cause at all (H).  
Even though the version of CV I have been defending does involve the existence of a 
common factor (ex. certain functional properties, a positive phenomenal character), 
but the common factor is not taken to be the only element which is relevant for 
individuating and characterizing the states that share that factor. 
Since Cartesian Principle is not true, it is not true that two introspectively 
indiscriminable states have the same nature and are of same kind. Since Accessibility 
Principle is not true, it is not true that two introspectively indiscriminable states have 
the same Content. That is way hallucinations are not states of the same kind as 
perceptual experiences, even if their share relevant properties with the latter. Firstly, 
they do not make available to the subject what perceptual experiences make available 
to the subject. Indeed a PE makes the subject conscious of worldly particulars, and a 
veridical PE makes the subject conscious of worldly particulars and their properties. 
So a PE makes the world itself available to the subject, an H does not, even if it 
introspectively seems as if it did. So, it is not an objection to my version of CV the 
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idea that the Good case cannot make available just the same which is made available 
by the Bad case, because otherwise the Good case would justify our belief no more 
that the Bad case. On the contrary, the Good case is good exactly because it makes 
available to us the surrounding world itself with its objects and features  (by making 
us conscious of them), whilst the Bad case does not make available anything to us. 
The Bad case may be introspectively indiscriminable from the Good case, so I may 
be not in a position to know whether I am in a Good state or in a Bad state. That 
circumstance could be appealed to by a skeptic, it is true, but any other view will not 
do any better in this sense: for example, a Naïve Realist à la Martin must recognize 
that a hallucination can be subjectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception. 
Even if the veridical Case is a direct manifestation of the world with a special 
justificatory power, I could be in a second-order mistaken state in thinking that I am 
in a World-Disclosing state with an undefeasible justificatory power, when I am in 
the Bad state instead
58
.  
Thus, a moderately disjunctive version of CV entails a difference in nature between 
perceptual experiences and hallucinations, so that a given experience is not just 
individuated by its being a certain “mere appearance”: the nature of that 'appearance' 
and the elements which it factively makes available for us, are not just determined by 
its conscious character. The subject could be deeply mistaken on the nature of her 
own experience, because things can be different from the way they seem, and 
perceptual experiences are no exception. 
The justificatory power of perceptual experiences essentially rests – among other 
things – on their being genuine relations to the environment: they can be such 
relations because their content is object-dependent, so they are essentially episodes in 
which worldly particulars are made available to the subject. 
It is through perception that our empirical beliefs are originally anchored to the 
world. Not only is such an anchoring compatible with CV, but CV is also the best 
way to account for it. Only an object-dependent content can guarantee the right 
'aboutness' for a belief to originally concern the world, and the object-dependent 
content of perceptual beliefs is a conceptualization and a judgmental endorsement of 
more basic, object-dependent perceptual contents. 
                                                
58 For that line of criticism, see Wright 2008. 
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The epistemological facet of the Detachment Problem may constitute a worry for 
certain particular versions of the Content View, but a duly spelled-out version of CV 
is rather the best way to cope with it. 
 
2.6.4 Semantics 
Our scheme of descriptive identification rests on the possibility of a non-descriptive 
acquaintance with the objects we identify, characterize and know. Again, perceptual 
acquaintance with the world makes demonstrative thoughts possible in the first place. 
Johnston, Campbell, Travis and others hold that only the 'revelatory' nature of 
perceptual experience could account for our capacity of making de re judgments 
about perceived particulars, without any semantic intermediary (like representations) 
between us and those particulars. Perceptions must be making particulars available 
for immediate demonstration, in order that de re judgments about them be possible at 
all
59
. If perceptual experience did not bring such particulars into view, the world 
could not even control our empirical judgments. 
I reply to this points that all of this can and must be accepted. Although, none of 
these points speaks against the Content View as such, the Singularity Thesis is 
precisely the ingredient of the Content View that makes the view semantically apt in 
accounting for our direct reference to worldly particulars in empirical judgments. 
                                                
59 According to Travis 2004, visual experience just ‘brings the world into view’ without involving 
any representation, so that perceptual experiences are neither accurate nor inaccurate, rather we are 
right or wrong in judging that what we see is such and so. He argues that looks as visible features 
cannot index a coherent content, because many different and incompatible things can share a look 
(a pig, the half of a pig in view, a rear pig, a wax pig, a hologram of a pig, a hairless wild boar, and 
on and on). But his argument does not work, because firstly he does not distinguish low-level 
contents, so complex sensible profiles made out of SCM-properties, from thicker contents like 
[being a pig], so from what the seen object strikes you as being on the basis of your perception. 
SCM-looks are neither inconsistent nor indeterminate: something can look pinkish, moving certain 
ways, with this or that complex shape, at this or that distance, and so on. The fact that many 
different kinds of things can exhibit that objective sensible profile, is another matter: the sensible 
profile is represented determinately, and the visual representation of it is accurate or not according 
to how the perceived object is in fact. But also with respect to thick contents Travis’s argument 
does not work: by perceptual learning I can acquire a visual recognitional disposition for a certain 
type of object or for an individual, even if the visible profile I represent could be instantiated by 
other types of objects or other individuals: the fact that a robot or a hologram could have the same 
visible profile as that of my mother, does not entail that when I recognize my mother just-by-
looking my experience does not represent the seen object as being my mother but as being either 
my mother or a hologram of my mother or a robot identical to my mother or whatever else one can 
think of. Likewise, I can see x as a pig, even if my visual experience could be wrong in such a 
thick representation despite being accurate at the thin level of SCM-properties: as I have argued 
for, a very same Scenario Content is compatible with different proto-propositional contents or 
seeing-as (see Chapter IV, Section 1). 
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Such a direct reference does rest on an immediate availability of worldly particulars, 
but that immediate availability is, again, guaranteed by perceptual contents' being de 
re contents. A PE makes particulars immediately available for though because its 
Content already includes the Object which the PE represents as being such and so. 
To recall the point made above, that PE is “direct presentation of particulars” is not a 
fact that prevents PE from being a contentful state. It is exactly in having a 
(exemplified) de re content, that a PE manage to be the conscious, direct presentation 
of a particular to the subject. 
The Singularity Thesis provides the Content View with the theoretical resources for 
avoiding also the semantic facet of the Detachment Problem. Our perceptual beliefs 
have de re, particular-involving contents insofar as the perceptual episodes on which 
they are grounded (and of which they are a cognitive effect) have a particular-
involving semantic Content. 
 
2.6.5 Metaphysics 
According to the Martin-Fish Disjunctivism cum Naïve Realism, a veridical 
experience is a state of a kind which could never be instantiated when hallucinating. 
But the Content View entails that a state is fundamentally individuated by its 
representational content, and that can be shared by a veridical perception and an 
indiscriminable hallucination. The content of a state (so something essential to its 
nature and kind) is individuated independently on whether it is exemplified or not, 
i.e. on whether the state is accurate or inaccurate. So for CV, it is argued, the fact that 
a veridical experience is a genuine relation in which the subject is presented with the 
surrounding world, must be completely inessential to the nature of such a state. Its 
being a Cognitive Contact is inessential to its nature, so a VP is not a world-
involving state. CV must be a conjunctive view on which a perceptual experience is 
individuated in isolation from the world. The world is just externally added to the 
Common Factor – a merely psychological, intra-mental element – to characterize 
veridical cases, without really conditioning their fundamental nature. So the Mind is 
separated by the World, insofar as, even in the Good case, the World stands to the 
Mind in a merely causal rather than in a constitutive relation. 
Therefore the Content View, as a form of Conjunctivism, is doomed to be trapped 
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into the Detachment Problem also with respect to the metaphysics of mental states. 
This line of criticism is grounded in good reasons, but it should not be addressed to 
the Content View as such, rather to certain possible versions of it, which could be 
labeled as “purely conjunctive” versions
60
. 
According to the moderately disjunctive version of CV, it is not true that being a 
relation to mind-independent objects is inessential to the nature of the perceptual 
experience as a mental state. The 'mere appearance' which could be shared by 
veridical perceptions, illusions and hallucinations does not fix any common nature 
(DJ is right on that) although it is a common property (Radical DJ is wrong on that). 
The appearance of a genuine relation to the world does not fix anything else other 
than a subjective-introspective commonality between something which is a genuine 
relation and something which only seems to be a relation. H and PE have a different 
'nature' even if they may be subjectively mistaken one for the other. Indeed, 
hallucinations are not episodes that make us aware of worldly objects and properties. 
All that means that my version of CV does not drive an unbridgeable wedge between 
the mind and the world. The relationality of PE is essential to it, that is why the 
contrast that really matters is the one between hallucinations and perceptions (be 
them illusory or veridical). 
I have argued that, if we are to attribute a 'fundamental kind' to mental states, such 
kind-individuation must track bio-functional facts. The function of perceptual 
experience is a relational function, representing a perceived object in an accurate 
way. So, a PE is a perceptual relation with a determinate teleo-function. An H is a 
state of a type which should have had the function of representing a perceived object 
accurately. But a relational function without its proper environmental target or 
relatum, is not a function exerted inaccurately, rather it is the missed exercise of a 
function, so an H can be only the appearance of a relational function. 
That is why, within the theoretical frame of the Content View, we need to commit to 
a distinction in nature between hallucinations and perceptions, we need to go 
moderately disjunctivists. Perceptions are essentially world-involving, indeed their 
contents are de re content. The demand of Cognitive Contact is done justice to by 
                                                
60 For example, the version of CV of Crane 2006 is vulnerable to that objection, insofar as Crane 
holds that perceptual experiences are not relational states, and he contrasts – differently from me – 
intentional with relational views on perceptual experience. 
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CV, and the Detachment Problem is avoided by the moderately disjunctive treatment 
of the relation between hallucinations and perceptual experiences. They may have 
something in common, even something relevant – phenomenal character and a 
'purported' teleo-function – but that does not prevent hallucinations from being states 
of another kind, namely, non-relational states. On the contrary, for non-hallucinatory 
perceptual states, be they illusions or veridical perceptions, they are ecological 
relations rather than merely psychological states. Perceptual states cannot be 





In this Chapter I have taken into consideration the Disjunctivist (DJ) objections to 
the Content View about perceptual experience, in order to show that they are 
resistible. CV can cope with them. 
In Section 1, I have firstly introduced the core-idea of DJ, and individuated four 
kinds of reasons typically provided in favour of it and often also provided against the 
Content View. I have suggested that such reasons (phenomenological, 
epistemological, semantical, metaphysical) are all amenable to a basic theoretical 
desideratum, that of avoiding what I have called the Detachment Problem. The 
Detachment Problem is raised by any views on perceptual experience which 
conceive of PEs as mental states which can be type-individuated and characterized 
independently on their being or not being a genuine relation to the world. Perceptual 
phenomenology is presentational and apparently world-involving, a fact which 
would be best explained by PE's really being genuine relations of presentation, at 
least in the veridical cases. So, it is argued, presentations are not representations, 
since the latter are not essentially world-involving: if also veridical PE are 
                                                
61 A criticism that could be moved to Martin and to other advocates of the disjunction [hallucinations 
and illusions] vs. [veridical perceptions] is the following: when having an illusion, we normally 
represent the object accurately for some respect, and inaccurately for other respects. That means 
that the very same state (numerically the same) is a genuine 'disclosure' of the world, on the one 
side, and a state of a totally different kind, on the other side. Indeed the state makes certain 
properties manifest, but fall short of making other properties manifest, since it is not a total 
illusion. Now, can we really conceive a state that is partially of a manifestative kind and partially 
of the 'spurious' kind of those state not knowable as different from a VP? Since the perceptual 
mistake is normally partial, radical DJ is at odds in accounting for a state that is partially veridical 
(for certain properties) and partially falsidical (for other properties). Is the state as an instance of 
the Good or an instance of the Bad? Each answer is wrong, but the Good and the Bad cannot be 
mixed since the radically differ in kind, so the view cannot account for illusion. 
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representations, they are what they are independently on being genuine relation to the 
world, so the Content View entails that even veridical PEs are 'detached' from the 
world insofar as they do not essentially involve it. Secondly, if a PE is a state that 
represents a certain content which could be veridical, illusory or hallucinatory, then a 
veridical perception would make available to the subject that what also an illusion or 
a hallucination make available to the subject. If so, a veridical PE could not provide 
reasons for perceptual knowledge any more than an illusion or a hallucination. If we 
want PE to have an epistemological role in justifying our perceptual knowledge, we 
must think that veridical PEs do make available to us just certain represented 
contents but the World itself they are relation to. That is the epistemological facet of 
the Detachment Problem. 
The semantic facet of the Detachment problem goes like this: in order to have 
demonstrative thoughts about the perceived world, perceptual experience needs not 
just represent the worldly particulars but rather make them directly available for 
immediate demonstration to our perceptual thoughts, beliefs and judgements. So 
particulars needs to be immediately present, not represented. 
Also the metaphysics of mental states entailed by the Content View is conjunctivist. 
Veridical experiences are mental states individuated by their semantic properties, 
properties which can be shared by falsidical experiences. So, the relationality of 
veridical experience cannot be fundamental to kind-individuate veridical PEs, and 
veridicality must be taken as an external ingredient which does not determine the 
nature of the mental state. On the contrary, DJ-cum-NR does consider veridical 
experiences as relational states made out of the worldly elements which are 
experienced and so 'disclosed' to the subject, and deceptive experiences will be not 
states of the same kind but only states subjectively indiscriminable from states of this 
kind, i.e. from genuine manifestations. 
In Section 2 I have argued that many critical points made by DJ can and must be 
positively embedded into the Content View. Indeed I have argued for a moderately 
disjunctivist version of CV, on the following lines. Firstly, DJ is right in taking the 
Good case (veridical perception) as basic and in characterizing the Bad case by 
reference to the Good case. I have supposed that a teleo-semantic version of the 
Content View is true (without positively arguing for that version), in order to show 
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that CV is consistent with an asymmetrical and moderately disjunctivist treatment of 
the Good and the Bad. I have then argued that, within a naturalistic framework on 
mind and mental properties, the proper function of a mental state is what type-
individuates its, on the top of determining its content when the state has the function 
of perceptually representing the environment. Now, since the acquisition of a certain 
representational function is a matter of evolutionary selection of a respective 
mechanism, and the function had been originally selected because it was successful, 
a certain function so acquired is to be specified by reference to its successful 
exercises. The Bad case is essentially a failed exercise of the Good case, but not vice-
versa. Still, the Good and the Bad have the same function, so they share relevant 
properties: also the phenomenal character of PE is plausibly related to the 
representational function of that type of states, namely, to the semantic function of 
the state.  
Therefore, first of all there is a conceptual, explanatory and natural asymmetrical 
dependence of the Bad cases from the Good cases (Principle of Dependence). 
Secondly, there are relevant common properties between the Bad and the Good 
cases. They have the same function and the same conscious character, so Radical 
disjunctivism is false, besides being incompatible with the Content View. 
Nonetheless, I have suggested that the principles typically rejected by disjunctivists 
are to be rejected  also within a consistent version of the Content View. Firstly, it is 
false that if two states are subjectively indiscriminable they have the same nature, 
kind and type (Cartesian Principle). Secondly, it is false that if two experiences are 
subjectively indiscriminable then they have the same Content (Accessibility 
Principle). Thirdly, it is false that a mental event E
1





 is brought about by the same kind of proximate cause as E
2 
(Proximate Cause Principle). The moderately disjunctivist proposal is that of treating 
perceptual experiences, illusory or veridical, as essentially relational states, and to 
contrast them with hallucinatory states, which are only subjectively indiscriminable 
from the firsts, but they are not relational states. That perceptual experiences are 
relational states is entailed by the very semantic structure of their Contents. Indeed 
perceptual content is a de re content, which includes a worldly, perceived object as a 
constituent. So, it is true that two states can have same subjective character, same 
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kind of proximate causes, but different 'nature' (PE are essentially relations to the 
environment, H aren't) and also different Contents (PE's have de re contents, Hs do 
not, because their contents are not object-dependent). On that view, the phenomenal 
character of an experience is determined by the Mode together with the properties the 
PE represent something as having, but not by the Object. Indeed a H is object-less 
but can share the phenomenal character with a veridical experience, because the two 
states share the represented properties and the Mode (ex. Visual). The Content View 
must go (moderately) disjunctivist, but the right disjunction is that between 
perceptual experiences and hallucinations, not that between veridical experiences and 
deceptive experiences. 
Additionally, I have pointed to a problem which seems to arise with moderate 
disjunctivism and functional account of type-individuation of mental states and 
ascription of their contents. If mental states are type-individuated, and plausibly also 
hallucinations are tokens of types of states which have the function of accurately 
representing the environment a certain way, why should hallucinations contrasted 
with perceptual experiences, if a H and a PE share a basic teleo-function and 
functions are what type-individuate mental states in the first place? 
I have argued that such a problem can be coped with by appeal to a closer reflection 
on the very notion of relational function. A function is relational when it is supposed 
to be exercised toward a certain environmental target. Perceptual functions are 
relational par excellence: when a certain circumstance obtain, then a certain state is 
produced to represent it accurately. Something the object causing the perception is 
not represented as it is, so the function is applied to an environmental domain but it is 
unsuccessfully exerted. But if there is no target at all, no environmental domain to 
which the function is applied, then the situation is better to be described as the failure 
at exerting a relational function, rather than as an unsuccessful exercise of the 
function. Hallucinations are states which should have been relational states but are 
not such: therefore their proper function – that of representing their environmental 
target an accurate way – is not exercised at all, and a missing exercise of a relational 
function due to the absence of a relatum is neither an accurate exercise nor an 
inaccurate exercise, rather it is no exercise at all. Therefore, even if both H and VP 
would have the teleo-function of being a relation of accurate representation of a 
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certain environmental object, that function remains in H only an abstract, potential, 
targetless function. Indeed H is an appearance of representation of the world without 
really being about any worldly object. 
In fact, hallucinations rise big problems for the Content View. Firstly, what are we 
aware of when hallucinating, if not of any worldly object? Secondly, if the Content 
of PE is object-dependent (Singularity Thesis), how can objectless states like 
hallucinations be semantically evaluable at all? Any if they are not, where does come 
from the strong intuitions that they are inaccurate states? 
The two questions are deeply interwoven, still they are not to be conflated. I have 
addressed the first problem first, which is not a specific problem of the Content View 
but of any view on perception. Given the intuition that whenever we have a visual 
experience, there is something we are aware of  (Item Awareness Principle), and 
what we are aware of in H cannot be mental objects like sense-data  – because of the 
well-known problems of the sense-data theory – two more alternative are available. 
One is that is H we are aware of Meinongian objects, i.e. of particulars having the 
bizarre property of not existing. For example, when you hallucinate a pink rat you 
are aware of a genuine particular object, a rat, it is just that the rat does not exist. I 
have argued that such an alternative is to be left aside, because such a suspicious 
ontology of non-existent particulars has the same problems of the position of sense-
data (indeterminate objects, impossible objects, and so on). But above all that is a 
hopeless solution for treating H, because in hallucinating a pink rat the supposedly 
non-existent particular we are aware of is pink, on the top of being a rat. This means 
that hallucinations are a priori true, because their non-existent objects have the 
properties the H represent them as having! We wanted to do justice to the intuitive 
inaccuracy of hallucination, but our Meinongian treatment makes all H true, so 
something must be wrong with that treatment.  
The other alternative is holding that we are not aware of objects at all in H, rather we 
are aware of properties. Since no object instantiated these represented properties, we 
are aware of structured complexes of uninstantiated properties, which are to be meant 
as universals. I have pointed out that the Property-View is the best way to respect the 
Item Awareness Principle for Hs, but the view does not come without problems. It is 
not so easy, for example, to conceive of a sensuous and phenomenologically salient 
 277 
awareness of universals. Could a phenomenal character like that your PE has just 
now be determined by your awareness of universals alone? There is an issue of 
phenomenological adequacy, but no more appealing proposal is actually in view. So, 
if in H we are aware of something – if Item Awareness Principle holds – we must be 
aware of uninstantiated properties.  
Another alternative is that of dropping the Item Awareness intuition and accept that 
in H we are not aware of anything at all, neither of object nor of properties (neither 
instantiated nor uninstantiated). That is the Evans-Pautz proposal. Sensorily 
entertaining a content in a conscious experience, when the content is made out of 
represented properties does not amount to being aware of these properties. Rather, 
being in a certain conscious state puts you in a position to self-ascribe a content, but 
your PE's having a certain content – say, representing [red] and [round] – entails that 
if your PE was veridical, you would be factively aware of these instantiated 
properties. It does not entail that you must be aware anyway of these properties but 
“uninstantiated”. The Item Awareness intuition comes from a wrong way to conceive 
introspection and the relation between phenomenal character and content. For a 
representationalist version of CV (as mine, see Chapter V, Section 1) phenomenal 
properties are the properties your PE represents an object as having (given under a 
Mode, but that does not matter now). But a perceptual state with a conscious 
phenomenal character and a content, is a state you are in, it is not a state you must be 
aware of. In introspecting you may become aware of your own experience, but that is 
not an inner perception as if you “saw” your experience with its phenomenal 
character and its related content. Phenomenal character is what makes your PE a 
conscious visual state, not something you are visually conscious of. So, visually 
entertaining a content involving certain properties does not mean being aware of 
these properties, unless the PE is veridical so it really, factively makes you aware of 
these properties and of the worldly object which instantiates them. Call such a view 
on H the No Item Awareness View. 
I have not taken a definite stand toward the alternative between the Property-View 
and the No Item Awareness View. The choice between them may depend also on a 
decision about how to stipulate the “awareness-relation” to mean. 
In any case, both views do not solve the other problem I have treated successively, 
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which is that of the semantic content of hallucinatory states. I have argued that the 
Content of PE is a de re content, made out of the properties the PE represents a 
perceived object as having, plus the worldly Object the PE has both as a cause and as 
a representational target. No worldly target, to evaluability then. 
But Hs are just states with a gappy Content, because properties are represented, even 
under a Mode (for example, Visual) with its distinctive phenomenology, but no 
object is there to make the content accurate or inaccurate. So either we drop the 
Singularity Thesis, or we take it that hallucinations have a general and existential 
content, like [there is an object which is pink and is a rat] so that Hs can be 
inaccurate. Since there are good arguments for the Singularity Thesis (see Chapter 
III, Section 2), and since it is implausible that Hs and VP, having the same potential 
function, and the same phenomenal character, have one a general and existential 
content and the other a de re Content, I have argued that hallucinations, despite our 
intuitions, are not semantically evaluable, so they are neither accurate nor inaccurate 
in themselves. What is accuracy-evaluable, and inaccurate, is not the hallucination as 
such but the beliefs and perhaps the more basic belief-like states which are produced 
by hallucinations as immediate cognitive effects of them. Hs subjectively seem 
demonstrative states, so they seem to be accuracy-evaluable states. Hs are not 
accurate as they seem, but they are not inaccurate either, because they are not 
accuracy-evaluable as they seem to be in the first place. The reason why we have a 
strong intuition for their inaccuracy, is that they have false beliefs and falsidical 
cognitive stands toward the surrounding environment as their natural and immediate 
effects. 
After having treated the problem of awareness in H and the problem of hallucinatory 
contents, I have come back to the Detachment Problem introduced before, in order to 
show that the alleged problems that would weigh on the Content View can be 
satisfactorily treated within the frame of the Content View. Firstly, the 
phenomenology of singularity, actuality, immediacy and world-involving 
presentation does not speak against the Content View, nor must the Content View be 
an error theory about perceptual phenomenology. I have tried to show that the 
criticism rests on an unnecessary opposition between representation and presentation. 
When a representational state like a PE is veridical, it does make us aware of worldly 
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objects and features, so enable the subject's capacity to be presented with the world. 
When the content of a PE is exemplified and the PE is in the right causal contact with 
its target, then the accurately represented world is a presented world. The Singularity 
Thesis posits demonstrative contents, so the PE's content being originally object-
involving and world-involving fits very well with the phenomenology of actuality, 
immediacy and singularity. So the version of the Content View I have been 
articulating is phenomenologically apt. 
Similar reflection can be done about the semantic and epistemological facets of the 
Detachment Problem. It is not true that what a VP makes available to us is the same 
as what a H makes available to us (a “mere appearance” or something like that). On 
the contrary, a VP make us aware of worldly objects and features, so it makes 
available for us the surrounding world (through accurately representing it), whilst a 
H does not make available for us any worldly objects and features. So it is true that 
the justificatory power of a VP rests on it being a genuine relation to the world rather 
than a 'mere appearance', but that special power of the Good case is not in conflict 
with the Content View. I have argued on similar lines that also the semantic worries 
about genuine reference to the world are easily treated within the Content View. It is 
said that in order our perceptual beliefs and judgement to be about the perceived 
particulars, the role of perception must be that of making worldly particulars as 
immediately available for reference, as topics for empirical thought. But the 
Singularity Thesis just guarantees that our perceptual beliefs and judgements are de 
re beliefs and judgements. Indeed, our perceptual beliefs are de re beliefs because 
they are grounded on de re perceptual contents in the first place, namely, on 
particular-involving content. There are no semantical worries of Detachment 
Problem for my version of the Content View. 
From a metaphysical point of view, I have firstly argued that the only plausible kind-
individuation of mental states, at least within a naturalistic framework, must rest on 
the (teleo)functions of these states or, to put it better, of the mechanism which 
produce the type of states a given state is a token of. So, there is a 'natural' divide 
between relational states (representational functions exercised on an environmental 
target) and non-relational states like hallucinations (representational states which 
lack a target for being genuine exercise of the function their type is suppose to 
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perform). So, it is right that the kind of state I am having when veridically perceiving 
an F is a type of state that could never be instantiated when hallucinating an F. That 
is true, veridical states are genuine relations, so there is no metaphysical facet of 
Detachment Problem either. It is not true, in other words, that the Content View 
cannot give a special metaphysical status to the Good case. Nothing, not even God, 
could make a deceiving appearance of a perceptual relation (a H) into a genuine 
perceptual relation (a PE). All that being said, there are many relevant properties in 
common between veridical perceptions and hallucinations. For example their 
phenomenal character and certain teleo-functional features, so that the Radical 
Disjunctivism – for which there is nothing relevant in common between the veridical 
'manifestative' episodes and subjectively indiscriminable non-manifestative 








In what follows I very briefly state the main points I have variously argued for in this 
dissertation. 
The Content View on visual experience fits very well with ordinary ascriptions of 
visual experiences and episodes. It also vindicates our pre-theoretical intuitions about 
our experiences’ being accurate or inaccurate, about things seeming/looking a certain 
way, and so forth. 
The Content View, if duly articulated, embeds in itself the virtues of the classical 
Belief Theory without inheriting its problems (philosophical problems and 
incompatibility with experimental data). According to the global articulation of the 
Content View I have proposed: 
Perceptual content is two-layered, so it involves a ‘scenario’ level and a proto-
propositional level. 
Perceptual content is singular and de re, it is essentially an object-dependent content. 
Perceptual content is Russellian, it consists of environmental properties and relations 
represented as possessed/entertained by perceived objects, so it is not double 
(Russellian and Fregean). 
The phenomenal character of our perceptual experiences it is determined by the 
represented properties and by the Mode, but not by the perceived Object which is 
represented as having the properties (that is why it can be shared by veridical 
perceptions and objectless states like hallucinations). Such a view is an impure 
representationalism about phenomenal character: it is impure, because it entails that 
the conscious character is not determined by the content alone but also by the Mode. 
It is a form of representationalism, because the Mode is a modality-dependent way 
for a property to be represented, but that way is inseparable from the respective 
property. 
The Content View so articulated is able to successfully cope with the many facets of 
the Detachment Problem, the apparent wedge which the notions of content and of 
representation seem to drive between the Mind and the World: the Disjunctivism 
cum Naïve Realism is a bad and ultimately untenable way to address the Detachment 




the contrary, a certain version of the Content View is the only way to address it 
properly. Such a view must be a moderately disjunctivist version of the Content 
View, according to which perceptual experiences (veridical or illusory) must be told 
apart from hallucinations: the firsts are genuine relations to the surrounding world, 
which may represent it accurately or inaccurately, the seconds are not genuine 
relations so – even if they may share a positive phenomenal character with veridical 
perceptions – they have a gappy content which is, strictly-speaking, not even 
semantically evaluable. Though, hallucinations systematically produce inaccurate 
beliefs about the surrounding world, so they are inaccurate states in a derivative 
sense. 
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